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Introduction
Klaas Landsman, Ellen van Wolde and Noortje ter Berg
Das Gewebe dieser Welt ist aus Notwendigkeit und Zufall gebildet
(The fabric of reality is built from necessity and chance)
Goethe
Abstract This chapter introduces the theme of the book (i.e., the challenge of
chance) and includes brief surveys of the individual chapters.
The collapse of cohesion is one of the features that characterize chance. By sheer
accident, or so it seems, something breaks the typical regularity of the natural
world, like a comet disrupting the solar system. At a human scale, we ﬁnd examples
like unexpectedly bumping into an old friend, or losing a loved one in an accident.
Such (seemingly) random phenomena appear arbitrary; they disrupt our lives and
frustrate our human need for logic and meaning. The ensuing feelings of uncer-
tainty and apprehensiveness, in turn, trigger us to search for explanations that will
help restore order and normal patterns of cause and effect. In a word, we are
challenged by chance, and we have been so at least since antiquity.
How do we respond to such challenges? For thousands of years people have tried
to decide whether chance is a fundamental and irreducible phenomenon, i.e. certain
events are not caused—they just happen, or whether chance is merely a reflection of
our ignorance. Either way, we ﬁnd the experience of chance hard to deal with.
Humans constantly try to understand random phenomena and prefer explanations
that (re)install meaning. The question, then, is whether this search for explanation
and meaning has succeeded, or, at least, has a ﬁghting chance (sic) to succeed.
This question is more subtle than it appears, since with his revolutionary claim
that the universe is necessarily the way it is and yet has no goal, Spinoza cut the
thread connecting explanation and purpose. Even necessity was subsequently
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challenged by Darwin’s theory of evolution in the 19th century, followed by
quantum theory in the 20th, in both of which chance plays a fundamental role.
Insult following injury, from Hume and Kant onwards even the causal patterns that
permeate traditional science began to be questioned. From Aristotle to the 18th
century, natural philosophy had seen these patterns as real, our role being limited to
discovering them. Now, however, causality was claimed to be a mere by-product of
our subjective need for rules, patterns, and meaning, which eventually led Bertrand
Russell to his witticism that causality is “a relic of a bygone age, surviving, like the
monarchy, only because it is erroneously supposed to do no harm.”
The overall picture was summarized by the chilling words of Physics Nobel
Laureate and popular science writer Steven Weinberg: “The more the universe
appears comprehensible, the more it also appears pointless.” However, he imme-
diately qualiﬁed this pessimistic view (quoted from his popular account of the Big
Bang entitled The First Three Minutes) in the following way: “But if there is no
solace in the fruits of our research, there is at least some consolation in the research
itself. Men and women are not content to comfort themselves with tales of gods and
giants, or to conﬁne their thoughts to the daily affairs of life; they also build
telescopes and satellites and accelerators, and sit at their desks for endless hours
working out the meaning of the data they gather. The effort to understand the
universe is one of the very few things that lifts human life a little above the level of
farce, and gives it some of the grace of tragedy.”
This effort to understand includes the present book, which complements the
excellent interdisciplinary books on chance that have already appeared over the last
decades, both at a scholarly1 and a popular2 level. By incorporating a wide range of
historical and contemporary sciences, the studies presented here allow us to develop
a transdisciplinary perspective on chance. Thus our multidisciplinary approach, in
which a team of authors explores the issue of chance in the disciplines of philos-
ophy, mathematics, economics, game theory, statistics, physics, theology, neu-
ropsychology, genetics, ecology, history, law, and linguistics, makes us aware of
shared insights in these distinct disciplines. Let us ﬁrst give a short survey of the
articles originating in these various disciplines, to conclude with a few thoughts
towards a transdisciplinary perspective on chance.
1See, for example, G. Gigerenzer et al. (eds.), The Empire of Chance (Cambridge University Press,
1989), L. Krüger et al., The Probabilistic Revolution, Vols. 1, 2 (MIT Press, 1990), I. Hacking,
The Taming of Chance (Cambridge University Press, 1990), I. Hacking, The Emergence of
Probability (Cambridge University Press, 2nd ed. 2006), S. Kern, A Cultural History of Causality
(Princeton University Press, 2004), P. Vogt, Kontingenz und Zufall: eine Ideen- und
Begriffgeschichte (Akademie-Verlag, 2011).
2E.g., N.N. Taleb, Fooled by Randomness (Penguin, 2004), W. Poundstone, Fortune’s Formula
(HIll and Wang, 2005), K. Mainzer, Der kreative Zufall (C.H. Beck, 2007), N. Silver, The Signal
and the Noise: The Art and Science of Prediction (Penguin, 2012), D. Hand, The Improbability
Principle (Bantam Press, 2014).
2 K. Landsman et al.
1 Contents of This Book: Addressing the Challenge
The opening chapter by Lüthy and Palmerino presents a survey of 2500 years of
linguistic, philosophical, and scientiﬁc reflections on chance, coincidence, fortune,
randomness, luck and other related concepts. In particular, they show that any
concept of chance could only be understood through the alternative that the par-
ticular notion of chance attempted to exclude. And precisely because the alternative
that was to be excluded did not have a stable identity, also its anti-pole (i.e. the idea
of what chance is) had a variable meaning. For example, ‘chance’ has been opposed
to ‘fate’, ‘providence’, ‘natural laws’, ‘determinism,’ and ‘the knowledge of cau-
ses’. This heterogeneous list illustrates what a slippery concept ‘chance’ really is.
The endeavour to pin down and deﬁne concepts by contrasting with opposites is a
thread that runs throughout this book.
Perhaps the most rigorous way to analyse chance is through pure mathematics.
In Terwijn’s chapter we are told that even the best efforts in the 20th century to
capture randomness mathematically have yielded no single ‘true’ notion of ran-
domness.” Instead, a number of (equivalent) deﬁnitions have been proposed that
contextualize randomness relative to prior notions such as computability.
Accordingly, an object is deﬁned as random if its description cannot be shortened in
a computable way, that is, randomness is opposed to computable compressibility.
For example, according to this deﬁnition, despite the completely irregular distri-
bution of its inﬁnitely many digits the number π = 3.14… is not random at all, since
instead of giving all these digits we could write a short program to compute them.
On the other hand, most real numbers are random in this sense, although, curiously,
this fact cannot be proven for any given random number.
Historically, the ﬁrst application of mathematics to chance was to betting and
gambling. Unexpectedly, two centuries later similar methods turned out to lie at the
heart of game theory in economics (Weitzel and Rosenkranz). In ﬁnance, one
typically assumes complete rationality on the part of all actors. In combination with
the ‘efﬁcient market hypothesis’, this would naively seem to imply a deterministic
course of events. However, one of the remarkable predictions of game theory is that
even on these assumptions the most rational strategy is often a random mixture of a
number of alternative possibilities. Of course, this again blurs the alleged demar-
cation between determinism and chance.
Moving from probability to statistics, Goeman describes how researchers in
medical statistics and psychology look for statistical correlations between data in
the hope of revealing (publishable) evidence of a chain of cause and effect (for
example, to conclude or predict that drinking milk is healthy whereas smoking is
not). In a word, statistics is used to ‘negotiate’ chance. However, as Goeman
argues, even ignoring notorious (especially Dutch) cases of scientiﬁc fraud, esti-
mates of the unreliability of serious and published clinical studies range from 14 to
89 %, and he makes several proposals to improve this situation.
In the next chapter, Landsman’s analysis of the ‘ﬁne-tuning argument’ bridges
the gap between chance in mathematics and physics on the one hand and chance in
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philosophy and theology on the other. The laws of nature contain parameters that
are set at highly speciﬁc values for the universe to exist, and for us, humans, to exist
in it. The list of possible explanations for this ﬁne-tuning of the universe includes:
design by a deity, a ‘multi-verse’ (so as to increase the probability of the existence
of our own universe), ‘blind chance’, and ﬁnally, ‘blind necessity’. For Landsman
the latter two are the best options but he adds: “The present state of science does not
allow us to make such a choice now, and the question even arises whether science
will ever be able to make it, except perhaps philosophically.”
Contrary to common belief, theological stances from the past were not all
deterministic. In the Hebrew Bible, for instance, the book of Job describes the
dramatic alternation between fortune and misfortune in a non-deterministic way, as
Van Wolde’s analysis shows. Job is unaware that God is carrying out an experiment
because of a wager with the satan. Job tries to ﬁnd his own explanations and
reasons, but is chastised by God for obscuring “the design by words without
knowledge”. God’s dismissive words reverberate throughout the years of thinking
about chance, coincidence, luck, randomness and such concepts. Are these just
words without knowledge? Or is it our historical, spatial, and cultural perspective
that limits our type of rationality? Van Wolde also discusses this question with
respect to the ﬁrst chapter of the book of Genesis, which for many people, secular
or non-secular, is the clearest example of God initiating a cause-driven chain of
events. The question, then, is whether this is really the case.
It is a relatively small step from the ancient Near-East to the ancient Greek and
Asian worlds. Bringing both philosophical and Buddhist attitudes towards chance
into the picture, Thijssen and Loy point out that at ﬁrst, ‘luck’ (or ‘chance’) and
‘karma’ seem to be opposing concepts. If something happens because of good or
bad luck, it is beyond the agent’s control whereas, in contrast, karma, implies that
agents have a great deal of control (albeit indirect) over what happens. However,
both philosophical traditions believe that being invulnerable to bad luck depends
upon mental transformation. Western traditions focus more on coping with the
emotional effects of bad luck, whereas Eastern traditions concentrate on the agent’s
motivations. But both aim to change our experience of the world and are still
helpful today in our attempts to secure happiness in the face of adversity.
In contrast, the contemporary western approach to chance as an aspect of human
life is set in the framework of cognitive neuroscience. van Elk, Friston, and
Bekkering discuss the deeply engrained human tendency to give meaning to
coincidences. However, it turns out that not only are humans remarkably bad at
estimating chances and probabilities, they also tend to perceive a causal nexus
between situations even where there is none. In doing so, the original meaning of
coincidence is subverted, as it gestures at a perceived connection between events
even though we cannot explain the causal mechanism behind it. Following
Helmholtz, they argue that the human brain a priori constructs a predictive model of
the world, which however may be interrupted or distracted by seemingly random
events (neuroscientists typically have a deterministic world picture, so that ran-
domness is never absolute but is only experienced as such). However, it is their
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very randomness that endows such events with at least subjective explanatory
power, in that the brain may conclude that the inexplicable becomes explicable,
precisely because it was random.
Medical research has to bridge another chasm, namely from biology and genetics
to the feelings of loss when a handicapped child is born ‘by chance’ to healthy
parents. Brunner shows in his study that random genetic mutations that originate at
the molecular level can subsequently have either causal or probabilistic conse-
quences for genes, individuals, species, ecosystems, and eventually even for the
planet. The example of genetics also raises the question whether random events are
beneﬁcial or harmful: on the one hand, random errors of replication during the
formation of germ cells can cause birth defects that result in a miscarriage or severe
problems for the child and parents. On the other hand, such mutations drive evo-
lution at the level of the species, typically enabling it to improve.
Coincidence also plays a central role in De Kroon and Jongejans’ chapter. They
counter the statement that “if it’s a coincidence, it is not scientiﬁc”—a judgment
implied in the premises of the previous two chapters. They argue that if ‘chance
processes’ such as a heavy storm occur at the right place and time they could well
determine the development of ecosystems and they claim “chance is pervasive in
ecological systems.” But what is the status of chance here? Qualifying their thesis,
the authors argue that chance events typically have a deterministic origin, and that
the stochastic nature of their occurrences can often be deﬁned within a range of
predictable variation. What remains problematic is the uneasy relationship between
the scale-dependence of cause and effect with that of stochasticity.
In his chapter, Hekster tells us that because coincidences are, by deﬁnition, not
causally related, traditional historians have tended to ignore them. So when is a
coincidence just a coincidence, and when does a pattern occur? And why would a
historian be interested in ‘accidents’, ‘singular events’, or ‘contingent circum-
stances’? Surely, it has been historically decisive that Hitler survived all attempts to
kill him (except his own). Yet it is tempting to walk the path of ‘what-if history’.
But does counterfactual thinking liberate us from a false sense of historical deter-
minism or does it, instead, lead to a view of history as a series of random events?
The answer to this question depends entirely on one’s sense of the causal forces
active in history. A providentialist or determinist will see inevitabilities and
necessities. As Hekster argues, much will also depend on how one deﬁnes “the
intersection between private actions and the public world,” where “history devel-
ops.” At those intersections, coincidences might play an explanatory role, but only
if understood in terms of micro-causes related to individual human agency.
In Jansen’s article, which deals with ‘accidental harm’ under Roman law (which
has exerted a paramount influence on modern European Law), we once more
encounter the Latin word ‘casus’ with its many meanings, which signiﬁes not just
‘accident’, but also ‘misfortune’, ‘fate’, ‘adversity’ or ‘setback,’ which, in the legal
context, all amount “to an event resulting in damage which cannot be traced back to
another party’s fault.” For the Roman lawyer, however, ‘casus’ is not opposed to
necessity, but to some state of intentionality. In any case, accidents are seen as
purely negative, and the question is simply who is liable for the damage they cause.
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Yet at least in Western Europe, after WW II this principle was increasingly
countered by the tendency of governments to protect citizens from misfortune,
notably by means of a social security system—“from womb to tomb” (Churchill).
In recent years such systems seem to be weakening, partly for ﬁnancial reasons
(they are arguably becoming unaffordable), but also under the influence of liberal
tendencies to restore the individual’s responsibility for whatever happens to him or
her.
The chapter by Van Hout and Muysken starts with a rejection of complete
generative models of linguistics à la Chomsky, in which chance hardly plays any
role and at best represents a lack of knowledge. Instead, they use numerous
examples to show that chance, in the sense of language variation, plays a major role
at each of the four levels of linguistics: inter-species variability, inter-language
variability, variability in the linguistic signal within a given language, and ﬁnally
inter-individual variability. In each of these four levels, the notion of chance ﬁgures
as an inherent property; it is a probability mechanism to explain variability. They
conclude the ﬁnal chapter of this book with the comment that random variations in
language ultimately originate from the fact that human ways of expressing meaning
are far from unique.
2 A Transdisciplinary Perspective on Chance
One of the insights of this collection of articles that struck us as meaningful when
looking at chance from such diverse disciplinary perspectives is that two aspects
return in many of the contributions, namely the contextuality of chance and its role
in explanations.
Contextuality of chance is most clearly seen in scale-dependence, which is found
in many biological ecosystems (cf. De Kroon and Jongejans). What seem to be
random events at a lower level can produce stability at a higher level. For example,
seeds are dispersed at random by the wind, then may germinate into a plant or
disappear. Another example is the origins of language variation. Ideas about ran-
dom origins will be different if studied at the level of species, language in general,
different languages, or individual speakers of a given language (Van Hout and
Muysken). Random genetic mutations (Brunner) provide yet another case in point.
They originate at a molecular level but, subsequently, have causal or probabilistic
consequences for genes, individuals, species, ecosystems and thus, ultimately, for
the planet as a whole. In history, what seem to be a small-scale state of affairs (such
as the legendary beauty of Cleopatra’s nose) can have huge consequences for
nations and even epochs (Hekster). As a ﬁnal example, in economics, the (random)
individual psychology of a single investor interacts with the rather more deter-
ministic psychology of the ‘masses’, for example, during the tulip mania in 1637 or
the dotcom bubble in the 1990s (Weitzel and Rosenkranz).
Another instance of the contextuality of chance is its perspectival nature. In
mathematics (Terwijn), no absolute notion of randomness can exist, and in order to
6 K. Landsman et al.
properly deﬁne the notion, one has to specify with respect to what the supposed
random objects should be random. Thus a random object is random with respect to
a given type of deﬁnition, or class of sets. Strikingly, this view is comparable to the
theological view presented in literary form in the biblical book of Job (Van Wolde).
In the narrated divine speech out of the whirlwind, chance is related to a multifocal
view of a universe and interpreted in terms of perspective: God, reflecting on the
universe and its inhabitants, states that he does not share the perspective of the stars,
weather phenomena, or animals, and that he does not even share the moral con-
victions of human beings who only want him to share their perspective, such as
their ideas of justice. Thus what seems to be coincidental at the level of humans (or
animals and plants) may be the effect of order at a higher level.
Secondly, throughout history including contemporary science, chance has been
used both as an explanation and as the hallmark of an absence of explanation. Thus
one may wonder if these apparent antipodes are really as antithetical as they seem.
Historiography itself is a prime example. One could argue that Western philosophy
would have emerged without Plato, or that there would have been a Scientiﬁc
Revolution without Newton. But would there have been a communist Russian
Revolution without Lenin, or a Holocaust without Hitler? If not, the actual occur-
rence of these momentous events in history was eventually caused by the random
events of the births of these particular individuals. Similarly, parents with a severely
handicapped or stillborn child may feel that their misfortune has no explanation,
while their doctor may say it was caused by a random genetic defect. Appeals to God
as the instigator of certain random events play a similar role. In quantum physics it
could be claimed that radio-active atoms decay because of random events, or it could
be said that this decay cannot be explained. The Fine-Tuning Argument brings this
dual role of chance to a head, as many contemporary secular scientists seem perfectly
happy to attribute the occurrence of life to chance, whereas others regard this as the
lack of an ‘explanation’, and look elsewhere.
The reader is invited to also look at other chapters from these two angles, or
indeed from any angle he or she prefers, as chance is an inﬁnitely rich phenomenon
that will continue to fascinate humans as long they live. We hope this book will
challenge our readers as much as it did the authors.
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Conceptual and Historical Reflections
on Chance (and Related Concepts)
Christoph H. Lüthy and Carla Rita Palmerino
Abstract In everyday language, the use of such words as “chance,” “coincidence,”
“luck,” “fortune” or “randomness” strongly overlap. In fact, in some languages,
such as German, they coincide in one word (Zufall). In others, there is a clear
separation between chance events with positive connotations (e.g., “luck,” “for-
tune”) and those with bad ones (e.g., “accident,” “hazard”). In this essay, we try to
sketch the main lines of development of several of these concepts from the ancient
Greeks up to modern times, or more precisely, from Democritus and Aristotle up to
the world of quantum mechanics. Three elements emerge with particular force.
First, “chance,” “fortune,” “randomness,” etc. are in some instances invoked as
explanations of events, but in others designate events that occur without an
explanations. Second, the meaning of these terms only becomes clear when one
understands which alternatives they exclude. Finally, it is conspicuous to see how,
after a rigid exclusion of “chance” or “randomness” from the domain of scientiﬁc
explanation in the early modern period, they were restored to full glory in nine-
teenth- and twentieth-century biology and physics.
There exists a cluster of words with which we designate events that in some way or
another surprise us, either because we didn’t expect them, or because they are out of
the ordinary, or because they seem inexplicable. “Chance,” “coincidence,” “ran-
domness,” and “luck” are words that belong to this category of surprise. Sure
enough, each of them has more technical meanings, particularly when used in
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speciﬁc scientiﬁc and non-scientiﬁc contexts; take, for example, a mathematically
precise notion such as Martin-Löf randomness.1 But as far as everyday language is
concerned, our terms strongly overlap. Phrases such as “I met him by chance,” “this
was an extraordinary coincidence,” “I was randomly chosen,” or “I was lucky
enough to escape” all gesture at the fact that we couldn’t have predicted what in fact
happened to us or to someone else.
All of these terms are popular, and some are used with great frequency. And yet,
it is very difﬁcult to say what exactly they mean. It is impossible to develop either a
coherent theory or a single narrative around them. They are simply too soft con-
ceptually, too imprecise, and in fact even contradictory. Most people would
probably agree with the Enlightenment philosopher David Hume that “chance,
when strictly examined, is a mere negative word, and means not any real power
which has anywhere a being in nature.” (Hume 1748, Ch. 8.1).
One important reason why it is impossible to give a coherent account of this
negative word and of its siblings is that they are used both to offer an explanation
and to signal the lack of an explanation! Two examples will sufﬁce to demonstrate
this. In the sentence, “She didn’t know the game, and that she won was sheer luck,”
the word “luck” signals the absence of a good explanation (such as routine or skill)
to account for the fact that someone won at a game. The logic is quite different in
the sentence, “through this lucky coincidence, she managed to win the elections.”
Here, the “lucky coincidence” offers an abbreviated explanation. The “coincidence”
might refer to the fact that Harry, the obvious candidate, had suffered a stroke, and
Lucy, his opponent, had on the same day been imprisoned, so that Theodora, whose
ambitions had previously seemed implausible, could now win the elections. While
in the ﬁrst sentence the expression “sheer luck” signals the absence of a convincing
causal explanation, in the second the expression “lucky coincidence” provides the
explanation, while obviously also indicating its unforeseen nature.
Depending on the context, “chance,” “coincidence,” “randomness,” or “luck” do
not only indicate the presence or absence of a recognizable causal logic, but they
also indicate unknown probabilities, which might or might not be calculable.
“Chances are that you won’t make it,” or “If you are lucky, you might still catch
that train,” are phrases which imply an embryonic form of probabilistic reasoning of
the type “what are the odds that x happens?”
Explanation, lack thereof, or intuited probabilities: it is in this ill-deﬁned,
swampy area that the terms we are examining here are located. As a consequence,
Madam Fortune, the mythological personiﬁcation that rules over these swamps, will
necessarily also assume multiple roles. At one extreme, she will manifest herself as
a divine ﬁgure that determines our fate; reference to her will in that case provide a
coherent answer for explaining why things that for us had been unpredictable had
nevertheless happened. At the other extreme, she is as helplessly exposed to
1On different mathematical deﬁnitions of randomness, see Sebastiaan Terwijn’s chapter in this
book.
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circumstances as we are. A ﬁckle woman placed on the allegorizing weather vane
who is swept about by the winds, she is herself the object of unpredictable influ-
ences. Explaining an event through fortune characterized in the latter way amounts
to empty prattle, as it merely moves unpredictability to a different level.
Despite the elusive and contradictory explanatory value of this cluster of words,
there are interesting things than can be said about them. In our ﬁrst section, we will
ﬁrst try an etymological approach. There, we will encounter a strong presence of
falling dice as well as of lots, straws and other literally “aleatoric” objects of
gaming and decision making, including the emblematic Wheel of Fortune. But we
will also witness a strong and unresolved tension between viewing fortune and
chance as a ﬁnal (possibly divine) explanation for unexpected occurrences, and that
of depicting them as merely a higher level of unpredictable randomness.
Our main approach is, however, historical. We will in some detail survey a
number of key moments in the history of scientiﬁc (or natural philosophical)
thought, from the divine fate of Greek tragedy and the chance swerve of Epicurean
atoms through the deterministic machine world à la Descartes up to the reintro-
duction of chance and randomness in scientiﬁc theories as diverse as evolutionary
theory and quantum physics. In this section, we will see that, as a general rule,
philosophy and science have repeatedly tried to drive chance and coincidence out of
their domain—unless they could stand for a precise type of causal factor that was
required for a speciﬁc type of physical explanation—but that, time and again,
chance entered anew through the back door.
We will end by concluding that our terms are best understood ex negativo. In
order to understand what scientists or philosophers of past and present ages mean
when they attribute something to chance, coincidence, randomness or luck, it is
indispensable to understand what it is that they wish to exclude. Is it necessity, fate,
determinism, causal knowledge, regularity, high probability, or something else?
Given the obvious vagueness and contradictoriness of the connotations of our
original set of words, it will come as no surprise to see that their contraries are just
as ill-deﬁned. Still, there is a strong heuristic advantage to this exercise. Being
aware of what it is that we wish to exclude, we, the readers of this essay, will at
least have some greater clarity of what it is that we implicitly wish to afﬁrm with
our underdetermined words.
1 Etymological Prelude
1.1 Dice and Other Falling Objects
We have opened this essay with the observation that “chance,” “coincidence,”
“randomness,” and “luck” may possess precise meanings in speciﬁc scientiﬁc and
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cultural circumstances, but that in everyday language, their meanings overlap.2 Let
us now add that this overlap is much greater in one language than in another.
A particularly striking case is German (and the same is true for Dutch), where the
word “Zufall” covers all four English terms: “eine zufällige Begegnung” is “a
chance encounter”; “ein seltsamer Zufall” is translated as “a rare coincidence”; “ein
zufälliger Passant” would be “a random passer-by”; and “ein Zufallstreffer” could
be translated as “piece of good luck.” Now, Zufall, this all-encompassing German
word, is an old but literal translation of the Latin accidens: “something that falls
down” or “upon.”
Cadere, the Latin verb for “to fall,” stands in fact at the root of several of the
words that we are investigating in these pages. To begin with, there is of course the
Latin noun casus, “the fall,” a word that can describe the falling of snow, but also
everything else that literally “befalls” us, however improbable it may be. Casus is
therefore also the Latin word for “chance,” “coincidence,” or “luck.” In Italian, it
has retained precisely that meaning: “Sei per caso in città domani?” is literally “Are
you by chance in town tomorrow?” The English word “case,” which barely hides its
Latin origin, has lost most of the original signiﬁcance of casus, although the
adjective “casual” still retains some of it, as when we speak of a “casual meeting.”
What “befalls” us can be pleasant or unpleasant. Whereas Zufall is neutral in that
respect (an event can be a glücklicher or unglücklicher Zufall), the Latin accidens,
of which Zufall is a translation, has in many languages assumed a predominantly
negative connotation. While the adverb “accidentally” still means “by chance,” the
noun “accident” has clearly negative connotations. The phrase, “It was an acci-
dent,” would nowadays never be used with reference to a “fortune” won at the
lottery, but most certainly so as to explain why the window is broken. The same
negative connotation of “accident” is found in French or Italian, while in German,
the oddly inauspicious preﬁx un- in Unfall does the same trick. Signiﬁcantly, the
French word hazard, which ultimately seems to go back to an Arabic expression
relating to the throwing of dice, has had the same double fate as “accident”: while
par hazard is emotionally neutral, simply meaning “by chance,” the English
“hazard” and “hazardous”—as in “hazardous waste”—are negatively charged.
But the element of “falling” is even more pervasive than that. Just like “case,”
the English word “chance” also derives in the last instance from the Latin verb
cadere. It has however made a certain detour, deriving ultimately from cadentia,
“the ways in which the dice fall,” which later became chéance in old French. Just
like “hazard,” which—as mentioned before—may derive from an Arabic word that
also refers to the unpredictable way in which the dice fall, “chance” eventually
came to designate whatever happens without us being able to determine it. Seen in
2The following etymological paragraphs were written on the basis of the Oxford English
Dictionary, 2nd ed. (1989), s.v.; Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie, voice “Zufall”; Duden.
Deutsches Universalwörterbuch (2007), s.v.; the Online Etymological Dictionary, s.v.; as well as
various Latin, Greek, French, German and Italian dictionaries.
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this light, Julius Caesar’s famous pronouncement, “The die is cast” (alea iacta est),
which announced his much thought-over decision to cross the Rubicon and start a
civil war, would be an oddly inappropriate metaphor, given that Caesar’s was
everything but a random decision. But in fact, it appears that he spoke the phrase in
Greek, citing a line from a comedy by Menander; the Greek phrase anerrhiphtho
kubos should in fact be translated as alea iacta esto, “let the die be thrown,”
referring not to the decision taken, but instead to the uncertain outcome of the
enterprise that was to follow from it (Lewis and Short 1879, s.v. alea).
The word “coincidence” derives from the Latin verb cadere in a more visible
way. A “coincidence” takes place when things “fall” (cadere) “together” (co[n]-)
and “upon” (-in) something. The word is not ancient Latin, but medieval, and it
seems to have ﬁrst been used in astrology, where coincidentia referred to the joint
influence of multiple planets. This genealogy gives us an indication of a basic
difference between “chance” and “coincidence”: the latter requires more than one
thing to happen at the same time. In the sentence, “By chance, I was born into a rich
family,” you could not replace the ﬁrst word by “by coincidence.” Meeting your
neighbour in a far-away vacation location, by contrast, certainly qualiﬁes as a
coincidence; after all, you both had to travel there in order for your paths to cross.
These various shades of “falling” are instructive. It is certainly noteworthy how
many terms there are in English and other languages that express surprise at a
certain event or “occasion” (yet another such word) in terms of a “fall.” It is as if the
casus, “chance” or Zufall always fell down from above, literally “out of the blue.”
The proverbial “stroke of luck” would therefore have to be represented by the
gesture of a fast downward arm movement.
More indirectly, the same is true for other words, such as “luck,” which—though
related to Germanic words for happiness and fortune—seems to have entered
English as a gambling term. Like “accident,” it might originally have referred to the
way in which the dice fall, although this time with a uniquely positive connotation.
The “falling” of the casus has here been conﬁned to the descent of circumscribed
objects on the gambling table. Still, the downward direction has remained intact.
1.2 Fortuna, Wheels and the Lottery
Still related to gambling, but involving quite a different type of movement, is the
Wheel of Fortune. In late Antiquity and medieval times, this wheel was the constant
attribute of the goddess Fortuna, who was spinning it (either blindfolded, or else
maliciously watching) as men and women were literally “rising to fortune” or
descending rapidly, “losing their fortune.”Whether blind or seeing, Madam Fortune
was a puppeteer, we mortals were her puppets. But then, as we have mentioned
earlier, she was also regularly depicted in a passive role, herself the victim of
unpredictable change. A particularly striking depiction of this latter ﬁgure was
given by the Roman tragedian Pacuvius, who sketched the following portrait:
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“Philosophers proffer the view that Fortune is insane and blind and stupid, /And
they teach that she stands on a round, spherical rock: /They assert that, where
chance (fors) pushes that rock, there Fortuna will fall.”3 Once one realizes that the
word fors, “chance,” stands at the root of the name of the goddess Fortuna, one
begins to stare down the mirror cabinet of an inﬁnite regress: we get a situation in
which we humans rise and fall, tied to the Wheel of Fortune, while the goddess
herself falls from the ball on which she stands, pushed in turn by “chance” (of
which one had mistakenly expected her to be the ruler and embodiment).
In his demolition of the pantheon of pagan deities, Saint Augustine in The City of
God directs his glance also at Fortuna (Book IV, Ch. 18). Why, he asks, is Fortuna
traditionally associated with “felicity”—the Romans had initially endowed her with
a cornucopia, and had thus viewed her as an exclusively positive ﬁgure—although
we know that one can also have “bad fortune?” Such an identiﬁcation doesn’t make
any sense, according to Augustine. Further, why should Fortuna be considered a
goddess, if she can also bring about bad things? Plato tells us clearly that it is the
essence of gods to be good; “how, then, is the goddess Fortuna sometimes good and
sometimes bad? Is it perhaps that when she is bad, she is not a goddess, but is
suddenly transformed into a malignant demon?” (Augustine 1998, 164). And
ﬁnally, what should we make of the fact that the name of the goddess is also derived
from the word fortuito, that is, “by accident?” How can she be a goddess if what we
ascribe to her happened accidentally? In a few lines, Augustine exposes all the
contradictions that reside in the concept of a deiﬁed principle of randomness, and all
the inner tensions between a principle that should account at the same time for luck,
happiness, destiny, the vicissitudes of life and personal success.
It is surprising to see that despite Saint Augustine’s debunking, Fortuna was
highly popular in the Middle Ages. In the meantime, however, her cornucopia had
deﬁnitely disappeared for the wheel (Vogt 2011). Fortuna had changed from the
positive ﬁgure ridiculed by Augustine into a highly ambivalent one. This may come
as a surprise, as the idea of the random rise and fall of people (and peoples) is of
course profoundly un-Christian, as it contradicts the notion of providence. And yet,
it survived, and in fact thrived, in the hands of medieval Christianity. Dante
Alighieri eulogizes Fortuna as nothing less than the ﬁrst creature of God, who rules
over the world and makes it spin about according to her occult whims, which are
ominously invisible “like the serpent in the grass.” With respect to God and to
humans, she is “general servant and leader,” respectively (Divina Commedia,
“Inferno,” VII.78–84).
It has been argued that the popularity of Fortuna in the Middle Ages is due to the
late Roman author Boethius, in whose Consolation of Philosophy Fortuna makes a
striking appearance, declaring:
3Pacuvius, ed. O. Ribbeck (1897), vol. 1, vv. 365–375: “Fortunam insanam esse et caecam et
brutam perhibent philosophi,/ Saxoque instare in globoso praedicant volubili:/ Id quo saxum
inpulerit fors,/ eo cadere Fortunam autumant.”
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This is my art, this the game I never cease to play. I turn the wheel that spins. I delight to
see the high come down and the low ascend. Mount up, if you wish, but only on condition
that you will not think it a hardship to come down when the rules of my game [ratio ludicri
mei] require it (Boethius 1897, II.2p, trans. modiﬁed).
Curiously, while Fortuna goes about her pagan business of causing the rise and
fall of people, she seems (at least in this passage), to give us the choice between
participating in the “ludicrous game” or abstaining from it. In fact, she quickly
recalls to her listener the brutal fall of the Lydian king Croesus. The theme of the
fall of kings—and here we are back with the previous etymology, of the casus and
the “accident”—was popular throughout the Middle Ages. The Carmina Burana
warns the powerful of the inevitable turning of the wheel: “too high up/ sits the king
at the peak/ let him beware of ruin!”4 In fact, a particularly popular image was that
of four kings attached to a wheel, with one ascending (regnabo, “I will rule”), one
on top (regno, “I rule”), one dethroned and descending (regnavi, “I have ruled”),
and one at the bottom (sum sine regno, “I have no kingdom”).
However, Boethius’ Fortuna does not only seem to give us the choice between
taking a ride on her wheel or leaving it, but Boethius himself, in Stoic fashion,
recommends that we should seek our tranquillity irrespective of the vicissitudes
afflicting our personal lives. Moreover, he suggests that there is a higher, maybe
Platonic or else providentially Christian level at which it all makes sense. It has in
fact been suggested that the ubiquitous medieval representations of Fortuna should
be interpreted through the influence of Boethius (Vollmer 2009). The advantage of
this explanation is that it helps us explain how it was possible that the pagan Wheel
of Fortune could end up deﬁning the shape and iconographical program of cathedral
roses and church interiors (see Fig. 1).
An entirely demythologized, contemporary version of the Wheel of Fortune is
the lottery wheel, which is inscribed by numbers corresponding to lottery tickets
and a pointer pointing to the rim. The wheel is spun, and when it comes to a
standstill, the ticket carrying the number corresponding to the number indicated by
the pointer wins. With this device, we have arrived at our last set of terms.
Originally, the “lot” was any object—a piece of straw, a chip of wood with a name
on it, or, as in so many earlier examples, a die—that was used to determine
someone’s share, for example in an inheritance. A “lot” of land (and even the trivial
“parking lot”) still refer to that process of “random allotment” as does the phrase,
“what falls to a person by lot.” But when we recall the ﬁgure of Fortuna spinning
her wheel, or deciding the outcome of the draw or the casting of dice, we will
understand how “lot” and “lottery” could also come to refer to any “(ill-)fortune”
that life has in store for us. The village lottery may assign a lot of land to us; the
phrase “It was my lot to be born poor” refers instead to a lottery in which I was not
able to buy even my own ticket.
4Carmina burana (1974), song 16: “nimis exaltatus / rex sedet in vertice - / caveat ruinam!”.
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1.3 Randomness and Reckoning with Fortune
With the “randomness” of the lottery’s decision-making process, we have arrived at
the last word in our etymological survey. There was once an Old Frankish word,
*rant, cognate to the English “running,” which eventually became randir, “to run
fast,” in Old French, as well as randon, meaning “rush” and “disorder.” From the
French, it migrated to English, where it became “at random,” which originally
meant, “at great speed” and hence “without order” and “haphazardly.” By 1650, it
had acquired one of its current meanings, by referring to events that took place
“without deﬁnite aim or purpose.” Originally, it was actor-bound: an individual was
said to act “randomly,” that is, without purpose, for example by pointing at
Fig. 1 Fortuna (1372) depicted on the floor of the Cathedral of Siena. Is the ruler on his throne
(regno) about to fall (regnavi), or is he rather, solidly enthroned, supervising the ascent and
descent of the other ﬁgures? Strikingly enough, the four philosophers in the corners are all pagan:
Euripides (“I have told you, son, to seek fortune through labours,” from Elektra); Seneca (“A great
fortune is a great slavery,” from De consolatione); Aristotle (“Great fortune makes men more
petulant,” from the Politics); and Epictetus (“Glory not in the gifts of fortune, but in the goods of
the souls,” from the Enchiridion). Their advise has no providential, Christian, or eschatological
overtones, but combines classical prudentialism with the topos of virtus vincit fortunam
(“virtue/determination wins over fortune”): don’t seek fortune, but if you do, seek it through hard
labour; but be beware that it will negatively affect your character; and anyway, “it’s what’s inside
that counts.”
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someone while blindfolded. The use of the word as an adjective, as well as the
identiﬁcation of “chance events” with “random events,” seem to be of more recent
date. Of even more recent date are the mathematical theories of randomness, which
are an extension of classical probability theory, or the quantum-mechanical
randomizers.
These recent developments are interesting from a philosophical perspective. For
once one equates randomness with chance, and once chance becomes calculable, as
it did over the past three and a half centuries thanks to the mathematical determi-
nation of probability, one somehow also domesticates chance, randomness, and
possibly even one’s lot. Looking at a set of global statistics, one may now state:
“The odds were high that I would be born poor.” In Boethius’ Consolation (II.3p),
we have Fortune asking deﬁantly: “Do you wish to count out the score with
Fortune?” (Visne igitur cum fortuna calculum ponere?). Through the mathemati-
zation of probability, we are attempting to do just that: “Reckon with fortune.” As
several chapters in this book document, this reckoning has taken on high forms of
abstraction in various disciplines.
And yet, despite all domestication of chance, luck, fortune, coincidence and
randomness in the specialized disciplines, the old meanings have not disappeared.
Fortuna may no longer be a deity, but the surprise, the rage, the joy, and the
bewilderment that something particular happened to us, of all people, that it had to
happen just then and there, has not vanished. Nor have most of the terms and
expressions that the Greeks, the Romans and our medieval ancestors used.
Did, then, our etymological exercise tell us anything useful? If we had hoped for
a conceptual convergence between the words investigated here, then we were
(predictably) deluded. Between the goddess who spins the wheel, the blind and
hasty rush forward, life’s lottery, the ubiquitous falling of dice, and all other
unpredictable coincidences and accidents, there is little that amounts to any over-
arching notion of how we must “account” for the unforeseen events in life, nature or
history. The divergent uses of the words we investigated, and even of single words,
is however illuminating. To remind ourselves of the most dramatically ambivalent
word, “fortune,” we have seen that Fortuna could appear as a goddess of “good
fortune,” with her cornucopia at the ready; she could be a (still personiﬁed)
semi-independent cosmic force governing over chance, coincidence and random-
ness; she could be a way of life that one could choose to follow or else ignore; but
“fortune” could also be the well-deserved result of hard work, the danger being,
however, that it might corrupt our character.
To be aware of the internal tensions between the various sub-meanings of the
words seems to us an important step towards a comprehension of what these words
can possibly be intended to achieve. But their full complexity only becomes
apparent once one places them into the philosophical and scientiﬁc context in which
their role in the causal nexus of things was examined. This is what needs to be done
next.
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2 History
2.1 Greek Origins
Let us therefore turn to an examination of a number of key moments in the intel-
lectual—that is: philosophical and scientiﬁc—evolution that our words have
undergone, and the explanatory (or causal) role that was attributed or denied to
them. We must start with ancient Greece, because it is there that our current
terminology takes its origin. It is also there that we ﬁnd, for the ﬁrst time in Western
intellectual history, a debate about the status of unexpected events and the way we
must deal with them conceptually.
We have begun our essay with the element of surprise that characterizes the
various terms in question. In ancient Greece, the word that designated an unexpected
turn of events in a human life or in the observed natural world was tuchê. In
comedies, tragedies and in works of historiography, tuchê is invoked to designate
such unforeseen events, which may derive from the gods or from mere fortune [tas
tôn theôn tuchaskai to chreôn (Euripides, Hercules Furens 309–11)]. If from the
gods, tuchê is of course providential, which means that what to us may seem “by
chance,” is instead “by necessity” or “will” at a higher, divine, level. The existence
of such a two-tiered logic explains why Sophocles can speak, in what at ﬁrst looks
like an oxymoron, of “necessary chance” (anankaia tuchê, Ajax 485, 803), a com-
bination of words that in other texts is rendered as “fate” (moira, potmos). But while
the older tragedians Aeschylus and Sophocles seem to have equated tuchê with fate,
their younger colleague Euripides was less inclined to attribute all unforeseen events
to a providential plan (Dudley 2012, 137). In Hecuba 488–491, a certain Talthybius
wonders, for example, whether it is the gods or rather chance (tuchê) that rule over
human affairs, thereby clearly separating the two (Lawrence 2013).
2.2 Aristotle
Distinctions and reflections that in literary works were merely adumbrated were
made most fully explicit in that potent thinker whom Dante called “the master of
those who know,” namely Aristotle, whose philosophical and scientiﬁc teachings
were to deﬁne Western university education until the end of the seventeenth cen-
tury. In various of his works, we ﬁnd Aristotle reflecting on the possible role that
chance might play in the natural world and in human affairs. Always an acute
analyst of terminology, he carefully examined various types of chance, distin-
guishing between tuchê, on the one hand, and such related concepts as to
automaton (a type of spontaneity), and eutuchia (which might be translated as
“good fortune”).
Aristotle’s most extensive treatment of chance is found in book 2 of his Physics.
As is often the case, Aristotle starts his analysis with an historical excursus.
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Previous philosophers have failed to give an account of chance, he tells us, which is
all the more surprising as some of them have attributed to chance a fundamental
role in their physical systems (Physics 195b30–196b9). Aristotle here thinks of
Empedocles’ cosmogony, which relies on air that moves upwards by chance and
speaks of the haphazard origin of limbs of animals; but he thinks even more clearly
of Democritus, who maintains that “the cosmic order came by chance […], whereas
neither animals nor plants are, or come to be, by chance, but are all caused by
Nature or Mind or what else.” Aristotle laughs this idea out of court, arguing thus:
But if this really were so, that very fact ought to give us pause and convince us that the
matter needs investigation. For, in addition to the inherently paradoxical nature of such an
assertion, we may note that it is exactly in the movements of the heavenly bodies that we
never observe what we call casual or accidental variations, whereas in all that these people
tell us is exempt from chance such things are common. Of course it ought to be just the
other way (Aristotle 1957, 196a25–196b5).
Famously, Aristotle inverts the order: for him, “regular and customary succes-
sions,” such as those observed in the heavenly motions, must happen by necessity
(ex anankês), whereas the terrestrial realm is deﬁned by a great degree of ran-
domness. Regular necessity is observed throughout the superlunary sphere, where
the sun, the planets and the stars are located and which is deﬁned by one single
element, ether, and by constant, circular movements. By contrast, in the sublunary
sphere, where the four elements constantly mix and unmix, objects continuously
come about and perish again. Here, where we ﬁnd irregularity and surprising
events, we may truly speak of products of chance (hê tuchê kai to automaton). Let
us here remember that this stark Aristotelian opposition between two cosmological
domains, each with its distinct ontological status and its own set of physical laws,
was to break down only in the aftermath of Copernicus and Kepler in the course of
the seventeenth century.
Aristotle admits that, in our sublunary domain of permanent change, “what we
call luck or chance corresponds to some reality” (Aristotle 1957, 196b15–17). At
the same time, he rejects the suggestion that tuchê should be viewed as a speciﬁc
type of causality. Instead, chance events should be regarded as accidental, that is to
say, concomitant effects of a deﬁnite cause: “Tuchê,” Aristotle writes in his Physics,
“is a cause only accidentally (kata symbebêkos)” (ibid., 197a14f). But what does it
mean to be an accidental cause? In his Metaphysics, Aristotle deﬁnes “accident” as
that which happens “neither necessarily, nor usually,” adding that there is “no
deﬁnite cause for an accident, but only a chance, i.e., indeﬁnite cause (aoriston)”
(Aristotle 1933, 1025a15). If a man goes to the market and “accidentally” meets his
debtor, “the reason of his meeting him was that the wanted to go marketing; and so
too in all other cases when we allege chance as the cause, there is always some
other cause to be found” (Aristotle 1957, 196a1–8). Here, then, we have the typical
surprise moment mentioned in our introduction. The man may have wanted to buy
cheese and vegetables, but, “as it happened,” he encountered his debtor. That the
verb sumbainô, of which symbebêkos (“accident”) is the past participle, literally
means “to walk together,” is most suitable for this speciﬁc Aristotelian example, as
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it provides a quite visual model for what we have earlier deﬁned as a “coincidence”:
two men walking, each steered by his own intentions, to the market, but “acci-
dentally” ending up in each other’s company.
In order to make sense of Aristotle’s distinctions, one has to remember that his
entire universe, and the causality that is active in it, is everywhere purposeful and
goal-driven, so that the explanations he offers tend to be teleological. In such a
universe, tuchê is an “accident” in the sense that it designates those events that
eschew all purposes. In the natural world, a typical class of “accidents” is consti-
tuted by monstrous births, which also include female babies and which may be
regarded as “failures of purpose in Nature” (Aristotle 1957, 199b4), in the sense
that accidental factors hindered the natural development of the seed.5
Being “characteristic of the perishable things of the earth” (Aristotle 1937,
641b15), chance manifests itself above all in the domains of biology and of human
action. Sometimes, Aristotle in fact wishes to limit the scope of tuchê even further,
restricting it to rational behaviour. “Neither inanimate things nor brute beasts nor
infants can ever accomplish anything by tuchê, since they exercise no deliberate
choice.” By contrast, the larger category, automaton, describes cases in which “any
causal agency incidentally produces a signiﬁcant result outside its aim” (Aristotle
1957, 197b19–23). Spontaneous generation, in which the presence of warmth can
bring about worms or insects in a heap of dung or a warm puddle, is a case in which
non-rational agents bring about a meaningful product by a sheer concurrence of
circumstances.
If taken in this restrictive meaning, tuchê becomes the object of ethical reflec-
tion. In his Eudemian Ethics, when discussing the cause and the ethical bearing of
good luck (eutuchia), Aristotle formulates an interesting paradox: we tend to call
those persons “fortunate” (eutuchês) who “without the aid of reason are usually
successful” (Aristotle 1935, 1247b27–28). This is however in contradiction with the
accepted deﬁnition of chance or fortune (tuchê), which implies that something
happens neither always nor even regularly (ibid., 1247a31–35). In order to resolve
this paradox, Aristotle distinguishes between two types of fortune. The ﬁrst is due to
the aid of a god, whereas the second type of fortune is that of persons who are
successful because they instinctively choose for the right course of action. Both
sorts of good fortune are “irrational,” in the sense that they are not obtained through
our conscious choice, but the ﬁrst is continuous, whereas the second is incidental
(ibid., 1248b5–10).
What Aristotle’s sundry ethical, physical and biological reflections on chance
have in common is an emphasis on the inherent lack of reflection, premeditation or, in
short, rationality. Good luck (eutuchia), chance (tuchê) and spontaneity (automaton)
are all paralogos, unaccountable by reason, either because there is no purpose
5Both in Physics and in the Generation of Animals, monsters are regarded as “chance substances”;
see Dudley 2012, 171, 175.
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involved (as in the case of worms being spontaneously generated in a heap of dung),
or because the result of an action was not intended (as the man meeting his debtor on
the market square) (Physics, 197a10, 18–20 and Eudemian Ethics, 127a33–38). It is
precisely their undirected, irregular and contingent nature that also renders chance
events “unscientiﬁc.” For Aristotle, “science” (episteme) designates a psychological
state in which the mind possesses knowledge with regard to the causes of an event. In
the case of accidental events, the cause is however “unrecognizable,” “indeﬁnite” and
“irrational” (paralogos) (Physics, 197a8–35).
2.3 The Ancient Atomists
So much for Aristotle himself. Let us however return to the atomists he criticized
for what he took to be a misguided cosmogony and a misleading causal theory. We
recall from above that Aristotle ridiculed Democritus speciﬁcally for suggesting that
the cosmic order was the product of chance. Interestingly, the doxographer
Diogenes Laertius provides a different version of Democritus’ convictions,
ascribing to him the view that “everything happens according to necessity; for the
cause of the coming-into-being of all things is the whirl [that is, the atomic vortex
which gave origin to the world], which he calls necessity” (Laertius 1925, IX, 45).
Similarly, the only extant fragment of Leucippus, who may have been the inventor
of the concept of atom, reads: “Nothing exists at random (matên), but everything for
a reason (logos) and by necessity (anankê)” (Kirk et al. 1983, 420).
Why should Aristotle then have attributed to Democritus the view that the world
came about by chance (apo tautomatou)? According to Edmunds’ influential
interpretation, he did so to stress the purposeless character of the atomistic cosmos
(Edmunds 1972).6 We recall from above that according to Aristotle’s own deﬁni-
tion, automaton “means an occurrence that is in itself to no purpose” (Physics
197b25–30). In other words, what to Leucippus and Democritus was “necessary”
and hence the contrary of “chance” would for Aristotle have been its very opposite,
namely a blind and therefore unguided and random event. Put differently, what was
a deterministic “necessity” to one philosopher was mere “chance” to the other. This
is a typical example for the phenomenon that will be discussed in our conclusion:
the terms with which we are engaging in this chapter can only be understood if one
knows the alternative terms they wish to rule out.
Indeed, as A. A. Long has perceptively pointed out, chance (tuchê) is incom-
patible with necessity (anankê) only if the former is taken to indicate events that are
the result of sheer contingency and indeterminacy (Long 1977, 67–68). This
observation takes us to Epicurus, the ﬁrst philosopher to have explicitly introduced
6A similar point is made by Cherniss (1935), 248–49, and Long (1977), 67.
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an element of contingency and indeterminacy into the universe. Epicurus in fact
criticized previous natural philosophers, including the atomists he followed in his
physics, for attributing the origin of the cosmos to necessity and for making man the
slave of destiny (Epicurus 1931, Letter to Pythocles, 89–90; Letter to Menoeceus,
131, 133, 134). He himself hoped to avoid absolute determinism by postulating a
parenklisis, a spontaneous swerve that atoms suddenly perform, deviating from
their rectilinear parallel paths and intermingling as a consequence of these devia-
tions. In his own rendition of Epicurus’ theory, Lucretius explained how this
swerve, which he called clinamen, was responsible for breaking “the bonds of fate
and preventing one cause from following from another from inﬁnity” (Lucretius
1924, 2.251).
According to Cicero, the main function of Epicurus’ clinamen was that of
introducing freedom into a universe that would otherwise be fully deﬁned by
necessity:
The reason why Epicurus brought in this theory was his fear lest, if the atom were always
carried along by the natural and necessary force of gravity, we should have no freedom
whatever, since the movement of the mind was controlled by the movement of the atom.
The author of the atomic theory, Democritus, preferred to accept the view that all events are
caused by necessity, rather than to deprive the atoms of their natural motions (Cicero 1941,
On Fate, 23).
While Cicero pitted necessity against freedom, Epicurus himself distinguished
between three concepts, namely “necessity,” “chance” and “freedom”:
With us lies the chief power in determining events, some of which happen by necessity and
some by chance, and some are within our control; for while necessity cannot be called to
account, (…) chance is inconstant, but that which is in our control is subject to no master,
and to it are naturally attached praise and blame (Epicurus 1926, Letter to Menoeceus 133).
In other words, from the ethical point of view, we cannot be blamed for actions
that are due to necessity or chance, as both types defy our control. Only those
actions that we control are free. But are we in control of the swerves of the atoms in
us? How convincing is Lucretius’ statement—which incidentally corroborates
Cicero’s analysis of the raison d’être of the swerve—that “what keeps the mind
itself from having necessity within it in all actions (…) is the minute swerving of the
ﬁrst beginnings at no ﬁxed place and at no ﬁxed time?” (Lucretius 1947, 2: 288–
293). In fact, the debate on whether or not the swerve, which might look like the
epitome of randomness, was really meant to offer a plausible account of free will,
continues to this day. Scholars presuming Epicurean free will to have been syn-
onymous with “conscious chance” (Bailey in Lucretius 1947, 3: 1287) are opposed
by others who think that Epicurean freedom “ﬁts random actions, rather than
deliberate and purposive ones” (Furley 1967, 232–233). According to Furley’s
interpretation, the point of the swerve is merely to allow for a discontinuity in an
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otherwise deterministic succession of causes, and thereby to assure that the source
of a human action can be traced in the agent himself and not in external factors. It
does not, however, account for anything like a conscious free action.7
If we return our glance to Cicero’s analysis of Epicurus, we will ﬁnd that he
opposes Epicurus’ worldview not only to that of the older atomist Democritus, but
also to that of the Stoic philosopher Chrysippus, according to whom “all things
happen by fate and spring from eternal causes governing future events” (Cicero
1941, On Fate, 21). Indeed, it would seem that the Greek Stoics held that there
exists a rational organizing principle that is found in all things in the world and
which determines the course of all events. It is obvious that such a view “leaves no
room for alternative developments of the world. There is exactly one course of
events (and states) that is in accordance with the rational universal nature” (Bobzien
1998, 31).
While this type of strict determinism might have been compatible with
Democritean atomism, it clearly wasn’t with Epicurus’. From Plutarch’s On Stoic
Self-Contradictions, we know that Chrysippus derided the argument according to
which the soul “takes a swerve of itself and resolves the perplexity.” He replied
“that the uncaused is altogether non-existent,” and warned that “obscure causes
insinuate themselves” whenever events appear to happen by chance. In the context
of the etymological link between the words “chance” and “hazard” and the
throwing of dice, to which we have drawn attention in our previous section, it is
interesting to ﬁnd Chrysippus insisting that dice and scales “cannot fall or incline
now one way and now another without the occurrence of some cause” (Plutarch
1976, On Stoic Self-Contradictions 1045). The fact that we do not know how the
dice will fall does not mean that there is no cause behind their speciﬁc fall.
2.4 On Divination and Providence
Let us conclude our section on Antiquity by listening once more to Cicero, and
more speciﬁcally to his attack on divination, the power to foretell the future. His
critique contains important reflections on chance, necessity and the knowledge of
the course of nature. As the Latin word divinatio clearly indicates, the seer’s
knowledge of the future is “divinely inspired.” This meaning implies that you can
only know the future, ﬁrst, if a god has predetermined it, and secondly, if this god
7Furley’s interpretation was challenged by Fowler (1983) and Purinton (1999), who attribute to
Epicurus and Lucretius the view that random swerves are indeed the cause of all voluntary actions.
Bobzien (2000) agrees with Furley that the swerve is not responsible for every voluntary action,
while O’Keefe (2005) 17, goes as far as to deny that the swerve plays any role in the production of
action. While the above-mentioned interpretations are concerned with upward causation (from the
atomic to the macroscopic level), David Sedley believes that Epicurus’ denial of Democritus’
determinism “involves an express assertion of downward causation”: volitions are not influenced
by, but instead influence atoms’ motion (Sedley 1988, 318).
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has also revealed his or her plans to the seer. At some point in his De divinatione,
Cicero criticizes speciﬁcally the view that “divination is the foreknowledge and
foretelling of events considered as happening by chance [res fortuitae],” that is to
say, of things which, “for though they happen frequently they do not happen
always” (Cicero 1923, On Divination 2.5.13–14). Cicero retorts that physicians,
pilots or military men continuously make predictions concerning future events,
which are however based on science, experience, skill and wisdom. But in the
absence of such professional knowledge, can there be
any foreknowledge of things for whose happening no reason exists? For we do not apply
the words “chance,” “luck,” “accident,” or “casualty” except to an event which has so
occurred or happened that it either might not have occurred at all, or might have occurred in
any other way. How, then, is it possible to foresee and to predict an event that happens at
random, as the result of blind accident, or of unstable chance? (Ibid., 2.5.15).
Indeed—Cicero concludes—the very idea of foretelling what is random is
self-contradictory! For this reason,
it is not in the power even of God himself to know what event is going to happen
accidentally and by chance [casu et fortuito]. For if He knows, then the event is certain to
happen; but if it is certain to happen, chance [fortuna] does not exist. And yet chance does
exist, therefore there is no foreknowledge of things that happen by chance (ibid., II.7.18).
Cicero’s reflections on divine foreknowledge provide us with a perfect bridge to
the Christian Middle Ages, in which the divine predicates of omniscience and
omnipotence forced the discussion about the status of chance, coincidence, fortune
and luck in new directions, although the logical possibilities had already been
deﬁned by Greek and Latin philosophers. Irrespective of whether ancient philos-
ophy was the cradle of Christianity or rather an obstacle to be overcome, we cannot
understand medieval discussions without Greek philosophy.
It is evident that in a cosmos created and ruled over by an eternal, omniscient,
and omnipotent God, mere chance can have no place. Whatever happens must have
been known to God even before it happened; whether that implies that God also
willed it, is a different and theologically difﬁcult question. Is all “pro-vidence,” in
the sense of “fore-seeing,” also “providence” in the sense of “benevolent guid-
ance?” God must have foreseen the Fall of Adam and Eve; but it presumably was
not an intended part of his plan.
However one may wish to settle this tricky issue, for Saint Augustine, the most
influential of the Latin Church Fathers, it was obvious that there existed a personal
type of divine providence, which implied that whatever happened, was—at least for
God, the source of all providence—a rational event. This meant that no event was
ultimately fortuitous and without reason: “those things that seem fortuitous come
about by hidden forces” (Augustine 1841, Quaestiones in Heptateuchum, I. 91),
just as generally, “the world is not governed by blind fate, but by the providence of
a highest God, just as the Platonists also maintain” (Augustine 1998, 9.13.2). For
most Christian authors, these two ideas were indeed linked, and necessarily so
because of the divine predicates. On the one hand, there was God’s omniscience,
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which left no room for mere chance in the sense of unpredictability—we have seen
that Cicero had already pointed to this logical incompatibility even before the
advent of Christianity. On the other hand, there was God’s omnipotence, which
implied that whatever happened, had to happen, and since God was benevolent,
whatever happened, also had a positively providential aspect to it—an idea that
Saint Augustine attributes to the Platonists.
2.5 Boethius
But if God is omnipotent and benevolent, and if everything is providential, how
should we then explain the presence of evil in this world? This so-called problem of
theodicy was addressed by another early Christian author, Boethius, whom we have
encountered earlier in our essay, and who tried to correlate the three causal terms of
“necessity,” “free will” and “chance.” Against the Stoics, Boethius insisted on the
existence of a free will and argued against determinism; and against the Epicureans,
he defended a plurality of causes, and rejected atomic monocausalism
(Boethius 1891). While developing his solution to this problem, he drew a dis-
tinction between “divine providence” and “fate.” These two terms, he explained,
referred to the same thing, but did so from a different perspective:
The mind of God has set up a plan for the multitude of events. When this plan is thought of
as in the purity of God’s understanding, it is called Providence, and when it is thought of
with reference to all things, whose motions and order it controls, it is called by the name the
ancients gave it, Fate. […] Providence includes all things at the same time, however diverse
or inﬁnite, while Fate controls the motion of different individual things in different places
and in different times. So this unfolding of the plan in time when brought together as a
uniﬁed whole in the foresight of God’s mind is Providence; and the same uniﬁed whole
when dissolved and unfolded in the course of time is Fate…. (Boethius 2000, IV.6p).
Boethius applies a similar perspectival approach to the existence of chance. In a
world governed by providence, there was of course no space for chance; still, there
was a sense in which something could be said to “happen by chance”:
Whenever anything is done for one reason, but something other than what was intended
happens on account of other reasons, it is called chance [casus]. […] Therefore, we can
deﬁne chance as an unexpected event brought about by a concurrence of causes which had
other purposes in view. These causes come together because of that order which proceeds
from inevitable connection of things, the order which flows from the source which is
Providence and which disposes all things, each in its proper time and place (Boethius 2000,
V.1p).
It is no coincidence that in the same chapter from which these quotes are drawn,
Boethius refers to Aristotle’s Physics. Indeed, Aristotle’s tuchê and Boethius’ casus
have in common that they are the non-intended by-products of intended actions. We
have earlier encountered Aristotle’s example of the man who went to the market
and there happened to encounter his debtor. Boethius’ main example is also taken
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from Aristotle (Metaphysics V, 30), and is that of a man who goes to his ﬁeld to
plant a tree and happens to ﬁnd a treasure. But what to us seems mere chance, is in
reality only a concurrence (concursus) of causally accountable circumstances. After
all, someone must have buried the gold in the ﬁeld in the ﬁrst place. For Boethius,
the concept of casus is thus not only incompatible with providence, but also with
the causal structure of the world. A real casus would not only be inexplicable, but
would be uncaused, or, in Boethius’ terms, ex nihilo. This identiﬁcation of casus
with ex nihilo events is not taken from Aristotle, but might be indicative of
Boethius’ debt to Stoic determinism.
2.6 Late Medieval Views on Chance
In fact, even when they read and used Aristotle on the issue of chance, Christian
authors were generally driven by different concerns than their admired Greek
preceptor. Several centuries after Boethius, for example, Peter Abelard deﬁned
“chance as an unexpected event” (inopinatus eventus). He insisted that what is to
blame is not the event itself, but only our own lack of understanding: “the word
‘chance’ … denotes always ignorance” (Peter Abelard 1919, 426). The common
medieval view that “chance” is always “in us, not in the things,” agrees with
Aristotle’s view that chance does indeed denote ignorance, in the sense that it deﬁes
our scientiﬁc grasp of the underlying causal pattern, but it deviates from Aristotle in
correlating this ignorance with the rare, irregular and indeed “casual” nature of a
given event.
Apart from the obvious impact of a monotheistic conception of an all-powerful
God running the universe on discussions regarding chance, fortune and accident,
when one examines the later Middle Ages, one cannot but be impressed by the
acuity with which these and related words were examined. Ever since the seven-
teenth century, the so-called scholastics have been derided because of the bookish
nature of their knowledge claims and their delight in hair-splitting controversies.
But precisely their trust in the authority of the authors of the books they commented
on and their attention to even the most abstruse interpretative possibilities implied
that they were good readers and careful observers of language. Having to examine
and reconcile ideas from various traditions—Greek and Latin philosophy, Jewish
and Christian theology—they were aware of the abundance of different terms that
were used to express similar ideas. They noticed, for example, that casus, contin-
gentia and fortuna described similar and often even identical events, although the
meaning of some of the words was more general than that of others (e.g., John
Buridan 1509, 36rb). They also noticed that casus, “chance,” was applied to both
causes and effects—an observation to which we have already drawn attention in our
own introduction (e.g., Roger Bacon 1935, 116). Many of their considerations
regarding contingency (notably in their analysis of the status of future contingents),
non-essential predicates (accidentia), the concomitance of various “coinciding”
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causes, or the nature of “fortuitous events” (eventus fortuiti) were indeed
ground-breaking.
Let us end our medieval section with Thomas Aquinas, who in his famous
Summa theologiae examined the relation between chance, fate and divine provi-
dence. Invoking positions that we have encountered earlier in our chapter, Thomas
refers to Aristotle’s conception of chance, quotes Augustine’s view that there is
neither chance nor luck in the world as all events are foreseen, and cites Boethius,
for whom the word “fate” referred to an inherent disposition of things by which
divine Providence brings about the desired effects. Christianizing the Aristotelian
distinction between the regularity encountered in the supralunary world and the
disorder found in the sublunary world, Thomas explains that “what happens on
earth accidentally, either in nature or in human affairs, is derived from a
pre-ordaining cause, namely Divine Providence” (Thomas Aquinas 1964–1976,
vol. 15, Summa Theologiae, Part 1, art. 116, qu. 1). Only when explained in terms
of their proximate causes do things happen by luck or chance, but not when
explained in terms of divine providence, whereby “nothing happens randomly in
the world” (ibid.).
In the second book of the Summa contra gentiles, which deals with the creation
of the world, Thomas devotes a chapter to the question of whether “the distinction
of things,” that is to say their separation into genera and species, is the result of
chance. His answer, which relies on Aristotle’s so-called hylemorphist doctrine,
according to which all substances are constituted by matter and form, is that all
individuals belonging to a species share the same form, and that it is matter that is
responsible for individual differences. Given that “chance is found only in things
that are possibly otherwise,” Thomas argues that “the distinction of things in terms
of species cannot be the result of chance,” as the forms (which deﬁne the species)
are by deﬁnition unchangeable. By contrast, differences between individuals
belonging to the same species “can perhaps be the result of chance,” because matter
is “a reservoir of multiple possibilities” (Thomas Aquinas 1975a, II. 39). As
Norman Kretzmann has explained, for Aquinas, the existence of, say, a particular
pigeon is a chance state of affairs, not because it is uncaused, but because it is “the
result of an unplanned convergence of two or more previously independent series of
causes” (Kretzmann 1999, 208). Thomas seems to suggest that “the generating of
individual members of species of plants or of non-human animals” may take place
“apart from” (praeter), although “of course not contrary to, the intention of the
creator/distinguisher” (ibid., 209). Humans, “metaphysical hybrids” composed of a
body and a soul, are the only individual beings whose coming-into-existence and
life-course cannot take place without an divine intentional act (ibid., 209).
In the third book of the Summa contra gentiles, Thomas invokes Aristotle’s
example of the casual encounter between a man and his debtor to show that
providence does not exclude chance: “It would be contrary to the essential character
of divine providence if all things occurred by necessity (…). Therefore, it would
also be contrary to the character of divine providence if nothing were to be for-
tuitous and a matter of chance in things” (Thomas Aquinas 1975b, III. 74).
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2.7 Chance, Necessity and Design in a Mechanistic
Universe
From what little has been said, it must be clear that Thomas Aquinas involves God
where he must, but for the rest tries to leave space for contingency. According to
Anneliese Maier, this wiggling space was to disappear within a century after
Thomas’ death. Maier is convinced that a noteworthy development took place in the
fourteenth century, which was going to shape the entire period up to the twentieth.
Most scholastics had previously insisted, just like Thomas, that each and every
natural event required a cause, but that not everything took place ex necessitate. In
the fourteenth century, however, a more restrictive view came to prevail according
to which contingency—understood as the contrary of necessity, as something that
could be thus but also otherwise—could only be encountered in the realm of
voluntary acts (Maier 1949, 241). Maier boldly suggests that from the fourteenth
century to the advent of quantum mechanics in the twentieth, there existed an
underlying consensus that excluded contingency from the natural world:
[…] for the [divine] ﬁrst cause, there exists no Zufall [chance/coincidence/randomness].
But this means: taken by itself, there exists no Zufall at all in the world, but only in a
relative sense, in respectu, that is, only with respect to speciﬁc and particular causes and
only for those who are not capable of surveying the concursus causarum [concourse of
causes] (Maier 1949, 231, our translation).
As we will see below, Maier’s bold thesis is probably mistaken for the nine-
teenth century, but it is quite convincing for the period that we tend to describe as
the Scientiﬁc Revolution, and notably for the seventeenth century. That century
witnessed the emergence of the idea of a physical world governed by laws of
nature, which were universally valid and admitted no exception. In the mechanistic
universe that became so fashionable in the second half of the century, nothing could
happen at random, so that the word “chance” could at best designate events that
provoked a subjective feeling of surprise while being inherently necessary.
It might at ﬁrst sight appear paradoxical that the probability calculus originated
precisely in that deterministically minded seventeenth century, in the hands of
mathematicians like Blaise Pascal, Pierre de Fermat and Christiaan Huygens. Until
the Renaissance, the adjective “probable” had been used to designate an opinion
which was based not on a demonstration, but on a reliable authority (Byrne 1968).
Only in the second half of the seventeenth century did a mathematical notion of
probability emerge (Hacking 1975, 11). According to Ian Hacking, who in an
unsurpassed historical analysis has reconstructed the history of probabilistic think-
ing, early-modern determinism, far from precluding any thought about randomness,
in fact paved the way for the mathematical study of chance and probability (ibid., 3).
A similar point has been made by Lorain Daston, according to whom “determinism,
far from stifling mathematical probability theory, actually promoted it” (Daston
1988, 37). To be sure, in his little Liber de ludo aleae (“Book on the game of dice”)
of 1520, Gerolamo Cardano had already tried to calculate the probability of various
dice throws, but had still attributed the discrepancy between calculated and actual
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outcome to the intervention of fortuna (ibid., 36). But once chance and fortuna had
both been banned from the deterministic world of seventeenth-century natural phi-
losophy, a new way of calculating probabilities had to emerge. As Hacking has
pointed out, the early modern notion of probability is, however, “Janus-faced: on the
one side it is statistical, concerning itself with stochastic laws of chance processes;
on the other side it is epistemological, dedicated to assessing reasonable degrees of
belief in propositions quite devoid of statistical background” (Hacking 1975, 12).
No one captures the substitution of the Lady of Chance, Fortuna, by a con-
ception of chance as mathematical and epistemic probability better than the Scottish
philosopher David Hume. In the chapter “Of Probability” of his An Enquiry
Concerning Human Understanding, he introduced a crucial distinction between
“Chance,” written with a capital letter, and mere “chances”:
Though there be no such thing as Chance in the world (….) there is certainly a probability,
which arises from a superiority of chances on any side; and according as this superiority
increases, and surpasses the opposite chances, the probability receives a proportionable
increase, and begets still a higher degree of belief or assent to that side, in which we discover
the superiority. If a dye were marked with one ﬁgure or number of spots on four sides, and
with another ﬁgure or number of spots on the two remaining sides, it would be more
probable, that the former would turn up than the latter; though, if it had a thousand sides
marked in the same manner, and only one side different, the probability would be much
higher, and our belief or expectation of the event more steady and secure. This process of the
thought or reasoning may seem trivial and obvious; but to those who consider it more
narrowly, it may, perhaps, afford matter for curious speculation. (Hume 1748, Ch. 6).
Similarly, Hume’s French contemporary, Voltaire, was convinced that “chance
is nothing, and that we have invented this word to describe the known effect of un
unknown cause.” Voltaire expressed this view in Le philosophe ignorant (Voltaire
1766, Ch. 13) as well as in the entry “On atoms” of the Philosophical Dictionary, in
which he explained that seventeenth-century mechanical philosophers
distinguished what is good in Epicurus and Lucretius, from their chimeras, founded on
imagination and ignorance (…). All have acknowledged that chance is a word without
meaning. What we call chance can be no other than the unknown cause of a known effect.
Whence comes it then, that philosophers are still accused of thinking that the stupendous
and indescribable arrangement of the universe is a production of the fortuitous concurrence
of atoms—an effect of chance? Neither Spinoza nor any one else has advanced this
absurdity (Voltaire 1901, s.v.).
Although very critical of the Church and of revealed religion, Voltaire was
convinced, as a Deist, that the existence of God could be inferred from the order of
the natural world. In the entry on “God/Gods” of the Philosophical Dictionary he in
fact claimed:
Every work which shows us means and an end, announces a workman; then this universe,
composed of springs, of means, each of which has its end, discovers a most mighty, a most
intelligent workman. Here is a probability approaching the greatest certainty. (…) I am
aware that various philosophers, and especially Lucretius, have denied ﬁnal causes (…). To
afﬁrm that the eye is not made to see, nor the ear to hear, nor the stomach to digest—is not
this the most enormous absurdity, the most revolting folly, that ever entered the human
mind? (Voltaire 1901, s.v.).
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Voltaire could not ignore the fact that Spinoza had launched a powerful attack
against the doctrine of ﬁnal causes. In the famous Appendix to the ﬁrst book of his
Ethics, Spinoza had argued that the idea that “God directs all things to a deﬁnite
goal” was a widespread misconception, which hindered “the understanding of the
concatenation of things.” According to Spinoza, God is the only substance that
exists and “acts solely by the necessity of his own nature.” All things “are in God”
and are “predetermined by God, not through his free will or absolute ﬁat, but from
the very nature of God or inﬁnite power.” Being “ignorant both of things and their
own nature,” people wrongly “believe that there is an order in things” and that “God
has created all things in order.” This misconception, Spinoza maintained, is the
product of a double fallacy. People mistakenly “think themselves free, inasmuch as
they are conscious of their own volitions and desires” and from this they wrongly
conclude that “all things in nature act as men themselves act, namely, with an end in
view” (Spinoza 1883, 75–81; Ethics, Appendix to Part I).
In his Philosophical Dictionary, Voltaire tried to convince his readers that,
contrary to Lucretius and other ancient philosophers, Spinoza could not “help
admitting an intelligence acting in matter, and forming a whole with it.” In
Voltaire’s eyes, Spinoza “did not understand himself”:
If this inﬁnite, universal being thinks, must he not have design? If he has design, must he
not have a will? Spinoza says, we are modes of that absolute, necessary, inﬁnite being. I say
to Spinoza, we will, and have design, we who are but modes; therefore, this inﬁnite,
necessary, absolute being cannot be deprived of them; therefore, he has will, design, power
(Voltaire 1901, s.v. God/Gods).
That Spinoza would have rejected Voltaire’s interpretation without further ado is
clear from some letters he wrote to Hugo Boxel, a Dutch contemporary who tried to
persuade him of the existence of ghosts. In a letter dated 21 September 1674, Boxel
had claimed that “it appertains to the beauty and perfection of the universe” that
“there are spirits of all sorts, but, perhaps, none of the female sex,” adding that his
reasoning would not convince those “who rashly believe that the world has been
created by chance.” In his answer, Spinoza could not avoid addressing the ques-
tion, “whether the world was made by chance.” He insisted that “chance and
necessity are two contraries,” so that
he, who asserts the world to be a necessary effect of the divine nature, must utterly deny that
the world has been made by chance; whereas, he who afﬁrms, that God need not have made
the world, conﬁrms, though in different language, the doctrine that it has been made by
chance; […]. I, myself, lest I should confound the divine nature with the human, do not
assign to God human attributes, such as will, understanding, attention, hearing, &c.
I therefore say, as I have said already, that the world is a necessary effect of the divine
nature, and that it has not been made by chance” (Spinoza 1883, 381).
In his reply, which is unfortunately lost to us, Boxel must have objected that the
opposite of “necessity” is not “chance,” but “freedom.” Spinoza reacted with
astonishment:
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I am […] at a loss for the reasons, with which you want to make me believe, that chance
and necessity are not contraries. […] As soon as I afﬁrm that heat is a necessary effect of
ﬁre, I deny that it is a chance effect. To say, that necessary and free are two contrary terms,
seems to me no less absurd and repugnant to reason. For no one can deny, that God freely
knows Himself and all else, yet all with one voice grant that God knows Himself neces-
sarily (Spinoza 1883, 385).
Returning to Voltaire, we may now declare that although he did not do justice to
Spinoza’s philosophical views, he was yet quite right in stating that no early
modern mechanical philosopher had regarded chance as an explanatory cause of
physical phenomena. Other eminent examples conﬁrm this opinion clearly. Pierre
Gassendi, one of the founding fathers of early-modern atomism, explicitly claimed
that “chance is nothing in itself (…), but the lack of foreknowledge and of the
intention of an event” (Gassendi 1658, 2: 829a). He borrowed from ancient ato-
mism the idea that all physical phenomena could be explained in terms of the
motion of minute particles of matters, but criticized Epicurus for turning chance
(fortuna) into a cause. In Gassendi’s eyes, Epicurus’ recourse to the swerve to
explain the formation of the world and to account for human freedom was no
convincing alternative to the determinism of Democritus and of the Stoics, because
whatever happens “by a variety of motions, collisions, rebounds, swerves” still
happens by necessity (ibid., 2: 838). Margaret Osler has rightly pointed out that
in order to embrace the evident facts of both causal order and contingency within the
bounds of his mechanical philosophy, Gassendi undertook a Christian reinterpretation of
the concepts of fate, fortune, and chance […]. Fate is nothing more than God’s decree, and
fortune and chance are expressions of contingency in the world coupled with human
ignorance of the causes of fortuitous events (Osler 1994, 92, with references to Sarasohn
1985).
Gassendi, who is usually dismissive of Aristotelian philosophy, here invoked,
just as Boethius had done centuries earlier, Aristotle’s example of the man who digs
the ground to plant a tree and accidentally ﬁnds a treasure in order to explain that
chance is the “concourse” of two independent causal chains (Gassendi 1658, 2:
828b). And, like Boethius, Gassendi also claimed that chance events are “part of
divine providence,” which “includes things which are foreseen as well as things
which are unforeseen to humans” (ibid., 2: 840b).
A position analogous to Gassendi’s—accepting atomism, but rejecting Epicurus’
random swerves as explanatory tool in physical and psychological matters—was
endorsed by the chemist Robert Boyle, one of the central ﬁgures of the early Royal
Society and the person to render “the mechanical philosophy” programmatic. In his
About the Excellency and Grounds of the Mechanical Hypothesis (1674), Boyle
wrote:
When I speak of the Corpuscular or Mechanical Philosophy, I am far from meaning with
the Epicureans that Atoms, meeting together by chance in an inﬁnite Vacuum, are able of
themselves to produce the World, and all its Phaenomena (Boyle 2000a, 103; cf. Fig. 2).
In his treatise, Boyle took issue not only with Epicurus, but also with “some
modern philosophers” who suggested that all God had to do in order “to make the
Conceptual and Historical Reflections … 31
Fig. 2 The seventeenth century’s difﬁculty of depicting “chance” and “randomness.” It is literally
no coincidence that of the 79 editions of Lucretius’ De rerum natura printed between 1473 and
1725, only one contains a depiction of atoms, namely the third edition of Thomas Creech’s English
translation of 1683. But what an ambivalent image it is! We see Lucretius gesturing at dots
descending—without any swerve!—from a celestial globe carrying the name “chance” (CASUS).
How “chance” can generate these dot-atoms is left unexplained, and it also remains entirely
unclear how a single type of dot-atoms can bring about the variety of life forms seen emerging out
of mud at the bottom of this frontispiece. In case the dots descending in a diagonal shaft of light are
intended as a reference to dust motes dancing in sunbeams, then the image is even more
misleading, because Lucretius denies explicitly that the motes are atoms; they are merely similar to
them (rei simulacrum et imago). (See Lüthy 2003, 122)
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world” was to impart motion to “the whole mass of matter (…), the material parts
being able by their own unguidedmotions to cast themselves into such a system.”The
type of mechanical philosophy that Boyle was defending was quite different, for it
reaches but to things purely corporeal [and hence not to the soul], and distinguishing
between the ﬁrst original of things; and the subsequent course of Nature, teaches con-
cerning the former, not only that God gave Motion to Matter, but that in the beginning He
so guided the various motions of the parts of it, as to contrive them into the World (…) and
establish’d those Rules of Motion, and that order amongst things corporeal, which we are
wont to call the Laws of Nature. And having told this as to the former, it may be allowed as
to the latter to teach, that the Universe being once fram’d by God, and the laws of motion
being settled and all upheld by this incessant concourse and general Providence; the
Phaenomena of the world this constituted, are Physically produced by the mechanical
affections of the parts of matter, and what they operate upon one another according to
Mechanical laws (Boyle 2000a, 103–104).
In this passage, Boyle addresses two of the most debated issues of early-modern
philosophy, namely the nature of corporeal things and the relation between God and
his creation. Boyle’s ﬁrst remark must be read as an answer to materialist
philosophers like Thomas Hobbes, who believed that the soul, being corporeal, was
subjected to the same immutable laws that governed the behaviour of physical
bodies. The second remark is an expression of what John Henry called “an
unmistakably voluntarist position” (Henry 2009, 94). Whereas intellectualists
insisted that God had created the best of all possible worlds, of which there could
only be one, so that God was limited in his choice, voluntarists regarded creation as
an act of God’s will and therefore as freely chosen. In the Free Enquiry into the
Vulgarly Received Notion of Nature (1686), Boyle wrote:
God is a most Free Agent, and Created the World, not out of necessity, but voluntarily,
having fram’d It, as he pleas’d and thought ﬁt, at the beginning of Things, when there was
no Substance but Himself, and consequently no Creature, to which He could be oblig’d, or
by which he could be limited (Boyle 2000b, 566).
In a similar vein, in a manuscript note redacted around 1672, Isaac Newton
wrote: “The world might have been otherwise than it is (because there may be
worlds otherwise framed than this). It was therefore no necessary but a voluntary &
free determination that it should be thus” (Newton, MS Yahuda 21, fol. 2r, spelling
adjusted, quoted from Henry 2009, 96).
The most famous clash between voluntarism and intellectualism is the contro-
versy between Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz and the Newtonian theologian Samuel
Clarke. In his letters, Leibniz repeatedly stressed that nothing in nature “happens
without a reason why it should be so, rather than otherwise” (Leibniz, Second Letter,
§ 1; in Alexander 1956, 16). If there really did exist an absolute space, as Newton
believed, which was ontologically independent from the bodies contained in it, then
the act of creation would have included an element of arbitrariness, for God would
have had no reason to order objects “after one certain particular manner rather than
otherwise” (Leibniz, Third Letter, § 5; ibid., 26). Clarke agreed with Leibniz that
“nothing is, without a sufﬁcient reason, why it is, and why it is thus rather than
otherwise,” but in his eyes, “this sufﬁcient reason is oft-times no other, than the will
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of God.” For Clarke, to deny to God the power of determining “why this particular
system of matter, should be created in one particular place, and that in another
particular place,” meant nothing less than “to take away all power of choosing, and
to introduce fatality” (Clarke, Second Letter, § 1; ibid., 20). On his account, then,
intellectualism implied fatalism. Leibniz, on the other hand, accused Newton and
Clarke of reintroducing chance into the world: “A will without reason, would be the
chance of the Epicureans. A God, who should act by such a will, would be a God
only in name” (Leibniz, Fourth Letter, § 18; ibid., 39). Clarke rejected this objection.
In his eyes, “the Epicurean chance is not a choice of will, but a blind necessity of
fate” (Clarke, Fourth Letter, § 18; ibid., 50). But Leibniz, conceiving of the relation
between chance, choice, necessity and fate differently, retorted: “Epicurus’ chance is
not a necessity, but something indifferent. Epicurus brought it in on purpose to avoid
necessity. ‘T is true, chance is blind; but a will without motive would be no less
blind, and no less owing to real chance” (Leibniz, Fifth Letter, § 39; ibid., 79).
This opposition sheds much light on our issue. For Leibniz, the word “chance”
designates the absence of a determining cause, and it can hence be applied to
whatever happens without a reason. For Clarke, by contrast, “chance” implies
“involuntariness,” so that no free agent can be said to operate by chance:
comparing the will of God, when it chooses one out of many equally good ways of acting,
to Epicurus’ chance, who allowed no will, no intelligence, no active principle at all in the
formation of the universe; is comparing together two things, than which no two things can
possibly be more different (Clarke, Fifth Letter, § 70; ibid., 107–108).
Leibniz considered his own metaphysics, which was based on the idea that an
omnipotent God cannot fail to choose the best, to be the only viable alternative to
the determinism of Spinoza, according to whom everything that exists flows nec-
essarily from the essence of God. In Clarke’s eyes, however, Leibniz’ worldview
was as necessitarian as Spinoza’s: to claim that “whatever God can do, he cannot
but do (…) is making him a mere necessary agent, that is, indeed no agent at all, but
mere fate and nature and necessity” (Clarke, Fourth Letter, § 22–23; ibid., 50).
2.8 Hume’s Critique of the Argument from Design
Precisely because the relation between chance, will, reason, and necessity can be
thought of in such radically different ways, David Hume was to insist on the
importance of agreeing over the deﬁnition of these terms. In his Treatise of Human
Nature, Hume explains that no “freedom of indifference” can exist, if it is deﬁned as
“that which means a negation of necessity and causes”:
According to my deﬁnitions, necessity makes an essential part of causation; and conse-
quently liberty, by removing necessity, removes also causes, and is the very same thing
with chance. As chance is commonly thought to imply a contradiction, and is at least
directly contrary to experience, there are always the same arguments against liberty or
free-will. If any one alters the deﬁnitions, I cannot pretend to argue with him, until I know
the meaning he assigns to these terms (Hume 2007, pt. 3, s. 1).
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In other words, that voluntary actions are caused by the agent’s will does not
make them any less necessary than the behaviour of material objects: “the chance or
indifference lies only in our judgment on account of our imperfect knowledge, not
in the things themselves, which are in every case equally necessary, though to
appearance not equally constant or certain” (ibid.).
The concept of “chance” plays an important role also in Hume’s famous
Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. Cleanthes, one of the literary interlocu-
tors, argues that the world exhibits too much order and harmony to be a mere
product of chance:
Throw several pieces of steel together, without shape or form; they will never arrange
themselves so as to compose a watch. Stone, and mortar, and wood, without an architect,
never erect a house. (…) The adjustment of means to ends is alike in the universe, as in a
machine of human contrivance. The causes, therefore, must be resembling (Hume 1779, 56).
Hume’s spokesman, Philo, suggests that Cleanthes’ reasoning rests on a weak
analogy. The dissimilitude between a house and the universe “is so striking, that the
utmost you can here pretend to is a guess, a conjecture, a presumption concerning a
similar cause.” Moreover, one should not suppose that the attributes of God “have
any analogy or likeness to the perfections of a human creature.”We ascribe to God
“Wisdom, Thought, Design, Knowledge (…) because these words are honourable
among men,” forgetting that “He is inﬁnitely superior to our limited view and
comprehension” (Hume 1779, 46).
Now, whereas Cleanthes argues that what cannot be the outcome of chance must
be the result of design, Philo adds a third term to the disjunction, namely necessity.
He illustrates his point by means of an interesting piece of mathematical reasoning:
It is observed by arithmeticians, that the products of 9, compose always either 9, or some
lesser product of 9, if you add together all the characters of which any of the former
products is composed. Thus, of 18, 27, 36, which are products of 9, you make 9 by adding
1 to 8, 2 to 7, 3 to 6. Thus, 369 is a product also of 9; and if you add 3, 6, and 9, you make
18, a lesser product of 9. To a superﬁcial observer, so wonderful a regularity may be
admired as the effect either of chance or design: but a skilful algebraist immediately
concludes it to be the work of necessity, and demonstrates, that it must for ever result from
the nature of these numbers. Is it not probable, I ask, that the whole economy of the
universe is conducted by a like necessity, though no human algebra can furnish a key which
solves the difﬁculty? And instead of admiring the order of natural beings, may it not
happen, that, could we penetrate into the intimate nature of bodies, we should clearly see
why it was absolutely impossible they could ever admit of any other disposition? So
dangerous is it to introduce this idea of necessity into the present question! and so naturally
does it afford an inference directly opposite to the religious hypothesis! (Hume 1779, 168).
However ingenious Hume’s triptych of possibilities, which is composed of
design, chance and necessity may have been, and however modern Hume was in
many other respects, with respect to biology, things turned out differently. What
emerged in the late eighteenth century and culminated in the mid-nineteenth was an
evolutionary account of life forms in which neither design, nor necessity, but
chance would in fact provide the required explanans.
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2.9 From Natural History to Darwinism
In the domain of natural history—what would later become biology and geology—
the eighteenth century ushered in a more chaotic world-view. God receded from his
previous role as the designing creator as well as the guarantor of an all-pervasive
necessity, as our world gradually turned out to have a tempestuous past made of ice
ages, inundations, volcanic eruptions, extinct species and ultimately of forms of life
that diversiﬁed in unpredictable ways in reaction to these circumstances.
Indeed, an impressive and ever increasing battery of eminent authors emerged
who would deny the distinction, which Anneliese Maier ascribes to this time period,
between a contingent realm of human action and a deterministic realm of nature.
One may observe, beginning in the eighteenth century, an increasing insistence on
the accidental nature of all forms of life, including man. Julien Offray de La Mettrie,
in his famous L’Homme machine, provocatively stated that human existence had
been thrown upon the Earth au hazard, “just like mushrooms,” mushrooms being at
the time in many quarters still seen as imperfect beings that were generated
spontaneously (La Mettrie 1764, 46). And as biologists began to get an inkling of
the changing morphology of species, they arrived at the concomitant idea of “in-
numerable multitude of individuals” produced by “chance” (hazard) and of “for-
tuitous combinations of the productions of nature,” of which the species living
today are only “a small part of what blind fate [un destin aveugle] has produced”
(Maupertuis 1752).
The epitome of that trend is of course Charles Darwin’s On the Origin of Species
of 1859, which introduces the notion of a blind natural selection, which relies on a
very simple combination of factors: there is a random type of variation of traits
found among siblings (a longer or shorter neck, thicker or thinner fur, greater or
lesser need of water, etc.); a deadly struggle for survival due to the presence of
predators, a perennial excess of offspring and the resulting scarcity of food and
resources; and the resulting selection of those randomly generated traits that happen
to give their owners an advantage in the struggle for survival. These traits, selected
again and again across numerous generations, would eventually lead to such
modiﬁcations in a population that a new species or even genus could come about
(Darwin 1859). Importantly, there existed, for Darwin, no underlying evolutionary
direction or logic. The environmental factors were as accidental as the traits they
selected among the randomly generated variants. Whether a thicker fur happened to
be an advantage or a disadvantage for survival depended on changing weather
patterns, diseases, the presence of predators and many other unpredictable condi-
tions. C. S. Lewis mocked this vision of nature in the ﬁrst lines of his satirical
Evolutionary Hymn:
Lead us, Evolution, lead us
Up the future’s endless stair;
Chop us, change us, prod us, weed us.
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For stagnation is despair:
Groping, guessing, yet progressing,
Lead us nobody knows where (Lewis 1964, 55).
Lewis parodies here a famous hymn by James Edmeston (1821), which to this
day is found in all Anglican and Episcopalian hymnals and whose ﬁrst verses sound
as follows:
Lead us, heavenly Father, lead us
o’er the world’s tempestuous sea;
guard us, guide us, keep us, feed us,
for we have no help but thee;
yet possessing every blessing,
if our God our Father be.
The opposition between the invocation of divine providence, in the original
hymn, and Lewis’ ironical description of the total absence thereof in an evolu-
tionary process that chops and weeds aimlessly and without purpose and direction
is stark. But the lack of providentialism is clearly expressed in Darwin’s model:
In such case, every slight modiﬁcation, which in the course of ages chanced to arise, and
which in any way favoured the individuals of any of the species, by better adapting them to
their altered conditions, would tend to be preserved; and natural selection would thus have
free scope for the work of improvement. (Darwin 1859, Ch. 4).
Darwin honestly admitted that he had no idea about the forces that were responsible
for the variability of traits found in offspring. After all, Mendel, genetics, and the
discovery of DNA were later episodes in the history of biology. Nevertheless, his
basic model has remained fairly intact, as has the role of chance in it. For example,
modern biology speaks of the role of mutations in the evolution of species in terms of
spontaneous mutations (such as molecular decay) or mutations due to errors occurring
in the replication of DNA. The default process is faithful copying, but errors take place
a bit like the sudden swerve or klinamen of atoms, unexplained deviations from the
usual direction.8
In the eyes of the American philosopher, logician, chemist and mathematician
Charles Sanders Peirce, Darwin’s evolutionary theory in fact constituted strong
evidence against a deterministic world-view. Quite generally, Peirce combated the
idea that the universe was governed by strict laws, preferring to see mathematical
laws of nature as nothing more than statistical approximations to general patterns or
“habits,” as he called them, which natural bodies tended to exhibit. In fact, taking
recourse to tuchê, the Greek word with which we begun our historical section,
Peirce in 1892 coined the neologism “tychism” as the name of the view that the
universe was characterized by “absolute chance,” not by a deterministic type of
“necessity.” Peirce dismissed the idea “that every single fact in the universe is
precisely determined by law” (Peirce 1892, 321). That mistaken idea had been
around since the days of Democritus and the Stoics, but had in the meantime been
8See on this Han Brunner’s chapter in this book.
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clad in new scientiﬁc clothes, looking thus: “Given the state of the universe in the
original nebula, and given the laws of mechanics, a sufﬁciently powerful mind
could deduce from these data the precise form of every curlicue of every letter I am
now writing” (ibid., 323).
But—Peirce retorted—the so-called “laws of mechanics,” like all laws of nature,
were mere approximations. The more exact one’s experimental measurements, the
greater the deviations of the data from the mathematical ideal. In the essay’s
concluding dialogue between an imaginary determinist and Peirce, which starts
with a discussion over whether the apparently random fall of a die is determined or
not, the real force of tychism is ﬁnally introduced. In an evolving cosmos, which
displayed ever-increasing complexity over time, all apparent mechanical regularity
could at best be provisional. In other words, one had to admit “pure spontaneity or
life as a character of the universe, acting always and everywhere though restrained
within narrow bounds by law, producing inﬁnitesimal departures from law con-
tinually, and great ones with inﬁnite infrequency” (ibid., 333–334).
2.10 Laplace’s Determinism, Statistical Regularity
and the New Physical Randomness
A similar recovery of chance and randomness took place in the domain of physics.
This occurred, paradoxically enough, after these concepts had been quite thor-
oughly expelled from the exact sciences. We have seen earlier that when medieval
philosophers such as Abelard claimed that “the word ‘chance’ … always denotes
ignorance,” they did so because they compared the low level of human compre-
hension with the omniscience of God, for whom nothing happened unexpectedly
and for whom there existed no chance. But we also recall that in the seventeenth
century, the idea emerged that if one managed to ﬁnd all laws of nature, these
would ultimately explain everything within a deterministic framework. In the latter
paradigm, “chance” was no longer opposed to “divine providence,” nor was it any
longer the expression of the innate limits of human understanding. If humans
attributed an event to “chance,” this term had to do either with their personal
ignorance of the physical laws causing the event in question, or else with the
mathematical difﬁculty of deriving that particular event from the multiplicity of
underlying causes and the respective laws governing them. This position was
forcefully expressed by the French mathematician Pierre-Simon Laplace, whose
name is associated with the development of statistical methods for calculating
probabilities (Théorie analytique des probabilités 1812), with a scientiﬁc form of
determinism, and with the concomitant elimination of divine causality from cos-
mology as well as physics quite generally. As the apocryphal story goes, he
explained to Napoleon that he did not need God as a hypothesis (“je n’avais pas
besoin de cette hypothèse-là”). His scientiﬁc determinism, in turn, expressed itself
most famously in the notion of a “demon”—a kind of perfect intelligence—that
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could derive all current and future states of the world from a complete under-
standing of previous states:
We may regard the present state of the universe as the effect of its past and the cause of its
future. An intellect which at a certain moment would know all forces that set nature in
motion, and all positions of all items of which nature is composed, if this intellect were also
vast enough to submit these data to analysis, it would embrace in a single formula the
movements of the greatest bodies of the universe and those of the tiniest atom; for such an
intellect nothing would be uncertain and the future just like the past would be present before
its eyes (Laplace 1902, 4).
This is of course the very theory to which Peirce alluded when he said that the
modern version of determinism pretended that “every curlicue of every letter I am
now writing” had been predetermined by the state of the ﬁrst stellar nebulae. Now,
“Laplace’s demon” is expressly not a god, and certainly not a creator, but rather a
calculating device of the type that we would nowadays identify with a supercom-
puter. Nor is he, or it, omniscient and in fact need not even be conscious. All it does
is to deduce, on the basis a complete set of natural laws and an equally complete
data set on all bodies in the world, mechanically, and with absolute certainty, the
present and future behaviour of the world and all that is in it.
But then, the century that started with Laplace ended with Peirce’s rejection of
the possibility the former’s omniscient demon. Quite generally, it witnessed what
Ian Hacking has described as a veritable “erosion of determinism” (Hacking 1983,
445). This erosion took place not only in philosophy and biology, but also in the
domain of physics.9
The probabilistic revolution in physics in fact clearly predated the advent of
quantum theory. It all started in the mid-nineteenth century with what we now call
“statistical mechanics” (Brush 1976, Ch. 4). This theory arose in the wake of ther-
modynamics and made the point that one fundamental assumption of classical
physics, namely a complete speciﬁcation of the state of a system as input for accurate
and certain predictions (in keeping with the spirit of determinism), was hardly
satisﬁed if the system in question consisted of 100,000,000,000,000,000,000,000
particles, as is typically the case for a gas in a container.
While at ﬁrst sight, this problem might still seem solvable by the hypothetical
Laplacian demon, the everyday phenomenon of irreversibility in macroscopic
systems turned out to be inexplicable on the assumption that probability was merely
a matter of ignorance. Incidentally, this issue remains unresolved until the present
day (Sklar 2009; Ufﬁnk 2007). In the late nineteenth century, at any rate, its
recognition served as a ﬁrst admonition with regard to a possibly fundamental (or
“irreducible”) role for probability in physics (Ufﬁnk 2014).
Another challenge to classical physics that fed probabilistic reasoning and atti-
tudes consisted in the observation of discrete and discontinuous phenomena
9The following six paragraphs have been written by Klaas Landsman; we have imported only
minor modiﬁcations.
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(especially at an atomic scale). Two of Einstein’s four path-breaking articles in his
annus mirabilis 1905 were concerned with such phenomena (Stachel 1998). The
ﬁrst article tackled the issue of Brownian motion—the motion of particles sus-
pended in a fluid—and was based on the use of what is called “random walks,” the
latter term referring to a mathematical formalisation of a path such as that of a
molecule in a liquid, which consists of a succession of random steps. Einstein’s
second article provided the ﬁrst empirical conﬁrmation of the quantum nature of
light, that is to say, the fact that light manifests itself only in multiples of a basic
unit. It was mainly the latter issue of discreteness and discontinuity, ﬁrst discovered
by Max Planck, Albert Einstein, and Niels Bohr, that eventually led to quantum
mechanics (Jammer 1966).
After a period of confusion and crisis lasting from 1900 to 1925, which ended
with the complementary work of Heisenberg on matrix mechanics in 1925 and of
Schrödinger on wave mechanics in 1926, quantum mechanics was more or less
ﬁnalized during the subsequent ﬁve years, apart from Werner Heisenberg and Erwin
Schrödinger also through the remarkable contributions of Paul Dirac, Max Born,
Pascual Jordan, Wolfgang Pauli, and John von Neumann. Quantum mechanics
thereby replaced Newton’s formalism of classical mechanics by a totally different
mathematical scheme, whose physical interpretation has remained a matter of
controversy to the present day (Jammer 1974).
Quantum mechanics has many strange features, all of which appear to be related
(including non-locality, another holistic property called entanglement, as well as the
phenomenon described as Schrödinger’s Cat). What counts for our purpose is that
its predictions are a priori probabilistic: instead of specifying one particular out-
come of some physical process with certainty, as classical physics does (at least
under ideal circumstances and for an ideal calculator such as Laplace’s demon),
quantum mechanics merely states a range of possible outcomes, even though each
probability can be precisely predetermined. Indeed, quantum mechanics allows for
the possibility of an absolutely random coin flip, realized, for example, by a single
photon (that is, the basic quantum of light), which may or may not be transmitted by
a polarizer, or by a spin measurement on an electron. Such quantum-mechanical
coin flip devices are even commercially available from the Swiss company ID
Quantique, which “commercializes a quantum random number generator, which is
the reference in the gaming and lottery industries” (ID Quantique 2015). With this
“random number generator,” we return to several earlier themes, the casus, hazard,
and the Wheel of Fortune, but now at the most basic level of matter, at which
Laplace’s demon expected to ﬁnd nothing but predictable order.
The probabilistic interpretation of quantum mechanics had been in the air almost
from the beginning, and notably, à contre-coeur, in the work of Einstein himself,
but it was ﬁrst explicitly proposed (and declared to be fundamental) in a paper by
Born in 1926 on collision theory. This paper also provided a formula for the
probabilities of the various outcomes, which is now known as “Born’s Rule” and
which forms the basis of practically all quantitative—and extremely successful—
predictions of quantum theory. What is crucial in the present context is that Born’s
probabilistic interpretation of quantum physics was construed by him and his
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colleagues in terms of a turn to indeterminism. The latter idea was reinforced by
Heisenberg’s famous paper of 1927, which proposed the uncertainty relations now
named after him. Heisenberg suggested that quantum mechanics was not only
indeterministic in its inability to predict the outcome of a single experiment, but
also in its failure to specify initial conditions with arbitrary accuracy (see Mehra and
Rechenberg 2000 and 2001 for a historical overview of this episode). In the wake of
Born’s and Heisenberg’s epoch-making papers, Niels Bohr (backed by most if not
all of the other leading players except Einstein and Schrödinger) soon stepped
forward as the champion of indeterminism, a position which, with the assistance of
Heisenberg and Pauli, he successfully defended against Einstein’s penetrating and
relentless criticism during their famous debate from 1927 to 1949 (Bohr 1949).
The general perception among physicists is that Bohr emerged victorious from
this debate with Einstein, and that determinism and hence the epistemic view of
probability is a thing of the past, at least in fundamental physics, forever replaced
by the indeterminism of quantum mechanics. Whether this view is really correct
remains to be seen, however. It certainly cannot be proved mathematically that
quantum mechanics, even if it should be the correct and ultimate theory of nature,
implies indeterminism; acceptable models to the contrary exist (such as Bohmian
mechanics). Furthermore, one should be open-minded to possible modiﬁcations of
quantum mechanics, including underlying theories that would restore determinism,
whilst reproducing its probabilistic predictions by averaging over so-called hidden
variables. The nature of contemporary discussions is to put constraints on deter-
ministic interpretations of quantum mechanics and on possible reﬁnements thereof,
as ﬁrst attempted by von Neumann in 1932 and more successfully in John Stuart
Bell’s path-breaking work of 1964. Such constraints typically make such alternative
theories unattractive, but not impossible. However, the discussion is ongoing, and
the last word clearly hasn’t been spoken yet.
With this mention of contemporary discussions in fundamental physics, our
selective survey of almost 2500 years of philosophical and scientiﬁc reflections on
chance, coincidence, fortune, randomness, luck and related concepts comes to a
close. Does it tell us anything helpful? Maybe above all this, that in speciﬁc
domains such as statistics, evolutionary biology, or quantum physics, the last three
hundred years have generated speciﬁc technical sub-meanings of several of these
terms. At the same time, it is also striking that none of the discussions seems to
have come to a close. We have seen, for example, how the deterministic world-view
of the ancient atomists was supplanted by Aristotelianism, which identiﬁed the
atomists’ “blind necessity” as “mere chance,” rejecting it; how Christian philosophy
tried to ﬁnd degrees of freedom within a cosmos otherwise deﬁned by an
omnipotent, providential God, who was however not to be held responsible for
everything, including evil, that occurred in it; how in the Newtonian age a scientiﬁc
determinism returned to prominence, which was sometimes accompanied by an
overt rejection of any divine agency; how this deterministic worldview was shat-
tered by a quantum physics that seemed to locate indeterminacy, probabilistic and
random behaviour at the lowest material and energetic levels and in the very laws
Conceptual and Historical Reflections … 41
that describe them; and ﬁnally how, from Einstein’s protests until today, the hope of
ﬁnding an intellectually more satisfactory, that is, deterministic model has never
entirely vanished.
3 A Conclusion ex negativo
Our ﬁrst, etymological, approach has taught us something about the common ele-
ment of several of the words in our cluster. As our eyes are usually directed ahead
of us, a falling object will tend to surprise us. We stop, in shock or pleasantly
surprised, to contemplate the unexpected arrival. Such a situational and emotional
description of our cluster of concepts—inspired as it was by the verb “falling” that
underlies casus, “coincidence,” “accident” as well as a number of words related to
the falling of dice—will, however, only take us so far. In speciﬁc situations, such as
when we receive a random assignment or try to calculate our chances of winning in
the lottery, the archetypal situation of the falling object will seem quite remote.
Moreover, we have seen that languages don’t divide the words along similar lines.
No English or French word is as broad as the German Zufall, and what has a neutral
meaning in one language, such as the French hazard or the Latin accidens, has
negative connotations in another.
Our second, main approach has been begriffsgeschichtlich. We don’t need to
repeat the conclusions of that section once more. Sufﬁce it to say here that Hegel
would be dismayed: we have not been able to detect any dialectical progress from
the ancient Greeks up to today’s physicists in the way in which scientists and
philosophers resolved the perennial tension between the predictable and the
unpredictable; between the necessary and the contingent; between necessity and
chance; or to dismiss fate, fortune, the accidental and the random. Given the
developments in evolutionary biology and quantum physics of the past 150 years, it
seems rather as if “chance,” “randomness,” and “coincidence” had been restored to
a place of respectability that they had previously lost. Indeed, whether our personal
surprise at a given event is merely a sign of personal ignorance or is instead a
necessary feature of this universe has once again been elevated to the status of
unresolved question.
One thing is certain. Time and again, throughout our pages, it has become
evident that any of the words with which we have been engaged could only be
understood if we also understood the type of explanation that it attempted to
exclude. And precisely because the alternative did not have a stable identity, it was
obvious that its anti-pole also had to change meaning. In the course of our chapter,
we have found the word “chance” opposed to “fate,” “purpose,” “providence,”
“natural laws,” “determinism,” or simply to “the knowledge of causes.” Given this
heterogeneous list, it is evident that the common opposite, “chance,” was doomed
to be a slippery concept.
The helpfulness of understanding our words ex negativo, that is, from their
respective contraries, should be evident. It helps understand, for example, the
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conceptual clash between the ancient atomists and Aristotle. As we recall,
Democritus and Leucippus had proposed that the world had come about by
necessity, through a blind and mechanical process of atomic combination, because
“nothing exists at random.” But what they regarded as “necessity” was in
Aristotle’s terminology mere “chance,” because the atomists’ cosmogony took
place without any plan or purpose. Or take the disagreements over whether divine
providence allowed for any fortuitous events. If “chance” is taken to mean that
something happened without divine foreknowledge, as Cicero postulated, provi-
dentialism is indeed incompatible with it. If “chance” means, by contrast, that
“something other than was intended happens on account of other reason,” as
Boethius argued, then it is compatible with providentialism in the precise sense that
the intentions in question are ours, not God’s. Or, again, take the conflict between
Leibniz and Clarke over whether “a will without reason” amounts to “the chance of
the Epicureans” (Leibniz), or whether instead an act of will per deﬁnition excludes
the “blind necessity of fate” (Clarke). Similarly, when Hugo Boxel objected that
necessity was the contrary of freedom, not of chance, as Spinoza had assumed, the
latter remarked on “the difﬁculties experienced by two people following different
principles, and trying to agree on a matter.” Finally, take the redeﬁnition of
“chance” in the early modern period, in which someone like David Hume could
claim that there is “no such thing as Chance in the world” (Chance written with a
capital ‘C’), adding that in a probabilistic sense, one was justiﬁed in speaking of
“chances,” written with a lower cap.
It is often mockingly asserted that philosophy is that academic discipline that
deals with questions that have no answers, or, more maliciously, that the reason
why philosophers can still engage with two thousand year-old texts is because there
has been no philosophical progress in all those centuries. If there should be any
truth to this view, it must with equal right be applied to the philosophical aspects of
all modern sciences (those grown-up daughters of what up to the seventeenth
century was “natural philosophy”). After all, we have seen, maybe with surprise,
how in each moment of scientiﬁc reflection on the relationship between natural
causality, determinacy, and chance, the ancient Greek vocabulary tends to
re-emerge. What has been overly evident in C. S. Peirce’s decision to re-introduce a
Greek term (namely tuchê) for a philosophy based on “chance” is true more gen-
erally. The “fortune” of our cluster of words has indeed followed the logic of the
Wheel of Fortune: tuchê, “chance,” or “randomness,” temporarily deposed and
“without kingdom,” have returned to the top of the wheel, to rule.
In a book dealing with ancient Greek concepts of nature, the famous physicist
Erwin Schrödinger once wrote:
By the laws of physics we are forced in each moment to do whatever we do. What is the
point then in considering whether it is right or wrong? Where is there any room for a moral
law, if the omnipotent law of nature does not provide it with a chance to speak? Today, the
antinomy is as unresolved as it was twenty-three centuries ago (Schrödinger 1956, 18).
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The Mathematical Foundations
of Randomness
Sebastiaan A. Terwijn
Abstract Wegive anontechnical account of themathematical theoryof randomness.
The theory of randomness is founded on computability theory, and it is nowadays
often referred to as algorithmic randomness. It comes in two varieties: A theory
of finite objects, that emerged in the 1960s through the work of Solomonoff,
Kolmogorov, Chaitin and others, and a theory of infinite objects (starting with von
Mises in the early 20th century, culminating in the notions introduced by Martin-
Löf and Schnorr in the 1960s and 1970s) and there are many deep and beautiful
connections between the two. Research in algorithmic randomness connects com-
putability and complexity theory with mathematical logic, proof theory, probability
and measure theory, analysis, computer science, and philosophy. It also has sur-
prising applications in a variety of fields, including biology, physics, and linguistics.
Founded on the theory of computation, the study of randomness has itself profoundly
influenced computability theory in recent years.
1 Introduction
In this chapter we aim to give a nontechnical account of the mathematical theory
of randomness. This theory can be seen as an extension of classical probability
theory that allows us to talk about individual random objects. Besides answering
the philosophical question what it means to be random, the theory of randomness
has applications ranging from biology, computer science, physics, and linguistics, to
mathematics itself.
The theory comes in two flavors: A theory of randomness for finite objects (for
which the textbook by Li and Vitányi 2008 is the standard reference) and a theory
for infinite ones. The latter theory, as well as the relation between the two theories of
randomness, is surveyed in the paper (Downey et al. 2006), and developed more in
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full in the recent textbooks by Downey and Hirschfeldt (2010) and Nies (2009). Built
on the theory of computation, the theory of randomness has itself deeply influenced
computability theory in recent years.
We warn the reader who is afraid of mathematics that there will be formulas and
mathematical notation, but we promise that they will be explained at a nontechnical
level. Some more background information about the concepts involved is given in
footnotes and in two appendices. It is fair to say, however, that to come to a better
understanding of the subject, there is of course no way around the formulas, and we
quote Euclid, who supposedly told King Ptolemy I, when the latter asked about an
easier way of learning geometry than Euclid’s Elements, that “there is no royal road
to geometry”.1
2 What Is Randomness?
Classical probability theory talks about random objects, for example by saying that if
you randomly select four cards from a standard deck, the probability of getting four
aces is very small. However, every configuration of four cards has the same small
probability of appearing, so there is no qualitative difference between individual
configurations in this setting. Similarly, if we flip a fair coin one hundred times,
and we get a sequence of one hundred tails in succession, we may feel that this
outcome is very special, but how do we justify our excitement over this outcome? Is
the probability for this outcome not exactly the same as that of any other sequence
of one hundred heads and tails?
Probability theory has been, and continues to be, a highly successful theory, with
applications in almost every branch of mathematics. It was put on a sound math-
ematical foundation in (1933) by Kolmogorov, and in its modern formulation it is
part of the branch of mathematics called measure theory. (See Appendix A.) In this
form it allows us to also talk not only about randomness in discrete domains (such
as cards and coin flips), but also in continuous domains such as numbers on the real
line. However, it is important to realize that even in this general setting, probability
theory is a theory about sets of objects, not of individual objects. In particular, it does
not answer the question what an individual random object is, or how we could call
a sequence of fifty zero’s less random than any other sequence of the same length.
Consider the following two sequences of coin flips, where 0 stands for heads and 1
for tails:
00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
00001110011111011110011110010010101111001111010111
1As with many anecdotes of this kind, it is highly questionable if these words were really spoken,
but the message they convey is nevertheless true.
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The first sequence consists of fifty 0’s, and the second was obtained by flipping a
coin fifty times.2 Is there any way in which we can make our feeling that the first
sequence is special, and that the second is less so, mathematically precise?
3 Can Randomness Be Defined?
Acommonmisconception about the notionof randomness is that it cannot be formally
defined, by applying a tautological reasoning of the form: As soon as something
can be precisely defined, it ceases to be random. The following quotation by the
Dutch topologist Freudenthal (1969) (taken from van Lambalgen 1987) may serve
to illustrate this point:
It may be taken for granted that any attempt at defining disorder in a formal way will lead
to a contradiction. This does not mean that the notion of disorder is contradictory. It is so,
however, as soon as I try to formalize it.
A recent discussion of randomness and definability, and what can happen if we
equate “random” with “not definable”, is in Doyle (2011).3 The problem is not that
the notion of definability is inherently vague (because it is not), but that no absolute
notion of randomness can exist, and that in order to properly define the notion, one
has to specify with respect to what the supposed random objects should be random.
This is precisely what happens in themodern theory of randomness: A random object
is defined as an object that is random with respect to a given type of definition, or
class of sets. As the class may vary, this yields a scale of notions of randomness,
which may be adapted to the specific context in which the notion is to be applied.
The first person to attempt to give a mathematical definition of randomness was
von Mises (1919), and his proposed definition met with a great deal of opposi-
tion of the kind indicated above. Von Mises formalized the intuition that a random
sequence should be unpredictable. Without giving technical details, his definition
can be described as follows. Suppose that X is an infinite binary sequence, that is, a
sequence
X (0), X (1), X (2), X (3), . . .
2The author actually took the trouble of doing this. We could have tried to write down a random
sequence ourselves, but it is known that humans are notoriously bad at producing random sequences,
and such sequences can usually be recognized by the fact that most people avoid long subsequences
of zero’s, feeling that after three or four zero’s it is really time for a one. Indeed, depending on one’s
temperament, some people may feel that the first four zero’s in the above sequence look suspicious.
3The notion ofmathematical definability is itself definable in set theory, seeKunen (1980, Chap. V).
If “random” is equated with “not definable”, then the following problem arises: By a result of Gödel
(1940) it is consistent with the axioms of set theory that all sets are definable, and hence the notion
of randomness becomes empty. The solution to this problem is to be more modest in defining
randomness, by only considering more restricted classes of sets, as is explained in what follows.
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where for each positive integer n, X (n) is either 0 or 1. Suppose further that the
values of X are unknown to us. We now play a game: At every stage of the game
we point to a new location n in the sequence, and then the value of X (n) is revealed
to us. Now, according to von Mises, for X to be called random, we should not be
able to predict in this way the values of X with probability better than 12 , no matter
how we select the locations in X . A strategy to select locations in X is formalized
by a selection function, and hence this notion says that no selection function should
be able to give us an edge in predicting values from X . However, as in the above
discussion on absolute randomness, in this full generality, this notion is vacuous! To
counter this, von Mises proposed to restrict attention to “acceptable” selection rules,
without further specifying which these should be. He called the sequences satisfying
his requirement for randomness Kollektiv’s.4
LaterWald (1936, 1937) showed that vonMises’ notion of Kollektiv is nonempty
if we restrict to any countable set of selection functions.5 Wald did not specify a
canonical choice for such a set, but later Church (1940) suggested that the (countable)
set of computable selection rules would be such a canonical choice. We thus arrive at
the notion ofMises–Wald–Church randomness, defined as the set ofKollektiv’s based
on computable selection rules. This notion of random sequence already contains
several of the key ingredients of the modern theory of randomness, namely:
• the insight that randomness is a relative notion, not an absolute one, in that it
depends on the choice of the set of selection rules;
• it is founded on the theory of computation, by restricting attention to the com-
putable selection functions (cf. Sect. 4).
Ville (1939) later showed that von Mises’ notion of Kollektiv is flawed in the
sense that there are basic statistical laws that are not satisfied by them. Nevertheless,
the notion of Mises–Wald–Church randomness has been decisive for the subsequent
developments in the theory of randomness.6
The Mises–Wald–Church notion formalized the intuition that a random sequence
should be unpredictable. This was taken further by Ville using the notion of martin-
gale. We discuss this approach in Sect. 7. The approach using Kolmogorov complex-
ity formalizes the intuition that a random sequence, since it is lacking in recognizable
structure, is hard to describe. We discuss this approach in Sect. 5. Finally, the notion
randomness proposed by Martin-Löf formalizes the intuitions underlying classical
probability and measure theory. This is discussed in Sect. 6. It is a highly remark-
able fact that these approaches are intimately related, and ultimately turn out to be
essentially equivalent. As the theory of computation is an essential ingredient in all
of this, we have to briefly discuss it before we can proceed.
4For a more elaborate discussion of the notion of Kollektiv see van Lambalgen (1987).
5A set is called countable if its elements can be indexed by the natural numbers 0, 1, 2, 3, . . . These
sets represent the smallest kind of infinity in the hierarchy of infinite sets.
6In the light of the defects in the definition of Mises–Wald–Church random sequences, these
sequences are nowadays called stochastic rather than random.
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4 Computability Theory
The theory of computation arose in the 1930s out of concerns about what is provable
in mathematics and what is not. Gödel’s famous incompleteness theorem from 1931
states, informally speaking, that in any formal system strong enough to reason about
arithmetic, there always exist true statements that are not provable in the system.
This shows that there can never be a definitive formal system encompassing all of
mathematics. Although it is a statement about mathematical provability, the proof of
the incompleteness theorem shows that it is in essence a result about computability.
The recursive functions used by Gödel in his proof of the incompleteness theorem
were later shown by Turing (1936) to define the same class of functions computable
by a Turing machine. Subsequently, many equivalent definitions of the same class
of computable functions were found, leading to a robust foundation for a general
theory of computation, called recursion theory, referring to the recursive functions in
Gödel’s proof.Nowadays the area ismostly called computability theory, to emphasize
that it is about what is computable and what is not, rather than about recursion.
Turing machines serve as a very basic model of computation, which are never-
theless able to perform any type of algorithmic computation.7 The fortunate circum-
stance that there are so many equivalent definitions of the same class of computable
functions allows us to treat this notion very informally, without giving a precise def-
inition of what a Turing machine is. Thus, a computable function is a function for
which there is an algorithm, i.e. a finite step-by-step procedure, that computes it. It is
an empirical fact that any reasonable formalization of this concept leads to the same
class of functions.8
Having a precise mathematical definition of the notion of computability allows
us to prove that certain functions or problems are not computable. One of the most
famous examples is Turing’s Halting Problem:
Definition 4.1 The Halting Problem is the problem, given a Turing machine M and
an input x , to decide whether M produces an output on x in a finite number of steps
(as opposed to continuing indefinitely).
Turing (1936) showed that the Halting Problem is undecidable, that is, that there
is no algorithm deciding it. (Note the self-referential flavor of this statement: There
is no algorithm deciding the behavior of algorithms.) Not only does this point to a
fundamental obstacle in computer science (which did not yet exist in at the time that
7It is interesting to note that the Turingmachinemodel has been a blueprint for all modern electronic
computers. In particular, instead of performing specific algorithms, Turingmachines are universally
programmable, i.e. any algorithmic procedure can be implemented on them. Thus, the theory of
computation preceded the actual building of electronic computers, and the fact that the first comput-
ers were universally programmable was directly influenced by it (cf. Copeland 2008). This situation
is currently being repeated in the area of quantum computing, were the theory is being developed
before any actual quantum computers have been built (see e.g. Arora and Barak 2009).
8The statement that the informal and the formal notions of computability coincide is the content of
the so-called Church-Turing thesis, cf. Odifreddi (1989) for a discussion.
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Turing proved this result), but it also entails the undecidability of a host of other
problems.9 Its importance for the theory of randomness will become clear in what
follows.
5 Kolmogorov Complexity
An old and venerable philosophical principle, called Occam’s razor, says that when
given the choice between several hypotheses or explanations, one should always
select the simplest one. The problem in applying this principle has always been to
determine which is the simplest explanation: that which is simple in one context may
be complicated in another, and there does not seem to be a canonical choice for a
frame of reference.
A similar problem arises when we consider the two sequences on page 3: We
would like to say that the first one, consisting of only 0’s, is simpler than the second,
because it has a shorter description. But what are we to choose as our description
mechanism?When we require, as seems reasonable, that an object can be effectively
reconstructed from its description, the notion of Turing machine comes to mind.
For simplicity we will for the moment only consider finite binary strings. (This is
not a severe restriction, since many objects such as numbers and graphs can be
represented as binary strings in a natural way.) Thus, given a Turing machine M ,
we define a string y to be a description of a string x if M(y) = x , i.e. M produces
x when given y as input. Now we can take the length of the string y as a measure
of the complexity of x . However, this definition still depends on the choice of M .
Kolmogorov observed that a canonical choice for M would be a universal Turing
machine, that is, a machine that is able to simulate all other Turing machines. It is an
elementary fact of computability theory that such universal machines exist. We thus
arrive at the following definition:
Definition 5.1 Fix a universal Turing machine U . The Kolmogorov complexity of
of a finite binary string x is the smallest length of a string y such that
U (y) = x .
We denote the Kolmogorov complexity of the string x by C(x).
Hence, to say that C(x) = n means that there is a string y of length n such that
U (y) = x , and that there is no such y of length smaller than n. Note that the definition
of C(x) still depends on the choice of U . However, and this is the essential point, the
9In 1936, Turing used the undecidability of the Halting Problem to show the undecidability of
the Entscheidungsproblem, that says (in modern terminology) that first-order predicate logic is
undecidable.
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theory of Kolmogorov complexity is independent of the choice of U in the sense that
when we choose a different universal Turing machine U ′ as our frame of reference,
the whole theory only shifts by a fixed constant.10 For this reason, the reference
to U is suppressed from this point onwards, and we will simply speak about the
Kolmogorov complexity of a string.
Armed with this definition of descriptive complexity, we can now define what it
means for a finite string to be random. The idea is that a string is random if it has no
description that is shorter than the string itself, that is, if there is no way to describe
the string more efficiently than by listing it completely.
Definition 5.2 A finite string x is Kolmogorov random if C(x) is at least the length
of x itself.
For example, a sequence of 1000 zero’s is far from random, since its shortest
description is much shorter than the string itself: The string itself has length 1000,
but we have just described it using only a few words.11 More generally, if a string
contains a regular pattern that can be used to efficiently describe it, then it is not
random. Thus this notion of randomness is related to the compression of strings: If
U (y) = x , and y is shorter than x , we may think of y as a compressed version of x ,
and random strings are those that cannot be compressed.
Amajor hindrance in using Kolmogorov complexity is the fact that the complexity
function C is noncomputable. A precise proof of this fact is given in Appendix B (see
Corollary B.2), but it is also intuitively plausible, since to compute the complexity of
y we have to see for which inputs x the universal machine U produces y as output.
But as we have seen in Sect. 4, this is in general impossible to do by the undecidability
of the Halting Problem! This leaves us with a definition that may be wonderful for
theoretical purposes, but that one would not expect to be of much practical relevance.
One of the miracles of Kolmogorov complexity is that the subject does indeed have
genuine applications, many of which are discussed in the book by Li and Vitányi
(2008). We will briefly discuss applications in Sect. 11.
We will not go into the delicate subject of the history of Kolmogorov complexity,
other than saying that it was invented by Solomonoff, Kolmogorov, and Chaitin (in
that order), and we refer to Li andVitányi (2008) andDowney andHirschfeldt (2010)
for further information.
10This is not difficult to see: Since both U and U ′ are universal, they can simulate each other, and
any description of x relative to U can be translated into a description relative to U ′ using only a
fixed constant number of extra steps, where this constant is independent of x .
11Notice that the definition requires the description to be a string of 0’s and 1’s, but we can easily
convert a description in natural language into such a string by using a suitable coding, that only
changes the length of descriptions by a small constant factor. Indeed, the theory described in this
chapter applies to anything that can be represented or coded by binary strings, which includes many
familiar mathematical objects such as numbers, sets, and graphs, but also objects such as DNA
strings or texts in any language.
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6 Martin-Löf Randomness
The notion of Martin-Löf randomness, introduced by Martin-Löf in (1966), is based
on classical probability theory, which in its modern formulation is phrased in terms
of measure theory. In Appendix A the notion of a measure space is explained in some
detail, but for now we keep the discussion as light as possible.
The unit interval [0, 1] consists of all the numbers on the real line between 0 and 1.
We wish to discuss probabilities in this setting by assigning to subsets A of the unit
interval, called events, a probability, which informally should be the probability that
when we “randomly” pick a real from [0, 1] that we end up in A. The uniform or
Lebesgue measure on [0, 1] assigns the measure b − a to every interval [a, b], i.e.
the measure of an interval is simply its length. For example, the interval [0, 12 ] has
measure 12 , the interval [ 34 , 1] has measure 14 . Note that [0, 1] itself has measure 1.
Given this, we can also define the measure of more complicated sets by consider-
ing combinations of intervals. For example, we give the combined event consisting
of the union of the intervals [0, 12 ] and [ 34 , 1] the measure 12 + 14 = 34 . Since the mea-
sures of the subsets of [0, 1] defined in this way satisfy the laws of probability (cf.
Appendix A), we can think of them as probabilities.
A series of intervals is called a cover for an event A if A is contained in the union
of all the intervals in the series. Now an event A is defined to have measure 0 if it is
possible to cover A with intervals in such a way that the total sum of the lengths of
all the intervals can be chosen arbitrarily small.
For example, for every real x in [0, 1], the event A consisting only of the real x
has measure 0, since for every n, x is contained in the interval [x − 1n , x + 1n ], and
the length of the latter interval is 2 1n , which tends to 0 if n tends to infinity.
These definitions suffice to do probability theory on [0, 1], and to speak informally
about picking reals “at random”, but we nowwish to define what it means for a single
real x to be random. We can view any event of measure 0 as a “test for randomness”,
where the elements not included in the event pass the test, and those in it fail. All the
usual statistical laws, such as the law of large numbers, correspond to such tests. Now
we would like to define x to be random if x passes all statistical tests, i.e. x is not in
any set of measure 0. But, as we have just seen in the example above, every single real
x has measure 0, hence in its full generality this definition is vacuous. (The reader
may compare this to the situation we already encountered above in Sect. 3 when we
discussed Kollektiv’s.)
However, as Martin-Löf observed, we obtain a viable definition if we restrict
ourselves to a countable collection of measure 0 sets. More precisely, let us say that
an event A has effective measure 0 if there is a computable series of covers of A,
with the measure of the covers in the series tending to 0. Phrased more informally:
A has effective measure 0 if there is an algorithm witnessing that A has measure 0,
by producing an appropriate series of covers for A. Now we can finally define:
Definition 6.1 A real x is Martin-Löf random if x is not contained in any event of
effective measure 0.
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It can be shown that with this modification random reals exist.12 Moreover, almost
every real in [0, 1] is random, in the sense that the set of nonrandomreals is of effective
measure 0.
Note the analogy between Definition 6.1 and the way that Church modified von
Mises definition of Kollektiv, as described in Sect. 3: There we restricted to the
computable selection functions, here we restrict to the effective measure 0 events.
Identifying a real number x with its decimal expansion,13 we have thus obtained
a definition of randomness for infinite sequences. The question now immediately
presents itself what the relation, if any, of this definition is with the definition of
randomness of finite sequences from Sect. 5. A first guess could be that an infinite
sequence is random in the sense of Martin-Löf if and only if all of its finite initial
segments are random in the sense of Kolmogorov, but this turns out to be false. A
technical modification to Definition 5.1 is needed to make this work.
A string y is called a prefix of a string y′ if y is an initial segment of y′. For
example, the string 001 is a prefix of the string 001101. Let us now impose the
following restriction on descriptions: If U (y) = x , i.e. y is a description of x , and
U (y′) = x ′, then we require that y is not a prefix of y′. This restriction may seem
arbitrary, but we can motivate it as follows. Suppose that we identify persons by their
phone numbers. It is then a natural restriction that no phone number is a prefix of
another, since if the phone number y of x were a prefix of a phone number y′ of x ′,
then when trying to call x ′ we would end up talking to x . Indeed, in practice phone
numbers are not prefixes of one another.We say that the set of phonenumbers isprefix-
free. We now require that the set of descriptions y used as inputs for the universal
machine U in Definition 5.1 is prefix-free. Of course, this changes the definition of
the complexity functionC(x): Since there are fewer descriptions available, in general
the descriptive complexity of strings will be higher. The complexity of strings under
this new definition is called the prefix-free complexity. The underlying idea of the
prefix-free complexity is the same as that of Kolmogorov complexity, but technically
the theory of it differs from Kolmogorov complexity in several important ways. For
us, at this point of the discussion, the most important feature of it is the following
landmark result. It was proven in 1973 by Claus-Peter Schnorr, one of the pioneers
of the subject.
Theorem 6.2 (Schnorr 1973) An infinite sequence X is Martin-Löf random if and
only if there is a constant c such that every initial segment of X of length n has
prefix-free complexity at least n − c.
The reader should take a moment to let the full meaning and beauty of this theo-
rem sink in. It offers no less than an equivalence between two seemingly unrelated
12The proof runs as follows: There are only countably many algorithms, hence there are only
countably many events of effective measure 0, and in measure theory a countable collection of
measure 0 sets is again of measure 0.
13We ignore here that decimal expansions in general are not unique, for example 0, 999 . . . =
1, 000 . . ., but this is immaterial.
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theories. One is the theory of randomness for finite sequences, based on descriptive
complexity, and the other is the theory of infinite sequences, based onmeasure theory.
The fact that there is a relation between these theories at all is truly remarkable.
7 Martingales
Thus far we have seen three different formalizations of intuitions underlying ran-
domness:
(i) Mises–Wald–Church randomness, formalizing unpredictability using selection
functions,
(ii) Kolmogorov complexity, based on descriptive complexity,
(iii) Martin-Löf randomness, based on measure theory.
Theorem 6.2 provided the link between (ii) and (iii), and (i) was discussed in
Sect. 3. We already mentioned Ville, who showed that the notion in (i) was flawed
in a certain sense. Ville also showed an alternative way to formalize the notion of
unpredictability of an infinite sequence, using the notion of a martingale, which we
now discuss.14 Continuing our game-theoretic discussion of Sect. 3, we imagine that
we are playing against an unknown infinite binary sequence X . At each stage of the
game, we are shown a finite initial part
X (0), X (1), X (2), . . . , X (n − 1)
of the sequence X , and we are asked to bet on the next value X (n). Suppose that at
this stage of the game, we have a capital of d dollar. Now we may split the amount
d into parts b0 and b1, and bet the amount b0 that X (n) is 0, and the amount b1 that
X (n) is 1. After placing our bets, we receive a payoff d0 = 2b0 if X (n) = 0, and a
payoff d1 = 2b1 if X (n) = 1. Hence the payoffs satisfy the equation
d0 + d1
2
= d. (1)
After placing our bets, we receive a payoff d0 if X (n)= 0, and a payoff d1 if X (n)= 1.
For example, we may let b0 = b1 = 12d, in which case our payoff will be d,
no matter what X (n) is. So this is the same as not betting at all, and leaving our
capital intact. But we can also set b0 = d and b1 = 0. In this case, if X (n) = 0 we
receive a payoff of 2d, and we have doubled our capital. However, if it turns out that
X (n) = 1, we receive 0, and we have lost everything. Hence this placement of the
14Theword “martingale” comes fromgambling theory, where it refers to the very dangerous strategy
of doubling the stakes in every round of gambling, until a win occurs. With the stakes growing
exponentially, if the win does not occur quickly enough, this may result in an astronomical loss
for the gambler. In modern probability theory, the word “martingale” refers to a betting strategy in
general.
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bets should bemade onlywhenwe are quite sure that X (n) = 0. Any other placement
of bets between these two extremes can be made, reflecting our willingness to bet on
X (n) = 0 or X (n) = 1.
After betting on X (n), the value X (n) is revealed, we receive our payoff for this
round, and the game continues with betting on X (n + 1).
Now the idea of Ville’s definition is that we should not be able to win an infinite
amount of money by betting on a random sequence. For a given binary string σ ,
let σ̂ 0 denote the string σ extended by a 0, and σ̂ 1 the string σ extended by
a 1. Formally, a martingale is a function d such that for every finite string σ the
martingale equality
d(σ̂ 0) + d(σ̂ 1)
2
= d(σ ) (2)
holds. The meaning of this equation is that when we are seeing the initial segment σ ,
and we have a capital d(σ ), we can bet the amount 12d(σ̂ 0) that the next value will
be a zero, and 12d(σ̂ 1) that the next value will be a one, just as above in Eq. (1). Thus
the martingale d represents a particular betting strategy. Now for a random sequence
X , the amounts of capital
d
(
X (0), . . . , X (n − 1))
that we win when betting on X should not tend to infinity.15
As in the case of Mises–Wald–Church randomness and the case of Martin-Löf
randomness, this definition only makes sense when we restrict ourselves to a count-
able class of martingales.16 A natural choice would be to consider the computable
martingales. The resulting notion of randomness was studied in Schnorr (1971), and
it turns out to be weaker thanMartin-Löf randomness. However, there exists another
natural class of martingales, the so-called c.e.-martingales,17 such that the resulting
notion of randomness is equivalent to Martin-Löf randomness.
Thus Ville’s approach to formalizing the notion of unpredictability using martin-
gales gives yet a third equivalent way to define the same notion of randomness.
8 Randomness and Provability
By Gödel’s incompleteness theorem (see Sect. 4), in any reasonable formal system
of arithmetic, there exist formulas that are true yet unprovable. A consequence of
this result is that there is no algorithm to decide the truth of arithmetical formulas.
15Ville showed that martingales provide an alternative, game-theoretic, formulation of measure
theory: The sets of measure 0 are precisely the sets on which a martingale can win an infinite
amount of money.
16Note that for every sequence X there is a martingale that wins an infinite amount of capital on X :
just set d(X (0) . . . X (n − 1)̂ i) = 2d(X (0) . . . X (n − 1)), where i = X (n). However, in order to
play this strategy, one has to have full knowledge of X .
17C.e. is an abbreviation of “computably enumerable”. This notion is further explained in Sect. 8.
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It follows from the undecidability of the Halting Problem (see Definition 4.1) that the
set of formulas that are provable is also undecidable.18 However, the set of provable
formulas is computably enumerable, meaning that there is an algorithm that lists all
the provable statements. Computably enumerable, or c.e., sets, play an important role
in computability theory. For example, the set H representing the Halting Problem
is an example of a c.e. set, because we can in principle make an infinite list of
all the halting computations.19 The complement H of the set H , consisting of all
nonconvergent computations, is not c.e. For if it were, we could decide membership
in H as follows: Given a pair M and x , effectively list both H and its complement
H until the pair appears in one of them, thus answering the question whether the
computation M(x) converges. Since H is not computable, it follows that H cannot
be c.e. Because the set of all provable statements is c.e., it also follows that not all
statements of the form
“M(x) does not halt”
are provable. Hence there exist computations that do not halt, but for which this fact is
not provable! Thus we obtain a specific example of a true, but unprovable statement.
The same kind of reasoning applies if we replace H by any other noncomputable
c.e. set.
Now consider the set R of all strings that are Kolmogorov random, and let non-R
be the set of all strings that are not Kolmogorov random.We have the following facts:
(i) non-R is c.e. This is easily seen as follows: If x is not random, there is a descrip-
tion y shorter than x such that U (y) = x . Since the set of halting computations
is c.e., it follows that non-R is also c.e.
(ii) R is not c.e. This is proved in Theorem B.1 in Appendix B.
By applying the same reasoning as for H above, we conclude from this that there
are statements of the form
“x is random”
that are true, but not provable. This is Chaitin’s version of the incompleteness
theorem, cf. Chaitin (1974).20
18This follows by themethodof arithmetization: Statements aboutTuringmachines can be translated
into arithmetic by coding. If the set of provable formulas were decidable, it would follow that the
Halting Problem is also decidable.
19We can do this by considering all possible pairs of Turing machines M and inputs x , and running
all of them in parallel. Every time we see a computation M(x) converge, we add it to the list. Note,
however, that we cannot list the converging computations in order, since there is no way to predict
the running time of a converging computation. Indeed, if we could list the converging computations
in order, the Halting Problem would be decidable.
20As for Gödel’s incompleteness theorem, the statement holds for any reasonable formal system
that is able to express elementary arithmetic. In fact, it follows from Theorem B.1 that any such
system can prove the randomness of at most finitely many strings.
Chaitin also drew a number of dubious philosophical conclusions from his version of the
incompleteness theorem, that were adequately refuted by van Lambalgen (1989), and later in more
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9 Other Notions of Randomness
Mises–Wald–Church random sequences were defined using computable selection
functions, and Martin-Löf random sequences with computable covers, which in
Ville’s approach correspond to c.e.-martingales. As Wald already pointed out in
the case of Kollektiv’s, all of these notions can be defined relative to any count-
able collection of selection functions, respectively covers and martingales. Choosing
computable covers in the case of Martin-Löf randomness gave the fundamental and
appealing connection with Kolmogorov randomness (Theorem 6.2), but there are
situations in which this is either too weak, or too strong. Viewing the level of com-
putability of covers and martingales as a parameter that we can vary allows us to
introduce notions of randomness that are either weaker or stronger than the ones we
have discussed so far.
In his groundbreaking book (1971), Schnorr discussed alternatives to the notion
of Martin-Löf randomness, thus challenging the status of this notion (not claimed by
Martin-Löf himself) as the “true” notion of randomness.21
In studying the randomness notions corresponding to various levels of computabil-
ity, rather than yielding a single “true” notion of randomness, a picture has emerged in
which every notion has a corresponding context in which it fruitfully can be applied.
This ranges from low levels of complexity in computational complexity theory (see
e.g. the survey paper by Lutz 1997), to the levels of computability (computable
and c.e.) that we have been discussing in the previous sections, to higher levels of
computability, all the way up to the higher levels of set theory. In studying notions
of randomness across these levels, randomness has also served as a unifying theme
between various areas of mathematical logic.
The general theory also serves as a background for the study of specific cases.
Consider the example of π . Since π is a computable real number, its decimal expan-
sion is perfectly predictable, and hence π it is not random in any of the senses
discussed above. However, the distribution of the digits 0, . . . , 9 in π appears to
be “random”. Real numbers with a decimal expansion in which every digit occurs
with frequency 110 , and more general, every block of digits of length n occurs with
frequency 110n , are called normal to base 10. Normality can be seen as a very weak
notion of randomness, where we consider just one type of statistical test, instead of
infinitely many as in the case of Martin-Löf randomness. It is in fact not known if
(Footnote 20 continued)
detail by Ratikaainen, Franzen, Porter, and others. Unfortunately, this has not prevented Chaitin’s
claims from being widely publicized.
21AfterMartin-Löf’s paper (1966), the notion ofMartin-Löf randomness became known as a notion
of “computable randomness”. As Schnorr observed, this was not quite correct, and for example
the characterization with c.e.-martingales pointed out that is was more apt to think of it as “c.e.-
randomness”. To obtain a notion of “computable randomness”, extra computational restrictions
have to be imposed. Schnorr did this by basing his notion on Brouwer’s notion of constructive
measure zero set. The resulting notion of randomness, nowadays called Schnorr randomness, has
become one of the standard notions in randomness theory, see Downey and Hirschfeldt (2010).
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π is normal to base 10, but it is conjectured that π is indeed “random” in this weak
sense. For a recent discussion of the notion of normality, see Becher and Slaman
(2014).
10 Pseudorandom Number Generators
and Complexity Theory
In many contexts, it is desirable to have a good source of random numbers, for
example when one wants to take an unbiased random sample, in the simulation of
economic or atmosphericmodels, orwhen using statisticalmethods to estimate things
that are difficult to compute directly (the so-called Monte Carlo method). In such a
case, one may turn to physical devices (which begs the question about randomness
of physical sources), or one may try to generate random strings using a computer.
However, the outcome of a deterministic procedure on a computer cannot be random
in any of the senses discussed above. (By Theorem B.1 in Appendix B, there is no
purely algorithmic way of effectively generating infinitely many random strings, and
it is easy to see that a Martin-Löf random set cannot be computable.) Hence the best
an algorithm can do is to produce an outcome that is pseudorandom, that is, “random
enough”, where the precise meaning of “random enough” depends on the context.
In practice this usually means that the outcome should pass a number of standard
statistical tests. Such procedures are called pseudorandom number generators. That
the outcomes of a pseudorandom number generator should not be taken as truly
randomwas pointed out by the greatmathematician and physicist John vonNeumann,
when he remarked that
Anyone who considers arithmetical methods of producing random digits is, of course, in a
state of sin.22
Randomized algorithms are algorithms that employ randomness during compu-
tations, and that allow for a small probability of error in their answers. For example,
the first feasible23 algorithms to determine whether a number is prime were random-
ized algorithms.24 An important theme in computational complexity theory is the
extent to which it is possible to derandomize randomized algorithms, i.e. to convert
them to deterministic algorithms. This is connected to fundamental open problems
about the relation between deterministic algorithms, nondeterministic algorithms,
22The Monte Carlo method was first used extensively in the work of Ulam and von Neumann on
the hydrogen bomb.
23In computational complexity theory, an algorithms is considered feasible if it works in polynomial
time, that is, if on an input of length n it takes nk computation steps for some fixed constant k.
24Since 2001 there also exist deterministic feasible algorithms to determine primality (Agrawal
et al. 2004), but the randomized algorithms are still faster, and since their probability of error can
be made arbitrary small, in practice they are still the preferred method.
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and randomized computation.25 Besides being of theoretical interest, this matter is
of great practical importance, for example in the security of cryptographic schemes
that are currently widely used. For an overview of current researchwe refer the reader
to Arora and Barak (2009). It is also interesting to note that randomness plays an
important part in many of the proofs of results about deterministic algorithms, that
do not otherwise mention randomness.
11 Applications
As pointed out in Sect. 5 and Corollary B.2, due to the undecidability of the Halt-
ing Problem, the notion of Kolmogorov complexity is inherently noncomputable.
This means that there is no algorithm that, given a finite sequence, can compute its
complexity, or decide whether it is random or not. Can such a concept, apart from
mathematical and philosophical applications, have any practical applications? Per-
haps surprisingly, the answer is “yes”. A large number of applications, ranging from
philosophy to physics and biology, is discussed in the monograph by Li and Vitányi
(2008). Instead of attempting to give an overview of all applications, for which we
do not have the space, we give an example of one striking application, namely the
notion of information distance. Information distance is a notion built on Kolmogorov
complexity that was introduced by Bennett et al. (1998). It satisfies the properties
of a metric (up to constants), and it gives a well-defined notion of distance between
arbitrary pairs of binary strings. The computational status of information distance
(and its normalized version) was unclear for a while, but as the notion of Kolmogorov
complexity itself it turned out to be noncomputable (Terwijn et al. 2011). However, it
is possible to approximate the ideal notion using existing, computable, compressors.
This gives a computable approximation of information distance, that can in princi-
ple be applied to any pair of binary strings, be it musical files, the genetic code of
mammals, or texts in any language. By computing the information distance between
various files from a given domain, one can use the notion to classify anything that
can be coded as a binary string. The results obtained in this way are startling. E.g.
the method is able to correctly classify pieces of music by their composers, animals
by their genetic code, or languages by their common roots, purely on the basis of
similarity of their binary encodings, and without any expert knowledge. Apart from
these applications, the notion of information distance is an example of a provably
intractable notion, which nevertheless has important practical consequences. This
provides a strong case for the study of such theoretical notions.
25The question about derandomization is embodied in the relation between the complexity classes
P and BPP, see Arora and Barak (2009). This is a probabilistic version of the notorious P versus NP
problem, which is about determinism versus nondeterminism. The latter is one of the most famous
open problems in mathematics.
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Appendix A. Measure and Probability
A measure space is a set X together with a functionμ that assigns positive real values
μ(A) to subsets A of X , such that the following axioms are satisfied:
(i) The empty set ∅ has measure 0.
(ii) If A ∩ B = ∅, then μ(A ∪ B) = μ(A) + μ(B). That is, if A and B are disjoint
sets then the measure of their union is the sum of their measures.26
If also μ(X) = 1 we can think of the values of μ as probabilities, and we call X
a probability space, and μ a probability measure. If A is a subset of X , we think of
μ(A) as the probability that a randomly chosen element of X will be in the set A.
Subsets of X are also called events. In this setting the axioms (i) and (ii) are called
the Kolmogorov axioms of probability. The axioms entail for example that if A ⊆ B,
i.e. the event A is contained in B, that then μ(A)  μ(B).
An important example of a probability space consists of the unit interval [0, 1] of
the real line. The uniform or Lebesgue measure on [0, 1] is defined by assigning to
every interval [a, b] the measure b − a, i.e. the length of the interval. The measure
of more complicated sets can be defined by considering combinations of intervals.27
Appendix B. The Noncomputability of the Complexity
Function
In Zvonkin and Levin (1970) the following results are attributed to Kolmogorov.
Theorem B.1 The set R of Kolmogorov random strings does not contain any infinite
c.e. set.28 In particular, R itself is not c.e.
Proof Suppose that A is an infinite c.e. subset of R. Consider the followingprocedure.
Given a number n, find the first string a enumerated in A of length greater than n.
Note that such a string a exists since A is infinite. Since a is effectively obtained
from n, n serves as a description of a, and hence the Kolmogorov complexity C(a)
is bounded by the length of n, which in binary notation is roughly log n (plus a fixed
constant c independent of n, needed to describe the above procedure), where log
denotes the binary logarithm. So we have that C(a) is at most log n. But since a is
random (because it is an element of A, which is a subset of R), we also have that
26It is in fact usually required that this property also holds for countably infinite collections.
27The definition of a probability measure on the unit interval [0, 1] that assigns a probability to all
subsets of it is fraught with technical difficulties that we will not discuss here. This problem, the
so-called measure problem, properly belongs to the field of set theory, and has led to deep insights
into the nature of sets and their role in the foundation of mathematics (cf. Jech 2003).
28R itself is infinite, but by the theorem there is no way to effectively generate infinitely many
elements from it. Such sets are called immune.
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C(a) is at least the length of a, which we chose to be greater than n. In summary,
we have n  C(a)  log n + c, which is a contradiction for sufficiently large n. 
Corollary B.2 The complexity function C is not computable.
Proof If C were computable, we could generate an infinite set of random strings,
contradicting Theorem B.1. 
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Randomness and the Madness of Crowds
Utz Weitzel and Stephanie Rosenkranz
Abstract Human interaction often appears to be random and at times even chaotic.
We use game theory, the mathematical study of interactive decision making, to
explain the role of rationality and randomness in strategic behavior. In many of
these situations, humans deliberately create randomness as a best response and
equilibrium strategy. Moreover, once out of equilibrium, individual beliefs about
the real intentions of others introduce signiﬁcant randomness into otherwise quite
simple and deterministic situations of interaction. In a second step we discuss the
role of randomness on ﬁnancial markets, which are prototypical institutions for the
aggregation of individual behavior. As in certain simple games, ﬁnancial markets
can produce outcomes that are close to perfect randomness. In fact, random walks
in ﬁnancial returns are considered by most scholars to be efﬁcient and desirable.
Finally, we apply game theoretical insights to behavior on ﬁnancial markets and
show how strategic speculation on ‘greater fools’ can create a ‘madness of crowds’
that often ends in chaotic swings, bubbles and crashes.
1 Introduction
In 1720, Sir Isaac Newton was heavily invested in the South Sea bubble. When the
stock bubble burst he lost a fortune of about £2.4 million (in present day terms) and
was quoted as stating: “I can calculate the movement of the stars, but not the
madness of crowds”.
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The interaction between humans does indeed often appear like madness, gov-
erned by error and randomness. There is, however, a scientiﬁc ﬁeld that attempts to
logically explain human interaction. Game theory is the mathematical study of
interactive decision making and it has revolutionized the way we see and under-
stand economics, politics, ﬁnancial markets, and many other aspects of human
society. Game theory also applies to other species than humans and has made
important contributions in, for example, biology.
This chapter will introduce simple game theoretical concepts and ﬁnancial
market applications to explain how we interact in certain situations and what role
randomness plays in our behavior. The central question is how people deal with
strategic uncertainty, which is the uncertainty about other people’s expectations and
actions that we face in human interaction. We then apply this approach to ﬁnancial
markets and discuss how heterogeneous beliefs and errors in updating can create
feedback cycles and the ‘madness of crowds’ Newton referred to.
2 Super-Humans Against Nature and the Rationality
Assumption
2.1 A Single Random Event
Imagine a very simple game against nature.
Coin toss: First, human bets on one side of the coin, heads or tails. Then, in the coin toss,
nature shows one side of the coin.1
Many people see the throw of a dice or a coin toss as a prime example for natural
randomness. For at least 5000 years, our ancestors used randomization devices.2 But
is a coin toss really random? This goes back to an age old discussion culminating in
the question whether the world is predictable or unpredictable; whether everything is
predetermined, or whether nature is inherently stochastic. During the Age of
Enlightenment and the Industrial Revolution, Isaac Newton’s advances in mechanics
suggested that the universe is predictably governed by simple physical laws. This
lead to the lofty notion that, one day, humans might be able to take full control over
their fate with a world formula. In 1814, the French astronomer and mathematician
1Another example of such a situation is a farmer who decides at the beginning of a year whether to
plant crops or not (human places a bet). There is an equal chance that the weather this year is good
or bad for crops (toss of a coin). It is up to nature to determine the outcome.
2The oldest known dice were part of an 5000-year-old backgammon set, excavated at the Burnt
City in southeastern Iran. In ancient times the outcome of a throw of a dice was seen as the
decision of God. Consequently, dice were frequently used in important decisions.
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Pierre-Simon Laplace famously described the idea of scientiﬁc determinism as a
perfect intelligence for which there exists no uncertainty (Laplace 1814).3
Laplace’s Demon, as his notion became known, comes close to the deﬁnition of
rationality in game theory. A completely rational agent is a super-human, an arti-
ﬁcial construct that comes in handy when economists and game theorists need to
build models. Like Laplace’s Demon, this super-human knows everything (‘perfect
knowledge’) and can compute even the most complex problems with lightning
speed. Another feature of this super-human is that she always strives to maximize
her own utility.4
In Laplace’s scientiﬁc determinism, a coin toss is a quite boring affair. So would
be Roulette or wheels of fortune. A super-human would simply know what side of
the coin nature would show and bet accordingly. Scientiﬁc determinism remained
the ofﬁcial dogma throughout the 19th century. This drastically changed with the
‘probabilistic revolution in physics’ initiated by statistical mechanics in the mid
nineteenth century and continued by quantum mechanics in the early twentieth
century (see Lüthy and Palmerino in this book).
But even without assuming unpredictable quantum states in quantum systems we
may not be able to forecast with certainty, even in Laplace’s deterministic world.
Early works, for example, by Henry Poincaré have shown that, in deterministic
systems, inﬁnitesimally small changes in starting conditions can produce unpre-
dictable outcomes.5 This insight is the foundation of deterministic chaos theory and
it took nearly a 100 years for the ‘chaos revolution’ to fully unfold. In the late 1960s,
the MIT meteorologist Edward Lorenz discovered what is commonly referred to as
the ‘butterfly effect’.6 In the 1970s, several mathematicians proved that simple
nonlinear dynamic systems can produce irregular long run behavior and chaotic
behavior without external random disturbance (Ruelle and Takens 1971; Li and
Yorke 1975).7 In nonlinear dynamic systems, predictions about the future become
progressively worse when we do not have absolutely perfect knowledge of the initial
3See the contribution of Lüthy and Palmerino in this book for a more detailed discussion.
4Utility maximization is a tricky concept, which many mix up with ruthless money-making and
egoism. First, utility is more than simply making money. Feeling happy, receiving love or any
other positive sensation can also be a utility that people strive to maximize. This all depends on
personal preferences. Given a choice between money and friendship, one person might prefer the
former and another the latter. Second, a human can gain satisfaction (utility) from helping others.
Did Mother Teresa only help others or also herself? Hence, being ‘altruistic’ can be perfectly in
line with the deﬁnition of own utility maximization and rationality.
5In 1887, king Oscar II of Sweden promised a prize for the best answer to the question ‘Is our solar
system stable?’ Poincaré showed that the motion in a simple three-body system—such as sun,
earth and moon—that interact through gravitational attraction, can be sensitively dependent on
initial conditions and become highly irregular and unpredictable.
6Lorenz and his team were running weather simulations on a computer and suddenly realized that
rounding errors in the third decimal of just one measurement in one corner of their map (a ‘flap of a
butterfly’) were able to change predictions in another area from clear skies to thunderstorms.
7A well-known application is logistic population growth in biology (May 1976).
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state. Thus, even after the discovery of quantum physics, chaos theory re-introduced
indeterminism ‘through the back door’ and at a surprisingly fundamental level.8
We will come back to deterministic chaos in complex systems in Sect. 5.3. For
the time being, it is important to note that, according to quantum physics, but also to
chaos theory, even a perfectly rational Laplacian super-human—without any
restriction in knowledge and cognition—would approach a simple coin toss against
nature in the same way as normal humans would: as a game of pure chance. This is
in line with game theory where a perfectly rational agent is still exposed to ran-
domness. When facing a coin flip, a rational decision maker, even when equipped
with perfect knowledge, will not know whether the outcome will be head or tails.
2.2 Repeated Random Events
Fortunately, once faced with many independent coin tosses, our perfectly rational
super-human can forecast the future very well.
Repeated coin toss: We start with no money and every minute nature offers us a coin toss
where we can either win one dollar (heads) or lose one dollar (tails). Our lifetime wealth
then develops according to what is known as a ‘random walk’: we start at zero and might
win a dollar, then another dollar (two dollars of wealth), then we may lose ﬁve dollars in a
row (minus three dollars wealth), but then we win some money again, and so on.
What is our average lifetime wealth? According to the law of large numbers and
the central limit theorem we can be almost certain to have earned an average of
zero. Why? We have an equal chance to win or lose one dollar, on average, zero
dollar. With millions of coin tosses, the gains and losses almost perfectly cancel
each other out. On average, we expect to gain or lose nothing. We therefore also say
that the expected value of such a coin toss is zero.
There is a catch, however. An expected value of zero dollar does not mean that
we actually receive zero dollar. The expected value of a single coin toss is zero, but
we still know for sure that the outcome will not be zero. Equally, just because we
know that the average wealth over our life time is going to be very close to zero, our
ﬁnal wealth at the end of our life-time will most probably not be zero. In fact, our
ﬁnal wealth will probably be substantially above or below zero. Our ﬁnal wealth is
not an average but a single realization and it is impossible to predict this exact
point. Hence, even if we are conﬁdent in predicting averages, we are not very good
at exact point predictions.
Figure 1 shows this intuitively with a Galton board, named after the English
scientist Sir Francis Galton. The horizontal position of the red ball dropped into the
Galton board represents the wealth level and the pegs represent the coin tosses.
Every time the red ball hits a peg there is an equal chance to fall to the left hand side
(loss of one dollar) or the right hand side (gain of one dollar). Each red ball follows
8We thank Klaas Landsman for valuable contributions to this and the previous paragraph.
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a random walk and many of these random walks (red balls) produce a binomial
distribution of ﬁnal wealth levels, as approximated by the distribution of red balls at
the bottom of the Galton board. As binomial distributions are symmetric, the
expected value of random walks, the average, is zero (the middle slot at the bot-
tom). The large majority of the red balls, however, does not land in the middle slot.
Therefore, although we can be quite sure to expect an average of zero wealth,
individual ﬁnal wealth levels are most probably not zero and the exact ﬁnal wealth
level (ﬁnal slot) of one single ball is unpredictable.
2.3 Risk Preferences
How much would we bet on a single coin toss against nature in which we can win
or lose one dollar? This depends on our risk preferences. The expected value is
zero, so if we are risk-neutral we should offer the expected value, which is zero.
This makes us indifferent between playing the game or not. But we might be
risk-seeking. As the ﬁnal wealth level of a single coin toss is certainly not zero, we
might want to bet on the positive outcome of the coin toss and pay anything from 1
to 99 cents for playing the game. How much we are willing to pay for playing the
Fig. 1 Galton board
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coin toss is an indication of our risk-seekingness. Conversely, we might have a
preference to prevent losses and to—at least partially—safeguard our current wealth
level. In this case we are risk-averse and we require nature to pay us some amount
from 1 to 99 cents to take the risk (play the game). The more risk averse we are, the
more attractive nature must make the game for us to accept it. So, how much we are
willing to pay/accept to play the game depends solely on our personal risk pref-
erences. This also applies to fully rational super-humans. We assume that personal
preferences are given and stable, but heterogeneous across individuals. Rational
players are not necessarily risk-neutral. They can have any risk preference and
maximize their payoff conditional on their preference. Moreover, we can have
different types of preferences, not only for risk, but also for altruism or equality or
with regard to other economic and social dimensions.
3 Super-Humans Against Super-Humans
The crucial characteristic of fully rational super-humans is that they have perfect
knowledge about the rules of the game and know that this also applies to all other
players, including the knowledge that they are also fully rational. The latter is called
the ‘common rationality assumption’. Given this deﬁnition of rationality, let’s see
what happens if two super-humans play the following game.
Centipede game: Two super-humans, Superboy and Supergirl, play ball with each other.
Nature randomly gives Supergirl the ball. She can decide to throw the ball to Superboy, or
not. If she passes the ball, Superboy can decide to throw it back, or not. The game is
ﬁnished either after 100 passes or if one of the two players decides not to pass the ball
anymore. Nature also puts a number on the ball and increases it by 10 with every pass.
When Supergirl gets the ball from nature, the number on the ball is 10. After the ﬁrst pass,
Superboy catches a ball displaying 20 on it. With the next pass the number changes to 30,
and so on. If a player decides not to pass the ball, s/he gets the number on the ball paid out
in dollar and the other player gets the same number divided by 10. Hence, the holder of the
ball receives 10 + n × 10 dollar and the other player ð10þ n 10Þ=10 ¼ 1þ n dollar after
n passes.
Assuming that both players prefer to earn some money over nothing at all, how
many passes do we observe between the two players? In game theory, analyses
typically start at the end and then move backwards to the beginning. This is what
we call ‘backward induction’. After 100 successfully completed passes, Supergirl
will get the ball back and receive 1010 dollar. But Superboy can see this coming
and therefore does not pass the last ball back. Then Superboy gets 1000 dollar and
Supergirl 100. Knowing this, Supergirl would not even pass the second-to-last ball
to Superboy. Knowing this, Superboy would not make the pass before that one, and
so on. Hence, when Supergirl receives the ball from nature, she does not even do
the ﬁrst pass and takes the 10 dollar. Superboy receives one dollar.
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Supergirl’s behavior is an equilibrium strategy. Under the common rationality
assumption, Supergirl knows the equilibrium strategy of Superboy (keeping the
ball) and she cannot beneﬁt from changing her chosen strategy, while Superboy
keeps his strategy unchanged. This applies to both players as none of the two
players would pass the ball if randomly chosen by nature as ﬁrst receiver. The
current set of strategies and the corresponding payoffs constitute a Nash equilib-
rium, named after the mathematician and John Nash.9
Backward induction is often not very intuitive, which is one of the reasons why
we have to assume super-humans. In many games only super-humans are actually
able to ‘see’ the end of the game, keep it in mind, rationally backward induct, ﬁnd
the game-theoretical equilibrium strategy and ﬁnally play the corresponding equi-
librium behavior flawlessly right from the beginning. Also, under the common
rationality assumption we assume that everybody in the game is a super-human and
everybody knows this. This takes all randomness out of the centipede game. Does
this mean that randomness never plays a role for super-humans and always leads to
determinism unless a mechanistic randomization device is introduced? Not quite.
The point is that Supergirl may know everything about Superboy’s reasoning,
preferences and incentives, but this does not mean that Superboy’s actions are
always predictable. In fact, there are games where fully rational players want to be
as unpredictable as possible.
Rock-Paper-Scissors: Supergirl and Superboy simultaneously choose either Rock, Paper or
Scissors. Rock beats Scissors, Paper beats Rock, Scissors beats Paper.
Each strategy has a 1=3 chance to win, 1=3 chance to draw and 1=3 chance to
lose. If Supergirl thinks that Superboy always plays Rock she could beat him with
always choosing Paper. But this is not a Nash equilibrium as Superboy could
improve on this strategy set by always choosing Scissors. This, again, would lead
Supergirl to always choose Rock, and so it goes round and round. The only
equilibrium strategy in this situation is to mix the three options as randomly as
possible in order to win a least in 1=3 of all tries, draw in 1=3, and lose in 1=3. So,
the solution to this game is to play sequences that are perfectly random and
unpredictable, just like a three-sided dice would be.
This is harder than we think. Humans are not very good at simulating random
patterns. For example, in ‘randomizing’ we often underestimate clustering. This is
the so-called gambler’s fallacy, which describes the phenomenon that humans tend
9It does not make a difference if the two players communicate with each other. Whatever Superboy
promises, he cannot commit to it. Therefore his answer is cheap talk. In fact, given his monetary
preferences he has a clear commitment to keep the ball, because this maximizes his payoff.
Knowing this, Supergirl will keep the ball even if Superboy promises to pass it back.
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to expect a coin toss to show tails with a higher probability after a sequence of
heads (Tversky and Kahneman 1971, 1974). In other situations we may fall prey to
the hot-hand-effect (Gilovich et al. 1985). Here, we tend to believe that a series of
heads indicates a higher likelihood of heads in future coin tosses.10
Of course, Supergirl and Superboy can randomize perfectly so that both win,
draw and lose with equal probability over the long run. But as a thought experi-
ment, let’s take the Laplacian view to the extreme and see what would happen if
fully rational super-humans would really know everything with absolute certainty.
What would happen if the brains of two players are two completely transparent
randomization devices (we basically see all neurons ﬁre) and both players are able
to perfectly anticipate—as a point prediction—what the other side will choose in
the next round? In this situation, the only equilibrium strategy for both players
would be to always play the same as the other so that every game ends in a draw.11
But what happens if a draw is not an option?
Matching pennies: Supergirl and Superboy each choose either heads or tails simultane-
ously. So, they both toss a virtual coin. Supergirl wins if the two coins match (heads and
heads or tails and tails). Superboy wins in all other cases (coins do not match).
As in Rock-Paper-Scissors the Nash equilibrium is a mixed equilibrium strategy
where both players have to perfectly randomize in order to win/lose half the time.
Draw, however, is not an outcome. Thus, if super-humans could perfectly look into
each other’s brains, both players would constantly point-predict the opponent’s
intention for the next move, update, change their own intentions and point-predict
again, only to realize that the opponent’s intention has changed accordingly, and so
on. In this setting, both players are frozen in an inﬁnite optimization without the
ability to act. This may be where free will or emotions are ultimately needed as
‘circuit-breaker’. It may be that “to make a decision, emotion is the necessary
trigger (and) without emotion, one would be reduced to the state of an idiot savant
who goes on endlessly calculating without the ability to make a choice” (Olsen
1998).
10This phenomenon is found in sports, where people falsely attribute skill to a random series of
wins and therefore believe that the team will win again. The same also applies to the believe that
random successes in the past in investment performance will continue in the future. The
hot-hand-effect applies less to situations where people have to randomize themselves, but more to
situations where people have to correctly ‘read’ or identify random patterns produced by others.
11In terms of payoff it would not even matter whether two super-humans always play draw or
perfectly randomize and win, draw and lose equally often. All that matters is that both know with
certainty which of the two meta-strategies they will play: a perfect point-prediction of each other’s
next draw or a perfect randomization across the three options rock, paper, and scissors.
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4 Humans Against Humans
4.1 Bounded Rationality
Rationality requires extreme assumptions concerning players cognitive abilities:
perfect knowledge about all factors that affect the decision to be taken—so basically
about everything—and virtually inﬁnite computing abilities to derive rational
expectations forecasts and optimal decisions. Needless to say that we are no
super-humans. And needless to say that no economist seriously believes that human
behavior is always fully rational. Rationality is only a benchmark model, but a very
powerful one. It allows us to analyze benchmark behavior, which, under evolu-
tionary pressure and over time, is theoretically more successful in dealing with
nature and its randomness than any other model. Nevertheless, it is far from present
in every human, in all situations, or at all times. In the 1950s, Herbert Simon
advocated the concept of bounded rationality, a more realistic description of human
behavior where agents have limited computing capacities and information (Simon
1955). Instead of perfectly optimal decision rules, boundedly rational players use
short-cuts, rules of thumb, or so-called heuristics to overcome ‘uncomputable’
problems. These heuristics are not necessarily optimal or perfect but in complex
environments they may perform reasonably well (for a discussion see Gigerenzer
and Selten 2002). By using heuristics we inevitably make mistakes, which may be
random but can also be biased.
4.2 Beliefs
As we cannot know everything, we are uncertain about the actions and beliefs (and
beliefs about the beliefs) of others. This is commonly referred to as strategic
uncertainty. Let’s assume that Superboy and Supergirl in the above ball game
(centipede game) can actually make mistakes. In other words, they are not
super-humans anymore but simply humans: Girl and Boy. Let’s also assume, that
Girl, who received the ball from nature ﬁrst, actually passes the ball to Boy.
Remember that this is a move that super-humans would never do because it is no
Nash equilibrium. However, as we now look at humans, there is a possibility that
Boy receives the ball and suddenly has to form a belief about Girl’s motives for
passing the ball. Here are some beliefs that Boy might hold about Girl:
1. Girl violates rationality and made a mistake. She passed the ball, because she
simply did not understand the game properly. She did not backward induct and
did not realize that passing the ball in the ﬁrst place is not fully rational.
2. Girl has other preferences (other than purely monetary ones). Maybe she passed
the ball because she is altruistic and actually wants Boy to get the proﬁt from the
game. So, Girl actually gets more utility out of giving Boy the proﬁts than
keeping the ball and the money to herself.
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3. Girl aims for a more efﬁcient outcome. As the pot is increasing for both with
every pass, Girl might expect that Boy colludes with her against nature. After
the last pass, Girl and Boy would have extracted the highest possible proﬁt from
nature. For this, however, Girls would have to believe that Boy passes the last
ball back to her (or have altruistic preferences).
Of course, the dilemma of the situation is that Boy does not know what Girl’s
underlying motivation was when she passed the ball. Boy has to form a belief about
Girl’s intentions, but he cannot know for sure. To make matters worse, in a world of
many players, there are many possible beliefs and weighted mixtures of beliefs
about each other’s underlying motivations.
With certain assumptions, game theory can deal with these situations. For
example, let us assume that all deviations from the rational equilibrium are because
of the ﬁrst of the above reasons. If people make independent and unbiased mistakes
and we know about this, then Boy can compute how probable it is that Girl makes
another mistake.12 If players believe in a sufﬁciently high error rate, they end up in
a ‘Quantal Response Equilibrium’ (QRE) of passing the ball at least once
(McKelvey and Palfrey 1995, 1998). In fact, experimental evidence shows that the
vast majority of people pass the ball more than once. Repeated rounds of this game
also show, however, that the experienced error rate in the population in early rounds
feeds into people’s behavior in later rounds, which can then be explained quite
rationally in a QRE sense (McKelvey and Palfrey 1992).
The basic reasoning in the centipede game is not restricted to sequential moves
but can also take place in a one shot decision as the following example shows.
Guessing game: Every person in a larger group is asked to privately pick a number from 0
to 100 and write it on a piece of paper. An experimenter collects the numbers and computes
the average. The person with the number that is closest to 2=3 of the group average wins.
These rules are known to everybody before they pick the number (Moulin 1986).
Let’s assume that everybody in the room (except you) randomly picks a number.
Then the group’s average would be 50 and you would pick 2=3  50 ¼ 33. If
everybody thinks that, everybody would pick 33 and you should pick
2=3  33 ¼ 22. Then again, if everybody does that you should pick 14:6, 9:7; 6:5
etc. until you reach 0. Depending on their number, players exhibit distinct,
boundedly rational levels of cognitive reasoning (Nagel 1995). Players with no
level of reasoning (‘Level 0’) pick a random number, ‘Level 1’ players pick 33,
‘Level 2’ players pick 22, and so forth. In experiments, most players reveal ﬁrst-
and second-order depth of reasoning (Nagel 1995; Camerer et al. 2004).
Under the common rationality assumption, there is no strategic uncertainty about
the others. Hence, if all players have an inﬁnite level of reasoning, all players
12Of course, it might also be that Girl did not make a mistake at all but instead assumed that Boy
would make a mistake. She might have passed the ball in the expectation that Boy erroneously
passes it back. Hence, if we assume mistakes, observing a ‘mistake’ might not actually be a real
error, but rational speculation on the other side making one. See Osborne (2003) for a discussion
on this.
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choose the number 0, which is the Nash equilibrium of this game. Zero is the only
value where everybody in the group can win.
In a QRE-world, however, where we believe that some of us makes mistakes, 0
would not be a best response or equilibrium. We would have to pick a positive
number, but which one exactly solely depends on our belief about the error rate of
the other people in the group. Thus, to win this game in the real world, rational
players should not choose the theoretical Nash equilibrium but a positive number.
Interestingly, when doing so, we cannot tell anymore from the outside whether the
winner was extremely rational or made a mistake and was simply lucky.
There are several other models that try to explain the real-world deviations from
the Nash equilibrium in both the centipede and the guessing game (a.k.a. beauty
contest). Cognitive hierarchy models, for example, assume that each player has a
ﬁnite depth of reasoning and believes that s/he is the most sophisticated player in
the game. Thus, in the guessing game, a Level 2 player will assume that all others
are Level 1 and therefore choose 22. A Level 3 player expects all others to be Level
2 and chooses 14:6, and so on.13 Another branch of game theory, referred to as
‘global games’, attempts to deal with the second of the above reasons (other
preferences), by assuming various simultaneous payoff structures that each player
may face with a certain probability (Carlsson and Damme 1993).
In essence, all models advance possible ways how certain beliefs about other
players’ actions and beliefs are formed. Depending on these beliefs, practically all
out-of-equilibrium outcomes can be reached. However, as all models plausibly
describe experimentally observed outcomes, we still lack a fundamental under-
standing of belief formation processes. How are initial beliefs (priors) about others
are formed under strategic uncertainty? How quickly do people learn and in which
way?14 A common assumption is that people form expectations and update their
beliefs about the real state of the world according to some learning scheme (Sargent
1993). Many studies in neuroscience, particularly in the area of sensorimotor
control, suggest that our brain is a Bayesian prediction machine.15 We would not be
able to catch a ball without continuous forecasting and updating of priors about its
most likely trajectory (Doya 2007). When it comes to cognitive processes, however,
other studies have shown that we are not very good at Bayesian updating. For
13In the centipede game, if Girl is Level 0 (non-strategic), she will compare the payoffs at each
possible endpoint of the game. As the pot is increasing for both with every pass, she will note that
her highest reward results from Boy passing the ball on the ﬁnal round. Girl will thus choose to
always pass the ball. If Girl is Level 1, she will note that this outcome is not feasible for Boy on the
last round and choose not to pass the ball on her last round. If Girl is Level 2, she expects that Boy
is Level 1 and that he will, therefore, anticipate her ending the game on her last round. She
therefore chooses to end the game on the second to last round, and so on.
14For example, in the centipede game, assume that Boy believes Girl is rational, but then he
suddenly gets the ball. How did Boy come to his initial belief in the ﬁrst place, and how does he
adapt his belief given that Girl did not behave accordingly?
15Also see the chapter of Bekkering, van Elk and Friston in this book.
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example, in the assessment of probabilities, people have been shown to neglect base
rates (Kahneman and Tversky 1973). In stock markets, investors seem to over- and
under-react to different types of news (De Bondt and Thaler 1985). Alternative
models, for example, reinforcement learning and adaptive learning of simple
forecasting heuristics or anchor and adjustment processes, are cognitively less
demanding and allow for more errors (Kahneman 2003; Tversky and Kahneman
1974; Hommes 2013). At the extreme end of the spectrum, some psychologists
argue that beliefs come ﬁrst and that the brain is nothing more than a chatterbox that
rationalizes beliefs ex post. The brain looks for patterns in sensory data and infuses
them with meaning, forming beliefs. Then, it primarily focuses on the selection of
conﬁrmatory evidence that reinforces those beliefs in a positive feedback loop.16
4.3 Speculation
With heterogeneous beliefs and different levels of reasoning, speculation comes
into play. We focus on ﬁnancial speculation, which aims at making a proﬁt from
price movements in a market, even if these price movements are completely
unrelated to the fundamental value of the underlying asset or its proceeds (e.g.,
dividends or interest).17 This can be seen in the following adaptation of the cen-
tipede game from (Moinas and Pouget 2013).
Bubble game: An asset, commonly known to have no fundamental value, is traded in a
sequential market with three traders. At each point in the sequence, an incoming trader has
two choices. S/he can either accept a buy offer at a given price and offer it to the next trader
in line at a higher price, or s/he can reject the buy offer, which leaves the current owner
stuck with a worthless asset. The last trader in the sequence cannot sell the asset anymore.
Thus, when traders buy the asset, they effectively speculate on not being last and on being
able to sell it to the next trader at a higher price. Traders do not know their position in the
market sequence. They do, however, receive a signal about their position. This signal is the
price of the asset that has been offered to them. The higher the offered price the higher the
probability of being last in the sequence.
Figure 2 shows a graphical representation of the game. All traders receive one
dollar initial capital. Trader 1 is offered to buy the asset at a randomly drawn price
P1 by nature.
18 Trader 1 does not know whether the offer comes from nature or a
16A recent bestseller of psychologist and science historian Michael Shermer has popularized this
view (Shermer 2012).
17Despite many disadvantages and public criticism, speculation also has positive functions, for
example, to provide liquidity in ﬁnancial markets, which makes it easier or even possible for others
to offset risk.
18As the random price can be above 1 dollar, we assume that a ﬁnancial partner (who is not part of
the game) provides each player with sufﬁcient capital to be able to buy the asset. When selling the
asset the ﬁnancial partner gets all the proﬁts except for 10 dollar which the trader receives.
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previous trader (as s/he does not know her position in the sequence for sure).19
When Trader 1 rejects the offer the game ends and all traders earn one dollar of
initial capital. When Trader 1 accepts the offer, the asset is offered to Trader 2 at a
price P2[P1. When Trader 2 rejects, the game ends: Trader 1 earns nothing and
Trader 2 and 3 each earn their initial capital (one dollar). When Trader 2 accepts,
Trader 1 successfully sells the asset and earns 10 dollar. Trader 2 then offers the
asset to Trader 3 at P3[P2. When Trader 3 rejects, the game ends and Trader 2 is
stuck with the worthless asset (Trader 1 gets 10 dollar, see above). As Trader 3 does
not know for sure whether s/he is last in row she might buy the asset, but will be
unable to resell. In this case Trader 3 gets nothing and Trader 1 and 2 each enjoy 10
dollar proﬁt from successful reselling.
The Nash equilibrium of the bubble game is very similar to the centipede game:
due to backward induction no trader should buy the asset. Thus, the ﬁrst, randomly
drawn price P1 of the asset will not be accepted by Trader 1. Accordingly, the
market value for the asset is equal to its fundamental value, namely 0. In their
experiments, however, Moinas and Pouget (2013) ﬁnd substantial trading of this
worthless asset and the formation of signiﬁcant price bubbles. Theoretically, the
QRE povides the best explanation for this buying behavior (Moinas and Pouget
2013). Traders seem to believe that their fellow traders down the line will make
mistakes. It is therefore rational for them to speculate on such mistakes and buy the
asset as long as the probability to sell it to someone next in line is high enough. This
result is very much in line with the famous ‘greater fool theory’ (Long et al. 1990),
which suggests that rational traders buy overvalued assets in the expectation that a
Fig. 2 Bubble game (extensive form)
19There are only two cases where traders can know their position for sure: when the offered price is
the minimum or the maximum of the range of randomly drawn prices, which signal with certainty
that they are at the ﬁrst or last position in the sequence, respectively. For all other prices, however,
traders can only infer a probability not to be last.
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‘greater fool’ down the line will mistakenly buy the asset at an even higher price.20
In fact, experimental tests show that individuals who speculate a lot in this game
also produce stronger bubbles and crashes in more realistic and dynamic double
auction trading environments (Janssen et al. 2015).
5 The Madness of Crowds
As explained in the previous section, speculators may try to ride a bubble in the
belief that there are enough fools out there to buy them out. This can be a rational
strategy and there are many scientiﬁc models that explain the existence of such
rational bubbles in ﬁnancial markets (see Stracca (2004) for an overview). It seems
that there are potentially enough greater fools out there for more professional
traders to speculate on. Heterogeneous agent models in ﬁnance assume that market
participants are very different, not only with respect to preferences but also in terms
of market experience, ﬁnancial literacy and speculative sophistication (Hommes
2006). Empirical studies show that private traders, who are considered to be less
sophisticated than professional traders, do not gain from their trading on average
and actually underperform after deduction of transaction costs. Instead of (noise)
trading, private investors could have made more money buy simply investing into a
broadly diversiﬁed stock market index and do nothing (Barber and Odean 2000).
Speculating on greater fools, however, entails the risk to exit the market too late
when not enough fools are left to buy the overpriced stocks. To complicate matters
it is possible that speculators feed on each other, mistaking purchases of other
speculators as noise. As in the guessing game it is often hard to tell whether a
winning bid was really smart or simply lucky, particularly when there is a lot of
noise. Warren Buffet, one of the richest and most successful investors of all time,
once warned: “Nothing sedates rationality like large doses of effortless money.
After a heady experience of that kind, normally sensible people drift into behavior
akin to that of Cinderella at the ball. They know that overstaying the festivities—
that is, continuing to speculate in companies that have gigantic valuations relative to
the cash they are likely to generate in the future—will eventually bring on
pumpkins and mice. But they nevertheless hate to miss a single minute of what is
one helluva party. Therefore, the giddy participants all plan to leave just seconds
before midnight. There’s a problem, though: They are dancing in a room in which
the clocks have no hands.”21
20‘Greater fools’ are also often called ‘noise traders’, because they are seen to buy and sell assets in
ﬁnancial markets at random, like ‘white noise’. Classical examples of noise traders are inexpe-
rienced individuals who inherit some money and decide to invest it in some random portfolio in
the stock market.
21Warren Buffet, Letter to the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc., 2000, p. 14.
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5.1 Luck Versus Skill
This raises the question how speculators can be viewed as professional rational
agents who exploit noise traders and, at the same time, as ‘giddy Cinderellas’ who
miss the point of exit. The answer is that, although professional traders and
sophisticated speculators may not be greater fools, even they cannot beat the market
in the long run, which makes them fools, too; maybe lesser fools, but fools after all.
This notion is a direct implication of the efﬁcient market hypothesis (EMH), which
states that nobody can systematically beat the market. The value of a ﬁnancial asset
is deﬁned by its expected future cash flow, discounted to its present value. Through
the market mechanism, all relevant forecasts of market participants are compounded
in market prices. If ﬁnancial markets are efﬁcient, which means that all information
about possible future states of nature and cash flows are impounded in market prices
instantaneously, then the residual price movements must be triggered by genuine
surprises, which nobody has seen coming and which are therefore, by deﬁnition, a
random walk (Fama 1965).
For a graphic representation, let’s extend the Galton board in Figure 0 to 1000
rows of pegs, run a couple of balls through it and track their paths. Figure 3 shows
some of the random walks of these balls, turned by 90° so that they now ‘fall’
horizontally along the x-axis of 1000 pegs. Remember that this is equivalent to a
1000 coin tosses in which we can either lose or gain a dollar. Most random walks
will deviate substantially and for longer periods from wealth levels of zero. Two
thirds can deviate as far as 31:70 dollars, indicated by the two dotted lines, which
are deﬁned by r ﬃﬃﬃnp : the standard deviation of the coin toss (r ¼ 1) and the
number of tosses (n ¼ 1000). One third of all random walks will deviate at some
point to wealth levels above and below r ﬃﬃﬃnp , as the two outliers show with
wealth levels of 100 dollars.22
As the EMH predicts, the random walks in Fig. 3 have a high resemblance with
stock price charts. In fact, some surveys indicate that stock market traders and other
ﬁnancial professionals cannot reliably tell the difference between random walks and
real stock price developments (Siegel 2013). Many studies in ﬁnancial economics
show that the performance of the vast majority of ﬁnancial professionals is due to
(random) luck and not skill (Fama and French 2010; Malkiel 1995). Luck to be
active in a certain period and in a certain class of investments. As a famous
multi-annual experiment by the Wall Street Journal showed there is a very high
likelihood that a dart-throwing monkey is an equally ‘skilled’ stock market fore-
caster as professional investment advisers (Porter 2005). If an investment manager
22Theoretically, if enough red balls fall through the Galton board, 1000 pegs or coin flips can
produce a sequence of 1000 heads, leading to a ﬁnal wealth of 1000 dollar. This is equivalent to
Émile Borel’s inﬁnitely typewriting ape, published in 1913. At one point in time, by chance, this
ape will have produced the Bible or Hamlet or any other ﬁnite text.
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has an exceptional track record of past investments, there is a good chance that we
have met the upper outlier random walk in Fig. 3 and not somebody who can
consistently predict super-investments that others simply did not see. The catch
with random walks is that the expected value of all future coin flips does not change
and always remains zero, no matter at which point we currently are. This is what
mathematicians and ﬁnance scholars call a ‘martingale’: at each point in a realized
random sequence, the conditional expectation of the next value in the sequence is
equal to the current value, irrespective of the preceding sequence. The martingale
property of asset returns in efﬁcient ﬁnancial markets is the reason why govern-
ments warn clients that past investment performance provides no indication for the
future. Unfortunately, too many investors believe that signiﬁcant positive deviations
from the x-axis are a signal of skill and not luck (Hoffmann and Post 2014).23 In
doing so, they fall prey to the self-attribution bias, which is the tendency to attribute
success to one’s own disposition and failure to external forces (Miller and Ross
1975; Feather and Simon 1971).
The prevalence of the EMH is the reason why traders say that there is ‘no free
lunch at Wall Street’. You cannot simply predict future stock prices from some
charts (its preceding sequence) and make some easy money. Even news, when
publicly available, cannot be used as forecasting and trading advantage as it is
almost instantaneously compounded in the market price. In many ﬁnancial markets
computer algorithms are involved in more than half of all ﬁnancial transactions.
Algorithms trade in milliseconds, impounding new information in prices much
Fig. 3 Random walks
23For a vivid description of the pitfalls of randomness that ﬁnancial traders falls prey to, also see
Nassim Nicholas Taleb’s bestseller ‘Fooled by randomness’ (Taleb 2005).
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quicker than any human trader could, which has a positive effect on the informa-
tiveness of prices (Chaboud et al. 2014).24
The bottom line is, that efﬁcient ﬁnancial markets are very good in ‘producing’
random walks. There is a broad consensus in the academic ﬁnance community—
including many critics of the EMH—that, because of the efﬁciency of most
ﬁnancial markets, it is very hard, if not impossible, for traders to systematically beat
the market (Stracca 2004).25 In the end we are all greater or lesser fools in light of
the self-produced randomness on ﬁnancial markets.
5.2 No Free Lunch 6¼ the Price Is Right
The EMH is probably the most powerful and, at the same time, most hotly debated
principle in Finance. This was demonstrated in 2013, when the Nobel Prize in
Economics was awarded to three eminent scholars: Eugene Fama, father of the
EMH; Robert Shiller, an outspoken critic of the EMH, and Lars Peter Hansen, who
offered an econometric compromise between the two. The EMH has two implica-
tions: one is that we cannot beat the market (no free lunch); the other is that, because
of this informational efﬁciency, the market price we observe is a correct estimate of a
ﬁnancial asset’s future cash flows a.k.a. its fundamental or intrinsic value (the price
is right). The former looks at price changes (returns), the latter at price levels. In the
former we are in a world of arbitrage which exploits temporary differences between
prices.26 In the latter we are in a world of market timing, over-/undervaluation and
mean reversion, which exploit differences to fundamental values. It is the latter of the
two worlds in which we believe to observe ‘madness’ in markets: bubbles and
crashes that—with hindsight—seem to be everything but ‘the right price’.27 As
much as ﬁnancial scholars agree on the former, that we cannot beat the market, they
are critical about the latter, the claim that the price is always right (Stracca 2004).
24The implications of algorithmic trading for social welfare are less clear. The informational
efﬁciency by speeding up price discovery with machines may not be socially efﬁcient if traders
overinvest in technology due to adverse selection (Biais et al. 2011).
25This insight has led to the phenomenal growth of index funds, which specialize in automatic and
therefore very cost-effective investments in large, diversiﬁed index portfolios (the market return),
without the pretense of being able to beat the market.
26A classic example is triangular arbitrage in currency markets. If we pay 2 euro for 1 dollar, 1
dollar for 1 pound, and 1.5 euro for 1 pound, then it makes sense to buy pounds with euros (1.5:1),
sell pounds for dollars (1:1), and sell dollars for euros (1:2) until all three exchange rates are
perfectly balanced.
27A prominent example is the ‘tulipmania’ in March 1637 in the United Provinces (now the
Netherlands), where a single tulip bulb reached prices of more than 3000 guilders (florins), which
was about 10 times the annual income of a skilled craftsman. Note that many of the peak prices
were quoted in futures contracts which were later changed by decree into options contracts. Thus,
despite extreme price quotes, it is questionable whether much money had changed hands between
buyers and sellers (Thompson 2006).
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To unravel this apparent contradiction we have to understand that the EMH rests
on three, progressively weaker conditions, any one of which will lead to market
efﬁciency: (i) full rationality, (ii) independent deviations from rationality, and
(iii) unlimited arbitrage (Shleifer 2000). Proponents of the EMH argue that, even if
conditions (i) and (ii) do not hold, which is widely accepted, any systematic pricing
errors (biases) will be arbitraged away by more sophisticated traders. Critics of the
EMH argue that the potential of arbitrageurs to reduce mispricing is limited:
arbitrage is not riskless, in many situations there exist severe liquidity constraints to
arbitrage against the market, and arbitrage requires substantial investments in ICT,
real-time data, and human capital to succeed in a very competitive business
(Shleifer and Vishny 1997). Hence, even if there is no free lunch, because the
market does not offer any feasible arbitrage opportunities, this does not necessarily
lead to a convergence of prices to fundamental values (Stracca 2004). This has been
demonstrated by Robert Shiller, who is well-known for his early warnings of a
housing price bubble in a comparatively inefﬁcient market with very limited arbi-
trage possibilities.28 A related criticism is that arbitrage is limited, because arbi-
trageurs themselves are boundedly rational. Then less rational traders (greater fools)
are driven out of the market by more rational traders (lesser fools) so that nobody
can beat the market anymore, but this does not exclude that assets are mispriced.
Overall, “the existence of a pricing bias due to behavioral factors is indeed fully
compatible with rational expectations and a random walk behavior of asset prices”
(Stracca 2004 p. 395).
5.3 From Mispricing to Madness
An important difference between economics and natural sciences is that today’s
economic decisions and actions depend on today’s beliefs and expectations about
the future (which again can differ from tomorrow’s belief about the future). The
predictions, expectations or beliefs of agents about the future are part of a highly
endogenous, dynamic and nonlinear feedback system which requires a theory of
expectations (Hommes 2013). An early and mathematically very elegant theory of
expectations was the rational expectations hypothesis (Muth 1961; Lucas Jr 1972):
28Accordingly, Shiller calls for more ﬁnancial innovation that allow trading of risks that really
matter: “Had there been a well-developed real estate market before the ﬁnancial crisis of 2008, it
would plausibly have reduced the severity of the crisis, because it would have allowed, even
encouraged, people to hedge their real estate risks. The severity of that crisis was substantially due
to the leveraged undiversiﬁed positions people were taking in the housing market, causing over 15
million US households to become underwater on their mortgages, and thus reducing their
spending. There is no contradiction at all in saying that there are bubbles in the housing market and
yet saying that we ought to create better and more liquid markets for housing” (Shiller 2014,
p. 1511).
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under assumptions of rationality this hypothesis provides a rational expectations
equilibrium (REE), where expectations and realizations, on average, coincide.
Theoretically, in an efﬁcient market with risk neutral agents, prices correctly reflect
all possible future states of an asset’s cash flows (discounted at the risk free rate)
and their true, physical (objective) probabilities. Hence, from efﬁcient risk neutral
market prices we can infer state price probabilities that coincide with objective
probabilities.29
The REE refers to situations where we play Roulette with well-deﬁned states,
probability distributions and expected values. We refer to this kind of uncertainty as
risk. Risk can be seen as a very special case of uncertainty, but it is not the norm.
Most decisions in life are taken without knowing objective probabilities or all
possible states, often referred to as ambiguity (Wakker 2010). Ambiguous situa-
tions provide a fertile breeding ground for very heterogenous beliefs and expec-
tations (Stahl 2013) which agents have to learn about. As learning is not perfect,
boundedly rational systems can be complex, nonlinear and dynamic (Hommes
2013). In such an environment, strategic uncertainty about the beliefs and behavior
of others can easily create nonlinear feedback cycles. This would not be a problem
if the system eventually converges to the REE.30 There are many examples,
however, where bounded rationality leads to deterministic chaos that makes pre-
dictions virtually impossible and forecasts become practically random. Econometric
time series studies did not succeed in ruling out randomness in stock price data (or
deterministic chaos) and there is strong evidence for nonlinear dependence
(Hommes 2013). Hence, while fully informed rational expectations are
self-fulﬁlling in the REE, less informed prophecies can also be self-fulﬁlling in
boundedly rational systems under ambiguity.
A typical example of such a feedback cycle are situations where fundamental
values themselves are affected by market evaluations. To illustrate this, take a look
at the market price of Tesla Motors as shown in Fig. 4. In mid 2014, the electric car
company is trading at a market value of more than half that of General Motors,
Ford, and Honda. Each of those established companies had more than 50 times the
annual revenues as Tesla. “Pure electric cars remain a niche market, making up
<1 % of total U.S. car sales. And within that, Tesla is a niche product. Its Model S
29When markets reflect risk aversion, state price probabilities for undesirable (desirable) states are
higher (lower) than objective probabilities (Bossaerts and Oedegaard 2000). The equivalent
martingale measure (EMM) is a probability measure in mathematical ﬁnance that adjusts the
observed state price probabilities of future outcomes such that they incorporate investors’ risk
preferences. The EMM is a central tool in arbitrage pricing. It reflects the probability distribution
under which all possible bets are fair given complete markets and no-arbitrage conditions.
30Attempts by ﬁnance theorists to reconcile evidence of individual non-rational behavior with
aggregate rationality at the market level through learning and evolutionary selection has proved
difﬁcult as they required a number of demanding conditions (see Sect. 5.2 and Stracca (2004) for a
discussion).
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costs about $75,000, while prices for the Leaf start around $30,000 and the Volt
around $35,000.”31 Moreover, in 2014 Tesla sold less e-cars than Nissan.32
Is Tesla a bubble? Interestingly, Tesla’s CEO himself, Elon Musk, repeatedly
remarked that he considered the stock to be overvalued (see quotes in Fig. 4).
Indeed, there are indications that the price is partially driven by speculation.33 It
may therefore be rational, albeit risky, for investors to ride the bubble as long as
others are still buying. In support of the latter, apparently many people believe that
Tesla will lead a revolution in the car industry. In fact, the high share price, possibly
also driven by pure ﬁnancial speculation, provided enough funding for Tesla to
make some very expensive investments in potentially game-changing projects.34
Thus, if shareholders’ beliefs have been over-optimistic originally, precisely this
deviation from otherwise rational expectations, possibly reinforced by rational
speculation, may have provided Tesla with the necessary capital to make their
beliefs more realistic.
Even with hindsight it will be difﬁcult to disentangle the underlying effects in
Tesla’s stock price development. “There is often a tendency (probably because
Fig. 4 Stock price of Tesla motors, 2010–2014
31According to marketwatch.com, Oct 3, 2014 2:59 p.m. ET.
32In September 2014, the most sold e-car was Nissan Leaf (2881 units), followed by Tesla’s
Model S (1650 units) and Chevrolet’s Volt (1394) and BMW’s 3i (1022).
33In a cryptic tweet in October 2014, Musk mentioned “D and something else”. As a popular
investor news site, MarketWatch.com, reported, “Musk’s cryptic tweets last Thursday—and the
rampant speculation they have fueled since—have pushed Tesla (…) shares about 9 % higher from
their Wednesday close.”
34Tesla announced that they invest 5 billion US$ in a lithium-ion battery Gigafactory with a
planned production that exceeds the world capacity of 2013. Tesla also embarked on building an
ambitious network of Supercharger stations along roads to facilitate longer distance journeys.
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economists are themselves affected by hindsight bias) to regard a certain devel-
opment caused by market developments as unavoidable (supporting the idea of
exogenous rationality). But it can sometimes be the result of a self-fulﬁlling spiral
in which the prime mover is indeed an ‘endogenous’ market whimsical move. (…)
The issue of the feedback mechanism seems most relevant in this respect. Thus far,
there has been no systematic attempt to address the issue of the feedback from
market prices to fundamentals, and only some informal speculations have been
provided (Shiller 2000a, b; Daniel et al. 2002)” (Stracca 2004, p. 397).
6 Conclusion
Interactions between people are rich in randomness, consciously produced or
unintended. The fertilization of economics and ﬁnance with psychological ideas and
evidence allows for new insights in dealing with randomness in human interactions,
but it also adds to the risk of being less parsimonious (Tirole 2002). A useful feature
of many game theoretical models and the classical REE is that they impose a strong
discipline on the degrees of freedom in economic models. Boundedly rational
models run the risk of incorporating too much randomness and freedom as if
anything goes. “To avoid ‘ad hoccery’, a successful bounded rationality research
program needs to discipline the class of expectations and decision rules” (Hommes
2013, p. 9). In doing so, and in order to understand ‘madness’ in markets, more
investigation in social psychology rather than individual psychology is needed. We
need to understand how randomness can be channeled at the aggregate level in
social and economic systems, for example through the synchronization of expec-
tations with improved market structures and communication (see, e.g., Shiller
2000a, b).
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Randomness and the Games of Science
Jelle J. Goeman
Abstract Recently it has become clear that too many ﬁndings reported in the
scientiﬁc literature are irreproducible. We study the causes of this phenomenon
from a statistical perspective. Although a certain amount of irreproducible research
is unavoidable due to the randomness inherent to scientiﬁc observation, two related
phenomena conspire to increase the proportion of such ﬁndings: publication bias,
i.e. the custom that negative ﬁndings are usually not published, and conﬁrmation
bias, i.e. the human inclination to interpret observations in a way that conﬁrms prior
beliefs. Both biases are poorly held in check in the current scientiﬁc publication
model in which there is no explicit role for the views of a critic, i.e. a scientist with
opposing theoretical views. We argue that if researchers are able to play the critic’s
role imaginatively, they will publish science of higher methodological quality that
is not only more reproducible, but also more relevant for theory. To allow for this,
we must promote a different view on statistical methodology, seeing statistics not as
the gatekeeper of scientiﬁc evidence, but as a language scientists may use to discuss
uncertainty when they talk about the implications of observations for theory.
1 Introduction
In 2009, a highly remarkable scientiﬁc experiment was performed by Bennett,
Baird, Miller and Wolford, four American brain researchers. They used functional
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), a brain imaging technique, to determine which
brain areas respond to emotional stimuli in a test subject. The subject was shown
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several emotionally laden pictures and was asked to verbalize the emotion shown.
The display of pictures was alternated with rest, and by comparing the brain
readings between exposure and rest, the researchers were able to clearly identify a
brain area that showed a response to the stimulus offered (Bennett et al. 2011).
What was so remarkable about this experiment? Certainly not the idea of
measuring brain response to pictures using fMRI; this had been done countless
times by other researchers in the past. Also not the statistical methods used to ﬁnd
the relevant brain regions by comparing exposure and rest states; the same tech-
niques had been used in many influential publications in brain imaging before. The
originality of the study lay in the choice of the test subject. This was not, as usual, a
human, but an Atlantic salmon. Moreover, the salmon was stone dead, having been
bought in the local supermarket on the very morning of the experiment.
The paper describing the experiment, when ﬁnally published, created quite a
storm among brain imaging researchers, and was credited with the Ig Nobel prize in
2012.1 Apparently, standard imaging techniques with standard analysis methods
could produce clearly nonsensical results. In the future, the authors of the salmon
experiment argued, more stringent statistical methods should be used in fMRI
research that have a smaller risk of false positive results. As a result of this paper,
methodological standards in brain imaging have increased substantially in the last
few years. However, the salmon experiment not only had implications for future
research, but also casts doubt on past results. How many published papers on brain
imaging would have used the same methods as the salmon experiment to come to
equally wrong conclusions? How reliable, then, is the brain imaging literature?
Other authors in other ﬁelds have also raised questions about the reliability of the
scientiﬁc literature. Prominent among these is the epidemiologist John Ioannidis
with his (2005) essay “Why most published research ﬁndings are false.” Ioannidis
argued quite generally from statistical arguments that a large proportion of the
results presented in medical publications can be expected to be wrong. This pro-
portion may differ between subﬁelds of medicine, and depends on several factors,
which we will come back to later. He comes to several surprising conclusions,
among which one is that ‘hot’ scientiﬁc ﬁelds, in which many teams work on the
same problems, and scientiﬁc breakthroughs are eagerly anticipated, are especially
prone to produce unreliable ﬁndings. Consequently, results in high status journals,
such as Nature and Science, would be especially unreliable.
Ioannidis’ theoretical arguments have been conﬁrmed by researchers that have
actually tried to reproduce published scientiﬁc results. The results of such attempts
have varied greatly. In psychology, where Ioannidis’ arguments can be expected to
hold as well, the journal Social Psychology published a special issue that reported
replications of 13 recent studies (Klein et al. 2015). In 10 out of 13 cases, the effects
reported in the original papers were found again, although often with a smaller
magnitude. One study was on the borderline, replicating with a very small effect.
The other 2 studies (14 %) failed to reach the same conclusions. More dramatic was
1The Ig Nobel Prizes honor scientiﬁc achievements that make people laugh, and then think.
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the experience reported by Begley and Ellis (2012), scientists working at Amgen, a
pharmaceutical company in California, who tried to replicate the results of many
‘landmark’ papers describing promising drug targets. They failed in no less than 47
out of 53 cases (89 %). Statisticians have tried to quantify the proportion of
unreliable results in larger chunks of the scientiﬁc literature. Jager and Leek (2014)
estimated the proportion of unreliable results in the whole medical literature at
14 %. Statisticians commenting on this effort almost invariably stressed that the
percentage is very likely to be an underestimate, and possibly a severe one. The
discussion of the reliability of scientiﬁc results has also reached the popular media,
where regularly a bleak image is sketched of science in crisis. As to the cause and
prevention of the unreliability scientiﬁc results, different opinions are voiced. Two
competing explanations dominate the debate.
According to the ﬁrst, scientists striving for fame and status deliberately engage
in ‘sloppy science’. They make their results look better than they are in order to
publish them in higher ranking journals. Results are not fabricated, and ‘sloppy
science’ is not the same as downright fraud, but ‘sloppy’ scientists are accused of
wilfully neglecting proper checks and validations in order to publish more quickly.
In variants of this argument, scientists are the victims rather than the perpetrators, as
they are forced into their behavior by external institutional pressures. Because of
savage competition between scientists and the demands from universities and
funding agencies for ever longer lists of publications, scientists would have no
choice but to engage in this type of dubious behavior.
A second explanation does not blame the scientists, but the methods they use.
Since statistical methods are supposed to protect scientists against spurious ﬁnd-
ings, a high incidence of unreliable scientiﬁc results clearly indicates a design error
in these methods. The type of statistical method most commonly denounced is the
hypothesis test and the p-value, which, as critics point out, are frequently misun-
derstood and often used in a wrong way. Some authors argue that these methods
should be banned altogether, a policy recently implemented by the journal Basic
and Applied Psychology (Traﬁmow and Marks 2015). Some commentators advo-
cate different statistical methods instead, e.g. Bayesian statistics. Others such as the
editors of Basic and Applied Psychology simply advise against all advanced sta-
tistical methods, advocating simple descriptive statistics instead.
Interestingly, these two explanations suggest radically different solutions to the
problem of unreliable results in science. If ‘sloppy science’ is the problem, scien-
tists should be forced to adhere more strictly to proper statistical methodology.
They should be kept in check by statisticians, who would then be cast into the role
of policing various ﬁelds of science. Conversely, if statistics itself is the problem,
the solution would be to free scientists from the influence of statisticians as much as
possible. Scientists would then either convert to a completely different way of doing
statistics, or just report their ﬁndings unencumbered by any need to demonstrate
statistical signiﬁcance.
More statistics or less? Which is better for the advancement of science? Which
of the two explanations for the current flood of irreproducible research is the right
one? Discussing the second explanation ﬁrst, we will ﬁrst review where
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randomness and irreproducibility in science come from, and discuss the way sta-
tistical methods deal with this. We will explain that randomness is inherent to
scientiﬁc observation, and that statistics provides scientists with a way to discuss
the implications of this randomness on their experiments. Next, to shed light on the
ﬁrst explanation, we discuss several models for the way scientists interact with each
other. We emphasize the important role of critics with different theoretical views in
scientiﬁc inquiry, arguing that statistical reasoning is an essential part of the dia-
logue between scientist and critic. Finally, we look at the current publication model
for reporting scientiﬁc results, and how it encourages a different, much more
mechanical view of statistics. In this view statistics is seen as an arbiter of truth
rather than as a language for discussing uncertainty. Rejecting both of the expla-
nations given above, we will argue that it is primarily this distorted view of sta-
tistical methods that explains the current reproducibility crisis in science.
2 Randomness in Science
“Everything changes and nothing remains still; you cannot step twice into the same
stream” said the Greek philosopher Heraclitus, stressing the ever-changing nature of
reality. This truism applies very much to research, where no two experiments ever
return exactly the same result: different subjects respond differently to treatment,
and measurements are always variable. Randomness is inherent to scientiﬁc
observation.
Randomness, moreover, is bound to produce flukes. Since scientiﬁc observation
is subject to variability, seemingly meaningful patterns that the researcher observes
may well be one-time events rather than repeatable ones. For example, the patients
in a treated group may happen to recover very well, while the patients in the
untreated group do poorly, all because of their own particular reasons not related to
the treatment. To the researcher this may suggest a strong effect for a treatment that
is in reality not effective. When the experiment is subsequently replicated by the
same group of scientists or by a different one, the spurious patterns are very likely
not observed again. Irreproducible results, therefore, are a fundamental conse-
quence of randomness in scientiﬁc observation, and are unavoidable even in the
most meticulous and honest scientiﬁc practice. We can, however, try to limit the
frequency of the occurrence of such result. This is what statistics tries to do.2
Statistical theory makes an explicit distinction between the sample, i.e. the
concrete observations the researcher has in hand, and the population, i.e. a larger
pool that these observations were drawn from. For example in a preelection poll, the
2This statistical view on (lack of) reproducibility is a limited one. There are of course many other
ways in which research can be irreproducible, for example because of systematic measurement
error, such as when the CERN-OPERA group in 2011 reported neutrino's that traveled faster than
light, or downright fraud, such as for example with the Dutch social psychologist Diederik Stapel.
See Baggerly and Coombes (2009) for an shocking account of how wrong things can go.
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sample consists of the voters that have been interviewed by the pollsters, whereas
the population is the much larger group of all voters. In many cases the ‘population’
is more abstract, such as in a lab experiment, where the sample might consist of a
number of measurements the scientist has made, and the population we assume they
have been drawn from is then the abstract collection of all possible measurement
outcomes.3
The distinction between sample and population allows for an explicit deﬁnition
of what replication of scientiﬁc experiments means. From a statistical perspective
replication of an experiment means taking a new sample from the same population.
Each sample is similar to the population it is drawn from, but deviates from the
population in its own random way. Irreproducible ﬁndings then are statements that
hold for a particular sample, but not for the underlying population, so that they do
not typically occur again in other samples.
The central tenet of statistics is that we are not generally interested in the
capricious sample, but only in the stable population behind it. Descriptive statistics
describing the sample are therefore of limited use. We use the sample only as a
means to learn about the population, a type of reverse engineering that we call
statistical inference.4 To do this in a quantitative way we must make an additional
assumption on the manner in which the sample was obtained from the population,
typically that it was drawn randomly. This assumption makes the powerful math-
ematical instrument of probability theory available that describes exactly how much
the sample and the population are likely to differ, which in turn allows us to
quantify the reliability of inferences about the population.
In particular, we can quantify the probability of drawing a wrong conclusion
about the population from a sample. If we assume that a researcher has set out to
ﬁnd a certain relationship or pattern, i.e. to make a scientiﬁc discovery, then we can
distinguish two possible erroneous conclusions. In the ﬁrst place, the pattern can be
visible in the sample, but not in the population. We call this a false positive or a
false discovery. Secondly, the pattern can be present in the population, but obscured
in the sample, called a false negative. While both types of errors are harmful, false
discoveries are generally considered the more serious of the two. Where a false
negative represents a waste of resources because a scientiﬁc experiment fails to
produce a result, a false positive typically initiates an even greater waste of
resources, as it will often be a trigger for misguided follow-up research. In terms of
scientiﬁc progress, a false negative is a failure to take a step forward, but a false
discovery is a step in the wrong direction.
With limited resources it is impossible to prevent both false positive and false
negative results completely. A researcher could be very restrained, only publishing
a result if there is ample evidence. Such a researcher will incur many false negative
results while avoiding false positives. Conversely, an audacious researcher
3In such situations statistics is very explicitly platonic in its philosophy. It supposes that the
unobservable abstract population really exists and is of more interest than the observable sample.
4As opposed to descriptive statistics, which describe the sample.
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publishing results on precarious evidence can expect to have many false positives
and few false negatives. Both researchers, however, risk both false positive and
false negative results. The only way to avoid false positives completely is never to
publish, and the only way to avoid false negatives completely is to always to
publish, regardless of the evidence. The inherent randomness of scientiﬁc inquiry
causes it to have elements of a game of chance. Even the best designed experiment
may, by sheer bad luck, produce a sample that is different from the underlying
population in crucial aspects and that therefore suggests a wrong conclusion.
False positive and false negative results are an inevitable consequence of the
randomness of scientiﬁc data. They are not caused by statistical thinking, or
inherent to any particular statistical method. Rather, by making the distinction
between sample and population explicit statistics provides a language to discuss
randomness of empirical data. Avoiding inferential statistics as Applied Social
Psychology proposed, mostly ignores the problem. Switching to a different statis-
tical framework, such as the Bayesian, merely rephrases it. Wrong conclusions will
result from empirical research whatever methods we use, and this fact must be
somehow taken into account.
3 The Likelihood of Irreproducible Research
The outcome of the experiment is never fully under the researcher’s control, but the
probability with which an adverse outcome occurs can be. One way to take ran-
domness into account is to control the probability of an adverse outcome (a false
positive or a false negative result). To avoid large differences between researches
regarding the reliability of the evidence they present, in most scientiﬁc ﬁelds the
acceptable risk of a false positive result is pre-speciﬁed for all researchers. It is
conventionally set to 5 %, which implies that 19 out of 20 times that a researcher
performs an experiment the result should not be a false positive, and should
therefore be reproducible at least in the limited statistical sense.
This may seem to imply that 19 out of 20 published scientiﬁc results are reliable.
Ioannidis, however, argued that this is not the case. This ratio of 19 out of 20
represents the perspective of the researcher, but is not immediately relevant from
the perspective of the readers of the scientiﬁc literature. Even if 95 % of the time
researchers produce results that are not false positives, this does not mean that 95 %
of all scientiﬁc publications are not false positives. This is because negative results,
being less newsworthy, are seldom published. Looking only at published results,
the proportion of false positives is likely to be much higher than 5 %.
The argument follows from Bayes’ rule. It is most conveniently illustrated with a
table. Suppose that 200 experiments have been carried out by researchers in a certain
ﬁeld of science in a certain period of time. Sometimes the conjecture the researchers
set out to prove was correct, sometimes it was not. For some experiments the
researchers accumulated enough evidence to prove the conjecture; for others they
were not. Based on these two dichotomies we can summarize these 200 experiments
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in a 2 × 2 contingency table. If we suppose that half of the conjectures that
researchers try to prove are in fact true, then we have 100 experiments on true and
false conjectures each. If 5 % false positive results are allowed, then 5 out of 100
experiments on false conjectures re- gardlessly accumulate enough evidence lead to
a publication. Conversely, researchers typically accept a 20 % chance of false
negative results, so that 80 out of the other 100 experiments lead to a publication.
These numbers are summarized in Table 1. As readers of the scientiﬁc literature we
only see the 85 published results, not the 115 experiments in which the researchers
failed to demonstrate their point. The percentage of false positive results among the
publications is 5/85 = 6 %, clearly more than 5 %, but not dramatically so.
This changes if we think of a ﬁeld in which researchers try much more ambitious
conjectures. Let us suppose that instead of 50 %, only 10 % of the conjectures that
the researchers attempt are in fact true. In this case we can create a similar table,
which will look like the one in Table 2. Now the researchers have to work a lot
harder for their publications, and only 25 publications result from their 200
experiments. More importantly, the percentage of irreproducible ﬁndings soars to
9/25 = 36 %.
The percentage of irreproducible results can also be high if many of the
experiments on true conjectures are underpowered, i.e. if researchers have a small
probability of ﬁnding evidence for a conjecture even if it is true. If we would have
50 % true conjectures as in Table 1, but only for 30 out of 100 true conjectures
enough evidence would be accumulated, then the proportion of false positive would
be as high as 5/35 = 14 %, as we can see in Table 3. In general, even when the
percentage of false positive results per experiment is at most 5 %, the percentage of
false positive, i.e. irreproducible results will be large if most of the conjectures
researchers set out to prove are false, or if the probability of accumulating enough
evidence for publication of a true result is low.
It is interesting to note that in both Tables 2 and 3 we see that the percentage of
experiments that leads to a publication is relatively low: 12.5 and 17.5 %,
Table 1 Illustration of Ioannidis’ argument with 50 % true conjectures
True conjecture False conjecture Total
Evidence for conjecture 80 5 85
No evidence for conjecture 20 95 115
Total 100 100 200
Table 2 Illustration of Ioannidis’ argument with 10 % true conjectures
True conjecture False conjecture Total
Evidence for conjecture 16 9 25
No evidence for conjecture 4 171 175
Total 20 180 200
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respectively. One of the things that is crucial for judging the viability of scientiﬁc
ﬁndings is therefore the success rate, i.e. the proportion of failed experiments for
every successful one. This success rate is typically hidden from the view of the
reader of the scientiﬁc literature, who only gets to see the successful experiments.
The resulting selection bias, also known as publication bias, is inherent to the
publication model that is currently dominant in science. Here, the initiative for
performing experiments and publishing about them lies with the researchers. The
experiment has clearly deﬁned positive and negative outcomes, with positive out-
comes being the only ones of real interest. The scientiﬁc readership has an
exclusively passive role, only taking note of the experiment at a late stage after an
apparent positive result has been obtained. Even the reviewers and editors who
judge the manuscript are limited to retrospective checking of quality and plausi-
bility. In this model no one except the researchers themselves can see the success
rate. No one except the researchers themselves can therefore judge the probability
that published results are false positives.
A third way, however, in which the proportion of false positive results in the
literature may be high is when there is a large probability that evidence is seemingly
found for a conjecture that is wrong. This probability is supposed to be at most 5 %,
but it can be much larger because of the well-known psychological mechanism of
conﬁrmation bias. This is a natural tendency to look for evidence that supports our
initial views, and to discard evidence that seems to counter those. Conﬁrmation bias
is a very strong force in human thinking, and one which is very difﬁcult to counter.
In research, conﬁrmation bias works in rather the same way as publication bias, but
at an earlier stage.
Conﬁrmation bias in science may arise for example when there are multiple
ways to perform an experiment, a number of statistical models and tests that can be
used, or a number of ways to pre-process the data prior to that analysis. Some of
these methods are better than others, but which ones those are is often not clear. If
an experiment does not give the result that the researcher expected, this may
therefore be due to several reasons. Of course the researcher’s theory may be false,
but it is also likely that something just went wrong in the experiment or that the
right analysis method has not been chosen. It is perfectly reasonable, then, and
scientiﬁcally sensible, to redo the experiment or the analysis. If a second experiment
or a reanalysis now turns out to support the scientist’s views, a natural explanation
will be that there was an error in the ﬁrst experiment or analysis, which has been
corrected by the second.
Table 3 Illustration of Ioannidis’ argument: underpowered studies
True conjecture False conjecture Total
Evidence for conjecture 30 5 35
No evidence for conjecture 70 95 165
Total 100 100 200
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In practice, researchers therefore do not usually perform one single analysis, but
perform several, selecting relatively favorable ones by their conﬁrmation bias. Even
if every individual experiment yields a false positive result only once every 20
times, a series of experiments like this may easily have a much larger probability a
false positive result, because a researcher trying to demonstrate something that is
not true will make several attempts, each of which again has a probability of a
seemingly favorable result. When the existence of conﬁrmation bias is taken into
account in Ioannidis’ argument, it is easy to see that it will result in an even larger
proportion of false positive results in the scientiﬁc literature.
Ioannidis’ simple reasoning can be used to pinpoint areas in science in which we
would expect false positive rates to be exceptionally high. These are for example
areas with small studies that have low power, areas with exploratory studies where
error control is lacking, areas in which statistical methods are not well standardized
so that many will be tried out, areas with cheap but difﬁcult experiments in which it
is accepted that many experiments fail. However, these are especially those areas in
which the scientiﬁc conjectures are a long shot, so that most of them are actually
false. The resulting ﬁndings, paradoxically, are typically the most newsworthy ones
which tend to get the attention of the high proﬁle journals. As a rule of thumb,
according to Ioannidis’ analysis, the more excitement surrounding a scientiﬁc
result, the greater the probability that it is a false positive. As an extreme case,
Ioannidis also describes the existence of null ﬁelds, areas of research based on false
prepositions, in which all researchers are working on research conjectures that are
not true. From the reader’s perspective, it is difﬁcult to unmask such a ﬁeld, because
the failed experiments remain under the waterline, and a steady trickle of promising
results will still be published, especially if many researchers are working in the area.
Note that null ﬁelds are often sparked by an initial false positive result.
Conﬁrmation and publication bias work together to increase the number of
irreproducible results in the scientiﬁc literature. The argument we have given here is
reminiscent of the ‘sloppy science’ argument for explaining irreproducible research
described in the introduction, but subtly and importantly different. The ‘sloppy
science’ argument implies wilful neglect of proper checks on scientiﬁc quality by
scientists eager to publish, either because of their own ambition or because they are
forced by external pressures. The argument implicitly assumes that if there would
be no sloppy science (i.e. if scientists would adhere to statistical rules) there would
not be many false positive results. Although it is true, of course, that ‘sloppy
science’, when practiced, would increase conﬁrmation biases and lead to irrepro-
ducible results, not all conﬁrmation bias arises from ‘sloppy science’. It is also clear
from Ioannidis’ arguments that large proportions of false positive ﬁndings would
still arise if ‘sloppy science’ would cease to exist. Both publication and conﬁr-
mation bias are inherent to the publication model used to disseminate results in
science. We will discuss that model later in more detail, but ﬁrst look at alternatives.
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4 The Dialogue with the Critic
The discussion so far carried an implicit assumption about the way scientists
communicate with each other. We take it for granted that they do so via scientiﬁc
publications, which are well-prepared solitary efforts by a single research group,
made public after extensive quality checking by editors and reviewers. This is the
current dominant model for science, but it is not the only possible model. To see
how other models might function, it is helpful to look back into the history of
science. Current science has an amazing productivity in terms of sheer volume of
knowledge, but early pre-20th century science has an even more surprising pro-
ductivity if we take into account the relatively small number of scientists active at
the time. In this period, when the foundations of many modern ﬁelds were laid out,
how did science progress?
Let us illustrate this with an example. In the eighteenth century two Italian
scientists were interested in electricity and its relationship to life. It was known that
application of static electricity to the limbs of dead animals could cause them to jerk
in movements similar to those a living creature would make. Surely, therefore, there
was a relationship between electricity and life. This was at least the opinion of Luigi
Galvani, a researcher from Bologna. He believed that electricity was an essential
life force in animals. According to him, static electricity was sent to the muscles,
where it was stored and used as energy for movement. By applying external
electricity to the limbs, the researcher released the reservoir of ‘animal electricity’,
thus causing the movement that was observed. Not everyone agreed with his views,
however. Alessandro Volta, from Pavia, did not agree with Galvani’s views. He did
not believe in reservoirs of animal electricity, but held the opinion that it was the
externally applied electricity alone that caused the movements.
Galvani and Volta corresponded extensively on this issue, each trying to con-
vince the other. In 1781 Galvani performed what he thought was the deﬁnitive
experiment. He hung a dead frog on an iron wire on which he had also attached a
copper wire. When he touched the frog’s leg with the copper, it jerked in the same
way as when he applied static electricity to the frog’s leg. The interpretation, to
Galvani, was obvious. No outside static electricity had been applied, and still the
frog’s leg had moved. The electricity for the movement must have come from inside
the frog. Volta replicated the experiment, getting exactly the same result. However,
he remained unconvinced, while Galvani set out his grand theory of animal elec-
tricity in a large monograph entitled De Viribus Electicitatis.5
Volta still maintained that the electricity that caused the frog’s movement must
be external, but for a long time he stood alone in his opinion. Only many years later,
in 1800, was he able to show that contact between two different metals, such as the
copper and iron used by Galvani, may generate a minute electrical current, and that
5Although Galvani's theory turned out to be wrong, this is not irreproducible research in the
statistical sense. All experiments the theory was based on were reproducible. Reproducibility is
necessary but not sufﬁcient for good theory.
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this current was sufﬁcient to cause the jerking of the frog’s leg. The electricity was
external after all. The exchange between Galvani and Volta has been of crucial
importance both for physiology and for physics, as Volta’s insights eventually led
him to develop the ﬁrst battery.
It is helpful to look more closely into the dialogue between these two scientists,
which represented a type of scientiﬁc interaction quite typical for their time. We see
a hefty competition that is fueled by irreconcilable theoretical views. Despite, or
perhaps because of their differences the two researchers remain in frequent contact.
Each tries to challenge his opponent by designing and performing an experiment of
which he expects that the result will be in concordance with his own theory while at
odds with his opponent’s. In this ‘duel’, it is natural for each of the scientists to
immediately try to replicate any crucial experiments in order to try to understand the
results and to dismiss them should they turn out to be irreproducible. Volta never
believed the results of Galvani’s experiment until he had seen them with his own
eyes. When he did see them, he still had his own explanation for the result, of
course. Reproducibility of an experiment is not enough; in the end it is the
implications of the experiment for theory that matter.
A competitive collaboration between scientists with diametrically opposed the-
oretical ideas can lead to research of high methodological quality, as we can see in
the example of Galvani and Volta. For Galvani’s experiments, Volta functions as a
professional critic, always alert to false assumptions, wrongly designed experiments
or hasty conclusions. Galvani could count on Volta immediately replicating every
crucial experiment, attacking any weak spots in the design. Irreproducible research
would be immediately exposed by him. Moreover, the competition with Volta gave
focus to Galvani’s experiments. It was not enough if his experiments lent support to
his own theory, but they had to simultaneously discredit Volta’s. Only experiments
for which Volta and Galvani would expect a different result would be relevant to
their argument.
The insight that collaboration between scientists with different views can be
highly productive motivated the psychologist Willem Hofstee to advocate a ‘wager
model’ for scientiﬁc research.6 In this model, a scientist who wants to conduct an
experiment ﬁrst tries to ﬁnd a scientist with different theoretical views and who, on
the basis of these views, expects different ﬁndings from the experiment than the
researcher him or herself. Let us call this scientist the critic. He will play a similar
role as Volta in Galvani’s experiments. If a critic cannot be found it is not necessary
to perform the experiment, since no one would be surprised by the results. Such
experiments apparently have no implications for theory. Once a critic is found, the
researcher and the critic should sit together to discuss the details of the way the
experiment will be performed, making sure that methodological biases do not favor
the researcher or the critic. The experiment can proceed when both scientists agree
on its validity, and it should possibly be executed in duplicate in both labs to
6‘Weddenschapsmodel’ in Dutch (Hofstee 1980). My translation.
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prevent conﬁrmation bias. An experiment set up in this way will have scientiﬁc
merit whether the outcome is positive or negative for the researcher, and the
researchers should commit themselves to publication whatever the outcome. From
their competing theoretical views, it is likely that the two researchers will disagree
on the ﬁnal interpretation, with the ‘losing’ side trying to salvage their theory by
alternative explanations.
The name of wager model has been appropriately chosen for two reasons.
Firstly, because it suggests a clear investment of both parties into the experiment,
with a commitment for each party to ‘pay up’ and proceed with the publication even
in case of an adverse outcome. Secondly, because the word wager invokes the
image of betting, suggesting that an element of chance plays a role. In fact, this is
usually the case. As we have described above, the competing researchers will have
to draw their conclusions on the basis of a sample, while their theoretical dispute is
about the underlying population. Since the sample is variable, the risk is that the
experiment favors the researcher although the critic’s theory is right, or vice versa.
This risk the contestants should be prepared to take.
Statistics can help to even the odds for both parties. In fact, the original
framework of statistical hypothesis testing as proposed by Neyman and Pearson is
highly suitable for the wager model. It uses a ‘null hypothesis’ representing the
critic’s view and an ‘alternative hypothesis’ representing the researchers view, and
treats them symmetrically. The famous lemma of Neyman and Pearson tells us how
to summarize the data most effectively in order to discriminate between these two
hypotheses. The probabilities of a false conclusion favoring either the researcher or
the critic can easily be calculated. Using this information a decision boundary can
be set in such a way that the wager is a fair one, and the investment can be
calculated that is needed to make the probability of both erroneous conclusions
acceptably small. The statistician, therefore, has all the tools to stand as a natural
arbiter between the researcher and the critic.
Like with the exchange between Galvani and Volta, close attention to
methodology is naturally built into the wager model. The crucial element in both
cases is the influential presence of a critic. The critic will insist on publication in
those cases in which the researcher may not want to publish, thus countering
publication bias. The critic will not share the conﬁrmation bias of the researcher
because of his competing theoretical views, and will thus be vigilant to counter it.
The wager model thus avoids both conﬁrmation and publication bias in a natural
way. Since Ioannidis’ causes for the large number of false positive results in the
literature do not apply, we could expect far fewer irreproducible results if this
model would be widely adopted. Sadly, this model is hardly ever used in practice,
for various historical, psychological, practical and institutional reasons that we will
not explore here.
The value of the wager model here is that provides a very useful ideal that can be
used to study the current publication model of science, which we can see as an
approximation to the wager model. This perspective will help to understand the
methodology better, and also the extent to which this methodology is appropriate.
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5 Publishing
Current research practice almost never involves an explicit critic. In contrast to the
wager model we can refer to the dominant scientiﬁc model as a ‘betting model’. It
differs from the wager model mostly by the fact that the critic is abstracted and
impersonal.
How does this work? Let us ﬁrst review an example in which the model works
very well.
A group of nutrition researchers from Amsterdam led by Martijn Katan wanted
to demonstrate that the consumption of sugar through soft drinks makes children
gain weight. This may seem obvious, but other researchers (and soft drink com-
panies) maintained that children would automatically compensate for their sugar
intake by being more active or eating less of other foods, negating the weight gain
of the sugar intake. To prove their point, Katan’s group enrolled 650 children in
several schools and randomly allocated them into two groups. The ﬁrst group was
handed out a daily sugared soft drink. The second group received a daily sugar-free
version. The two drinks tasted the same and the children and their parents were kept
in the dark as to which child received which drink. After 1.5 year the researchers
measured the weight gain of each of the children. They found that on average the
children who drank the sugared drink gained one kilo more weight than the children
who drank the sugar-free version. They submitted a description of the experiment
and their conclusions to the New England Journal of Medicine, writing that con-
sumption of sugar via soft drinks does indeed cause substantial weight gain in
children. His manuscript was judged and commented on by an editor and two or
more anonymous referees, and found acceptable for publication (De Ruyter et al.
2012b).
Before the study was started, the precise design of the study was laid down in a
study protocol published separately (De Ruyter et al. 2012a).7 This protocol stip-
ulated exactly how the study would be executed, what measurements would be
taken at what time, what statistical analyses would be performed and what would be
done with the data (or the absence of data) of children who did not follow the study
to the end. The protocol also motivates the number of participating children. This
was chosen in such a way that if Katan’s theory was right and children would
indeed gain weight as a result of drinking soft drinks, Katan would have 80 %
chance of demonstrating it with this trial.
If we compare the approach that Katan followed with the wager model of
Hofstee, then we can easily see a number of parallels. Katan investigated an issue
about which there was clear disagreement in the ﬁeld. Katan did not explicitly
involve a scientist of a different opinion on the matter at stake, but if we imagine
that he would have, the design of the experiment would probably have been very
similar. He built in many of the methodological checks that would have resulted
from negotiation with a critic and which make the experiment impartial to either
7This is usual in clinical trials but not in nutrition research.
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outcome, such as the blinding of the children and their parents for the type of drink
received. In fact, Katan even put himself at a disadvantage when he accepted a
20 % chance of not being able to demonstrate his case even if he was right, against
only 5 % for the absent critic. The protocol thus serves as a strong protection of the
interest of the critic.
We call the model that Katan uses a betting model, since it is similar to the wager
model, except that the researcher plays the game essentially against himself. Katan
also played the role of the critic. Other critical scientists, namely Katan’s peers, did
come into play, but only at the peer review stage after the experiment had been
conducted and reported. Like the critic in the wager model, they judged whether
they were convinced by Katan’s experiment. However, their role was in many
respects very different from the role of the critic. They became involved only at a
very late stage, and their power to influence the experiment was therefore extremely
limited. Moreover, they had the power to influence whether the experiment would
be published, a power that the critic in the wager model does not have. Reviewers
do not themselves play the role of the critic, they can only judge whether Katan
himself played that role convincingly.
The statistical framework that Katan used to analyze the outcome of his
experiment, i.e. Fisher’s approach to hypothesis testing, clearly reflects the char-
acteristics of the betting model. In contrast to the symmetric framework of Neyman
and Pearson that was suitable for the wager model, Fisher’s approach is asym-
metric. The null hypothesis, which represents the critic’s opinion, becomes more
formalized, and assumes a greater importance than the alternative hypothesis.
Central to Fisher’s approach is the concept of a p-value. This value between 0 and 1
is a measure of how extreme the outcome of the experiment would be from the
critic’s point of view. High values indicate outcomes that conform to the critic’s
theory. Low values indicate outcomes that are difﬁcult to reconcile with it, but
which would more easily ﬁt the researcher’s perspective. The p-value can therefore
be seen as a quantitative measure that describes to what extent the absent critic is
convinced by the outcome of the experiment. Numerically, the p-value is calibrated
to take small values below 0.05 only 5 % of the time if the null hypothesis is true,
i.e. the critic is right. Conventionally, this ﬁve percent is the threshold below which
the critic will be convinced. With a p-value below this cut-off, the researcher may
claim to have a convincing (in statistical parlance: ‘signiﬁcant’) result.
We can see that the absent critic’s role and opinions have been completely
formalized in this approach. Katan found that children who drink a daily sugared
beverage gained about kilo of weight in a year. He also maintained that these results
were very difﬁcult (p = 0.001) to reconcile with the theoretical view that it does not
matter for children’s weight whether or not they drink sugar. How convincing this
latter statement is crucially depends on how well Katan represented this theoretical
view that he did not himself support. We have seen that Katan built in all kinds of
safeguards into his experimental design, such as the blinding and the protocol, to
protect the experiment from his own biases. Essentially, these measures limit his
own freedom in analyzing his results, evening out the odds between him and the
critic, and by doing that making the outcome more convincing.
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Not all research is as well designed. Headlines in newspapers in 1995 announced
that eating tomatoes would dramatically decrease the risk of prostate cancer.
Surprisingly, the beneﬁcial effect was not found in fresh tomatoes, but rather in
tomato concentrate in the form of ketchup, pizza, tomato soup and even potato
crisps with ketchup flavor. The source of the news was a publication by a group led
by Edward Giovannucci from Harvard (Giovannucci et al. 1995). According to
him, the substance lycopene, found abundantly in tomato concentrate, eliminated
the free radicals which caused the cancer. Giovannucci’s article has had a major
impact, with over a 1000 citations in the scientiﬁc literature over the last twenty
years. How did Giovannucci come to his conclusion? He asked a large group of
health professionals to ﬁll out food intake questionnaires, focusing on intake of 46
vegetables and fruits. Next, he followed his subjects in time to see who would
develop prostate cancer, to check whether people who ate more or less of certain
foodstuffs would on average develop prostate cance more frequently. In only 4 of
the 46 food types he investigated was he able to ﬁnd the relationship he was looking
for, supported by p-values smaller than 0.05. Upon closer examination, those four
were all related to industrially processed tomatoes. A plausible explanation was
found in the lycopene theory, and this was the result that was highlighted in the
publication.
How convincing is the result? To answer this question it is helpful to imagine
how the investigation would have turned out if Giovannucci would have involved a
critic. We have to remember that Giovannucci did not yet have his theory about
lycopene when he started his study, so that at the moment he contacted a critic, he
would have only had a relatively vague theory that the risk of prostate cancer might
be influenced by diet. We can therefore suppose that such a critic would be
skeptical about this idea, maintaining that the risk of prostate cancer might depend
on all manner of things, such as genetic and lifestyle factors, but that food intake
did not matter. To settle this difference of opinion, it would be unethical and
unpractical to use a clinical trial design such as the one that Katan followed, and
Giovannucci and his critic would have quickly decided to study observational data.
This is a methodological quagmire because it is difﬁcult to distinguish the effects of
different factors. For example, people who eat more vegetables typically also
exercise more and are more highly educated. If we ﬁnd that people who eat more
vegetables have less prostate cancer, is that due to the vegetables or due to the
exercise? Still, discussing these issues at length, it is conceivable that Giovannucci
and an open-minded critic might have come to a wager. Would that wager have
taken the form described as the evidence in the eventual paper?
Giovannucci investigated 46 different foodstuffs separately, calculating a sepa-
rate p-value for each of them. In 4 out of these 46 did he ﬁnd a p-value smaller than
0.05. In terms of the betting model with which we can interpret the meaning of
these p-values, this is equivalent to betting against the critic 46 times, of which he
lost 42 times and won only 4. If a real critic would be present, it is likely that he or
she would claim victory over Giovannucci rather than the other way around. If we
remember that p-values are calculated in such a way that the critic will lose the bet
about one out of twenty times even when the critic is right, we can expect
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Giovannucci to win about 2.3 times out of 46 even when there is no relationship
between diet and prostate cancer. Winning at least 4 times in this situation is not an
unlikely event, with an occurrence almost 20 %.8 Under a wager model, therefore,
the conclusion of the study would most likely have been support of the critic’s view
that diet and prostate cancer are unrelated. If the four foodstuffs for which a rela-
tionship is suggested may be the product of chance, it is especially unlikely that a
critic would be convinced by the mechanistic explanation about lycopene, made up
only after the experiment. The critic may have wondered what explanations
Giovannucci might have come up with had four other foodstuffs come out.
The difference between Giovannucci and Katan does not lie in the statistical
methods they used. These are broadly the same. The difference is in the way they
realized the meaning of the methods they used. Katan took great care to look at his
own experiment from the perspective of a critic, taking that point of view into
account in every aspect of the study. Giovannucci seems to have done this to a
much lesser extent. He applies the rules of the statistical methods he uses, but he
does not seem to realize that the results he presents are not as convincing as they
have to be. Interestingly, also the reviewers who deemed his work suitable for
publication did not notice this.
It is of course the reviewer’s job to check a manuscript’s quality before advising
publication. We could expect that reviewer’s take the same perspective as the critic,
checking manuscripts meticulously for methodological errors, vigilantly aware of
possible conﬁrmation bias on the side of the researcher. In practice, sadly, this is not
the rule. Since the reviewers come into play at a late stage, after the experiment has
been carried out and reported, many the important problems resulting from con-
ﬁrmation bias remain invisible to them.9 For example, they cannot see how many
other analysis methods the researcher tried, or what the original hypothesis was that
the experiment was designed for. Moreover, reviewers tend to focus much more on
the conclusions of the papers than on the methods. This was demonstrated in 1998
by Fiona Godlee, editor of the British Medical Journal. She sent an article with 8
deliberate serious methodological errors to more than 200 regular reviewers of her
journal. On average, each reviewer only observed 2 of the 8 errors. Of the
reviewers, 33 % suggested to accept the article with only minor changes, while only
30 % advised to reject it (Godlee et al. 1998). Reviewers naturally bring their own
conﬁrmation bias. When they disagree with the conclusions they will study the
methods much more critically than when they agree with them.
The betting model used for scientiﬁc publication can best be described as a
watered-down version of the wager model. It calls for the scientist to win a bet
against a critic of his or her own making, and it is completely up to him or her how
8Calculated under the assumption of independence. If—as is likely here—the p-values are
dependent, this probability will typically be even larger.
9This is not the case for the paper of Giovannucci, who (to his credit) makes his conﬁrmation bias
very explicit in the description of the experiment and the analysis. The reviewers should have
protested and demanded a proper multiple testing correction here.
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formidable an opponent the critic is. Some researchers play the role of the critic
very convincingly, others just set up a straw man. The statistical methods used are
the same in both cases.
6 Speaking About Uncertainty
We now return to the original question about the role of statistics in creating or
preventing irreproducible science. We have seen that the randomness of scientiﬁc
observation makes it impossible to forestall irreproducible results completely, but
that two types of bias may dramatically increase the proportion of such ﬁndings in
the scientiﬁc literature: publication bias and conﬁrmation bias. Both of these are
tied closely to the current model we use for communication of scientiﬁc results via
publications, a model I have called the betting model.
At ﬁrst sight the role of statistics in this betting model seems a rather mechanical
one, emphasizing the calculations that have to be done and the cut-offs that have to
be exceeded ‘to get the statistics right’ and to achieve the necessary statistical proof
needed for publication. This is often how statistics is taught, as a cookbook full of
prescriptions that researchers have to follow in order to analyze their data in a
correct way. This mechanical view underrates the role that statistics can play in
scientiﬁc discourse. In the mechanical view, statistics is seen as an arbiter of truth.
This is something it cannot be. Statistics is just a language researchers can use to
speak about chance and uncertainty.
To be relevant for scientiﬁc progress, experiments must be designed and ana-
lyzed in such a way that they make a difference, changing at least some people’s
opinions about theory. To be convincing requires to be empathic, studying the other
side’s arguments and taking them seriously. The betting model, as we have seen,
only works well if the researcher is prepared to take a critical point of view
throughout the design and analysis of his experiment, while maintaining focus on
the theoretical issues at stake. A scientiﬁc experiment is only valuable if it furthers
theoretical discussion in some way.
The scientiﬁc attitude necessary for this is under pressure in many countries due
to the demands on scientists to publish and acquire grants. In this rat race publi-
cations are often viewed as personal achievements of scientists, and as end products
rather than as arguments in an ongoing scientiﬁc discussion. Regarding a publi-
cation as a personal achievement emphasizes competition between scientists for
honors, instead of their collaboration on furthering theory. It is based on the mis-
conception that the essence of science is competition between individuals rather
than between theories. Regarding publications as end products promotes the idea
that the publication should present deﬁnite proof. This, in turn, encourages the
mechanical perspective on methodology and statistics.
It may be clear that throwing inferential statistics out of the window represents a
step back, leaving us with no language to even discuss the problem of irrepro-
ducible research. However, having statisticians police scientists is equally pointless
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if these checks are only executed at the ﬁnal stage when the experiment has already
been performed. At this stage, much of the conﬁrmation bias is not visible anymore,
and should any clear mistakes be found, there is no way to mend them. In the words
of the famous statistician Ronald Fisher ‘To consult the statistician after an
experiment is ﬁnished is often merely to ask him to conduct a post mortem
examination. He can perhaps say what the experiment died of’ (Fisher 1938).
Moreover, involving statisticians in the role of arbiters only serves to emphasize the
mechanical view of statistics. This will hamper the discussion between scientists
about uncertainty more than it will stimulate it.
Reduction of the proportion of irreproducible research ﬁndings calls for a
renewed interest in methodology. The mechanistic view of statistical analysis has
made many scientists see methodology and statistics as a necessary evil. Better
understanding of methodology might help scientists to think about statistics in
terms of convincing rather than in terms of proof, and to see how statistical lan-
guage is a necessary element of the dialogue between researchers with opposing
views. The wager model, even if not practical, may help as a thought experiment for
researchers setting up an experiment, and may help to create awareness of conﬁr-
mation biases, and to design more imaginative experiments. To facilitate this
thought experiment in the absence of a critic with opposing theoretical views,
collaboration with a neutral methodologist may be a good alternative.
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The Fine-Tuning Argument:
Exploring the Improbability
of Our Existence
Klaas Landsman
A mild form of satire may be the appropriate antidote. Imagine,
if you will, the wonderment of a species of mud worms who
discover that if the constant of thermometric conductivity of
mud were different by a small percentage they would not be
able to survive. (Earman 1987, p. 314).
Abstract Our laws of nature and our cosmos appear to be delicately ﬁne-tuned for
life to emerge, in a way that seems hard to attribute to chance. In view of this, some
have taken the opportunity to revive the scholastic Argument from Design, whereas
others have felt the need to explain this apparent ﬁne-tuning of the clockwork of the
Universe by proposing the existence of a ‘Multiverse’. We analyze this issue from a
sober perspective. Having reviewed the literature and having added several
observations of our own, we conclude that cosmic ﬁne-tuning supports neither
Design nor a Multiverse, since both of these fail at an explanatory level as well as in
the more quantitative context of Bayesian conﬁrmation theory (although there
might be other reasons to believe in these ideas, to be found in religion and in
inflation and/or string theory, respectively). In fact, ﬁne-tuning and Design even
seem to be at odds with each other, whereas the inference from ﬁne-tuning to a
Multiverse only works if the latter is underwritten by an additional metaphysical
hypothesis we consider unwarranted. Instead, we suggest that ﬁne-tuning requires
no special explanation at all, since it is not the Universe that is ﬁne-tuned for life,
but life that has been ﬁne-tuned to the Universe.
1 Introduction
Twentieth Century physics and cosmology have revealed an astonishing path
towards our existence, which appears to be predicated on a delicate interplay
between the three fundamental forces that govern the behavior of matter at very
small distances and the long-range force of gravity. The former control chemistry
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and hence life as we know it, whereas the latter is responsible for the overall
evolution and structure of the Universe.
• If the state of the hot dense matter immediately after the Big Bang had been ever
so slightly different, then the Universe would either have rapidly recollapsed, or
would have expanded far too quickly into a chilling, eternal void. Either way,
there would have been no ‘structure’ in the Universe in the form of stars and
galaxies.
• Even given the above ﬁne-tuning, if any one of the three short-range forces had
been just a tiny bit different in strength, or if the masses of some elementary
particles had been a little unlike they are, there would have been no recognizable
chemistry in either the inorganic or the organic domain. Thus there would have
been no Earth, no carbon, et cetera, let alone the human brains to study those.
Broadly, ﬁve different responses to the impression of ﬁne-tuning have been
given:
1. Design: updating the scholastic Fifth Way of Aquinas (1485/1286), the Universe
has been ﬁne-tuned with the emergence of (human) life among its designated
purposes.1
2. Multiverse: the idea that our Universe is just one among innumerably many,
each of which is controlled by different parameters in the (otherwise ﬁxed) laws
of nature. This seemingly outrageous idea is actually endorsed by some of the
most eminent scientists in the world, such as Martin Rees (1999) and Steven
Weinberg (2007). The underlying idea was nicely explained by Rees in a talk in
2003, raising the analogy with ‘an ‘off the shelf’ clothes shop: “if the shop has a
1“The Fifth Way is based on the directedness of things. We observe that some things which lack
awareness, namely natural bodies, act for the sake of an end. This is clear because they always or
commonly act in the same manner to achieve what is best, which shows that they reach their goal
not by chance but because they tend towards it. Now things which lack awareness do not tend
towards a goal unless directed by something with awareness and intelligence, like an arrow by an
archer. Therefore there is some intelligent being by whom everything in nature is directed to a
goal, and this we call ‘God’.” Translation in Kenny (1969, p. 96), to whom we also refer for a
critical review of Aquinas’s proofs of the existence of God. It is a moot point whether the Fifth
Way is really an example of the medieval Argument of Design, which Aquinas expresses else-
where as: “The arrangement of diverse things cannot be dictated by their own private and
divergent natures; of themselves they are diverse and exhibit no tendency to form a pattern. It
follows that the order of many among themselves is either a matter of chance or must be attributed
to one ﬁrst planner who has a purpose in mind.” (Kenny 1969, p. 116). Everitt (2004) distinguishes
between the Argument to Design and the Argument from Order, respectively, both of which may
still be found in modern Christian apologists such as Swinburne (2004), Küng (2005), and Collins
(2009), rebutted by e.g., Everitt (2004) and Philipse (2012). It is clear from his writings (such as
the General Scholium in Principia) that Isaac Newton supported the Argument from Design,
followed by Bentley (1692). Throughout early modern science, the gradual ‘reading’ of the ‘Book
of Nature’, seen as a second ‘book’ God had left mankind next to the Bible, was implicitly or
explicitly seen as a conﬁrmation of Design (Jorink 2010). Paley (1802) introduced the famous
watchmaker analogy obliterated by Dawkins (1986). See also Barrow and Tipler (1986) and
Manson (2003) for overviews of the Argument from Design.
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large stock, we’re not surprised to ﬁnd one suit that ﬁts. Likewise, if our uni-
verse is selected from a multiverse, its seemingly designed or ﬁne-tuned features
wouldn’t be surprising.” (Mellor 2002).
3. Blind Chance: constants of Nature and initial conditions have arbitrary values,
and it is just a matter of coincidence that their actual values turn out to enable
life.2
4. Blind Necessity: the Universe could not have been made in a different way or
order, yet producing life is not among its goals since it fails to have any
(Spinoza 1677).3
5. Misguided: the ﬁne-tuning problem should be resolved by some appropriate
therapy.
We will argue that whatever reasons one may have for supporting the ﬁrst or the
second option, ﬁne-tuning should not be among them. Contemporary physics
makes it hard to choose between the third and the fourth option (both of which seem
to have supporters among physicists and philosophers),4 but in any case our own
sympathy lies with the ﬁfth.
First, however, we have to delineate the issue. The Fine-Tuning Argument, to be
abbreviated by FTA in what follows, claims that the present Universe (including the
laws that govern it and the initial conditions from which it has evolved) permits life
only because these laws and conditions take a very special form, small changes in
which would make life impossible. This claim is actually quite ambiguous, in
(at least) two directions.
1. The FTA being counterfactual (or, in Humanities jargon, being ‘what if’ or
‘alternate’ history), it should be made clear what exactly is variable. Here the
range lies between raw Existence itself at one end (Rundle 2004; Holt 2012;
Leslie and Kuhn 2013) and ﬁxed laws of nature and a Big Bang with merely a
few variable parameters at the other (cf. Rees 1999; Hogan 2000; Aguirre 2001;
Tegmark et al. 2006).
Unless one is satisﬁed with pure philosophical speculation, speciﬁc technical
results are only available at the latter end, to which we shall therefore restrict the
argument.
2. It should be made clear what kind of ‘life’ the Universe is (allegedly) ﬁne-tuned
for, and also, to what extent the emergence of whatever kind of life is deemed
merely possible (if only in principle, perhaps with very low probability), or
2In the area of biology, a classical book expressing this position is Monod (1971).
3The most prominent modern Spinozist was Albert Einstein: “there are no arbitrary constants of
this kind; that is to say, nature is so constituted that it is possible logically to lay down such
strongly determined laws that within these laws only rationally completely determined constants
occur (not constants, therefore, whose numerical value could be changed without destroying the
theory.” (Einstein in Schilpp 1949, p. 63).
4The famous ending of The First Three Minutes by the physicist Weinberg (1977)—“The more the
universe appears comprehensible, the more it also appears pointless.”—could be bracketed under
either.
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likely, or absolutely certain. For example, should we ﬁne-tune just for the
possible existence of self-replicating structures like RNA and DNA,5 or for “a
planet where enough wheat or rice could be cultivated to feed several billion
people” (Ward and Brownlee 2000, p. 20), or for one where morally (or indeed
immorally) acting rational agents emerge (Swinburne 2004), perhaps even
minds the like of Newton and Beethoven?
It seems uncontroversial that at the lowest end, the Universe should exhibit
some kind of order and structure in order to at least enable life, whereas towards
the upper end it has (perhaps unsurprisingly) been claimed that essentially a
copy of our Sun and our Earth (with even the nearby presence of a big planet
like Jupiter to keep out asteroids) is required, including oceans, plate tectonics
and other seismic activity, and a magnetic ﬁeld helping to stabilize the atmo-
sphere (Ward and Brownlee 2000).6
For most of the discussion we go for circumstances favoring simple
carbon-based life; the transition to complex forms of life will only play a role in
discussing the ﬁne-tuning of our solar system (which is crucial to some and just
a detail to others).7
According to modern cosmology based on the (hot) Big Bang scenario,8 this
means that the Universe must be sufﬁciently old and structured so that at least
galaxies and several generations of stars have formed; this already takes billions of
years.9 The subsequent move to viable planets and life then takes roughly a similar
amount of time, so that within say half an order of magnitude the current age of the
5See e.g. Smith and Szathmáry (1995) and Ward and Brownlee (2000) for theories of the origin of
life.
6The conservatism—perhaps even lack of imagination—of such scenarios is striking. But
science-ﬁction movies such as Star Trek, Star Wars, E.T., My Stepmother is an Alien (not to speak
of Emmanuelle, Queen of the Galaxy) hardly do better. Conway’s Game of Life suggests that initial
complexity is not at all needed to generate complex structures, which may well include intelligent
life in as yet unknown guise.
7Reprimanding the late Carl Sagan, who expected intelligent life to exist in millions of places even
within our own Galaxy, Ward and Brownlee (2000) claim that whereas this might indeed apply to
the most basic forms of life, it is the move to complex (let alone intelligent) life that is extremely
rare (because of the multitude of special conditions required), perhaps having been accomplished
only on Earth.
8See e.g. Rees (1999), Ellis (2007), and Weinberg (2008), at increasing level of technicality.
9The reason (which may be baffling on ﬁrst reading) is that in addition to the light elements formed
in Big Bang nucleosynthesis (i.e., about 75 % hydrogen and 25 % helium, with traces of other
elements up to Lithium, see Galli and Palla 2013), the heavier elements in the Periodic
Table (many of which are necessary for biochemistry and/or the composition of the Earth and its
atmosphere) were formed in stars, to be subsequently blown into the cosmos by e.g. supernova
explosions. In that way, some of these elements eventually ended up in our solar system, where
they are indispensable in constituting both the Earth and ourselves. See Arnett (1996) for a
technical account and Ward and Brownlee (2000) for a popular one.
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Universe seems necessary to support life. In view of the expansion of the Universe,
a similar comment could be made about its size, exaggerated as it might seem for
the purpose of explaining life on earth.
2 Evidence for Fine-Tuning
Thanks to impressive progress in both cosmology and (sub) nuclear physics, over
the second half of the 20th Century it began to be realized that the above scenario is
predicated on seemingly exquisite ﬁne-tuning of some of the constants of Nature
and initial conditions of the Universe. We just give some of the best known and best
understood cases here.10
One of the ﬁrst examples was the ‘Beryllium bottleneck’ studied by Hoyle in
1951, which is concerned with the mechanism through which stars produce carbon
and oxygen.11 This was not only a major correct scientiﬁc prediction based on
‘anthropic reasoning’ in the sense that some previously unknown physical effect
(viz. the energy level in question) had to exist in order to explain some crucial
condition for life; it involves dramatic ﬁne-tuning, too, in that the nucleon-nucleon
force must lie near its actual strength within about one part in a thousand in order to
obtain the observed abundances of carbon and oxygen, which happen to be the right
amounts needed for life (Ekström et al. 2010).
Another well-understood example from nuclear physics is the mass difference
between protons and neutrons, or, more precisely, between the down quark and the
up quark (Hogan 2000).12 This mass difference is positive (making the neutron
heavier than the proton); if it weren’t, the proton would fall apart and there would
be no chemistry as we know it. On the other hand, the difference can’t be too large,
10See Barrow and Tipler (1986), Leslie (1989), Davies (2006), Ellis (2007), and Barnes (2012) for
further examples and more detailed references. Stenger (2011) and Bradford (2011, 2013) attempt
to play down the accuracies claimed of ﬁne-tuning, whilst Aguirre (2001) casts doubt on its limited
scope.
11In order to make carbon, two 4He nuclei must collide to form 8Be, upon which a third 4He
nucleus must join so as to give 12C (from which, in turn, 16O is made by adding another 4He
nucleus). This second step must happen extremely quickly, since the 8Be isotope formed in the ﬁrst
step is highly unstable. Without the exquisitely ﬁne-tuned energy level in 12C (lying at the 8Be
+4He reaction energy) predicted by Hoyle, this formation process would be far too infrequent to
explain the known cosmic abundances. Opponents of anthropic reasoning would be right in
pointing out that these abundances as such (rather than their implications for the possibility of
human life) formed the proper basis for Hoyle’s prediction.
12Quarks are subnuclear particles that come in six varieties, of which only the so-called ‘up’ and
‘down’ quarks are relevant to ordinary matter. A neutron consists of one up quark and two down
quarks, whereas a proton consists of two up quarks and one down quark. The electric charges (in
units where an electron has charge −1) are 2/3 for the up quark and −1/3 for the down quark,
making a neutron electrically neutral (as its name suggests) whilst giving a proton charge +1.
Atoms consist of nuclei (which in turn consist of protons and neutrons) surrounded by electrons,
whose total charge exactly cancels that of the nucleus.
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for otherwise stars (or hydrogen bombs, for that matter) could not be fueled by
nuclear fusion and stars like our Sun would not exist.13 Both require a ﬁne-tuning of
the mass difference by about 10 %.
Moving from fundamental forces to initial conditions, the solar system seems
ﬁne-tuned for life in various ways, most notably in the distance between the Sun
and the Earth: if this had been greater (or smaller) by at most a few precent it would
have been too cold (or too hot) for at least complex life to develop. Furthermore, to
that effect the solar system must remain stable for billions of years, and after the ﬁrst
billion years or so the Earth should not be hit by comets or asteroids too often. Both
conditions are sensitive to the precise number and conﬁguration of the planets
(Ward and Brownlee 2000).
Turning from the solar system to initial conditions of our Universe, but still
staying safely within the realm of well-understood physics and cosmology, Rees
(1999) and others have drawn attention to the ﬁne-tuning of another cosmological
number called Q, which gives the size of inhomogeneities, or ‘ripples’, in the early
Universe and is of the order Q * 0.00001, or one part in a hundred thousand.14
This parameter is ﬁne-tuned by a factor of about ten on both sides (Rees 1999;
Tegmark et al. 2006): if it had been less than a tenth of its current value, then no
galaxies would have been formed (and hence no stars and planets). If, on the other
hand, it had been more than ten times its actual value, then matter would have been
too lumpy, so that there wouldn’t be any stars (and planets) either, but only black
holes. Either way, a key condition for life would be violated.15
The expansion of the Universe is controlled by a number called Ω, deﬁned as the
ratio between the actual matter density in the Universe and the so-called critical
density. If Ω ≤ 1, then the Universe would expand forever, whereas Ω > 1 would
portend a recollapse. Thus Ω = 1 is a critical point.16 It is remarkable enough that
13Technically, the fundamental ‘pp–reaction’ (i.e., proton + proton→Deuteron + positron + neutrino),
which lies at the beginning of nuclear fusion, would go in the wrong direction.
14The Universe is approximately 13.7 billion years old (which is about three times as old as the
Earth). Almost 400.000 years after the Big Bang, the Universe (which had been something like a
hot soup of elementary particles until then) became transparent to electromagnetic radiation (which
in everyday life includes light as well as radio waves, but whose spectrum is much larger) and
subsequently became almost completely dark, as it is now. The so-called cosmic microwave
background (CMB, discovered in 1964 by Penzias and Wilson), which still pervades the Universe
at a current temperature of about 3 K (=−270 °C), is a relic from that era. It is almost completely
homogeneous and isotropic, except for the ripples in question, whose (relative) size is given by the
parameter Q. This provides direct information about the inhomogeneities of the Universe at the
time the CMB was formed, i.e., when it was 400.000 years old.
15As analyzed by the Planck Collaboration (2014), variations in the constants of Nature would also
affect the value of Q, which is ultimately determined by the physics of the early Universe. Hence
its known value of 10−5 constrains such variations; in particular, the ﬁne-tuning of Q necessary for
life in turn ﬁne-tunes the ﬁne-structure constant α (which controls electromagnetism and light) to
within 1 % of its value (1/137).
16Roughly, the physics behind this is that at small matter density the (literally ‘energetic’)
expansion drive inherited from the Big Bang beats the gravitational force, which tries to pull
matter together.
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currently Ω ≈ 1 (within a few percent); what is astonishing is that this is the case at
such a high age of the Universe. Namely, for Ω to retain its (almost) critical value
for billions of years, it must have had this value right from the very beginning to a
precision of at least 55 decimal places.17
This leads us straight to Einstein’s cosmological constant Λ, which he intro-
duced into his theory of gravity in 1917 in order to (at least theoretically) stabilize
the Universe against contracting or expanding, to subsequently delete it in 1929
after Hubble’s landmark observation of the expansion of the Universe (famously
calling its introduction his “biggest blunder”). Ironically, Λ made a come-back in
1998 as the leading theoretical explanation of the (empirical) discovery that the
expansion of the Universe is currently accelerating.18 For us, the point is that even
the currently accepted value of Λ remains very close to zero, whereas according to
(quantum ﬁeld) theory it should be about 55 (some even say 120) orders of mag-
nitude larger (Martin 2012). This is often seen as a ﬁne-tuning problem, because
some compensating mechanism must be at work to cancel its very large natural
value with a precision of (once again) 55 decimal places.19
The ﬁne-tuning of all numbers considered so far seems to be dwarfed by a
knock-down FTA given by Roger Penrose (1979, 2004), who claims that in order to
produce a Universe that even very roughly looks like ours, its initial conditions
(among some generic set) must have been ﬁne-tuned with a precision of one to
1010
123
, arguably the largest number ever conceived: all atoms in the Universe
would not sufﬁce to write it out in full.20 Penrose’s argument is an extreme version
of an idea originally due to Boltzmann, who near the end of the 19th Century
argued that the direction of time is a consequence of the increase of entropy in the
17If not, the expansion would either have been too fast for structures like galaxies to emerge, or too
slow to prevent rapid recollapse due to gravity, leading to a Big Crunch (Rees 1999). This
ﬁne-tuning problem is often called the flatness problem, since the Universe is exactly flat (in the
sense of Einstein’s Theory of General Relativity) when Ω = 1 (otherwise it either has a spherical or
a hyperbolic geometry). The ﬁne-tuning problem for Ω is generally considered to be solved by the
(still speculative) theory of cosmic inflation (Liddle and Lyth 2000; Weinberg 2008), but even if
this theory is correct, it merely shifts the ﬁne-tuning from one place to another, since the
parameters in any theory of inflation have to be ﬁne-tuned at least as much as Ω; Carroll and Tam
(2010) claim this would even be necessary to ten million decimals. In addition, the flatness
problem may not be a problem at all, like the horizon problem (McCoy 2015).
18The Physics Nobel Prize in 2011 was awarded to Perlmutter, Schmidt, and Riess for this
discovery. The cosmological constant Λ can theoretically account for this acceleration as some sort
of an invisible driving energy. Thus reinterpreted as ‘dark energy’, Λ contributes as much as 70 %
to the energy density of the Universe and hence it is currently also the leading contributor to Ω
(Planck Collaboration 2015).
19The broader context of this is what is called the naturalness problem in quantum ﬁeld theory,
ﬁrst raised by the Dutch Nobel Laureate Gerard ’t Hooft in 1980. His claim was that a theory is
unnatural if some parameter that is expected to be large is actually (almost) zero, unless there is a
symmetry enforcing the latter. This generates its own ﬁne-tuning problems, which we do not
discuss here; see Grinbaum (2012).
20The number called “googol” that the internet company Google has (erroneously) been named
after is ‘merely’ 10100; Penrose’s number is even much larger than a one with googol many zeroes.
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future but not in the past,21 which requires an extremely unlikely initial state (Price
1997; Ufﬁnk 2007; Lebowitz 2008). However, this kind of reasoning is as brilliant
as it is controversial (Callendar 2004, 2010; Earman 2006; Eckhardt 2006; Wallace
2010; Schiffrin and Wald 2012). More generally, the more extreme the asserted
ﬁne-tuning is, the more adventurous the underlying arguments are (or so we think).
To be on the safe side, the ﬁne-tuning of Ω, Λ, and Penrose’s initial condition
should perhaps be ignored, leaving us with the other examples, and a few similar
ones not discussed here. But these should certainly sufﬁce to make a case for
ﬁne-tuning that is serious enough to urge the reader to at least make a bet on one the
ﬁve options listed above.
3 General Arguments
Before turning to a speciﬁc discussion of the Design and the Multiverse proposals,
we make a few critical (yet impartial) remarks that put the FTA in perspective (see
also Sober 2004; Manson 2009). Adherents of the FTA typically use analogies like
the following:
• Someone lays out a deck of 52 cards after it has been shuffled. If the cards
emerge in some canonical order (e.g., the Ace of Spades down to 2, then the Ace
of Hearts down to 2, etc.), then, on the tacit assumption that each outcome is
equally (un)likely, this very particular outcome supposedly cannot have been
due to ‘luck’ or chance.
• Alternatively, if a die is tossed a large number of times and the number 6 comes
up every time, one would expect the die to be loaded, or the person who cast it to
be a very skillful con man. Once again, each outcome was assumed equally likely.
First, there is an underlying assumption in the FTA to the effect that the ‘con-
stants’ of Nature as well as the initial conditions of the Universe (to both of which
the emergence of life is allegedly exquisitely sensitive) are similarly variable. This
may or may not be the case; the present state of science is not advanced enough to
decide between chance and necessity concerning the laws of nature and the
beginning of the Universe.22
21This is a technical way of saying that heat flows from hot bodies to cold ones, that milk combines
with tea to form a homogeneous mixture, that the cup containing it will fall apart if it falls on the
ground, etc.; in all cases the opposite processes are physically possible, but are so unlikely that
they never occur.
22Our own hunch tends towards necessity, for reasons lying in constructive quantum ﬁeld theory
(Glimm and Jaffe 1987): it turns out to be extremely difﬁcult to give a mathematically rigorous
construction of elementary particle physics, and the value of the constants may be ﬁxed by the
requirement of mathematical existence and consistency of the theory. For example, the so-called
scalar u4 theory is believed to be trivial in four (space-time) dimensions, which implies that the
relevant ‘constant of Nature’ must be zero (Fernandez et al. 1992). This is as ﬁne a ﬁne-tuning as
anything! Similarly, in cosmology the Big Bang (and hence the initial conditions for the
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Second, granted that the ‘constants’ etc. are variable in principle (in the sense
that values other than the current ones preserve the existence and consistency of the
theories in which they occur), it is quite unclear to what extent they can vary and
which variations may be regarded as ‘small’; yet the FTA relies on the assumption
that even ‘small’ variations would block the emergence of life (Manson 2000). In
the absence of such information, it would be natural to assume that any (real,
positive as appropriate) value may be assumed, but in that case mathematical
probabilistic reasoning (which is necessary for the FTA in order to say that the
current values are ‘unlikely’) turns out to be impossible (McGrew et al. 2001;
Colyvan et al. 2005; Koperski 2005).23 But also if a large but ﬁnite number of
values (per constant or initial condition) needs be taken into account, it is hard to
assign any kind of probability to any of the alternative values; even the assumption
that each values is equally likely seems totally arbitrary (Everitt 2004; Norton
2010).
Nonetheless, these problems may perhaps be overcome and in any case, for the
sake of argument we will continue to use the metaphors opening this section.
4 Critiquing the Inference of Design from Fine-Tuning
The idea that cosmic ﬁne-tuning originates in design by something like an intel-
ligent Creator ﬁts into a long-standing Judeo-Christian tradition, where both the
Cosmos and biology were explained in that way.24 Now that biology has yielded to
the theory of Evolution proposed by Darwin and Wallace in the mid 19th
Century,25 the battleground has apparently moved back to the cosmos. Also there,
(Footnote 22 continued)
Universe it gives rise to) actually seems to be an illusion caused by the epistemic fact that we look
at the quantum world through classical glasses. In this case, the requirement that cosmology as we
know it must actually emerge in the classical limit of some quantum theory (or of some future
theory replacing quantum mechanics) may well ﬁx the initial conditions.
23Suppose some constant takes values in the real axis. In the absence of good reasons to the
contrary, any alternative value to the current one should have the same probability. But there is no
flat probability measure on the real numbers (or on any non-compact subset thereof). Even if there
were such a measure, any ﬁnite interval, however large or small, would have measure zero, so that
one could not even (mathematically) express the difference between some constant permitting life
if it just lies within some extremely small bandwidth (as the FTA has it), or in some enormously
large one (which would refute the FTA).
24See footnote 1 and refs. therein. Note that a ﬁne-tuning intelligent Creator is still a long shot from
the Christian God whom Swinburne (2004), Küng (2005), and Collins (2009) are really after!
25The Dutch primatologist De Waal (2013) recently noted how reasonable Creationism originally
was: animals known to the population of the Middle East (where Judeo-Christian thought origi-
nated) included camels etc. but no primates, and hence all living creatures appeared very different
from mankind.
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Design remains a vulnerable idea.26 For the sake of argument we do not question
the coherence of the idea of an intelligent Creator as such, although such a spirit
seems chimerical (Everitt 2004; Philipse 2012).
First, in slightly different ways Smith (1993) and Barnes (2012) both made the
point that the FTA does not claim, or support the conclusion, that the present
Universe is optimal for intelligent life. Indeed, it hardly seems to be: even granted
all the ﬁne-tuning in the world as well as the existence of our earth with its
relatively favorable conditions (Ward and Brownlee 2000), evolution has been
walking a tightrope so as to produce as much as jellyﬁsh, not to speak of primates
(Dawkins 1996). This fact alone casts doubt on the FTA as an Argument of Design,
for surely a benign Creator would prefer a Universe optimal for life, rather than one
that narrowly permits it? From a theistic perspective it would seem far more efﬁ-
cient to have a cosmic architecture that is robust for its designated goal.
Second, the inference to Design from the FTA seems to rest on a decisive tacit
assumption whose exposure sustantially weakens this inference (Bradley 2001).
The cards analogy presupposes that there was such a thing as a canonical order; if
there weren’t, then any particular outcome would be thought of in the same way and
would of course be attributed to chance. Similarly, the dice metaphor presupposes
that it is special for 6 to come up every single time; probabilistically speaking, every
other outcome would have been just as (un)likely as the given sequence of sixes.27
An then again, in the case of independently tunable constants of Nature and/or
initial conditions, one (perhaps approximate) value of each of these must ﬁrst be
marked with a special label like ‘life-permitting’ in order for the analogy with cards
or dice (and hence the appeal of the FTA) to work. The FTA is predicated on such
marking, which already presupposes that life is special.
26In this context, it is worth mentioning that the familiar endorsement of the Big Bang by modern
Christian apologists (see footnote 1) as a scientiﬁc conﬁrmation of the creation story in Genesis 1
seems wishful thinking based on a common mistranslation of its opening line as “In the beginning
God created the heavens and the earth” (and similarly in other languages), whereas the original
Hebrew text does not intend the “beginning” as an absolute beginning of time but rather as the
starting point of the action expressed by the following verb, whilst “created” should have read
“separated” (Van Wolde 2009). More generally, the world picture at the time of writing of Genesis
was that of a disk surrounded by water, the ensuing creation story not being one of creatio ex
nihilo, but one in which God grounds the Earth by setting it on pillars. This led to a tripartite
picture of the Cosmos as consisting of water, earth, and heaven. See also Van Wolde’s contri-
bution to this volume, as well as Noordmans (1934). The remarkable creatio ex nihilo story
introduced by the Church Fathers therefore lacks textual support from the Bible.
27Entropy arguments do not improve the case for Design. It is true that although the probability of
a sequence of all sixes is the same as the probability of any other outcome, the former becomes
special if we coarse-grain the outcome space by counting the number of sixes in a given long
sequence of throws and record that information only. The outcome with sixes only then becomes
extremely unlikely, since it could only have occurred in one possible way, whereas outcomes with
fewer sixes have multiple realizations (the maximum probability occurring when the number of
sixes is about one-sixth of the total number of throws). The point is that the very act of
coarse-graining again presupposes that six is a special value.
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It is irrelevant to this objection whether or not life is indeed special; the point is
that the assumption that life be special has to be made in addition to the FTA in
order to launch the latter on track to Design. But the inference from the (assumed)
speciality of life to Design hardly needs the FTA: even if all values of the constants
and initial conditions would lead to a life-permitting Universe, those who think that
life is special would presumably point to a Creator. In fact, both by the arguments
recalled at the beginning of this section and those below, their case would actually
be considerably stronger than the FTA.
In sum, ﬁne-tuning is not by itself sufﬁcient as a source for an Argument of
Design; it is the combination with an assumption to the effect that life is somehow
singled out, preferred, or special. But that assumption is the one that carries the
inference to Design; the moment one makes it, ﬁne-tuning seems counter-
productive rather than helpful.
Attempts to give the Design Argument a quantitative turn (Swinburne 2004;
Collins 2009) make things even worse (Bradley 2002; Halvorson 2014). Such
attempt are typically based on Bayesian Conﬁrmation Theory. This is a mathe-
matical technique for the analysis and computation of the probability P (H|E) that a
given hypothesis H is true in the light of certain evidence E (which may speak for or
against H, or may be neutral). Almost every argument in Bayesian Conﬁrmation
Theory is ultimately based on Bayes’ Theorem
PðHjEÞ ¼ PðEjHÞ  PðHÞ=PðEÞ;
where P(H|E) is the probability that E is true given the truth of the hypothesis H,
whilst P(H) and P(E) are the probabilities that H and E are true without knowing
E and H, respectively (but typically assuming certain background knowledge common
to bothH and E, which is very important but has been suppressed from the notation).28
In the case at hand, theists want to argue that the Universe being ﬁne-tuned for
Life makes Design more likely, i.e., that P(D|L) > P (D), or, equivalently, that
P(L|D) > P(L) (that is, Design favors life). The problem is that theists do not merely
ask for the latter inequality; what they really believe is that P(L|D) ≈ 1, for the
existence of God should make the emergence of life almost certain.29 For simplicity,
28This implies, in particular, that P(H|E) > P(H), i.e., E conﬁrms H, if and only if P(E|H) > P(E),
which is often computable. The probabilities in question are usually (though not necessarily) taken
to be epistemic or (inter)subjective, so that the whole discussion is concerned with probabilities
construed as numerical measures of degrees of belief. For technical as well as philosophical
background on Bayesianism see e.g. Howson and Urbach (2006), Sober (2008), and Handﬁeld
(2012).
29Swinburne (2004), though, occasionally assumes that P(L|D) = 1/2 as a subjective probability
(based on our ignorance of God’s intentions), which still makes his reasoning vulnerable to the
argument below. In Swinburne (2004), arguments implying PðLjDÞ[PðLÞ are called C-induc-
tive, whereas the stronger ones implying PðLjDÞ[ 1=2 are said to be P-inductive. Swinburne’s
strategy is to combine a large number of C-inductive arguments into a single overarching
P-inductive one, but according to Philipse (2012) every single one of Swinburne’s C-inductive
arguments is actually invalid (and we agree with Philipse).
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ﬁrst assume that P(L|D) = 1. Bayes’ Theorem then gives P(D|L) = P(D)/P(L),
whence P(D) ≤ P (L). More generally, assume P(L|D) ≥ 1/2, or, equivalently,
PðLjDÞPð:LjDÞ, where ¬L is the proposition that life does not exist. If (D,L) is the
conjunction of D and L, we then have
PðDÞ ¼ PðD; LÞþPðD;:LÞ 2PðD; LÞ 2PðLÞ;
since PðD;:LÞPðD; LÞ by assumption. Thus a negligible prior probability of life
(on which assumption the FTA is based!) implies a hardly less negligible prior
probability of Design. This inequality make the Argument from Design
self-defeating as an explanation of ﬁne-tuning, but in any case, both the interpre-
tation and the numerical value of P(D) are so obscure and ill-deﬁned that the whole
discussion seems, well, scholastic.
5 Critiquing the Inference of a Multiverse
from Fine-Tuning
The idea of Design may be said to be human-oriented in a spiritual way, whereas
the idea of a Multiverse more technically hinges on the existence of observers, as
expressed by the so-called (weak) Anthropic Principle (Barrow and Tipler 1986;
Bostrom 2002). The claim is that there are innumerable Universes (jointly forming
a ‘Multiverse’), each having its own ‘constants’ of Nature and initial conditions, so
that, unlikely as the life-inducing values of these constants and conditions in our
Universe may be, they simply must occur within this unfathomable plurality. The
point, then, is that we have to observe precisely those values because in other
Universes there simply are no observers. This principle has been labeled both
‘tautological’ and ‘unscientiﬁc’. Some love it and some hate it, but we do not need
to take sides in this debate: all we wish to do is ﬁnd out whether or not the FTA
speaks in favour of a Multiverse, looking at both an explanatory and a probabilistic
level. Thus the question is whether the (alleged) fact of ﬁne-tuning is (at least to
some extent) explained by a Multiverse, or if, in the context of Bayesian conﬁr-
mation theory, the evidence of ﬁne-tuning increases the probability of the
hypothesis that a Multiverse exists.30 To get the technical discussion going, the
following metaphors have been used:
30Although ﬁne-tuning has been claimed (notably by Rees 1999) to provide independent moti-
vation for believing in a Multiverse, the existence of a Multiverse may be a technical consequence
of some combination of string theory (Susskind 2005; Schellekens 2013) and cosmological
inflation (Liddle and Lyth 2000; Weinberg 2008). Both theories are highly speculative, though (the
latter less so than the former), and concerning the ‘landscape’ idea it is hard to avoid the
impression that string theorists turn vice into virtue by selling the inability of string theory to
predict anything as an ability to predict everything (a similar worry may also apply to inflation, cf.
Smeenk 2014). Let us also note that even if it were to make any sense, the ‘emergent multiverse’
122 K. Landsman
• Rees’s ‘off the shelf’ clothes shop has already been mentioned in the
Introduction: if someone enters a shop that sells suits in one size only (i.e., a
single Universe), it would be amazing if it ﬁtted (i.e., enabled life). However, if
all sizes are sold (in a Multiverse, that is), the client would not at all be surprised
to ﬁnd a suit that ﬁts.
• Leslie’s (1989) ﬁring squad analogy states that someone should be executed by
a ﬁring squad, consisting of many marksmen, but they all miss. This amounts to
ﬁne-tuning for life in a single Universe. The thrust of the metaphor arises when
the lucky executee is the sole survivor among a large number of other convicts,
most or all of whom are killed (analogously to the other branches of the
Multiverse, most or all of which are inhospitable to life). The idea is that
although each convict had a small a priori probability of not being hit, if there
are many of them these small individual probabilities of survival add up to a
large probability that someone survives.
• Bradley (2009, 2012) considers an urn that is ﬁlled according to a random
procedure:
– If a coin flip gives Heads (corresponds to a single Universe), either a small
ball (life) or a large one (no life) is entered (depending on a further coin flip).
– In case of Tails (modeling a ‘Binaverse’ for simplicity), two balls enter the
urn, whose sizes depend on two further coin flips (leaving four possibilities).
Using a biased drawing procedure that could only yield either a small ball or
nothing, a small ball is obtained (playing the role of a life-enabling Universe).
A simple Bayesian computation shows that this outcome conﬁrms Tails for the
initial flip.
Each of these stories is insightful and worth contemplating. For example, the
ﬁrst one nicely contrasts the Multiverse with Design, which would correspond to
bespoke tailoring and hence, at least from a secular point of view, commits the
fallacy of putting the customer (i.e., life) ﬁrst, instead of the tailor (i.e., the Universe
as it is). The Dostoyevskian character of the second highlights the Anthropic
Principle, whose associated selection effects (Bostrom 2002) are also quantitatively
taken into account by the third.
Nonetheless, on closer inspection each is sufﬁciently vulnerable to fail to clinch
the issue in favour of the Multiverse. One point is that although each author is well
aware of (and the second and the third even respond to) the Inverse Gambler’s
Fallacy (Hacking 1987),31 this fallacy is not really avoided (White 2000). In its
simplest version, this is the mistake made by a gambler who enters a casino or a
pub, notices that a double six is thrown at some table, and asks if this is the ﬁrst roll
(Footnote 30 continued)
claimed to exist in the so-called Many-Worlds (or Everett) Interpretation of quantum mechanics
(Wallace 2012) is a red herring in the present context, for, as far as we understand, all its branches
have exactly the same laws of nature, including the values of the constants.
31The Gambler’s Fallacy is the mistake that after observing say 35 throws of two fair dice without
a double six, this preferred outcome has become more likely (than 1/36) in the next throw.
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of the evening (his underlying false assumption being that this particular outcome is
more likely if many rolls preceded it). Despite claims to the contrary (Leslie 1988;
Manson and Thrush 2003; Bradley 2009, 2012), Hacking’s analysis that this is
precisely the error made by those who favor a Multiverse based on the FTA in our
opinion still stands. For example, in Rees’ analogy of the clothes shop, what needs
to be explained is not that some suit in the shop turns out to ﬁt the customer, but that
the one he happens to be standing in front of does. Similarly, the probability that a
given executee survives is independent of whoever else is going to be shot in the
same round. And ﬁnally, the relevant urn metaphor is not the one described above,
but the one in which Tails leads to the ﬁlling of two different urns with one ball
each. Proponents of a Multiverse correctly state that its existence would increase the
probability of life existing in some Universe,32 but this is only relevant to the
probability of life in this Universe if one identiﬁes any Universe with the same
properties as ours with our Universe.33 Such an identiﬁcation may be suggested by
the (weak) Anthropic Principle, but its is by no means implied by it, and one should
realize that the inference of a Multiverse from the FTA implicitly hinges on this
additional assumption.34
Moving from a probabilistic to an explanatory context, we follow Mellor (2002)
in claiming that if anything, a Multiverse would make ﬁne-tuning even more
puzzling. Taking the ﬁring squad analogy, there is no doubt that the survival of a
single executee is unexpected, but the question is whether it may be explained (or,
at least, whether it becomes less unexpected) by the assumption that simultane-
ously, many other ‘successful’ executions were taking place. From the probabilistic
point of view discussed above, their presence should have no bearing on the case of
the lone survivor, whose luck remains as amazing as it was. From another,
explanatory point of view, it makes his survival even more puzzling, since we now
know from this additional information about the other executions that apparently
the marksmen usually do kill their victims.
32Bradley (2012, p. 164) states verbatim that he is computing the probability that “At least one
universe has the right constants for life”, other authors doing likewise either explicitly or tacitly.
33Bradley (2009) counters objections like Hacking’s by the claim that “if there are many
Universes, there is a greater chance that Alpha [i.e., our Universe] will exist”. This implies the
same identiﬁcation.
34We side with Hartle and Srednicki (2007) in believing that the identiﬁcation in question is
solidly wrong: “This notion presupposes that we exist separately from our physical description.
But we are not separate from our physical description in our data; we are the physical system
described (…) It is our data that is used in a Bayesian analysis to discriminate between theories.
What other hypothetical observers with data different from ours might see, how many of them
there are, and what properties they might or might not share with us (…) are irrelevant for this
process.”.
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6 Conclusion
Already the uncontroversial examples that feed the FTA sufﬁce to produce the
fascinating insight that the formal structure of our current theories of (sub)nuclear
physics and cosmology (i.e., the Standard Model of particle physics and Einstein’s
theory of General Relativity) is insufﬁcient to predict the rich phenomenology these
theories give rise to: the precise values of most (if not all) constants and initial
conditions play an equally decisive role. This is a recent insight: even a physicist
having the stature of Nobel Laureate Glashow (1999, p. 80) got this wrong, having
initially paraphrased the situation well:
“Imagine a television set with lots of knobs: for focus, brightness, tint, contrast, bass, treble,
and so on. The show seems much the same whatever the adjustments, within a large range.
The standard model is a lot like that.
Who would care if the tau lepton mass were doubled or the Cabibbo angle halved? The
standard model has about 19 knobs. They are not really adjustable: they have been adjusted
at the factory. Why they have their values are 19 of the most baffling metaquestions
associated with particle physics.”
In our view, the insight that the standard model is not like that at all is the real
upshot of the FTA.35 Attempts to draw further conclusions from it in the direction
of either Design or a Multiverse are, in our opinion, unwarranted. For one thing, as
we argued, at best they fail to have any explanatory or probabilistic thrust (unless
they rely on precarious additional assumptions), and at worst ﬁne-tuning actually
seems to turn against them.
Most who agree with this verdict would probably feel left with a choice between
the options of Blind Chance and Blind Necessity; the present state of science does
not allow us to make such a choice now (at least not rationally), and the question
even arises if science will ever be able to make it (in a broader context), except
perhaps philosophically (e.g., à la Kant). However, we would like to make a brief
case for the ﬁfth position, stating that the ﬁne-tuning problem is misguided and that
all we need to do is to clear away confusion.
There are analogies and differences between cosmic ﬁne-tuning for life through
the laws of Nature and the initial conditions of the Universe, as discussed so far, and
Evolution in the sense of Darwin and Wallace. The latter is based on random
(genetic) variation, survival of the ﬁttest, and heritability of ﬁtness. All these are
meant to apply locally, i.e., to life on Earth. We personally feel that arguments to
extend these principles to the Universe in the sense that the Cosmos may undergo
some kind of ‘biological’ evolution, having descendants born in singularities, per-
haps governed by different laws and initial conditions (some of which, then, might
be ‘ﬁne-tuned for life’, as in the Multiverse argument), as argued by e.g., Wheeler
(in Ch. 44 of Misner et al. 1973) and Smolin (1997), imaginative as they may be, are
too speculative to merit serious discussion. Instead, the true analogy seems to be as
35Callender (2004) understandably misquotes Glashow, writing: “The standard model is not like
that.”.
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follows: as far as the emergence and subsequent evolution of life are concerned, the
Universe and our planet Earth should simply be taken as given. Thus the funda-
mental reason we feel ‘ﬁne-tuning for life’ requires no explanation is this36:
Our Universe has not been ﬁne-tuned for life: life has been ﬁne-tuned to our
Universe.
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Chance in the Hebrew Bible: Views in Job
and Genesis 1
Ellen van Wolde
Abstract There are a variety of views on ‘chance’ to be found in the Hebrew
Bible, or Old Testament. In this chapter we will discuss the Book of Job and the
opening chapter in the Book of Genesis, i.e. Genesis 1, both as narratives and as
poetic texts and explore the philosophical and theological consequences for a better
understanding of the concept of chance. In the prologue of the Book of Job, chance
is referred to as the result of a wager between God and the satan, who is described
as one of the sons of God. In the dialogue between Job and his friends, bad luck is
viewed as a consequence of bad behaviour while good luck is the result of good
behaviour. In this sense, chance clearly functions within a moral framework of
retribution. At the end of the Book of Job, in God’s speech out of the whirlwind,
chance is linked to a multifocal view of the universe and understood in terms of
position, perspective, and scale. Also the opening chapter of the Book of Genesis
offers a non-deterministic view on chance. Chance is not the exception in a causal
or necessary chain of events, but it stands out in a framework of non-linear thinking
in which totality and instantaneity alternate. With regard to both biblical texts,
God’s speech in the Book of Job and Genesis 1, chance can be conceived as a
disqualiﬁer of this chain of events, and even as an ultimate denial of the existence of
necessity.
1 The Prologue of the Book of Job: Chance as a Wager
Job’s life is going well, very well indeed. Job is rich, wealthier than anyone in the
East. He has a large herd of cattle, a huge number of employees, and a very large
household. Above all, he has the family that every rich man desired at that time,
namely seven sons and three daughters. Who could wish for more? Because of
these blessings, or maybe by choice, Job lives his life as righteously as he can,
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treating others as he would wish to be treated. Because he is an honest, upright, and
god-fearing man, people respect him. Suddenly, seemingly by chance, bad luck
strikes. One day as his sons and daughters socialise with their friends, a terrible
storm arose and lifted the roof off smashing it back down onto the group. They are
all killed in an instant—no one survives. The servants have to break this dreadful
news to their master. Then, barely has one disaster struck when another employee
rushes in from the ﬁelds to tell Job that cattle-thieves have stolen all his livestock:
thousands of oxen, she-asses, sheep, goats and camels are gone. Within the wink of
an eye this god-fearing man who had everything has lost everything.
This story of devastating misfortune is told in the book of Job,1 one of the books
in the Hebrew Bible.2 Surprisingly, chapters 1 and 2 already offer an explanation
why this happened. It seems that Job’s misfortune, or the shift from fortune to
misfortune, was the consequence of a deal made in heaven. Through the description
of a meeting by the divine council we ﬁnd out what lay behind Job’s misfortune
from heaven’s perspective. In this meeting, Yahweh3 opens the discussion by
asking a fellow divine being,4 one of the sons of God called the satan,5 the
1Most scholars today would date the composition of the Book of Job to some point between the
seventh and fourth centuries BCE. There are a number of indications in the book that it was not
written all at one time, but went through a phases of composition. In the most recent monography
on Job (Seow 2013, pp. 40–44), the Book of Job is dated to the late sixth to mid-ﬁfth century BCE.
Seow’s arguments are based on literary parallels to Deutero-Isaiah and Zechariah 3, as well as to
the historical reference to the Chaldeans in Job 1:17.
2Some of the most comprehensive and recent monographs on the book of Job are: Habel (1985);
Clines (1989–2009); Newsom (2003); Seow (2013).
3The notion of ‘God’ or ‘deity’ is expressed in Biblical Hebrew by the word ’elōhîm, a plural noun
of the singular form ’el or ’eloah, ‘God’, and this plural noun is commonly used with a singular
verb form. The personal name of the God of Israel is yhwh, Yahweh. In the Hebrew Bible
sometimes reference is made to the God of Israel by its common name ’elōhîm, other times by the
personal name yhwh. In the Book of Job both terms are used to designate the deity (see, e.g., here
in Job 1:6: “the sons of ’elōhîm presented themselves before yhwh”; or Job 1:21 where Job says:
“yhwh has given, yhwh has taken away”; see also Job 2:10, in which Job says to his wife: “Should
we accept good from the hands of the deity (ha-’elōhîm), should we not accept evil?”). Throughout
this chapter I will refer to ’elōhîm or yhwh by the term ‘God’, with the exception of literally quoted
verses.
4‘Sons of God’ or ‘divine beings’ (in Hebrew benê-’elōhîm or benê-’elîm) ﬁgure in several
passages in the Hebrew Bible and designate the divine beings that live in heaven and are seen as
closely related to Yahweh or to Elyon, ‘God, the most high’. The notion of a ‘divine council’
denotes a formal gathering of these ‘sons of God’ and this council is viewed as the godly
government, which most likely resembled the earthly royal court. The earthly and heavenly
councils formally operated in two ways: the ﬁrst way would be an advisory board for the
king/deity regarding matters of state or government; the second way was as a formal judicial court.
For extensive discussion, see White (2014). Reference to these divine beings and/or a divine
council is made in the Hebrew Bible in: Gen. 1:26; 3:22; 11:7; Exod 15:11; Deut 4:19; 17:3; 32:8;
33:2–3; Judg. 5:20; 1 Kg 22:19–23; Isa 6; 14:13; Jer 8:2; 23:18.22a; Am 8:14; Sach 3; 14:5; Pss
25:14; 29:1–2; 49:20; 58:1–2; 73:15; 82; 89:6–9; 96:4–5; 97:7–9; 148:2–3; Job 1–2; 15:8; 38:7;
Dan 7:9–14; Neh 9:6; 1 Chron 16:25 (book order follows the Hebrew canon).
5‘The satan’ is the translation of ha-sāta ̄n (in Hebrew this is the nominalised form of the participle
of the verb sa ̄tan ‘accuse’, preceded by the deﬁnite article ha-) and the deﬁnite article indicates that
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following question. “Have you noticed my servant Job? There is no one like him on
earth, a blameless and upright man who fears God and shuns evil!” The satan
replies, “Is it ‘for naught’ (Hebrew chinām) that Job has put his faith in you? You
have protected him, all his life.” In this sense, the satan argues that the principle of
retribution,6 or ‘tit for tat’, drives human behaviour, including Job’s model beha-
viour. In other words, the satan claims that Job puts his faith in God only because
God protects him and to make sure things go well for him. God takes the opposite
position. Simply put, God assumes that Job is pious at the same time as being rich,
whereas the satan claims that Job is pious because he is rich and wants to stay rich.
Challenged by the satan, God places his bets on Job. It is an important question for
God: do people fear God unconditionally or do they put their faith in him in order to
ensure they stay well off? 7 God cannot test everyone so he puts Job, the epitome of
a pious man, to the test. The aim is to answer the following questions: is people’s
loyalty to God pure, that is to say not driven by self-interest? Are disasters the
consequence of bad behaviour or caused by a lack of trust in God? Do human
beings who live a good life deserve happiness? Did Job deserve happiness? Is there
any rationality behind the alternation of fortune and misfortune on earth? To
demonstrate the signiﬁcance of these questions, the narrator sets the exchange
between God and the satan in heaven. Here the discussion between God and the
satan can be more open and intense. However, only the readers know about the
wager. The character Job knows nothing of this heavenly experiment.
The next scene is set on earth and shows how Job reacts when blow after blow
strike. Although deeply miserable and unable to understand what is happening to
him, he does not blame God. Instead he says: “Naked I came from my mother’s
womb, and naked I shall return. Yahweh has given and Yahweh has taken away;
blessed be the name of Yahweh” (Job 1:21). The interesting point of this response is
that Job does not consider misfortune as mere bad luck or as something inexplicable
that happened by accident, but he attributes everything, either good or bad, to God.
Job’s position, therefore, is one of complete faith or trust.
But then, new disasters strike Job. This time his body is affected and his skin
peels away until his body is raw. Eventually he ends up in a rubbish dump covered
(Footnote 5 continued)
‘the satan’ does not express a name, but refers to someone who performs the task of ‘accusing’.
Figuring in a judicial court, one might translate ‘the satan’ with ‘the (public) prosecutor’. In the
divine council operating as a judicial court (see note 4), the various divine beings each play their
own role: the satan acts as the public prosecutor, while (the highest) God acts as the judge, and the
ma ̄lach (traditionally translated with ‘angel’) functions as the messenger who brings the divine
judgements as messages to the human beings.
6The term retribution derives from the Latin retribuare, ‘to pay, grant, repay’.
7The modern terminology ‘to believe in God’, ‘to love God’, or ‘to have pure faith’ does not
adequately reflect the idea of ‘to fear God’. In the Hebrew Bible, ‘to fear God’ includes notions
like ‘trust’, ‘respect’, ‘awe’ and ‘loyalty’, which ﬁgure in a hierarchical framework of thinking.
The adequate human expression of this fear is ‘to serve God’. The question in Job’s prologue is,
therefore, do human beings fear God because they trust and respect God, or, in contrast, because
they expect reward and try to avoid punishment?
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with loathsome ulcers from the soles of his feet to the crown of his head. He
scratches himself with a pot shard but still he utters no reproach. Suddenly Job’s
wife turns up. Where did she come from? She was not mentioned before.8 The
narrator told us about Job’s sons and daughters but never mentioned a wife, and
when he lost his offspring there was no reference to her either. In his deepest misery
Job says that he is all alone in the world (“naked I came, naked I will go”) without
mention of a wife—apparently she does not count. Yet, now Mrs. Job enters the
picture and challenges her husband: “Do you still keep your integrity? Say
good-bye to God (’elōhîm) and die” (Job 2:9). In a way, Job’s wife draws the same
conclusion that many secular readers would draw under similar circumstances.
Embedded in her words are questions such as: “How can you keep on being loyal to
God when all this misfortune befalls you? Why are you being targeted? You, my
dear husband, do not deserve this. You live an upright life, I can testify to it.” Job’s
wife is motivated by the principle of causality as the steering principle of faith: you
place your trust in God since he is the one who made you, supports you, perhaps,
even punishes you when you deserve it. There appears to be balance in this
God-created universe. But disaster and misery prove that such a balance does not
exist, so you might as well give up your loyalty to God. Modern secular people
would add: it is not just the fact that this cosmic order does not exist, but the
so-called originator and defender of this cosmic order does not exist either. This
would be unthinkable in the context of ancient Near Eastern culture. Here in this
text the phrase is: ‘Say adieu to God’; the existence of God is not at issue.
Nevertheless, this farewell to God is what Job’s wife proposes and we, as modern
readers, are likely to agree with her as we often understand misfortune in individual
lives or in nature as evidence of the non-existence of God.
Yet, Job contests this view ﬁercely. He dismisses his wife’s words as foolish:
“Should we accept good from the hands of the deity, but should we not accept
evil?” (Job 2:10). Still, her words have an effect. By confronting Job with his own
death and pointing out to him the choice between blessing God or saying good-bye
to God, she forces him to respond. The difference between the wording of Job’s ﬁrst
reaction in Job 1:21 (“Yahweh has given and Yahweh has taken away; blessed be
the name of Yahweh”) and his response to his wife is striking. The ﬁrst time Job
speaks he refers to God by the name Yahweh. Thus Job acknowledges Yahweh as
Lord. The second time, immediately following his wife’s remarks, Job speaks about
God as ‘the deity’, ha-’elōhîm. Although Job still considers God as the agent or
distributor of good and bad luck, this sounds more detached. In addition, whereas
8Her namelessness, her absence in chapter 1, her short and unclearly presented speech in chapter 2,
and her departure after the second chapter of the book of Job never to return in the rest of the book,
have aroused interpreters’ interest in Job’s wife throughout history. From the Greek translation of
the Hebrew Bible in the Septuagint (third century BCE) in which a section on her is added to the
translation, through the interpretation history of the Bible, to contemporary novels and theatre
plays, Mrs. Job has received much more attention than in the biblical book of Job. For a recent
survey, see Gravett (2012, pp. 97–125). For a textual analysis of Job 1–2 and of the narrative
function of Job’s wife, see: van Wolde (1995, pp. 201–221).
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the ﬁrst reaction was a statement, the second is formulated as a question. And Job
who ﬁrst choses to bless God (in Job 1:21) now stops blessing God. His wife
introduces the notion of death and this instils doubt in Job. He is no longer sure of
anything and begins to ask himself questions. He even starts to reason from a
human point of view instead of automatically adopting the perspective of God. His
wife’s taunts trigger Job to change from an assured believer into someone who asks
questions. The responses of an ardent believer would not have provided material for
such a dramatic story. The book of Job is made human and lifelike through the
doubt and spirit of a man who has to confront his trust in God in the light of the
suffering, misery and undeserved and devastating bad luck that has befallen him.
Thus the opening chapters of the book of Job explore the theme of chance
through narrative. What seems to be an inexplicable change of fortune on earth is
described as the consequence of a wager in heaven. The bet turns out to be a kind of
empirical research. God’s hypothesis is that people serve him ‘for naught’. His is a
framework of non-causality. The counterhypothesis, formulated by the satan, is that
people serve God in order to secure a better life for themselves. His framework is
one of causality. The test is performed on God’s model servant on earth, Job. The
concept of chance thus ﬁgures in the domain of causality. By alternating between
scenes on earth and scenes in heaven, the reader is able to view the topic from two
perspectives through the characters in the two domains, i.e. God and the satan in
heaven, and Job and his wife on earth. By positioning the four characters in a kind
of matrix, the narrator reveals his preferences. The narrative strategy of Job 1–2 is
to convince readers to share both God’s and Job’s point of view and agree with
them that it is enough to accept that everything (good luck and bad luck) is given or
taken away by God. God and Job conclude that the satan and women (not just Job’s
wife) hold a point of view is seductive but incorrect. However, by introducing these
opposing characters, readers are challenged to consider questions such as: Are the
concepts of causality and retribution helpful in understanding the incidence of
fortune and misfortune in someone’s life? Are patterns of regularity, logic and
ethical balance sufﬁcient to explain the unexpected disruptions in someone’s life or
not?
2 Dialogue in the Book of Job: Chance as Proof of Moral
Balance
Job’s friends know the answers to these questions. In endless discussions (Job
chapters 4–37), usually called ‘dialogues’, Job and his friends defend the view of a
moral balance in the world in various degrees.9
9For an extensive description of the dialogue sections, see: van Wolde (2003, pp. 42–106).
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Eliphaz is the ﬁrst of Job’s friends to speak and his speech is characterized by
dignity, sobriety and reticence. The nub of what he wants to say is: “Is not your fear
of God your conﬁdence and the integrity of your life your hope?” (Job 4:6). Job can
be reassured precisely because he believes in justice and knows that God guarantees
that human beings will be recompensed in accordance with their behaviour, good or
bad, says Eliphaz. He thus sketches a hopeful future for Job. The second friend,
Bildad, is less optimistic. He calls God a just judge and in his view there is no doubt
that God administers law in the right way. Bildad even goes as far as seeing God’s
justice illustrated by the fate of Job’s sons: they partied too much and have sinned
so they were punished. In actual fact, his argument is back to front: because Job’s
sons were punished, they must have sinned. The third friend, Zophar, even goes one
step further. He identiﬁes where Job went wrong and explicitly condemns the
process that Job is going through, since he understands that Job risks throwing the
whole of the traditional doctrine of retribution overboard. Zophar’s reaction is
caustic and what he says can be summarized as follows: “don’t think that you can
understand everything by your talk and chatter. It cannot be grasped at all, so
submit to the traditional views and know that God’s justice is a great mystery”.
Thus Zophar puts Job’s behaviour to shame. In contrast to Eliphaz, who regarded
Job as innocent, and Bildad, who regarded the sons as guilty, Zophar now accuses
Job outright of sin and calls on him to repent.
Job’s friends’ views on misfortune and chance clearly function within the moral
framework of retribution. David Clines, one of the most prominent Job scholars of
our times, offers a fair reflection on their position:
Now it is very easy to mock the friends’ concept of God as the executor of retribution, and to
point to the myriad of examples we all know in which reward has been denied the godly and
the wicked have escaped punishment. Yet the alternatives to this theology may be worse
still: imagine a world in which there is simply no predictable correspondence between act
and consequence. How will any parent inculcate right behavior in children, how will any
state warn the criminally inclined, if there is no underlying principle of retribution? The
attractiveness of the theology is that it is not purely experiential and anecdotal, an accu-
mulation of instances, but a systematic, principled thinking through of the way the world
ought to work, should be governed, must be conceived. It posits a fundamental justice at the
heart of God’s design for the universe. From this perspective, any number of examples, or
apparent examples, where it fails to be implemented cannot subvert the principle, for—
although it is often stated as an account of what actually happens in the real world—it is not
so much a description of reality as a blueprint for it. (Clines 2004, p. 42)
Job, as a man who fears God and shuns evil (Job 1:1), had long accepted the
same theology. But since he has experienced a refutation of that theology at ﬁrst
hand, his whole view of God’s justice is called into question. He draws the bitter
conclusion that there is no retribution and that there is no justice. His personal
tragedy has led to disillusionment with God and the whole of the moral universe.
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3 God’s Answer “Out of the Whirlwind”
Surprisingly, in the book of Job, God’s speech out of the whirlwind is presented in
the form of an answer to Job: “Then, Yahweh replied to Job out of the whirlwind
and said” (Job 38:1). God’s answer, which stretches out over four chapters (Job 38–
41), is set in a poetic style, with short sentences, ﬁxed rhythms, and multiple series
of rhetorical questions, which very often open with the interrogatives ‘who’,
‘when’, ‘where’, ‘what’, or ‘do you know’? Yet, a real answer to the earlier
questions posed, it is not. It seems more of a monologue in which God does not
really react to Job’s questions and cry for justice. God’s ﬁrst words to Job are full of
signiﬁcance: “Who is this who darkens counsel, speaking without knowledge?”
(Job 38:2). God reproves Job for setting his own agenda. In his quest for justice, Job
obscures the fact that God does nothing to ensure that justice reigns in the world.
God speaks about a completely different order, when he continues, “Where were
you when I laid the earth’s foundations? Speak if you have understanding.” (Job
38:4). God not only points out their varying levels of knowledge, but also Job’s
physical location. God refers to Job’s position as well as his implied spatial limits
and, accordingly, limited perspective (Joode 2015, pp. 198–199). In fact, God’s
spatial scale is of a different order. Not only does he know everything about the
created universe, he is its architect. “Do you know who ﬁxed its dimensions? Or
who measured it with a line? Onto what were the earth’s bases sunk? Who set its
corner stone? When the morning stars sang together and all the divine beings10
shouted for joy?” (Job 38:4–7)11 And God continues: “Have you penetrated to the
sources of the sea? Or walked in the recesses of the deep?12 Have the gates of death
been disclosed to you? Have you seen the gates of deep darkness? Have you
surveyed the expanses of the earth? If you know of these, tell me” (Job 38:16–18).
Again and again, Job is forced to acknowledge his limited position, limited per-
spective, and, therefore, his limited knowledge.
Later, God carries on asking about all kinds of animals,13 implying that in their
own way they have all the freedom to reproduce and treat their young as they see
10For divine beings, see footnote 4. In Mesopotamia the stars are conceived as the heavenly
manifestations of deities, and hence as divine beings. The same divine beings are at the same time
physically present on earth, e.g. in statues (inaugurated after mouth-washing rituals) or in temples.
This fluidity of the divine selfhood in Mesopotamia, Canaan and possibly also in the Hebrew Bible
is discussed in Sommer (2009).
11The translation of the verses in Job 38–39 is the Jewish Publication Society’s-translation.
12For the tripartite worldview behind these questions (heaven, earth, and te ̆ho ̄m or ‘the deep’), see
below the ﬁrst paragraph in the section on Genesis 1.
13E.g. Job 38:39 and 39:1–4: “Can you hunt prey for the lion? And satisfy the appetite of the king
of beasts? They crouch in their dens, lie in ambush in their lairs. Do you know the season when the
mountain goats give birth? Can you mark the time when the hinds calve? Can you count the
months they must complete? Do you know the season they give birth? When they couch to bring
forth their offspring, to deliver their young? Their young are healthy; they grow up in the open.
They leave and return no more.”
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ﬁt. In a long series of rhetorical questions, God reflects on the universe and its
inhabitants, showing that he infused all entities and creatures with wisdom so that
they would be capable of acting on the own accord. Creatures reproduce, nurture
and sustain themselves and their offspring in their own ways and God does not need
to know everything they do. He does not watch over the mother ostrich when she
decides to hide her eggs, forgetting that other animals could tread on them.14 He
does not get involved in the moral convictions of human beings who want him to
share their ideas of justice. There is a universal order, which God upholds, but its
principles are not balance and equity, or retribution and equivalence, as Job and his
friends seem to think. God’s principles are more strategic and focus on intimate
knowledge, sustenance and variety (Clines 2004, p. 48). In his discourse, God
knows his universe intimately, but he does not tell the stars or the earth’s inhabi-
tants what to do and how to behave. The purposes of the universe are inﬁnitely
multiple, each of its elements has its own perspective and rules. As for humans,
they are merely one part. The world has not been designed just for them. If they
want to up hold justice they must to do it themselves, according to their own rules.
Finally, the theology of the divine speech contains an implicit answer to the
satan’s question: Does Job serve God chinām? The satan had suggested that Job
was pious because he found it beneﬁtted him to be pious. Job’s behaviour in the
opening chapters proves he is pious ‘without cause’ but now, in the divine speech,
this question is raised again in a different sense. Since the divine speech denies that
there is a causal relationship between deed and consequence, it follows that every
deed is done for free, without a reason and without reward (Clines 2004, p. 49).
There is no principle of retribution at work in the universe. Any system of moral
causation, of moral order, will not be from the universe or God, but will be made
and maintained by human beings.
4 Chance in the Book of Job
At the start of the Book of Job, readers are confronted with Job’s fate and we cannot
but feel compassion for him. Yet, as readers we know that what appears to be bad
luck for Job on earth is actually a consequence of the wager in heaven between God
and the satan. It is this dynamic interaction between the heavenly wager and its
impact on earth that makes the risk of good or bad luck acceptable to readers of the
Bible. This bi-focal perspective disappears in the dialogues between Job and his
friends, since here the friends present their respective mono-focal views, in which
chance clearly functions within a moral framework of retribution and is reduced
again to a simple balance. However, by the end of the Book of Job when we read
about God’s speech out of the whirlwind, these simplistic views are replaced by a
multifocal view of the universe in which chance is understood in terms of
14See Job 39:13–16.
138 E. van Wolde
perspective, place and scale. In a long series of rhetorical questions God reflects on
the universe and its inhabitants, showing every phenomenon’s spatial limitedness,
bound to each limited perspective. What is considered unacceptable or unjust on
one scale may be explicable on another scale, and vice versa. Thus the Book of Job
advocates a perspectival and scale dependent view on causal chains and events that
cannot be reduced to human explanations and simple schemes of retribution.
This non-deterministic framework we see in the Book of Job has not played a
major role in Jewish and Christian theologies. Like the satan, Job’s wife and Job’s
friends, people continue to ground their faith in God on causality and explain life in
a deterministic framework. That is to say, people develop causal explanations for
the sometimes inexplicable alternation of events, with their brains and rationality,
and then they make God responsible for what they consider to be a ‘reasonable’ or
‘necessary’ chain of events. They blame God for bad luck, injustice, natural dis-
asters, and in this ﬁnd a reason to conclude that God does not exist. God’s speech in
the Book of Job invites its readers to examine their views on the topic of chance as
this exposes the human quest for causal explanations as a result of a human need for
moral order, logical structure, and a system they can understand. The text teaches us
to consider chance as the residue of our quest for necessity, for moral and logical
patterns and our desire to call patterns God’s design. The Book of Job does not
present its teachings through an abstract discourse, a learned essay, or a treatise with
generalizations. It offers narrative and poetic material15 that reflects ambiguity, and
uses a matrix of characters’ perspectives to challenge us to make up our own minds
on the topic of justice, moral and logical order, and chance.
5 From Narrative to Philosophy
If we turn from the literary aspects of the Book of Job with its discussions on the
moral balance in the world to the deterministic views on chance that have domi-
nated Orthodox Judaism and Orthodox Christianity, we discover elements that still
influence present discussions on rationality and faith. Orthodox Jewish tradition has
adhered to a theology that celebrates Yahweh, the God of salvation, who elected his
people Israel out of the nations, acted mightily for Israel at the exodus and at the
conquest of the land, and gracefully in its offer of a covenant and of the Torah. In
return, his people must acknowledge him as the one and only God, serve him and
respect him, and live following his laws of covenant. Yahweh then will act as the
executor of a system of retributive justice.
Orthodox Christian theology has followed Jewish tradition in this theology of
retribution and has at the same time been influenced by Aristotelean ideas of
15The narrative style of chapters 1 and 2 in the Book of Job, characterized by sequential verbal
forms, long sentences, embedded speeches of distinct characters, and an observable narrator’s
voice, differs greatly from the poetic style of God’s speech in chapters 38–41, in which these
characteristics are absent.
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regularity, causality, and coherence, in which God is the initiator of all changes in
events. These religious deterministic worldviews are based on the convictions of a
divine cosmic order as well as a divine moral order: God is the initiator and
dominant agent behind all entities and the causal chains of events, and God upholds
the moral order according to the principle of retribution. According to this retri-
butionary view of God, those who act properly are rewarded with blessings, while
wrongdoers are punished.
Today, most people in Western Europe no longer uphold these orthodox tradi-
tions. Nevertheless, in modern notions of chance, ideas of regularity and causality,
which have their roots in ancient Christian adaptations of the Aristotelean con-
ception of causality (cf. Hulswit 2002), often resurface. Aristotle, in particular,
deﬁned an ‘efﬁcient cause’ as the primary source of change that is brought about for
the sake of an end. As part of the Newtonian revolution in science during the
seventeenth century, this concept of causality underwent a radical change, in that
goals or ends were replaced by initial conditions, and causal relations became
instances of deterministic laws. What remains unchanged, however, is the view that
causal relationships were conceived as if they are ontologically there.
From Hume and Kant onwards, this view also started to be questioned. There
was an awareness that causality presupposes selection or a predisposition that is
created from the perspective of the rule or scientiﬁc law that the human mind
accepts as such, but which may not be ontological. This development from
ontology to epistemology in modern science and philosophy obviously has con-
sequences for in understanding the notion of chance. See, for example, the position
taken by Hume described in the ﬁrst chapter of the present book The Challenge of
Chance: “The chance or indifference lies only in our judgment on account of our
imperfect knowledge, not in the things themselves, which are in every case equally
necessary, though to appearance not equally constant or certain” (Hume, Treatise
part 3, Sect. 1). Notice also Hume’s conclusion that, “one should not suppose that
the attributes of God have any analogy or likeness to the perfections of a human
creature. (…) We ascribe to God Wisdom, Thought, Design, Knowledge (…)
because these words are honourable among men, forgetting that He is inﬁnitely
superior to our limited view and comprehension” (Hume 1779, 46).
Surprisingly, this view expressed by Hume, and similarly by Kant, is not so very
different from the position ascribed to God in the Book of Job. As shown above,
God in his speech presented in Job 38–41 advocates a perspective and scale
dependent view on causal chains and events that cannot be reduced to human
explanations and simple schemes of retribution. God’s position is non-deterministic
and embedded in a framework where every living creature is responsible for his,
her, or its own decisions that are necessarily limited in scale, time, place and
position. The Book of Job does, therefore, not make God responsible for the chain
of events. Even Leibniz, Clarke, or Hume would not dare to speak of God’s
decisions in terms of a betting game. Yet, the openings chapters of the Book of Job
do talk about God’s actions in this way. So Einstein’s words that “God does not
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play dice” is in a way countered by Job. We could even conclude that the European
philosophical tradition does not consist of “a series of footnotes to Plato” (as A.N.
Whitehead famously held), but to footnotes to Job as well.
6 From Philosophy Back to Narrative: Genesis 1
Does everything that exists, have a beginning? Does everything that begins to exist
have a cause? For aeons Christian theology offered an answer to these two ques-
tions by means of a notion commonly known as creatio ex nihilo: God ‘created out
of nothing’, which contrasts with creatio ex materia ‘creation out of some
pre-existent, eternal matter’. Christian theology posited that all things, which have a
beginning, must also have a source or cause, and that, because the universe has an
apparent beginning, it must also have a transcendent cause. The idea of a beginning
demands a creator who existed without a beginning and prior to and outside the
universe. Currently, the general public (as can be seen on many websites) link the
common phrase creatio ex nihilo to Genesis 1:1. This verse is considered to be a
description of the ﬁrst act by God through which everything came into being. The
implication is that before this instant of creative action there was nothing: God did
not make the universe from pre-existing material, but he started from scratch.
In the twentieth century, it became accepted in biblical scholarship that this idea
of ‘creation out of nothing’ was not based on texts from the Hebrew Bible but on
Greek texts (especially on 2 Maccabees 7 in the Septuagint) and on later inter-
pretations influenced by Hellenistic philosophy. Over the last years, more nuanced
studies have been written on 2 Maccabees 7, the Septuagint, and Hellenistic Jewish
and Christian texts, showing that the idea of ‘creation out of nothing’ was not
present in 2 Maccabees 7 and not elsewhere in the Septuagint, but was developed in
the second century CE.16 In addition, new studies on creation texts in the Hebrew
Bible have been published that demonstrate how these texts were conceived in a
completely different intellectual framework than the later Jewish and Christian
traditions.17 Yet, it is not the original ancient texts that influence the notion of
‘creation out of nothing’ in our times (the 21th century CE), but the reception and
transformation of these texts by Christian traditions from the Early Middle Ages up
to today. It turns out that texts in the Hebrew Bible never presupposed the concepts
that lie at the heart of the creatio ex nihilo-theory, namely the concepts of noth-
ingness and of material origins.
I will now focus on Genesis 1 to explain the cognitive framework of the ancient
Near East in which Genesis 1 originated, a framework that differs from the Greek
and Hellenistic framework and from medieval Jewish and Christian traditions.
16See Schmuttermayr (1973), O’Neill (2002), Niehoff (2013).
17See three of the most recent comprehensive studies of Genesis 1: Smith (2010); Walton (2011);
Batto (2013).
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Subsequently, I show how this framework is different from the common under-
standing of Genesis 1 in modern non-academic and ecclesiastical circles that have
been greatly influenced by these later Jewish and Christian traditions. Upon a
sketch of the worldview this text presupposes, a short textual analysis of Genesis
1:1–3 will follow in order to elucidate the view this text offers of the beginnings of
the universe. Finally, some of its consequences for our understanding of the notion
of ‘chance’ will be drawn.
7 Worldview in the Hebrew Bible
“There is more between heaven and earth”, in this and other everyday conversations
it seems natural to make a distinction between heaven and earth. However, this is
not as self-evident as it appears. The endless universe is, in fact, continuous and not
split up into a heaven and an earth. Although the word string “heaven and earth” is
used in the Hebrew Bible as a merism to express the totality of all and everything,
biblical texts share the ancient Near Eastern view that the cosmos consists of at least
three layers: heaven, earth and the netherworld.18 This tripartite cosmic view serves
as a backdrop for all the texts in the Hebrew Bible.
The tripartite cosmic view is immediately apparent in the three opening verses of
Genesis 1. God performs an action with respect to two direct objects, ‘heaven’ and
‘earth’. The two nouns hāšāmayîm, heaven(s), and hāʾāres ̣, earth, reflect the
worldview that the universe consists of at least two components or levels. The
following two verses presuppose another level in the universe below the earth,
namely tĕhōm: the netherworld or abyss that is ﬁlled with water. What did the
ancient Israelites think of when they spoke of tĕhōm? The Biblical material allows
us to construe an inventory of the possible concepts underlying tĕhōm: it is con-
ceived as (1) a spatial realm under the earth, (2) a vertical depth, (3) a large expanse
of water expanded vertically and horizontally, (4) a container of water that is the
source of springs, wells, fountains, and rivers on earth, and (5) a layer on which the
earth rests. Based on the ﬁrst two concepts, the semantic content of tĕhōm is
considered in terms of depth and translated into English as ‘the deep’ or ‘the abyss’.
Based on concepts 3 and 4, the semantic content of tĕhōm is considered in terms of
huge volumes of water and translated into English as ‘waters’ or ‘(primeval) ocean’.
In short, in the Hebrew Bible, the tĕhōm is clearly conceived as the lowest tier in the
tripartite cosmos—a deep container ﬁlled with water.
Heaven is the highest tier, and biblical texts including Genesis (1:6–8) present
the idea that heaven is made of solid vertically arranged material that holds volumes
18Cf. Cornelius (1994); Horowitz (1998); Pongratz-Leisten (2001); Keel and Schroer (2002);
Walton (2011).
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of water in place.19 The function of this heavenly vault is to prevent the waters
above the vault from falling down on the earth. The tĕhōm or the spatial realm
beneath the earth is also ﬁlled with water. Earth occupies a central position in the
tripartite view of the cosmos sandwiched between heaven above and tĕhōm below.
Ancient maps, such as the Babylonian map in the British Museum and Greek maps
drawn by Anaximander and Herodotus, share the belief that the inhabited world
was a disk of earth surrounded by water. Biblical texts also conceive the earth as a
single, disk-shaped continent surrounded by an ocean of water. The Hebrew word
tebel refers speciﬁcally to this ‘earth-disk’, i.e. the earth as a single entity. The word
ʾeres ̣ is the more general term referring either to the (dry) land or ground, or to the
whole earth. Genesis 1:9–10 states that the ʾeres ̣ was formed as the result of the
waters moving horizontally outwards to leave dry land behind at the centre. This
produced two spatial domains on earth, namely land in the middle and waters
surrounding the land. Many texts in the Hebrew Bible from Prophets to Psalms and
Job describe how the earth comes into existence when God establishes the earth by
setting it on pillars to prevent the earth-disk from sinking beneath the waters of
tĕhōm—the underworld ocean.
8 Genesis 1:1–3
Genesis 1:1–3 tells us how this world came into being and this is commonly
translated “In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth. And the earth
was void and bare, darkness was over the abyss, and God’s spirit moved over the
waters. God said: Let there be light and light was.” A more detailed analysis shows
the flaws of this translation. The very ﬁrst word, bĕrēʾšît ‘in the beginning of’,
marks not an absolute starting point in time, but expresses the starting point of the
action expressed by the following verb. The meaning of this verb bārāʾ has been
widely discussed. In van Wolde (2009) the hypothesis is presented that this verb
designates ‘to separate’ as a purely spatial term, a view that was further explained
and substantiated in van Wolde and Rezetko (2011).20 Based on comprehensive
linguistic studies, the conclusion is that the verb bārāʾ functions in the cognitive
domain of space and designates [SEPARATION], [DIVISION], or [SETTING APART].
Dependent on the context it can be translated as, ‘to divide, separate, set apart,
spread out, disconnect.’ Hence, Genesis 1:1 should be translated: “In the beginning
19Genesis 1:6–8 uses the term ra ̄qîaʿ, ‘vault’, which refers to the result of either a gold/silversmith
who beats out metal/solid plates or of someone who spreads out a plate or other solid material.
Based on a metaphorical structuring of this concept, God’s making of the heaven is conceptualized
in terms of the beating out or spreading of solid plates of the heavenly vault in the endless water
expanse.
20van Wolde (2009, pp. 3–23), van Wolde and Rezetko (2011, pp. 2–39).
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when God separated the heaven and the earth, …”.21 The implication is that the
sentence is not concluded in verse 1, but continues in verse 2. It marks the starting
point of the divine action of separation over and against the situation described in
verse 2.
In verse 2a, the following two pictures are painted (1) the earth as tōhû wa-bōhû,
which creates an image of the earth not yet set on pillars, hence, not yet visible and
still covered with the pre-cosmic waters of the tĕhōm, and (2) a vast darkness over
this primeval ocean or tĕhōm. Verse 2b describes how God’s ruach or wind/breath
hovers over and faces these waters. In this sense, verse 2a depicts an endless
expanse of water stretching out in all directions, covered in complete darkness,
whereas verse 2b describes God’s spatial movement and actions with regard to the
waters.
This is a powerful image of what happened when God began to act in a universe
that, till then, had only consisted of water. Verse 1 describes the beginning of this
action and qualiﬁes it as separation: when God began to separate the heaven and the
earth. Verse 2a continues with the situation that the earth is covered with water and
darkness covers the abyss of waters, that is, it zooms in on the condition of the
heaven and earth referred to as direct object in verse 1. However, verse 2b zooms in
on God’s act of separation described in verse 1. Consequently, verse 2b shows that
it is God’s breath (or the wind) that separated the primordial waters to make a
spatial realm between heaven and earth. In this deep, dark and watery context, verse
3 uses only two Hebrew words to evoke God’s ﬁrst act of creation: “And God said:
wayyehi ʾōr, “Let light be”, followed by the immediate result: “And light was”. The
proposed translation is therefore:
1. In the beginning when God separated the heaven and the earth
2a. The earth was ungrounded and without foundation
and darkness covered the abyss ﬁlled with waters
2b. God’s breath/wind was moving/blowing over the waters,
3a. And God said:
3b. Let light be.
3c. And light was.
Genesis 1:1–3 uses imagery to convey how God’s breath or wind transforms a
world ﬁlled with water. This divine act of dividing by breathing shows us that God
does not ﬁll a void (the classical idea of creatio ex nihilo), but rather that he splits
the oneness of the primordial waters open to create a new reality.
21The syntactic structure of this verse is: “In the beginning of (the act by which) God separated the
heaven and earth”, which in English becomes “in the beginning when God separated the heaven
and the earth”. Cf. Holmstedt (2008, pp. 353–359).
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9 The Framework of Non-Linearity in Genesis 1
Genesis 1 is usually read from a chronological and causal perspective. Therefore,
the text is understood as a temporal arrangement in which the ﬁrst thing told
happened ﬁrst and the next thing told happened later. In a chronological reading,
the opening verse represents the beginning and the subsequent days show what
happens next. In a causal reading, the same text is read as a causal chain: the ﬁrst
element told not only happens ﬁrst, but it is also the cause of the second element,
which is therefore an effect of the ﬁrst event. In this reading causality will be the
story’s main theme: everything originates from the creative actions of God. He is
the initiator and the created phenomena are the effects of his actions. Causal rela-
tionships also occur between the created elements themselves. Water and light are
created ﬁrst and only then can the earth can bring forth plants. These plants in their
turn must be created before the animals as they are necessary for the animals to live
on. A causal understanding of the text has important consequences because the last
element told is considered the most valuable or important (at least this is the way it
is interpreted in history). In the Jewish tradition this has led to the conclusion that
the seventh and last day is the climax of the story. In the Christian tradition many
people infer that humans are the pinnacle of creation, and the 6th day of creation is
considered to be the story’s climax. On the 6th day God created the human being
and with this ﬁnal creature, creation reaches its culmination, possibly even its goal.
According to this causal conception, Genesis 1 is understood as an explanation of
the special position of the human being within the created universe: heaven is made
for the beneﬁt of the earth, the earth for the beneﬁt of humans, while plants and
animals are made to provide the necessary conditions for the human beings to live
on earth. However, if this causal approach is applied to Genesis 2 and the story of
paradise, a woman (‘Eve’) is the last creature to be made so we would have to infer
that creation reached its climax and ultimate goal when the human female was
created. Illogically, the opposite conclusion is usually drawn.
This linear interpretation of Genesis 1 rivals the scientiﬁc view, because it
understands causality in the same way as science does in the sense that they both
provide a linear explanation of the actual causal relations between objects and
events (see section above on causality as ontology). However, does this linear
arrangement actually apply to the text of Genesis 1? Some shortcomings can easily
be detected. If linearity were the fundamental device, how can it be explained that
God made the light in verse 4, and the sun and moon much later on, in verses 14–
16? How God could have possibly made the heaven and the earth in verse 1? And
do the earth and the heaven exist now, according to the story at this stage? If they
do, it is inexplicable that God in verses 6–8 creates a vault in the middle of the
waters and calls it ‘heaven’, and that in verses 9–10 God separates the waters from
the dry land and he calls the waters ‘seas’ and the dry land ‘earth’. Does God create
them twice? The most striking problem with a linear reading is that Genesis 2 is
positioned immediately after Genesis 1. It seems as though Genesis 2:4b–7 starts
from the beginning again. “On the day Yahweh God made earth and heaven, the
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earth was without plants and human beings … and he made human beings from
dust of the earth.” Yet, this had already happened before, as was described in
Genesis 1:26–28. People who read linearly are completely baffled. But what if this
linear conception is too limited a view?
In a non-linear reading the text can be explained as follows. The ﬁrst action
narrated is marked as an action by God through which he alters an existing situation
or totality by separating the expanses of water into heaven and an earth, and from
this point onwards God (and the narrator in the text) focus on the various elements.
Over and over again we see the non-linear pattern return. The starting point is
totality, and then the text zooms in on the making of one or more of its elements.
For example, verse 3 tells us about God creating light, but only later on, in verses
14–17, does the text mention God making the sun, moon and stars. Or, in verses 9–
10 God makes the earth as a whole, while zooming in in verses 11–13 on the plants
and trees on earth. Or, verse 1 describes the separation of the waters into heaven and
earth, while later on, in verses 6–8, we read that the heavenly vault was created to
keep the waters apart. This non-linear form of narration and conceptualisation can
also be seen in the two entire stories presented in the ﬁrst three chapters of the Book
of Genesis, namely Genesis 1 telling the story of creation, and Genesis 2–3 telling
the story of paradise. In the ﬁrst story, we are told how God made the human beings
on the 6th day (1:26–28). This is a kind of overarching view of what occurs in the
second story, when Yahweh God ﬁrst makes a male human being and then from
him makes a female human being while describing the details of their new exis-
tence. In other words, the story of paradise refers back to what has previously been
told through images of an overarching summary of creation. This non-linear
arrangement shows some similarities with fractal structures. The starting point is
like a fractal image at the highest level, from where the text zooms in on one
element, which in itself exhibits a fractal structure, too. Over and over again, new
elements are speciﬁed that form new smaller fractals.
10 The Non-linear Arrangement in Genesis 1
and the Concept of Chance
In the opening chapter of the Book of Genesis we discover various non-linear
arrangements in which the text ﬁrst introduces the elements in one big picture and,
subsequently focuses on one of these elements in detail. Depending on the per-
spective chosen (i.e., the level of detail zoomed in on) a new kind of ‘realm’ is
revealed. In each realm, the species have their own organisation and
responsibilities.
For example, verses 11–12 relate to the plants and trees on earth. God instigates
the earth to produce plants and trees, each with its own seeds and fruit in order to
reproduce distinct species. The words, ‘the seed’ is repeated six times in these
verses, three times with regard to plants and three times with regard to trees. The
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causative sense of the verb in verse 11 indicates that the plants are conceived as
producing the seed, and the seeds themselves are responsible for the process of
germination and production of new life in the ground. In verse 12, the fruits of the
trees are described as seed containers. The notion that each plant and tree should
bring forth new life according to its own species is repeated three times. In this way
the text emphasizes both the activity of the plants themselves and their system for
maintaining the necessary distinctions between their offspring.
Another example is the animal kingdom. In verses 20–23, God addresses ﬁrst (in
verse 20) two groups of animals: the animals that swarm the seas, and the birds that
are characterized in relation to earth and heaven. And the swarming sea animals are
blessed and encouraged to be fruitful and multiply and ﬁll the waters of the seas
whereas the birds are also blessed but are only told to multiply. However, in verse
21, also a third group of animals are mentioned: the tanninîm, the inhabitants of the
tĕhōm or the abyss. They are considered to have existed prior to God’s creative
activities and to differ from the other animals in their origin and procreative abil-
ities. They are not asked to reproduce themselves. In contrast, the sea animals (the
second group of animals mentioned in verse 21) are presented as having been
brought forth by the waters and they are asked to reproduce themselves in order to
swarm the sea. The birds are described as flying over the earth across the sky; they
are still related to the earth and to the aerial realm below the heavenly ﬁrmament.
God assigns each party to its own life sphere, which they have to ﬁll with their own
species of animate life, with the exclusion of the tanninîm who are not recorded as
reproducing new life.
In a cultural framework dominated by a non-linear way of thinking, the concepts
of necessity and chance also function differently. In a non-linear perspective, the
concept of chance is not understood in terms of a break in a causal or deterministic
chain of events, but it stands out in a framework of thinking in which totality and
instantaneity alternate. Because Genesis 1 alternates between scales, it does not
represent a temporal sequence or a causal arrangement. Thus the reader is made
aware of a new sense of coherence at each and every level or scale, and, more
importantly, challenged with the lack of necessity for sequence between the various
levels. Because of the absence of a causal chain of events, the text of Genesis 1
opens our eyes and shows us the fractal structure of the universe. Chance—so often
conceived as the opposite of necessity—turns out to be present in every event
depending on the scale and the perspective chosen. In this sense, Genesis does not
differ from the view presented by God in his represented speech in the book of Job.
11 Conclusion: Views on Chance in Job and Genesis 1
God’s speech out of the whirlwind in the Book of Job and the opening chapter of
the Book of Genesis both offer a non-deterministic view on chance. Chance is not
the exception in a causal or necessary chain of events, but is scale dependent. The
view is unmasked that causal relationships have to be conceived as if they are
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ontologically present. In his speech in the Book of Job, God invites its readers to
examine their views on the topic of chance as this exposes the human quest for
causal explanations that results from the human need for moral order, logical
structure, and an understandable system. The text teaches us that chance accom-
panies our quest for necessity, for moral and logical patterns and our desire to call
patterns God’s design. In addition, chance is linked to a multifocal view of the
universe and understood in terms of position, perspective, and scale. Moreover, the
opening chapter of the Book of Genesis offers a non-deterministic view on chance.
In Genesis 1, chance is not an exceptional event that disrupts some causal or
deterministic chain of events, but rather it is highlighted within a framework of
non-linear thinking where totality and instantaneity alternate. In a world, where
God zooms in or out on various lower-level components, any claims for com-
pleteness or order can no longer be made. In sum, in both Job and Genesis 1,
chance is presented as a disqualiﬁer of causal chains and even as an ultimate denial
of necessity.
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Happiness and Invulnerability
from Chance: Western and Eastern
Perspectives
Johannes M.M.H. Thijssen and David R. Loy
Abstract Since the beginning of Western philosophy, thinkers have discussed how
one might lead a good, i.e. a happy, life and what role luck plays in flourishing.
According to one dominant Ancient Greek tradition, life’s circumstances are not
relevant for our happiness, and, moreover, they fall outside of our control. What is
up to us is how we respond to life’s circumstances and adversities. Christianity,
however, rejected ancient tradition and moved happiness to a new home: heaven.
Because Adam and Eve were disobedient in Paradise, God punished the human
species with a ‘genetic’ defect which made life miserable for each and every
individual. Chance or (bad) luck is an inevitable ingredient of human suffering.
Buddhism also perceives chance or luck as intrinsic to life, but locates it into the
sphere of human control. It is not the gods, but we, who, through our own actions,
are responsible for what happens to us. This is called the law of karma: we reap
what we have sown. There are striking parallels between the Greek methods to train
our mental responses to (bad) luck and the Buddhist analysis of unwholesome
actions and corresponding advice to improve our karma. Both traditions are still
helpful today in our attempts to secure happiness in the face of chance adversity.
1 Introduction
On 17 July 2014, Malaysian Airlines flight MH 17 departed from Amsterdam. It
never reached its destination in Kuala Lumpur; the plane crashed in the Ukraine,
not far from the Russian border, claiming 298 lives. A few days after the crash, a
Dutch newspaper ran a story about a family that had ‘miraculously’ missed flight
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MH 17. The family had arrived slightly late at Schiphol Airport and, as the flight
was overbooked, had been transferred to another flight.
In the summer of 2005, Hurricane Katrina swept the Gulf of Mexico coast from
central Florida to Texas. At least 1833 people were killed, most of them in New
Orleans. The storm caused $108 billion in damage, depriving many people of their
homes and possessions.
These examples are just two of many others that people tend to associate with
‘luck’, ‘chance’, or ‘karma’, by those familiar with the Buddhist term. Initially, the
family that arrived late would feel they were unlucky in missing flight MH 17. But
after the crash the reverse was true; apparently they had been extremely lucky or
they had good karma Likewise, the people whose homes lay in the path of hurricane
Katrina and lost their homes and lives were clearly unfortunate while those who
lived a mile out of the path were just lucky.
What do we mean when we attribute a plane crash or a hurricane to chance or
(bad) luck? It means that we feel these events are random, unlikely and the result of
conjunctions of causes that are unknown to us. These events are unpredictable:
there is no apparent purpose or plan which includes all causal chains. Moreover,
and more importantly for this chapter, these events appear to be beyond our control.
Chance events expose the vulnerability of our happiness and even our lives. One
moment we are prosperous and happy, and the next moment our lives are disrupted
and our happiness is shattered.
In some languages, the words happiness and luck have an etymological con-
nection. For example, in German and Dutch, the same word is used for ‘chance’ and
‘happiness,’ thus implying that it takes some measure of luck (Glück; geluk) to
achieve happiness (Glück; geluk). In English, there is also an etymological con-
nection. In Middle-English ‘hap’ means ‘luck’ or ‘chance,’ and also occurs in
‘happiness.’ Yet is happiness only a matter of luck? How much good luck can be
expected and how much bad luck must be endured in attempts to lead a good life?
How insecure is our happiness?
Socrates and Siddharta Gautama, who later came to be known as the Buddha,
were near contemporaries. The philosophical traditions they initiated were anchored
in existential questions about how to live well, i.e. how to end suffering and be
happy. Interestingly, early Indian Buddhist philosophers as well as early Western
philosophers reflected on the relationship between chance and leading a happy life.
We look at ancient Greek and Buddhist philosophies and Christianity to explore
how they developed ways of thinking to get to grips with the terrifying notion of
life based on chance.
According to contemporary Western thinking, which is heavily influenced by
Greek notions, Hurricane Katrina and flight MH 17 appear to be chance events or
occurrences of (bad) luck. Even though there is a connection between certain actions
and certain consequences, for instance, between having bought a ticket and being on
flight MH 17, the actions and interactions are far too many and far too complicated to
be able to distinguish any direct causal chains. This is what, for instance, Aristotle
meant by tuchê, by luck: when a man goes to the marketplace and runs into a debtor
that he wished, but did not expect to ﬁnd, their meeting is a result, not of a
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determinate cause, but of luck (Physics II.5). Similarly, the travellers did not board
flight MH 17 expecting to die. That it happened was the outcome of (bad) luck.
In her now classic The Fragility of Goodness, Martha Nussbaum has drawn
attention to many Greek philosophers’ preoccupation with luck.1 Their concern was
to ﬁnd out how a person might lead a good, i.e. happy, life and become immune to
bad luck. As will be explained below, the Western approach is to learn how to cope
mentally with the undesirable results of luck in the pursuit of happiness.
Buddhist philosophy would take a different view of a plane crash or a hurricane
and attribute the devasting effects to the karma of the victims: as if the misfortune
happened through the victims own agency, instead of, just happening. A western
response to this view might be: “What terrible deeds have the victims done in the
past to deserve Katrina or flight MH 17?” It is true that the term ‘karma’ is central to
the Buddhist analysis of human action and seems to suggest a responsibility for
whatever is happening to us. Karma, however, is not a calculus of rewards and
punishments for one’s actions. In the words of Jay Garﬁeld, it is not “a cosmic bank
account”.2 Nevertheless, many of the events in one’s life are seen to be due to one’s
karma, i.e. they are the result of previous actions, whether in this or a former life.
According to traditional Buddhist teachings, the quality of an action is determined
both by the intentions behind it and by its consequences. This includes many,
perhaps most, of the good and bad things that happen to us, Thus, mere chance is
abolished and, although it may be delayed, we retain a way to control what happens
to us by behaving in a wholesome way. In this chapter, we try to compare and
contrast Western Greek and Asian Buddhist attitudes towards chance and how
chance events impact on happiness.
2 Ancient Greek Philosophy as a Way of Life: The Pursuit
of Happiness
The distinguished British philosopher Bernard Williams once quipped: “The legacy
of Greece to Western philosophy is Western philosophy”!3 And indeed, there is a
continuity between ancient and contemporary philosophy. Not only does philoso-
phy continually refer to themes that originated in antiquity, but philosophers today
remain fascinated by the views and theories of ancient Greeks and Romans. Yet, at
the same time, Williams’s aphorism overlooks one crucial aspect of ancient
Western philosophy that has disappeared from contemporary academic philosophy.
Philosophy today is mainly a theoretical and conceptual discourse, whereas ancient
philosophy crucially involved a way of life.
1Nussbaum (1986), although her angle is different from the one taken here.
2Garﬁeld (2015), 284. See also Loy (2008).
3Williams (2006), 3.
Happiness and Invulnerability from Chance … 153
Ancient philosophy covers a lengthy period of time, which conventionally runs
from the appearance of Thales in the sixth century B.C. until 529 C.E. when
Emperor Justinian, under pressure from a local Christian group, closed the philo-
sophical school in Athens. Durig this long period of twelve centuries, philosophy
was initially situated within a Greek culture and then continued within a Roman
context. Greek was the main language of the philosophers. When we study the
earliest Western philosophy, we tend to see it through the lens of contemporary
philosophical perspectives, and thus discover an ancient science, logic, ethics,
metaphysics and even a philosophy of mind. Due to this fragmentation, we tend to
miss the overall character of philosophy at that time, which runs through the
diversity and heterogenity of views and schools. In his Philosophies for sale, the
satirist Lucian (c. AD 125–180) wittily captures the heart of ancient philosophy.4 In
a marketplace, Hermes is setting up stalls for selling philosophies, with prices that
vary considerably. Each philosopher represents a speciﬁc school along with the
life-style, the bios, that comes with it, and is loudly advertised by Hermes. These
philosophies are attractve to buyers because they are guides for living a good life.
Yet what does this mean about philosophy as the search for wisdom and truth, an
inquiry into all kinds of topics and problems as well as the art of analysis and
argumentation? The ﬁrst Western philosophers were engaged in those activities as
well, but in addition, and in contrast to philosophers nowadays, they also lived their
philosophy. They operated on the (tacit) assumption that philosophy can save your
life. Philosophy is an authoritative guide on how to live, since the knowledge of the
world and your place in it will motivate you to live your life accordingly. In sum, the
philosophical life is a life based on reasoning, but it is about more than reasoning.
The French scholar Pierre Hadot, more than anyone else, has drawn attention to
the ancient conception of philosophy as a way of life, and has emphasized its
existential and spiritual dimensions.5 Philosophical discourse was an integral part of
a speciﬁc way of life. It was meant to justify and disseminate the way to live, both
among followers and opponents. At the same time, philosophical discourse also
expressed a way of life. And ﬁnally, it functioned as a type of mental exercise or
spiritual practice.
With Plato, this conception of philosophy came to be ﬁrmly established in all the
different schools. The most prominent among them were Plato’s own Academy,
Aristotle’s Lyceum, the Stoa, Epicurus’s Garden and the Skeptics.6 The last school
criticized the other schools for clinging to theories and statements (dogmata),
whose truth remained open to doubt, and hence to further investigation. According
4References to ancient texts are according to the standard system. Unless otherwise stated, the
editions of the Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, MA-London) have been used for Greek and
Latin texts and their English translations. Lucianus’ edition of his Biôn Praksis and its translation
are in vol. II, 450–511 of his works.
5Hadot (1995), which has been translated into several languages, among which English in Hadot
(2002).
6A convenient recent introduction to the philosophical schools in antiquity, which, moreover, has
been inspired by Hadot’s studies is Cooper (2012).
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to the Skeptics, the most sensible view is to assume that truth is beyond our powers,
a claim that in itself should not be taken as a dogmatic statement. The schools were
not just groups of pupils or followers who identiﬁed with a particular teacher, but
were also physically located in certain places: for instance, at a gymnasium outside
the walls of Athens, at a painted collonade in the marketplace, or in a garden.
In his studies, Hadot has emphasized the role of ‘spiritual exercises’ (askêsis,
meletê) in each school. The earliest Western philosophers were mental athletes who
through their practical exercises, which were part of their way of life, tried to
transform themselves spiritually. Hadot took his inspiration from the title of Ignace of
Loyola’s famous Spiritual exercises (Exercitia spiritualia), which in his view were
nothing but a Christian continuation of Greek and Roman practices.7 Mental training
takes place according to a method that is independent from any theory, and hence is
applicable to any theory. The purpose of the method is to ‘digest’ the speciﬁc doc-
trines, and thus prepare the practitioner for a life-change. Among the exercises that
Hadot has explored are diet, meditation on the breath, dialogue and discussion
between master and pupil, the study of maxims, self-examination and self-mastery.
One such exercise, familiar to anyone who ever studied for an exam, consists of
writing summaries or lists of key concepts and memorising them. Epicurus wrote
special summaries (epitomai) for the sake of his pupils. The Stoic Epictetus compared
the process of digesting such material with the mastication of food. In sheep, the
digestion of food will produce milk and wool, whereas the digestion of philosophical
propositions will lead to a change of behaviour (Encheiridion, 46). Marcus Aurelius
claimed that from the repetition of Stoic views the soul, like a garment, will receive a
new color (Meditationes, 5.16). Epicurus’s encouragement to become accustomed to
the idea that death is nothing to us, since we will not be aware of our own death, is
also a type of spiritual exercise (Letter to Menoikeus, 124). It can diminish our desire
to be immortal and hence help us to enjoy our mortal life.
In view of Hadot’s heightened awareness of ancient philosophy as a way of life,
as a program for-self-improvement-through-exercise, his virtually complete omis-
sion of the purpose of philosophy is remarkable. The philosophical schools had the
ambition to contribute to the happiness (eudaimonia) of their adherents.
Ancient philosophers had a keen eye for the human propensity to seek happi-
ness.8 As Plato points out: “We all strive to be happy” (Euthydemus 282a). The
desire to be happy is so evident that it does not make sense to ask “Why do you wish
to be happy?” (Symposium 205a). Happiness is an end-in-itself and hence does not
need further justiﬁcation. Moreover, being happy means that you are doing well (eu
prattein), and ﬁnally, happiness implies the presence of good things and the
absence of bad things in your life. All these characteristics of eudaimonia are taken
up in the traditions after Plato and further elaborated–in particular the question
7Hadot (2002).
8Throughout this article, eudaimonia has been translated as ‘happiness,’ and eudaimôn as ‘happy.’
See also Long (1996), 181–84 and (2001), 33–34. The Greek texts also use makarios (happy) and
makariotês (happiness), which recur in the New Testament, and are often translated as blessed. See
for instance The Gospel of Matthew, 5, 2–10. See also note 17.
Happiness and Invulnerability from Chance … 155
which ingredients in a human life contribute to happiness and which ones are
obstacles. Ancient philosophy is motivated by the concern to help us lead a life that
is worth living, a life that flourishes (eu prattein). In the words of Aristotle:
…..let us say what it is that we say political expertise seeks, and what the topmost of all
achievable goods is. Pretty well most people are agreed about what to call it: both ordinary
people and people of quality say ‘happiness’, and suppose that living well and doing well
are the same thing as being happy (Ethica Nicomachea 1095a17–20).9
Once you realize that the goal in your life is to become happy, you have to bring
order to your life and make important choices. You do not want to end up with a life
that is ‘unlived’, which consists of merely killing time. So what is the best possible
life? In other words, how can one really become happy? Each school offered its
own vision of the nature of the world and the human condition, and built its own
way of life upon those insights.
Human beings are vulnerable: not only the playthings of desires and emotions,
but also exposed to social and physical circumstances beyond their control, such as
untrustworthy rulers, wars, poverty, disease and obscurity that can all be described
as ‘bad luck’. All these factors can be obstacles to happiness and thus a source of
suffering. How much do such circumstances affect one’s quest for happiness?
Although different philosophical schools provided different anwers, their approa-
ches were all based on the revolutionary idea that human beings are (or can be)
masters of their own happiness. Happiness is achievable for anyone. Happiness is
what you think, and you can learn to think by doing philosophy!
In one of his tragedies, Euripides (480–406 B.C.) asks the following important
question:
“O Zeus, what should I say? That you watch over men? Or that you have won the false
reputation of doing so, while chance (tuchê) in fact governs all mortal affairs?” (Hecuba II,
488–91)
The play is about the former queen of Troy. After its fall, Hecuba had become a
Greek slave and as the story unfolds she will learn about the death of her two
children. The idea that we are governed by gods may seem disconcerting to some,
but the idea that we are living in a world that was not made for us, ruled by random
chance and constant change, may be even more frightening.
3 Immunising Against Luck: Ancient Greek Approaches
Since ancient times, Greek poets and philosophers have struggled with the role of
tuchê, luck or chance, in human life, including how to avert bad tuchê: how to avoid
one’s life turning into a tragedy. Seeking support from the gods seemed one sen-
sible strategy. Yet the gods behave in erratic ways and are difﬁcult to control.
9Aristotle. Nicomachean Ethics (2002).
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Furthermore, our misfortunes may have been caused not by us, but by what our
ancestors did. In the story of Pandora’s box, the poet Hesiod explains how the
miseries and misfortunes of humankind originated. Before Pandora lifted the lid of
the storage jar “the tribes of men used to live upon the earth entirely apart from
evils, and without grievous toil and distressful diseases, which gave death to men”
(Hesiod, Works and Days, 90–93).
The philosophical response to Euripides’ question was offered by Plato. He gave
an entirely new twist to an already extant term: eudaimonia and, moreover, was the
ﬁrst to bring up whether chance (tuchê) is also one of the good things that we need
in order to become happy (Euthydemus, 279c). The original meaning of eudaimonia
is that one is favored by the gods. A person who is eudaimôn has a ‘good (eu)
daimon,’ usually an identiﬁed Olympic God, and hence is in possession of the good
things that such a daimon is supposed to provide. Yet how can one guarantee to be
favored by the gods, who in the myths appear to be as capricious as human beings?
One can try to please them with sacriﬁces and prayers, but in the end we still have
to surrender to the disconcerting idea that our happiness, our eudaimonia, depends
on (good) luck (tuchê): we have no control over the gods.
Plato’s brilliant move was to internalize the daimon.10 Within us, we have a
godlike capacity: our reason. By putting oneself under the rule of reason, one still
submits to a god, though now an internal one. Be master of your own life by
following your reason. Only by using our rationality can we become happy, i.e.
temporarily becoming like a god (homoiôsis theôi).11 If you live according to
reason, life does not have to turn into a tragedy, run by blind luck and change. That
is the novel powerful reply that Plato gives to the literary tradition.
By making happiness dependent upon our rational capacities, Plato opens the
door for reconsidering the influence of external circumstances that seem to depend
on luck, and that is exactly what the various schools did. Philosophers since Plato
have not taken recourse to pacifying the gods, but have instead developed other
ways of thinking to make themselves immune to contingencies and the inherent
vulnerability of human existence. The ancient schools developed strategies to
eliminate the power of ungoverned tuchê, of the impact of external circumstances
beyond our control. In this chapter, the emphasis will be on those schools that are
based on the insight that, although we cannot change the world, we can change our
mental attitude if we are willing to commit to a certain way of life.12 In what
follows, we shall briefly focus on three such strategies that were meant to make our
10See Long (2001) and also Mikalson (2002).
11Plato, Timaeus 90a–c and also Theaetetus 176a–b. That the gods are happy, is mentioned by
Plato, Symposium 202c7. See Sedley (1999) for a fundamental discussion of becoming like a god.
12In his Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle discusses the two extreme views about the influence of luck
on human happiness. According to one position, being happy is a matter of good luck; it is a gift
from the gods. The other position claims that the factors relevant to happiness are within the
agent’s control. The strategy of the advocates of this view is to make happiness invulnerable to
luck. Aristotle himself takes a middle course. See Nussbaum (1986): 318–342.
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happiness safe from luck. Unfortunately, there is not the space here to elaborate all
the theoretical details and intricacies, so we will conﬁne ourselves to an outline.13
One common obstacle to happiness is not getting what we desire, for success in
acquiring what we want is never guaranteed. So we need to be careful about what
we desire. According to Epicurus, human beings are led by pleasure (hedonê) and
pain (lupê). These ‘instincts’ determine what we choose and what we avoid.
Unfortunately, human beings are often confused in their judgments about what they
want. Epicurus provides an intelligent classiﬁcation of human desires, and an
analysis of the beliefs upon which they depend. Very few desires turn out to be
natural and necessary, such as those for food, drink and sex. Most desires are
unnecessary, because we are too much affected by habitual preferences. It is not
really necessary to eat ﬁlet mignon every day. And ﬁnally, some desires are empty,
because they are based on wrong ideas, such as the wish to become famous or
wealthy. These desires are not important for our pleasure and happiness. Those who
are capable of satisfying their natural desires are free from pain (aponia) and mental
distress (ataraxia), and, as a consequence, they are happy (eudaimôn).
A second obstacle to happiness is emotional distress caused by our reactions to
(random) circumstances. The Stoics developed strategies to manage our emotions
(pathê). Their basic idea is that the happy life is a life of virtuous activity, i.e. a life
in which one’s actions and behaviour are an expression of the virtues (such as
justice, magnamity, temperance, courage). According to the Stoic conception, our
usual emotions are often a result of social conditioning, and are, in fact, ways of
feeling born out of ignorance. The Stoics are particularly concerned about unskillful
emotions. Not fear in response to real danger, but anxiety, desire, anger, grief,
obsessive love and jealousy are the targets of their therapy, because those emotions
disturb our lives, and, consequently, threaten our happiness. They are erroneous
value judgments. By revising or ‘unlearning’ these value judgments, we can learn to
see things differently.
According to the Stoics, we are caught in a dualism between the pursuit of what
we believe is good and the avoidance of what we think to be bad. However, only
the virtues are really good, and only the vices are really bad. The persons or
situations that give rise to emotions are actually not, on Stoic theory, important for
our happiness. We tend to judge them as ‘good’ or ‘bad’, whereas they are ‘in-
different’, or neutral. The beneﬁts equal the harms. The Stoics encourage us with
various exercises that keep our emotions from getting a hold on us. It is “up to us”
how we interpret and respond to whatever happens to us. In this way, Stoic phi-
losophy can shield us from misfortune: we learn not to be affected by whatever
happens. We are free from emotions (apatheia). How the Stoic immunisation
against bad luck works can be seen, for instance, in the following advice from
Epictetus:
13The following studies are extremely useful for understanding these aspects of ancient philoso-
phy: Annas (1993), Cooper (2012), Long (1996) and (2006), Nussbaum (1994), Sorabji (2000),
Tsouma (2009) and Warren (2009).
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Some things are up to us and others are not. Up to us are opinion, impulse, desire, aversion,
and, in a word, whatever is our own action. Not up to us are body, property, reputation,
ofﬁce, and, in a word, whatever is not our own action. The things that are up to us are by
nature free, unhindered and unimpeded; but those that are not up to us are weak, servile,
subject to hindrance, and not our own. Remember, then, that if you suppose what is
naturally enslaved to be free, and what is not your own to be your own, you will be
hampered, you will lament, you will be disturbed, and you will ﬁnd fault with both gods
and men. But if you suppose only what is your own to be your own, and what is not your
own not to be your own (as is indeed the case), no one will ever coerce you, no one will
hinder you, you will ﬁnd fault with no one, you will accuse no one, you will not do a single
thing against your will, you will have no enemy, and no one will harm you because no harm
can affect you (Encheiridion, 1)14
Epictetus’s advise is neatly summarized in the following well-known, but
hard-gained advice:
Do not ask things to happen as you wish, but wish them to happen as they do happen, and
your life will go smoothly (Encheiridion, 8)
A third obstacle is addressed by the Skeptics. They also wish to free us from the
dualism of good and bad. We think that we are struck by bad circumstances, and we
pursue the things that we believe are good, but which we lack. Once we have
acquired these so-called good assets, we are afraid to lose them, and, as a conse-
quence, experience troubles “For those who hold the opinion that things are good or
bad by nature are perpetually troubled” (Sextus Empiricus, PH 1.27).15 Their
strategy was to carefully investigate (skepsis) the various arguments and theories of
the different schools. Since this inquiry remained inconclusive, it led to a suspen-
sion of judgement about the ‘real’ nature of things. It is not possible to afﬁrm or
deny anything about a matter under investigation. We can talk only about
appearances, without arriving at the truth. Nevertheless, such skeptical inquiry has
beneﬁcial effects: “But those who make no determination about what is good and
bad by nature neither avoid nor pursue anything with intensity; and hence they are
tranquil” Sextus Empiricus, PH 1.28).
By not entertaining ﬁxed views about the nature of things or a situation, the level
of one’s anxiety is not unnecessarily raised. The Skeptic experiences hunger and
thirst, yet does not add the value judgement that it is really unfortunate that this is
happening to her, of all people.16 To use a Zen metaphor: she does not place
another head upon her own head. The goal of the Skeptic is to attain peace of mind
or tranquility (ataraxia) towards situations that are a matter of opinion or appear-
ance, and maintain composure (metriopatheia) towards situations that are inevitable
(PH 1.25). Once we have suspended judgement, freedom from confusion will
follow “as a shadow follows a body” (PH 1.29).
14The Epictetus translations are taken from Epictetus (1995).
15The Sextus Empiricus translations are taken from Annas and Barnes (1994).
16See also Sextus Empiricus, PH 3.235–238 and M 11.110–167.
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In such ways these earliest Western philosophers responded to the human
motivation to become happy. Moreover, they were all concerned to make happiness
immune from chance events beyond our control. Their important message is that it
is a matter of ignorance to think that to live a happy life is due to circumstances
beyond one’s control. Rather, it is a matter of how we deal with those circum-
stances. This insight, and living according to this insight, requires training. We
cannot eliminate suffering, but it is up to us whether it will make us unhappy. It all
depends on the perspective that we have on the world and on ourselves. Philosophy
has an important role to play in providing us with this perspective, as Epictetus
points out:
Philosophy does not promise to secure anything external for man, otherwise it would be
admitting something that lies beyond its proper subject-matter. For as the material of the
carpenter is wood, and that of the statuary bronze, so the subject-matter of the art of living
is each person’s own life (Dissertationes I.15.2)
The terms a-taraxia, a-ponia and a-patheia are signiﬁcant. The schools promise
that after a thorough training, they can free us from several kinds of mental suf-
fering: from confusion, from pain, and from unskillful emotions. In this way, our
happiness will become invulnerable to the world. The Skeptics are concerned to
free us from the suffering that arises when we get entangled in opposing views and
theories; the Epicurians teach us to learn what we really want, to analyse our desires
and not to desire more than you need; the Stoics help us to see our emotional
responses for what they really are: upheavals of thought that alternate between the
poles of attraction and aversion.
4 A Christian Perspective: The Myth of the Fall
Christianity brought a total change of scene. In particular Augustine does not
believe in the human capacity to achieve long-term happiness here and now and in
the role which ancient philosophers claimed to help achieve it.17
But such is the stupid pride of these men who suppose that the supreme good is to be found
in this life and that they can be the agents of thir own happiness, that their wise men,–I
mean the man whom they describe as such with astounding inanity,– whom, even if he be
blinded and grow deaf and dumb, lose the use of his limbs, be tortured with pain, and
visited by every other evil of the sort that tongue can utter or fancy conceive, whereby he is
driven to inflict death on himself, they do not scruple to call happy (De civitate dei, XIX, 4).
Augustine presents Christianity as an alternative philosophy in the ancient sense
of a way of life. Becoming Christian now comes to be the sure route to happiness,
though not in this life. In one of his most famous works, The City of God
17Augustine uses beatus (happy) and beatitudo (happiness), which are translations of makarios and
makariotês, respectively.
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(De civitate dei), written between 412 and 426/27, Augustine presents his complex
vision of earthly life and contrasts it with eternal life in the heavenly Jerusalem.18
Book 19 is devoted to the philosophers’ pathetic attempts to attain happiness within
the misery of human life (De civitate dei 19.1).
Those who think that there is any happiness in this world, reveal their aston-
ishing lack of understanding. According to Augustine, even the rhetorically gifted
are not able to describe life’s miseries to any extent. This does not prevent
Augustine from offering a page-long complaint about human suffering due to not
getting what we want, losing what we have, ailments, decay, mental illness, and the
incessant strife between virtue and evil. The best we can do in this life, is to foster
hope for happiness in the future, i.e. after our death (De civitate dei 19.4). We
should not overlook that Augustine’s keen eye for human suffering was sharpened
by a civil war and the invasion of Germanic tribes. In 410, Alaric and his Goths
sacked Rome, the eternal city. Its impact was much greater than that of 9/11 in the
West. From the Augustinian perspective, bad luck is just part of human life.
However, from the perspective of God, there is no luck or randomness. God is
all-powerfull, just, has complete knowledge, and hence, is in total control. So, the
question of how to deal with luck did not arise for Augustine. His concern rather is
to explain the miseries of human life in view of a God who is neither weak, nor
unjust.
So how do we explain and deal with humankind’s misfortunes? Augustine offers
an ingenious interpretation of the Book of Genesis, which becomes a fundamental
Christian doctrine in both its Catholic and Protestant versions.19 The only expla-
nation that Augustine can think of is that our suffering in this life is a punishment
from God. A punishment not for something we did, but a punishment for the
disobedience of Adam and Eve in the Garden of Eden. Augustine’s story is based
on his reading of Genesis 2:18–3:24. God had explicitly forbidden the ﬁrst humans
to eat from the tree of knowledge of good and evil. However, a fallen angel, using a
snake as its instrument, started with “the weakest link of the human couple” and
seduced Eve to eat from its fruit; and Eve offered the fruit to Adam. Obviously, God
discovered their disobedience and punished them with expulsion from Paradise, and
hence from eternal life and happiness. Suddenly, mankind found itself in a hostile
world, in which it had to toil for a living and was inflicted with bodily decay and
death. The blissfull order between soul and body was destroyed. The disobedience
of Adam and Eve to God has been punished with another corresponding disobe-
dience: the human body is no longer under control of the will, as is clear both from
inconvenient sexual temptation and from unwanted failure to perform (De civitate
dei 14.17). God has punished us with concupiscentia carnis, with carnal desire. It is
18See, for instance, Van Oort (1991).
19Nisula (2012) is the most fundamental recent study on the topic, which focuses on sexual desire
(concupiscentia) as the key concept in Augustine’s theory. Augustine’s theory is also discussed in
Nelson (2011). Among the many studies published about Augustine, see further Brown (1969)
Chadwick (2009) and Rist (1994) for details about his life and the broader intellectual background
of his views.
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this disobedience of Adam and Eve to God, which tainted them with a weakness
that has been passed on to future generations. One contemporary opponent, Julian
of Aeclanum, consistently described Augustine’s position as peccatum naturale, a
natural defect or sin. The disorder of sexual desire (concupiscentia) disseminates
itself, so to speak, in the off-spring and thus becomes ‘genetic’.20
As in Hesiod’s story, Augustine too believes that our misfortunes are caused by
what our ancestors did. There is no way to escape our miserable life on earth. Only
after it ends may we become eternally happy, if we follow the Christian way of life
and if God grants us his grace. In the hands of Augustine, Christianity’s solution to
the indifference of chance came to be its abolishment: God has total control and
complete knowledge. At the divine dimension, there is no contingency, whereas at
the human level, chance or (bad) luck are part of human suffering and have to be
accepted as God’s severe, but just punishment for Adam and Eve’s disobedience.
They are part of God’s plan.
5 The Asian Buddhist Perspective: Karma
Rather than (Bad) Luck
Buddhism, lacking ruling gods or a creator God, removes the intermediary between
our moral actions and their results. Karma (Pali, kamma) is understood as an
impersonal law of the cosmos: our intentional acts are causes that have direct
effects, sooner or later, in that what we do rebounds back onto us.21 Again, how-
ever, as in Christianity, the horrifying specter of mere chance is abolished.
Although the consequences of our actions may be delayed, we have a handle on
what will happen to us in the future. Insofar as we continue to be reborn, our present
circumstances are a result of what we have done earlier, and our future circum-
stances will be a result of what we are doing now. The doctrine of karma offers an
explanation for the repeated suffering of human beings. It stretches out the cause
and effect process over several lifetimes and thus makes acceptable that the vicious
are not punished immediately and the virtuous may suffer like Job in this life.
However, not original sin, but a spiritual ignorance lies at the origin of suffering.
Nothing happens to us by chance or luck, but as the result of our karma. According
to the Buddhist view, we are ‘heir’ to our actions, as Peter Harvey puts it. We reap
what we have sown, although not everything that happens to us is caused by karmic
actions in the past.22
For Augustine, happiness here on earth is not possible, yet if we obey God’s will
we can hope for an eternity in heaven after we die. But what can we do according to
the Buddhist view to diminish our suffering and to contain what seems to happen to
20See Nisula (2012), chapter three and especially 127-134 with the relevant texts in the footnotes.
21See also Loy (2008) and the excellent introductions in Carpenter (2014) and Harvey (2013).
22Harvey (2013), 39–40.
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us by (bad) luck? By following the Buddha’s teachings, we can end our ignorance
and improve our karma. The foundation of these teachings is the doctrine of the
“Four Noble Truths” and the related Buddhist analysis of the roots of unskilful or
unwholesome actions. In what follows, we will present a brief overview of these
crucial elements of Buddhist thought
For early Buddhism the ultimate goal is nirvana (nibbana in Pali), but the nature
of that goal is less clear. This world of samsara is a realm of suffering (Sanskrit
duhkha, Pali dukkha), craving, and delusion; nirvana signiﬁes the end of them,
because it is the end of rebirth and karmic retribution. According to the earliest texts
we have, in the Pali Canon, Sakyamuni the historical Buddha stated that he taught
only dukkha and how to end it, but apparently he offered few positive descriptions
of the goal.23 Then is someone who has attained nirvana happy? Despite occasional
references to sukha (the Pali term that corresponds most closely to the English term
happiness, but which also can be translated as comfort or ease), the emphasis in the
Buddhist tradition has been more on serenity and peace of mind.
Perhaps it is not surprising, then, that lay Buddhists have often been less
interested in attaining nirvana–which requires thousands of lifetimes of hard
practice, according to the common understanding—than in “merit-making” that will
lead to a more favorable (i.e., more enjoyable) rebirth. In popular practice, the
Buddha’s nuanced teachings about karma have been simpliﬁed and commodiﬁed
into a one-dimensional emphasis on generosity: by making offerings (usually food
and money), especially to monastics and temples, you accumulate merit
(Sanskrit puṇya, Pāli puñña) that will improve your circumstances, if not in this life
then in your next one. There is a curious parallel here with the commodiﬁcation of
sin that led to the sale of indulgences by the medieval Church: merit is positive,
something to be sought, while sin is negative, something that needs to be absolved,
yet in both cases the belief beneﬁts the religious institution, which therefore has
little incentive to correct it.
This shared preoccupation with what happens after we die should not, however,
distract us from more important similarities between the pre-Christian Western
philosophical traditions and the main teachings of Buddhism, regarding how to live
now. In fact, the parallels are so striking that we are led to reflect on the possibility
of historical influence, a topic that has recently received much scholarly attention.24
Because we normally describe Epicureanism, Stoicism, and Skepticism as
philosophies, but view Buddhism as a religion, we do not usually think to compare
them. Yet if we suspend any judgement about the transcendent nature of nirvana,
the similarities become truly remarkable.
Buddhist teachings focus on two basic causes of dukkha (suffering): craving
(Pali tanha, Sanskrit trisna) and ignorance (Pali avijja, Sanskrit avidya, literally
“not seeing”). Tanha is the origin of dukkha, according to the second of the four
noble truths believed to have been taught by the Buddha in his very ﬁrst teaching
23In both the Alagadduupama Sutta and the Anuradha Sutta.
24See, in particular, McEvilley (2001).
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(as preserved as the Dhammacakkappavattana Sutta) after his awakening. The third
noble truth asserts that there is an end to our dukkha (when our craving ceases), and
the fourth noble truth gives the eightfold path that leads to its cessation: right view,
right intention, right speech, right action, right livelihood, right effort, right
mindfulness, and right concentration (or meditation).
Noticeably absent from this list is any reference to ascetic practices, which the
Buddha reputedly tried before rejecting them in favor of mindfulness and medita-
tion. The Buddhist path is a “middle way” between hedonism and asceticism,
emphasizing not only ethical behavior but most of all realizing the way things really
are (including oneself): hence the term enlightenment or, more literally, “awak-
ening” (“the Buddha” means “the awakened one”). Although all eight parts of the
path are important, there is nonetheless special emphasis on the last two, which
involve the mind-control and personal transformation that is also the main focus of
pre-Christian philosophies.
Other similarities with classical Epicureanism, Stoicism, and the Skepticism are
hard to miss. The Buddhist path emphasizes nonattachment, so Buddhist monastics
live according to rules that clearly regulate what they are allowed to own, and what
desires they are able to satisfy. In the Theravada tradition, the basic possessions of
monks are three robes, a belt, sewing needle, razor, and water ﬁlter; they may also
have some incidentals such as toiletries (but not perfumes), a mosquito net,
medicines, dharma books, etc. They are mendicant and beg for their food, normally
eating only once a day, before noon. They must abstain from all sexual activity and
intoxicants such as alcohol. Of course, this lifestyle assumes that, as Epicurus also
realized, attempting to satisfy incessant desires is not the way to become truly
happy.
Even as the Skeptics were concerned about the dogmatism of ﬁxed views, so the
Buddha emphasized that his teachings were heuristic: rather than offering a meta-
physical position to identify with, they are helpful for discovering something for
ourselves. Two well-known stories illustrate this. One tells of a dialogue between
the Buddha and the monk Malunkyaputta, who is troubled by the Buddha’s silence
regarding fourteen questions, including the ﬁnitude or inﬁnitude of the universe,
and what happens to a Buddha after he dies. In response to his declaration that he
will leave the monastic order if the Buddha does not answer his questions, the
Buddha offers a parable:
Suppose,Mālunkyāputta, a manwere wounded by an arrow thickly smeared with poison, and
his friends and companions, his kinsmen and relatives, brought a surgeon to treat him. The
man would say: ‘I will not let the surgeon pull out this arrow until I know whether the man
who wounded me was a noble or a brahmin or a merchant or a worker.’And he would say: ‘I
will not let the surgeon pull out this arrow until I know the name and clan of the man who
woundedme;… until I knowwhether themanwhowoundedmewas tall or short or of middle
height;… until I know whether the bow that wounded me was a long bow or a crossbow…
The questions go on and on …
All this would still not be known to that man and meanwhile he would die. So too,
Mālunkyāputta, if anyone should say thus: ‘I will not lead the holy life under the Blessed
One until the Blessed One declares to me: “the world is eternal” … or “after death a
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Tathāgata neither exists nor does not exist,”’ that would still remain undeclared by the
Tathāgata and meanwhile that person would die (Culamalunkya Sutta, Majjhima Nikaya
63)25
As Thich Nhat Hanh glosses, “The Buddha always told his disciples not to waste
their time and energy in metaphysical speculation…. Life is short.”26
Even more famous is the simile comparing the Buddha’s teaching to a raft that a
man might use to cross a “great expanse of water, whose near shore was dangerous
and fearful and whose further shore was safe and free from fear”.
… Then, when he had got across and had arrived at the far shore, he might think thus: ‘This
raft has been very helpful to me, since supported by it and making an effort with my hands
and feet, I got safely across to the far shore. Suppose I were to hoist it on my head or load it
on my shoulder, and then go wherever I want.’ Now, bhikkhus, what do you think? By
doing so, would that man be doing what should be done with that raft?”
“No, venerable sir.”
… ‘Suppose I were to haul it onto the dry land or set it adrift in the water, and then go
wherever I want.’ Now, bhikkhus, it is by so doing that that man would be doing what
should be done with that raft. So I have shown you how the Dhamma is similar to a raft,
being for the purpose of crossing over, not for the purpose of grasping” (Alagadupama
Sutta, Majjhima Nikaya 22).27
A common Zen metaphor admonishes us not to take the ﬁnger for the moon. The
ﬁnger is pointing at something, which cannot be grasped conceptually. As the
Skeptics might say, the goal is not to discover the correct view—a precise set of
concepts—that we should ﬁxate on, but to understand our inquiry as a path that
seeks other beneﬁcial effects.
Like Stoicism, Buddhism is particularly concerned about “afflictive emotions”
(Sanskrit klesa, Pali kilesa) such as anger, pride, jealousy, and grief, which can lead
us to act in ways that we regret later. The Buddha used the metaphor of two darts to
emphasize the difference between pain and our emotional reaction to it:
When an untaught worldling is touched by a painful (bodily) feeling, he worries and
grieves, he laments, beats his breast, weeps and is distraught. He thus experiences two kinds
of feelings, a bodily and a mental feeling. It is as if a man were pierced by a dart and,
following the ﬁrst piercing, he is hit by a second dart…. Having been touched by that
painful feeling, he resists (and resents) it. … He is fettered by suffering, this I declare.
But in the case of a well-taught noble disciple, O monks, when he is touched by a
painful feeling, he will not worry nor grieve and lament, he will not beat his breast and
weep, nor will he be distraught. It is one kind of feeling he experiences, a bodily one, but
not a mental feeling. It is as if a man were pierced by a dart, but was not hit by a second dart
following the ﬁrst one…. Having been touched by that painful feeling, he does not resist
(and resent) it. Hence, in him no underlying tendency of resistance against that painful
feeling comes to underlie (his mind) Sallatha Sutta (Samyutta Nikaya 36.6).28
25The translation is from Bhikkhu Nanamoli and Bhikkhu Bodhi (1995), 534–35.
26Thich Nhat Hanh (1974), 42.
27See Bhikkhu Nanamoli and Bhikkhu Bodhi (1995), 228–29.
28The translation is from Bhikkhu Bodhi (2000), 1264–65.
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The issue of emotional reactions brings us back to the Buddha’s understanding
of karma, which emphasizes why we do what we do.
Although karma and rebirth were already widely accepted in pre-Buddhist India,
Brahminical teachings understood karma mechanistically: performing a Vedic
sacriﬁce in the proper fashion would sooner or later lead to the desired conse-
quences. The Buddha transformed this ritualistic approach into a moral principle by
focusing on cetana, which literally means “volitions” or “motivations.” The
beginning of the Dhammapada makes this point:
Experiences are preceded by mind, led by mind, and produced by mind. If one speaks or
acts with an impure mind, suffering follows even as the cart-wheel follows the hoof of the
ox…. If one speaks or acts with a pure mind, happiness follows like a shadow that never
departs.29
The term karma literally means “action.” Focusing on the eventual consequences
of our actions puts the cart (effect) before the horse (action), and loses the revo-
lutionary implications of the Buddha’s innovation. Emphasizing the initial act
yields a different insight: that my life-situation can be transformed by transforming
the motivations of my actions right now. Just as my body is composed of the food
eaten and digested, so “I” am (re)constructed by my habitual mental attitudes. By
choosing to change what motivates me, I can change the kind of person that I am.
Buddhist teachings say little about evil per se, but a lot about what are some-
times called the three “roots of evil” (also known as the three ﬁres, or the three
poisons) that often motivate our actions: greed, ill will, and delusion. We are
encouraged to transform them into their positive counterparts: generosity,
loving-kindness, and the wisdom that realizes our interdependence with others.
From this perspective, karma does not need to be taken as a cosmological law
comparable to Newton’s second law of motion. It can be understood more psy-
chologically, in a way that accords with Stoic insights into the happiness of a
virtuous life: we experience karmic consequences not so much for what we have
done as for what we have become, because what we intentionally and habitually do
make us what we are: I become the kind of person who does that sort of thing. In
other words, we are “punished” not for our “sins” but by them. And from the other
side, as Spinoza declares at the end of the Ethics: happiness is not the reward of
virtue, but is virtue itself (Ethics, Part V, Proposition XLII).
In other words, to be motivated differently is to become a different kind of
person, and to become a different kind of person is to experience the world in a
different way. When we respond differently to the challenges and opportunities the
world presents to us, the world tends to respond differently to us, because our ways
of acting involve feedback systems that incorporate other people. The more I am
motivated by greed, ill will, and delusion, the more I must manipulate the world to
get what I want, and consequently the more separate I feel from others, and the
more alienated others feel when they realize what is happening.
29Dhammapada (2010).
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On the other side, the more my actions are motivated by generosity,
loving-kindness, and the wisdom that acknowledges our interdependence, the more
I can relax and open up to the world. The more I feel genuinely connected with
other people, the less I will be inclined to use and abuse them, and consequently the
more inclined they will be to trust and open up to me. In such ways, transforming
my own motivations not only transforms my own life; it also tends to affect those
around me, since, as Buddhism emphasizes, we are not really separate.
This naturalistic understanding of karma does not exclude the possibility of more
mysterious possibilities regarding the consequences of our actions, such as their
effects on one’s rebirth, as traditional Buddhism emphasizes. Whether or not that
happens, however, karma as how-to-transform-my-life-situation-by-transforming-
my-motivations-right-now is not a fatalistic doctrine but an empowering teaching,
with many similarities to pre-Christian philosophies of life. Instead of passively
accepting the problematic circumstances of our lives, we are encouraged to improve
our situations by addressing them with generosity, loving-kindness and wisdom.
Of course, this approach does not make me invulnerable to external events
beyond my control, but focuses instead on training my mental ability to respond to
them. Whether or not karma is a cosmic law, whether or not there is rebirth,
whether or not nirvana transcends the reality of this world, such teachings have
enormous implications for how happily we are able to live here and now,
day-to-day.
6 Protection Against Luck: West and East
‘Luck’ or ‘chance’ on the one hand, and ‘karma’ on the other seem, at ﬁrst glance,
opposing concepts. If something happens by luck, it is beyond the agent’s control.
Hence, the main concern of some ancient philosophical schools has been to make
our happiness immune against luck. Karma, however, implies that the agent has a
great deal of (indirect) control over what happens to her. Thus, luck or chance has
been eliminated. Yet, as this chapter has attempted to demonstrate, ancient grap-
plings with luck and Buddhist discussions about karma, respectively, address the
same salient concerns of human existence. What should we do in order to become
happy, or, approaching the same question from the other side of the spectrum, what
should we do to end our suffering? Both philosophical traditions indicate ways of
how we should respond to oscillations of our experience, caused by internal and
external events that seem beyond our control. Both philosophical traditions believe
that the invulnerability of our happiness against luck depends upon a mental
transformation. The Western tradition has focused more on coping with the emo-
tional effects of bad luck: disappointed desires and expectations, anger, fear, anxiety,
grief. The Buddhist tradition, on the other hand, has focused its mental training much
more on the agent’s motivations. Even though these approaches are quite different,
the curative methods offered are aimed to change our experience of the world and are
still helpful today in our attempts to secure happiness in the face of chance adversity.
Happiness and Invulnerability from Chance … 167
Open Access This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
Attribution-Noncommercial 2.5 License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/2.5/) which
permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the
original author(s) and source are credited. The images or other third party material in this chapter
are included in the work’s Creative Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in the credit line;
if such material is not included in the work’s Creative Commons license and the respective action
is not permitted by statutory regulation, users will need to obtain permission from the license
holder to duplicate, adapt or reproduce the material.
References
Annas, J. (1993). The morality of happiness. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Aristotle (2002) Nicomachean ethics. Translation (with historical introduction) by Christopher
Rowe; Philosophical introduction and commentary by Sara Broadie. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Brown, P. (1969). Augustine of Hippo: A biography. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Carpenter, A. D. (2014). Indian Buddhist philosophy. London: Routledge.
Chadwick, H. (2009). Augustine of Hippo: A life. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
The Connected Discourses of the Buddha (2000). A Translation of the Samyutta Nikaya by
Bhikkhu Bodhi. Somerville, MA.
Cooper John, M. (2012). Pursuits of wisdom: Six ways of life in Ancient philosophy from Socrates
to Plotinus. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Dhammapada: The Way of Truth (2010). Translated from the Pali by Sangharakshita. Cambridge,
UK: Windhorse.
Epictetus (1995). The discourses, the handbook, the fragments. In C. Gill, (Ed.), (Trans. revised R.
Hard). London.
Garﬁeld, J. L. (2015). Engaging Buddhism. Why it matters to philosophy. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Hadot, P. (2002). Exercises spirituels et philosophie antique. Paris: Albin Michel.
Hadot, P. (1995). Qu’est-ce que la philosophie antique? Paris: Gallimard.
Hadot, P. (2002). What is Ancient philosophy (M. Chase, Trans.). Cambridge, MA.
Harvey, P. (2013). An introduction to Buddhism. Teachings, history and practices (2nd ed.).
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Long, A. A. (2006). From Epicurus to Epictetus: Studies in Hellenistic and Roman philosophy.
Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Long, A. A. (2001). Philosophy’s hardest question: “What to make of oneself?”. Representations,
74, 19–36.
Long, A. (1996). Stoic studies. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Loy, D. R. (2008). How to drive your Karma. In Money, Sex, War, Karma. Notes for a Buddhist
revolution (pp. 53–65). Boston: Wisdom Publications.
McEvilley, T. (2001). The shape of Ancient thought: Comparative studies in Greek and Indian
philosophies. New York: Allworth Press.
Nelson, D. R. (2011). Sin: A guide for the Perplexed. London: T&T Clark.
The Middle Length Discourses of the Buddha (1995). (B. Nanamoli & B. Bodhi, Trans.). Boston:
Wisdom Publications.
Mikalson, J. D. (2002). The daimon of eudaimonia. In J. F. Miller, C. Damon & K. S. Myers
(Eds.), Vertis in Usum: Studies in honor of Edward Courtney (pp. 250–259). München: K.G.
Saur.
Nisula, T. (2012). Augustine and the functions of concupiscence. Leiden: Brill.
Nussbaum, M. C. (1986). The Fragility of goodness. Luck and ethics in Greek tragedy and
philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
168 J.M.M.H. Thijssen and D.R. Loy
Nussbaum, M. C. (1994). The therapy of desire. Theory and practice in Hellenistic ethics.
Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Rist, J. M. (1994). Augustine: Ancient thought baptized. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Sedley, D. (1999). The ideal of godlikeness. In G. Fine (Ed.), Plato 2: Ethics, Politics, Religion
and the Soul (pp. 309–328). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Sextus Empiricus Outlines of scepticism (1994). (J. Annas & J. Barnes, Trans.). Cambridge.
Sorabji, R. (2000). Emotion and peace of mind: From Stoic agitation to Christian temptation.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Thich Nhat Hanh (1974). Zen keys. New York: Anchor Press.
Tsouma, V. (2009). Epicurean therapeutic strategies. In J. Warren (Ed.), The Cambridge
companion to Epicureanism (pp. 249–265). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Van Oort, J. (1991). Jerusalem and Babylon. A study into Augustine’s City of God and the sources
of his doctrine of the two cities. Leiden: Brill.
Warren, J. (2009). Removing fear. In J. Warren (Ed.), The Cambridge companion to Epicureanism
(pp. 234–248). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Williams, B. A. O. (2006). The legacy of Greek philosophy. In B. Williams (Ed.), The sense of the
past. Essays in the history of philosophy; Edited with an introduction by Myles Burnyeat.
Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press.
Happiness and Invulnerability from Chance … 169
The Experience of Coincidence:
An Integrated Psychological
and Neurocognitive Perspective
Michiel van Elk, Karl Friston and Harold Bekkering
Abstract In this chapter, we focus on psychological and brain perspectives on the
experience of coincidence. We ﬁrst introduce the topic of the experience of coin-
cidence in general. In the second section, we outline several psychological mech-
anisms that underlie the experience of coincidence in humans, such as cognitive
biases, the role of context and the role of individual differences. In the third and
ﬁnal section we formulate the phenomenon of coincidence in the light of the
unifying brain account of predictive coding, while arguing that the notion of
coincidence provides a wonderful example of a construct that connects the
Bayesian brain to folk psychology and philosophy.
1 Prelude
This book concentrates on the topic of coincidence. In this chapter, we focus on
psychological and brain perspectives on the phenomenon of coincidence. Humans
frequently experiences coincidences in life in the sense of the Oxford dictionary:
A remarkable concurrence of events or circumstances without apparent causal
connection. To shed light on this issue, we will ﬁrst introduce the topic of coin-
cidence in general. In the second section, we outline several psychological attri-
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butions that underlie the experience of coincidence in humans like cognitive biases,
the role of context and the modulation of the experience of coincidence as a
consequence of individual differences. In the third and ﬁnal section we formulate
the phenomenon of coincidence in the light of the unifying brain account of pre-
dictive coding, i.e., the assumption that brains are essentially prediction machines
supporting perception and action by constantly attempting to match incoming
sensory inputs with top-down expectations and predictions. In particular, we will
show how the experience of coincidence can be understood as an example of
Bayes-optimal model selection.
2 Introduction
In 2011 the newspapers reported the remarkable case of Joan Ginther from Texas.1
Over several years she won four times a multi-million dollar jackpot, by buying
scratch-off lottery tickets. It started in 1993 when she won $5.4 million, followed by
$2 million in 2003, $3 million in 2005 and in 2010 she won a $10 million dollar
jackpot.2 Such an extraordinary pattern of wins cries out for an extraordinary
explanation. Residents of the town of Bishop were convinced that Joan was born
under a lucky star or that God was behind it. Statisticians estimated that the chances
of winning such prizes four times in a row were 1 in 18 septillion.3 Combined with
the discovery that Joan had earned a Ph.D. in mathematics at the University of
Stanford, this led to the suggestion that Joan had ﬁgured out the algorithm behind
lotteries. Joan always bought her tickets at the same mini mart in Bishop. By ﬁg-
uring out the algorithm that determines the winner and the schedule by which
lottery tickets are distributed across Texas, Joan could have predicted when to buy
the winning ticket. Joan further contributed to the mystery, by refusing any
interview.
In general, humans are remarkably bad at estimating chances and probabilities
(Tversky and Kahneman 1974). As a consequence, coincidental events (i.e. a
chance concurrence of events without apparent causal connection) are often imbued
with special meaning and result in the search for an ultimate explanation (Brugger et al.
1995). In the case of Joan, the explanation turned out to be less extraordinary than
initially thought: the ﬁrst win was likely based on chance, as the number of the winning
ticket matched the date of her birthday. The money that was won may have
enabled Joan to buy large quantities of lottery tickets, up to tens of thousands of tickets
1We would like to thank our colleagues Bastiaan Rutjens & Frenk van Harreveld for bringing this
example to our attention in their book on ‘Coincidence’.
2http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2023514/Joan-R-Ginther-won-lottery-4-times-Stanford-
University-statistics-PhD.html.
3http://www.philly.com/philly/news/lottery/How_outrageous_were_the_odds_lottery_legend_
Joan_Ginther_beat.html.
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a year.4 Given these large quantities the odds of winning a prize become less unlikely
than initially thought. In addition, this strategy also explains the fact that Joan (and a
friend with whom she collaborated) won a large number of smaller prizes that passed
unnoticed by the media.
In this chapter we focus on the experience of coincidence, which can be deﬁned
as the remarkable co-occurrence of two events (e.g. being called by a friend you
were just thinking about). In some cases the experience of coincidence results in the
inference that a common cause underlies the two events (e.g. some unknown ‘force’
causing you to think about a friend and causing your friend to call you). In other
cases, the co-occurrence of events is attributed to chance. The experience of
coincidence thus implies a meta-cognitive perspective, in which the most likely
explanation for the events being observed is inferred. The experience of coinci-
dence likely underlies a wide range of human behaviors and beliefs, ranging from
belief in conspiracy theories, magic and superstition to belief in faith healing and
ultimately belief in supernatural agents, like God. National surveys indicate that the
tendency to experience coincidence and to engage in superstitious behavior are
widespread, with a prevalence of 26 up to 74 percent in the UK for instance, even
among scientists (Wiseman 2003).
3 The Psychology of Coincidence
In this section we will discuss basic psychological mechanisms that underlie the
experience of coincidence. First, we will argue that the experience of coincidence is
related to the over-generalization of predictive models, which in turn are based on
fundamental cognitive biases that may actually confer an adaptive advantage. Next,
we will focus on the role of context and individual differences in the experience of
coincidence.
3.1 Cognitive Biases and Predictive Models
The experience of coincidence may be considered a speciﬁc example of the idea
that humans construct a predictive model of the world (Friston and Kiebel 2009).
This idea, ﬁrst articulated by Helmholtz assumes that agents perform inference
based on a generative model of the world (Clark 2013; Friston 2010; Friston et al.
2012; Gregory 1980; Rao and Ballard 1999; Schwartenbeck et al. 2013). Such
models incorporate associations, which can be used to predict future events (e.g.
learning that dark clouds often predict rain) and to predict the consequences of our
4http://www.philly.com/philly/news/lottery/Lotterys_luckiest_woman_Joan_Ginther_bet_ﬂabber
gasting_sums_on_scratch-offs.html.
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own and others’ actions (e.g. learning how to throw a ball in a basket).
Psychological experiments have shown that in many cases, these models are based
on fast and frugal heuristic processes, that may be advantageous in speciﬁc limited
circumstances, but that may be difﬁcult to generalize across different domains
(Gigerenzer 2012). Furthermore, it has been suggested that predictive models may
come to dominate perception, such that reality is perceived in accordance with the
constraints imposed by the model, rather than that the sensory input determines the
updating of the model. An extreme example of the dominance of predictive models
over perception can be found in research on hypnosis, in which proneness to and
acceptance of suggestibility manipulations can result in an altered perception of the
environment (Raz et al. 2005). Similarly, it has been suggested that an over-reliance
on predictive models and a failure to update these models in accordance with the
available sensory evidence may be the basis of illusion in normal perception and
delusions and hallucinations in psychopathology (Adams et al. 2013; Corlett and
Fletcher 2012).
At a very basic level the experience of coincidence and the construction of a
predictive model may be related to basic principles of reinforcement learning and
classical conditioning. The behaviorist Skinner already noted that pigeons, when
food was presented at a random reinforcement schedule, tended to display
superstitious-like behavior (Timberlake and Lucas 1985). The co-occurrence of a
speciﬁc behavior (e.g. pecking at the wall of the cage) with a speciﬁc consequence
(e.g. receiving food) resulted in the subsequent reinforcement of that behavior—as
if it resulted in the presentation of the food. Similar principles of random rein-
forcement learning likely play a role in human experiences of coincidence and
superstitious behavior as well. For instance, imagine buying a lottery ticket at a
speciﬁc shop and at a speciﬁc time of the day and winning a prize. The next time
when you buy a lottery ticket, you may be inclined to buy the ticket at the same
shop at the same time—even though you know that the chances of winning at this
speciﬁc shop are as low as buying a ticket somewhere else.
An over-generalization of the principles of reinforcement learning may often be
adaptive, as it enables the learning of novel action-effect contingencies. The
so-called ‘false positives’ generated by learning illusory contingencies based are
relatively harmless. Evolutionary psychologists have thus argued that the emer-
gence of superstitious behavior and the belief in coincidence is the consequence of
adaptive cognitive biases (Foster and Kokko 2009). In a relatively stable and
predictable environment, failing to detect a speciﬁc contingency between two
events (e.g. knowing that smoke often signals ﬁre) is typically more costly than
erroneously inferring a relation between two unrelated events (e.g. believing that
drumming causes rain). The evolution of superstition is a speciﬁc example of the
error management principle (Haselton and Nettle 2006), according to which if there
is an asymmetrical distribution between type I errors (i.e. a ‘false positive’) and type
II errors (i.e. a ‘false negative’), a bias develops toward committing the least costly
error. The experience of coincidence may be related to the overestimation of
contingencies in a predictive model. As long as the environment is relatively stable
such a model is adaptive, but it may become maladaptive in a different context.
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For instance, in young children at home an over-estimation of the amount of control
over the environment may be adaptive, as they still need to learn which aspects of
their environment can be controlled, but may become maladaptive during adoles-
cence, leading to increased risk taking (Heckhausen and Schulz 1995). Similarly, it
has been pointed out that in games of chance, people often rely on the
over-generalization of principles of skill and practice: they approach a dice
throwing or gambling task for instance with a skill-oriented approach, as if their
speciﬁc movements or choices influence an outcome that is in fact uncontrollable
(Langer 1975). Such a bias is adaptive as long as the losses are small and the
potential gains are relatively high, but in speciﬁc contexts (e.g. casinos) this
behavior may become maladaptive, leading to risky gambling and excessive risk
taking.
In psychological research, many other cognitive, reasoning, social, memory and
attentional biases have been described that may directly contribute to the experience
of coincidence and the construction of mental models that influence subsequent
decision making (for an overview, see Kahneman 2011). The self-attribution bias
reflects the general tendency to over-attribute positive outcomes to oneself and
negative outcomes to external factors (Mezulis et al. 2004). The self-attribution bias
underlies the experience of coincidence, by incorrectly attributing two unrelated
events to a common cause (i.e. oneself). For instance, when throwing a dice or
when performing a card guessing game, people tend to take credit for positive
outcomes, while they externalize negative outcomes (van Elk, Rutjens and van der
Pligt 2015). A well-known example of the self-attribution bias can be observed in
John McEnroe, a famous tennis player in the nineteen-eighties who attributed wins
on a match to his own capacity and training methods, but losing to bad performance
of the umpire. Basically, it has been argued that the self-attribution bias reflects a
distorted perceptual process, which is driven by the need to maintain and enhance
self-esteem. As such, the selective and biased perception of the world has a strong
motivational signiﬁcance, by avoiding people from becoming passive (e.g. ‘learned
helplessness’). It has even been argued that an over-optimistic perception of one’s
own capabilities and the amount of control that can be exerted over the environ-
ment, may be adaptive and psychologically healthy (Taylor and Brown 1988).
In formal treatments of the predictive or Bayesian brain, it is fairly straightfor-
ward to show that the self-attribution bias is, mathematically, Bayes optimal. This
self-attribution bias, also known as optimism bias (Sharot 2012), is a natural
consequence of making inferences about the state of the world generating sensory
information (Friston et al. 2014). In active (Bayesian) formulations of decision
making and choice behavior, we act to realize preferred outcomes by sampling from
beliefs about the way that we will behave. Usually, these beliefs are informed by
sensory evidence. However, when that evidence is ambiguous the most likely state
of the world is the state that is consistent with our ongoing behavior (Friston et al.
2014). Because we believe our behavior will lead to preferred outcomes (that
actions can fulﬁll), this necessarily implies that inferences in an uncertain world are
optimistic and are inherently biased by beliefs about our purposeful behavior
(FitzGerald et al. 2014). A formal (mathematical) treatment of this issue can be
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found in FitzGerald et al. (2014) and Friston et al. (2014). In this treatment, the
neurobiological correlates of the conﬁdence in beliefs about policies are associated
with dopaminergic discharges in the brain—a theme that we will return to later.
Also, it has become quite clear that we do not perceive the world as it is. Above
all, the information provided at any moment in time is so abundant that we have to
be selective in what we attend to. The question how people are able to attend to the
most important information, while ignoring other sources of information has been
widely studied in psychology and is typically labeled selective attention. Donald
Broadbent started his investigations of this phenomenon after working with
air-trafﬁc controllers during the second world war (Broadbent 1958). In that situ-
ation numerous competing messages from departing and incoming aircraft are
arriving continuously, all requiring attention. His basic ﬁnding was that air trafﬁc
controllers can only deal effectively with one message at a time and so they have to
decide which is the most important. Based on his and other ﬁndings, cognitive
scientist argued that we must have a kind of sensory buffer and the input has to be
selected based on the physical characteristics for further cognitive processing.
However, this bottom-up approach to information processing was challenged, and
for example the attenuation model of Anne Treisman suggested that although we
can indeed only limitedly process multiple sensory inputs at once, attention is
attenuating speciﬁc sensory information rather than applying an early ﬁlter on the
non-attended sensory information (Treisman 1964). The next step in attention
research continued this line of thinking and actually argued that attention is able to
select information at a very late stage of processing. MacKay (1973) presented
participants information via both ears with a speciﬁc instruction, which ear to
attend. He found that shadowed ambiguous passages with information on the
unattended channel that clariﬁed the ambiguity (ear 1—bank; ear 2—river or
money) helped the subsequent memory test regarding the relevant channel; par-
ticipants were better in recalling sentences for which the un-shadowed word was
meaningful, thereby further challenging the bottom-up nature of attention. The
research of MacKay nicely illustrates that attention is serving a goal—in his
experiment acquiring information from any source available to predict the infor-
mation relevant for the task. Thus, perception is subjective by nature and the feeling
of coincidence based on cognitive biases can be considered in the light that we
selectively attend to certain stimuli in the context given while ignoring other
information available.
This form of selective attention can also be cast in terms of hypothesis selection.
In other words, we are compelled to select among a number of competing
hypotheses and search out conﬁrmatory (or dis-conﬁrmatory) sensory evidence for
those hypotheses. Clearly, the evidence or stimuli that we attend (or ignore) will be
highly sensitive to the current hypothesis entertained by the brain: Humans are
biased to selectively attend and recall information that is highly salient or infor-
mative (Mcdaniel et al. 1995). In addition, people often rely on representativeness
and availability heuristics when judging the likelihood of situational descriptions
(Tversky and Kahneman 1974) and may use counterfactual thinking to regulate
affect in response to unexpected positive or negative outcomes (Roese 1997).
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In general, people are characterized by a misperception of chance events (Tversky
and Kahneman 1974), as shown for instance by the tendency to perceive an ‘ir-
regular’ coin-toss sequence like ‘H-T-H-T-T-H’ as more likely than a regular
sequence like ‘H-H-H-T-T-T’. In this example, chance events are considered as a
self-corrective process and on each consecutive toss of the coin people take into
account the past history of ‘heads’ and ‘tails’—even though the coin obviously has
no memory. The latter bias is another good example of the general tendency to
construct predictive models of the world—even in cases when such a model is not
applicable or appropriate (or in which the model should classify the coin toss as a
‘chance event’).
In sum, we argue that the experience of coincidence may be considered a speciﬁc
instance of the tendency to construct and rely on predictive models of the world.
These models may often be based on adaptive biases or prior beliefs to detect
contingencies (Foster and Kokko 2009) and/or may be supported by other
domain-speciﬁc biases that confer an adaptive advantage (i.e. heuristics) in speciﬁc
settings. An over-reliance on internal models and the over-generalization of models
to contexts in which they do not apply, may contribute to the experience of
coincidence.
3.2 Context and Model Adjustment
In the preceding section we have argued that perception of events in the world is
subjective and that cognitive biases at the personal level may result in the experience
of coincidence. Speciﬁc situations or a given situational context, may also alter your
perception of the world dramatically. As has been argued before (FitzGerald et al.
2014), agents have to determine what model to use in the ﬁrst place and secondly to
make inferences about hidden variables to evaluate the likelihood of a model and the
precision of the parameters of any plausible model. A given situational context is
likely to affect both aspects: which model to use and/or how to weight the parameters
within the speciﬁc models.
A famous example was demonstrated in a Candid Camera television show in the
1960s (the example is also mentioned in Liebermann 2007). An uninformed indi-
vidual enters an elevator ﬁlled with multiple confederates working with the show.
These confederates stand all collectively facing the back of the elevator rather than
facing the front. Almost all individuals would look quickly around at the others and
then change their orientation in order to stand in line with the confederates. This
example is presented in social psychology as one of the fundamental insights of
social cognition: “people look to the social environment and external context to
guide their behavior, particularly when the appropriate course of action is
ambiguous or undeﬁned.” This example nicely illustrates how our behavior is
context-dependent, but it also nicely illustrates how different models compete for
different inferences. Relying on previous knowledge of elevators, you have learned
that the door that opened for you when you entered the elevator is also likely the
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door that will open again when you need to leave the elevator. However, occa-
sionally, you ﬁnd elevators with two doors, one entrance and one exit door typically
at the opposite side of the elevator. The fact that all others are facing the back might
strike you as too obvious to be coincidence. Thus, multiple inferences are produced
by your brain; the elevator model which activates probabilities about potential door
locations that you might perceive to open to allow you to exit the elevator, but also
the social model, i.e., the probability that several people all face one direction that is
likely going to be the direction at which relevant information will appear. In other
words, in a causal model of the world, you expect other agents to anticipate what
will happen next, and thus you assume they are directed to the location they expect
the door to open—or, you could even infer the candid camera model, i.e., how
likely is it that people are making a joke on me. Based on the precision of these
different models in terms of what is the best inference on what I can perceive next,
most people might make an active inference and turn their side in alignment with
the others. Interestingly, this Bayesian approach on a social phenomenon like this
emphasizes “the power of the situation” as much as many other well-studied
concepts in social psychology, like the conﬁrmation bias (Asch 1956), or the
famous obedience to authority phenomenon (Milgram 1965), from a uniﬁed
framework, predictive coding. Depending on the precision of parameters from
different models in your mind you infer what you will perceive next based on the
(social) context you are in. Again, we see the emergent theme of selecting among
plausible hypotheses that explain the sensory evidence at hand. Above, we have
discussed this in terms of perceptual inference, very much along the lines of per-
ception as hypothesis testing (Gregory 1980). Here, the same notion emerges in the
context of social inference. We will return to the central role of selecting hypotheses
and Bayesian model selection below.
In ambiguous and uncertain contexts, the need for predictive models and the
need for making predictions including situational constraints increases. In line with
this suggestion, the experience of coincidence and the engagement of superstitious
behavior are often strongly related to signiﬁcant life events that have important
consequences, such as well-being, illness or death. It has been found for instance
that belief in luck and coincidence increased during times of stress and in poten-
tially threatening situations (Keinan 1994, 2002). Similarly, superstitious behavior
is quite prevalent among the performing arts and in sports, and the occurrence of
superstitious acts typically increases with the importance of the outcome (e.g. playing
the ﬁnals; cf. Burger and Lynn 2005). Interestingly, large cultural differences exist in
the experience of coincidence and in probabilistic thinking (Wright et al. 1978):
Asians compared to westerners typically engage less in probabilistic thinking in terms
of ‘cause-and-effect’ and this may be related to the ‘fate-oriented’ view in Eastern
religion and philosophy. These ﬁndings highlight the role of context in the experience
of coincidence. Again, these ﬁndings make sense in a broader evolutionary frame-
work, according to which the detection of (illusory) contingencies and the need for
predictive models is especially important in potentially ambiguous or threatening
situations.
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Speciﬁc contexts may trigger an over-reliance on internal models and a failure to
update these models in accordance with the available sensory information, may
cause the experience of ‘coincidence’. An extreme example of a failure to update
one’s cognitive model may be found in the phenomenon of cognitive dissonance
(Festinger et al. 2008). In his seminal work, Festinger describes a religious sect
believing that the earth would be flooded and that they would be rescued by
extraterrestrials in a flying saucer. When the critical time had passed and the pro-
phecy did not come true, rather than giving up their beliefs, the sect became even
more fervent in their faith. Many psychological studies have shown that, rather than
changing one’s model based on new evidence, humans respond to cognitive dis-
sonance by discarding the evidence or assimilating the evidence to one’s current
model (Elliot and Devine 1994). For instance, many believers put their trust in a
religious leader, who in turn imposes their views on his followers. An increased
reliance on religious authority results in a reduced process of error monitoring and a
failure to update one’s model based on the available evidence. Recently it has been
argued that religious rituals are speciﬁcally aimed at reducing the process of error
monitoring, thereby enhancing people’s willingness to uncritically adopt a pre-
vailing worldview (Schjoedt et al. 2013). In line with this suggestion, it has been
found for instance that believers are characterized by a reduced activation of the
frontal executive monitoring network when listening to a religious authority
(Schjoedt et al. 2011). In such contexts, a failure to update one’s model may result
in the experience of coincidence, as observed for instance during faith healing in
which a common cause is inferred (e.g. ‘God’) for two scientiﬁcally unrelated
events (e.g. prayer by the religious authority and the (often) temporary recovery of
illness).
3.3 Individual Differences and Precision
In addition to contextual effects, individual differences in personality traits and
beliefs also play an important role in the experience of coincidence. Some people
may prefer more certainty and precision in their predictions than others. In addition
some people may more strongly rely on their predictive models than others and may
be characterized by systematic biases with respect to taking sensory information
into account.
It has been found that the tendency to perceive coincidences is related to the
individual trait of need for control (Hladkyj 2001). People scoring high on the need
for control (and likely requiring a higher precision in their prediction models) were
more likely to experience unusual coincidences as personally signiﬁcant (c.f., the
self-attribution and optimism bias above). In addition, belief in a meaningful world
and the imbuement of random events with meaning has been associated with a
stronger visual attention capture (Bressan et al. 2008): this ﬁnding could reflect that
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the tendency to perceive coincidences as meaningful is related to a process of error
detection of information that is conflicting with one’s cognitive schema’s.
Several studies have suggested that individual differences in the reliance on
internal predictive models of the world are also related to the experience of coin-
cidence. Participants scoring high on schizotypal personality traits are characterized
by an increased reliance on internal predictive models and by difﬁculties to update
their model based on new sensory evidence (Corlett and Fletcher 2012). In addition,
a relation has been suggested between schizotypy, the perception of coincidence,
magical ideation and paranormal beliefs (Williams and Irwin 1991). It has been
found, for instance, that people scoring high on schizotypy and magical ideation are
more prone toward detecting illusory contingencies (Brugger and Graves 1997). In
this task, participants were required to discover the rule whereby navigating a
virtual mouse through a maze would result in a reward. In fact, the reward was
directly coupled to the amount of time spent navigating: if the participants spent
more than three seconds in the maze, they would receive the reward, whereas if they
spent less time no reward was provided. Many participants developed beliefs in
illusory contingencies (i.e. the belief that moving the mouse repetitiously along a
speciﬁc path would result in the reward) and the amount of illusory hypotheses that
were believed were directly related to magical ideation. In another study using a
dice throwing task it was found that the perception of chance events as meaningful
is related to a tendency for repetition-avoidance e.g. in guessing outcomes (Brugger
et al. 1995). Interestingly, in the same study it was found that the tendency to avoid
semantically related guesses was associated to a stronger belief in extrasensory
perception. Finally, it has been reported that paranormal believers show fallacies in
probabilistic reasoning task and tend to underestimate the likelihood of chance
events (Rogers et al. 2009). In addition, paranormal believers are more prone to
reporting frequent experiences of coincidence during their life (Bressan 2002).
These ﬁndings illustrate that individual differences in model selection and the
reliance on internal models can have a strong effect on the experience of
coincidence.
In summary, when we use internal models to make inferences about the causes of
our sensations, we are in the difﬁcult game of carefully balancing the precision of, or
conﬁdence in, sensory evidence relative to prior beliefs. In hierarchical models (with
multiple levels of abstraction), each level is equipped with a precision that deter-
mines how much it predominates over other levels. Crucially, the precision at each
and every level of the hierarchy has to be optimized. This optimization itself depends
upon biases or priors about expected precision (or expected uncertainty) that can
lead to very different inferences and behavior. This may be manifest as normal
intersubject variation in cognitive biases or, indeed, provide a formal explanation for
false inference in psychopathology (Adams et al. 2013).
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4 Predictive Coding and Coincidence
We have deﬁned the experience of coincidence as an inference about the remark-
able co-occurrence of two events (Brugger et al. 1995). To conclude, we present a
more theoretical view on how Bayesian models, implemented in our brain, can lead
to the experience of coincidence. The experience is labeled as a coincidence, when
our explanation appeals to the notion of a ‘coincidence’, as opposed to some
underlying common cause. When a causal inference is made, the experience is
labeled as coincidence; in contrast, ‘non-causal’ inference makes the concurrence
coincidental. This means that we must have the capacity to infer that an improbable
(remarkable) concurrence was or was not causally mediated. This entails the
capacity to postulate two concurrent hypotheses (improbable events may or may not
have a common cause), and we must also have a (meta-representational) concept of
this inferential dilemma.
In this section, we turn to a formal treatment of coincidences from the per-
spective of the Bayesian brain. To set the scene, it would be useful to rehearse the
simplicity of the formal perspectives we have been appealing to. The most general
principle guiding action and perception is presumed to be a maximization for the
evidence of models used to explain the sensorium. The inverse or complement of
model evidence is surprise, prediction error or a quantity called variational free
energy. This means that the brain is trying to minimize prediction error (or maxi-
mize model evidence). A popular scheme for implementing this minimization is
predictive coding, for which there is a substantial amount of circumstantial evi-
dence in terms of neuroanatomy and neurophysiology (Friston and Kiebel 2009).
So what does it mean to maximize model evidence? To understand this, we have to
appreciate that model evidence has two components:
Log evidence ¼ accuracy complexity
Where, mathematically:
Log evidence ¼ ln Prðconsequencejhypothesis)
Accuracy ¼ E ½ln Prðconsequencejcause; hypothesis)]
Complexity ¼ D½Pr(causejconsequence; hypothesis)j jPrðcausejhypothesis))
where E[] denotes an expectation or average and D[] the relative entropy or
Kullback-Leibler divergence. This mathematical formulation of the goodness of ﬁt
of a model is interesting because it says that complexity is the divergence between
our prior beliefs (i.e., cognitive biases and preconceptions) and the (posterior)
beliefs adopted after seeing sensory information.
Crucially, a high model evidence requires a parsimonious but accurate expla-
nation for sensory consequences (of inferred causes). Generally, these explanations
rest upon internal or generative models with a deep hierarchical structure (possibly
reflecting the hierarchical organization of cortical areas in the brain). This deep
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structure is particularly important from the point of view of coincidences, because
appealing to a common cause adds an extra level or depth to the hierarchical
explanation that can minimize its complexity (and maximize model evidence). To
see this clearly, we need to see why complexity is so important.
If we explained all our sensations with a multitude of independent causes, we
would have a very accurate (low prediction error) explanation; however, the
complexity of this explanation or hypothesis would be very high. This is because
complexity increases with the degrees of freedom or number of causes invoked to
explain data (the divergence above). The problem with complex but accurate
models is that they do not generalize to other situations—a problem known as
over-ﬁtting in statistics. This means a good model should also be parsimonious and
use the smallest number of causes to explain (sensory) consequences. In turn, this
means we are compelled to construct unifying hypotheses about common causes
that reduce the cardinality of the causes of our sensory explananda.
It is therefore entirely Bayes-optimal to select hypotheses or models that ascribe
a common cause to coincident events; particularly those that are generated by some
agency (e.g., oneself, a deity or the CIA). In fact, several studies have shown that
the tendency to attribute coincidental events to external agents is universal and may
underlie supernatural and conspiracy beliefs (Banerjee and Bloom 2014; Imhoff and
Bruder 2014). It is at this point we see the utility of ‘coincidence’ as an alternative
hypothesis for the co-occurrence or succession of coincident events. To make this
concrete, consider a situation where you are meeting a friend for coffee and he
arrives at exactly the same time as you. This coincidence is surprising and will call
for an explanation in your (Bayesian) brain. This is because surprise has to be
minimized. There will be a number of competing hypotheses; for example, your
friend has been waiting for you, your friend knew exactly when you would arrive
because he has been spying on you, you both caught the same tram to the café, the
meeting was ordained by God and, ﬁnally, it was a coincidence. All of these
competing hypotheses or models provide an accurate explanation for the events you
have witnessed; however, they differ profoundly in terms of their complexity as
scored by the number of (implausible) deviations from your prior beliefs. As we
have noted above, selecting the best hypothesis corresponds to accepting the model
with the greatest evidence (this is known as Bayesian model selection in statistics).
This will be the hypothesis with the minimum complexity; namely the explanation
that requires the least divergence from your prior beliefs. In other words, an a priori
plausible explanation is most likely inferred (e.g., you arrived on the same tram).
However, if there are no tram stops near the café, then the most plausible hypothesis
could be a coincidence; provided you believe, a priori, coincidence is plausible. The
hypothesis you select will determine whether coincident events (in the real world)
are experienced as a coincidence.
The key insight provided by the above treatment is that we are equipped with the
hypothesis or heuristic that things can be explained by ‘coincidences’. This is a
constructive explanation—as opposed to simply ignoring co-occurrences. If this is
true, then the way that we deal with (real-world) coincidences depends strongly on
our prior disposition to ‘coincidence’ as a causal explanation. The very fact that we
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have this hypothesis at hand to explain surprising contingencies is a testament to the
sophistication of our hierarchical generative models and may not be seen in lower
animals (like pigeons). It also may provide one perspective on the formation of
delusional systems in psychosis, where the coincidence hypothesis is simply not
available.
There are some other interesting predictions that follow from our line of argu-
ment. Above, we have noted that the conﬁdence in our beliefs about chosen out-
comes may be signaled by dopamine in the brain. This stands in contrast to
alternative explanations based upon dopamine discharges reporting rewards or
preferred outcomes. Coincidences may offer an interesting resolution to the com-
peting explanations for dopamine responses. If coincidences resolve surprise, then
realizing something is a coincidence should resolve uncertainty and increase
precision resulting in elevated dopamine ﬁring. Conversely, if dopamine reports
preferred outcomes, even when they are surprising, dopamine should show a
response to unexpected rewards that are entirely coincidental.
5 Conclusions
In this chapter we have provided an analysis of the experience of coincidence from
a psychological and neurocognitive perspective. As humans we construct predictive
models of the world that enable us to generate predictions and to minimize surprise.
The experience of coincidence may result from cognitive biases, such as the
self-attribution bias and attentional biases, which are Bayes-optimal. Thereby
the notion of coincidence provides a wonderful example of a construct that connects
the Bayesian brain to folk psychology and philosophy.
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When Chance Strikes: Random
Mutational Events as a Cause of Birth
Defects and Cancer
Han G. Brunner
Abstract Faithful and stable inheritance of DNA is coupled with occasional ran-
dom errors of replication that lead to a change in the DNA code known as mutation.
Mutations can be considered as “good” because they are the fuel that drives evo-
lution of species. On the level of the individual they are mostly harmful. In fact, the
majority of severe intellectual disabilities derives from such random mutational
events. In my experience, the tendency to ascribe all events to deﬁnite causes is still
highly prevalent. Against this background of presumed guilt, parents who are
confronted with the birth of a severely handicapped child tend to take solace form
the knowledge that the condition was not their “fault”. Our recent understanding
that severe handicaps may strike anyone, may well lead to the acceptance of a more
universal offer of prenatal diagnosis than previous strategies which were based on
the identiﬁcation of high risk groups.
1 Fascination
For as long as we know, people have been devastated and fascinated by the birth of
a child with severe malformations or disabilities. Collecting malformed foetuses
was a popular pastime for the elite during the 17th Century. Rich and educated men
built up sizable private collections of curiosities. One such anatomical collection
was sold in its entirety to Czar Peter the Great in 1717 by Frederik Ruijsch from
Amsterdam (Baljet and Oostra 1998). An anatomical collection from the 18th
century that has been preserved and maintained as a museum is that of Willem and
Gerard Vrolik. This is now in the AMC hospital in Amsterdam. People with
malformations or other visible developmental defects were put on display in “freak
shows” and exhibitions. In the 19th century, PT Barnum in the USA and Tom
Norman in the UK traveled widely around their respective countries, with shows of
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supposed freaks of nature. Quite probably, malformations will continue to scare and
excite us forever. Certainly, our fascination with physical abnormality has not
ceased in the 20th century. The 1980 movie “the elephant man” directed by David
Lynch relates the story of John Merrick whose malformations were exploited by the
owner of such a freak show. The 1985 movie “Mask” was based on the life of Roy
Lee Dennis who died at age 16 from craniodiaphyseal dysplasia, a progressive
deforming bone disease of the skull. Another contemporary movie about malfor-
mation is Edward Scissorhands (Tim Burton 1990). The image of a boy born with
scissors for hands is clearly inspired by inherited ectrodactyly or “lobster claw
malformation” where the middle ﬁngers are missing at birth. A fascination with
malformations can further be found in many literary tales, notably Homer’s
Cyclops in the Odyssey.
2 Divinity and Sorcery
Beyond fascination is the need to ﬁnd explanations for personal disasters such as the
birth of a malformed or handicapped child. In antiquity, and in societies around the
world, congenital abnormalities were regarded as omens, or punishment from
the gods (Warkany 1959; Beckwith 2012). For example, Tigay (1997) mentions the
Babylonian Omen series (Izbu) which lists the predicted signiﬁcance of women
giving birth to children with a wide variety of malformations. “If a woman gives
birth (and the child) has two heads: there will be a ﬁerce attack against the land and
the king will give up his throne” (Izbu, II, 20 h32) (Pangas 2000). Although divinity
was not generally considered a plausible cause after the middle ages, witchcraft and
other supernatural phenomena remained serious possibilities until relatively
recently. A case cited by Brent and Fawcett (2007) concerns the trial of one George
Spencer from Connecticutt, who had a glass eye. When a one-eyed piglet was born
on the farm, he was charged with bestiality. He was duly sentenced to death in New
England in 1642 for having sired the abnormal pig. George Spencer was hanged.
The sow was put to death by the sword.
3 Maternal Impressions
One common belief about malformations which originated very early and appears
pervasive in many different cultures is the concept that events and images witnessed
by a pregnant woman may somehow imprint themselves on the foetus (e.g.
Warkany and Kalter 1962). A positive example of this is the advice given to
pregnant women in the Greek city of Sparta, to admire statues of well-formed
human beings. The converse idea, that viewing an abnormality can leave an imprint
on the developing foetus by some sort of “photographic” effect, remained common
until the late 19th century (Fisher 1870). In his book on medical curiosities Jan
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Bondeson (1997) extensively discusses these so-called maternal impressions.
Bondeson relates the story of the Danish anatomist Bartholin who saw a girl with a
cat’s head on a visit to Holland in 1738. The explanation given to Bartholin by the
locals, was that a cat hiding in her mother’s bed, had dashed out unexpectedly and
startled the pregnant woman. Bartholin and his colleague Jaccobaeus were
influential at the Danish court. On their advice, King Frederik IV ruled that invalid
and malformed people should be kept out of sight in a special hospital in
Copenhagen. This was not out of pity for the poor and crippled, but to prevent
pregnant women from bearing children exactly like them (Bondeson 1997). The last
serious description of maternal impression (“Verzien” in Dutch) as a cause for
malformation in the Dutch National Journal of Medicine occurred almost exactly
100 years ago (Formijne 1915). Occasional supporters of the concept remain among
those who believe in parapsychology.
4 Infections and Teratogens
The discovery by Gregg in the early 1940s (Gregg 1947) that congenital rubella
infection causes cataract, deafness, and other abnormalities and the description of
severe malformations due to Thalidomide in the early 1960s by McBride in Australia
(1961) and Lenz in Germany (1962), in conjunction with experimental work by
Warkany in Cincinnati amongst others established the science of teratology, which
studies the influence of harmful substances and infections on the foetus (Warkany and
Nelson 1940). This concept of the foetus as a vulnerable developing human being
inspired dramatic and effective improvements in prenatal care. It is now generally
accepted that prenatal factors are responsible for malformations and handicaps in at
most of 5 % in newborns in developed countries. In spite of the apparent rarity of
teratogenic causes, all mothers of children with severe abnormalities or disabilities
feel guilty. Many consider the possibility that something happened during pregnancy
that harmed their child, which should have been avoided. In the case of intellectual
disability, it is sometimes assumed that a lack of oxygen during delivery was
responsible. However, it would seem that this is also rare and that it cannot begin to
account for most cases of intellectual disability in the population at this time.
5 Inherited Factors
Inbreeding is an important factor for malformations, and intellectual disability. This
reflects recessive inheritance where a child is affected because it received an
abnormal gene from both parents. Because most deleterious gene variants are rare,
the chance of these coming together in a child is very low, unless the parents are
related. Thus, recessive inheritance has an important role in causing malformations
and intellectual disability in countries with a high consanguinity rate. A recent study
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from the UK suggests that the risk of a baby having a malformation is approxi-
mately doubled from 3 to 6 % if the parents are ﬁrst cousins (Sheridan et al. 2013).
A recent study from Germany based on prenatal ultrasound scans came to much the
same conclusion but the increase was about 3-fold, from 2.8 to 8.5 % for offspring
from ﬁrst-cousin marriages (Becker et al. 2015). No good estimates are available on
their frequency, but there is good evidence for recessive inheritance of intellectual
disability from populations with high rates of consanguinity such as Iran
(Najmabadi et al. 2011).
The frequency of consanguinity varies enormously across the world, from less
than 1 % of all marriage unions in the USA and Russia to over 50 % in Sudan and
Pakistan (Romeo and Bittles 2014). This variation is tightly linked with customs
and existing religious rules. Notably in Europe, the Roman Catholic church gen-
erally prohibited ﬁrst-cousin marriages, while the protestants took a more liberal
view. In the UK, following the marriage of Henry VIII ﬁrst to his sister in law,
Catherine of Aragon, and then to Anne Boleyn who was a cousin of his executed
second wife, the church of England decided to legalize all ﬁrst-cousin marriages
(Bittles 2009). A dispute about the possible adverse effects of ﬁrst-cousin marriage
in Great Britain in the late 19th century was settled when George Darwin (son of
Charles Darwin who married his ﬁrst cousin Emma Wedgwood) produced evidence
that the negative effects of ﬁrst-cousin marriages were likely small (Darwin 1875;
cited in Bittles 2009). Indeed we ﬁnd that in outbred populations, the contribution
of recessive inheritance to intellectual disability appears of modest importance
(Gilissen et al. 2014; Deciphering Developmental Disorders Study 2015).
6 De Novo Mutations in Human Genetic Disease
Mutations are sudden changes in the genetic material. Mutations are the fuel of
evolution, and therefore beneﬁcial to the adaptation of species to changes in their
environment (Crow 2000). Nonetheless, most mutations are either of no effect to
the individual (neutral) or detrimental to health and survival. Truly beneﬁcial
mutations are clearly exceptionally rare events. Mutations can involve chromo-
somes, parts of chromosomes, or single genes.
Chromosome abnormalities have been recognized as a cause of severe intel-
lectual disability for many years at least since the discovery of trisomy 21 in Down
syndrome 50 years ago. Chromosomal abnormalities are an important cause of
severe intellectual disability and explain about 20 % of the total frequency.
Techniques for the investigation of chromosomes have become better over time.
Still, most individuals with severe intellectual disability have normal chromosomes
even when studied by the best available techniques. Patients come from a normal
pregnancy, normal birth and from normal families. For these reasons the most
common answer to the question why a child has intellectual disability is “I don’t
know”. The possibility to characterize the complete DNA sequence at the single
base level by whole genome sequencing has radically changed this situation. It now
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turns out that most people with a severe intellectual disability do not have abnor-
malities of whole chromosomes. Some have very small chromosomal changes, but
most have an abnormal single gene which has mutated (Gilissen et al. 2014).
Similar ﬁndings have been reported for autism and schizophrenia but in a lower
percentage. Analysis of the affected child and both parents demonstrates that the
abnormality has arisen spontaneously in the child by a mutation of a single
nucleotide in the DNA. This has important implications since DNA mutations are
spread more or less equally across the genome, and occur at a relatively ﬁxed rate of
one per 100 million nucleotides per generation. Mutations represent random errors
of replication during the formation of our germ cells. Thus, the majority of all
instances of severe intellectual disability and a large proportion of other diseases
such as autism, schizophrenia and birth defects are due to what seem to be
essentially random events (Veltman and Brunner 2012).
7 The Randomness of Mutations
It has now been ﬁrmly established that the number of DNA mutations in a newborn
child is approximately 100. Of these 100 mutations, on average 1 or 2 hit a gene.
Since there are 20,000 genes, the impact of the single gene mutation that every
newborn child has will be determined by the nature of the gene that was hit, and by
the severity of the mutational event. Both of these factors are random. We may say,
that the more we improve our lives, our habits, and our pregnancy care, the more
the decision to start a family becomes similar to taking part in a genetic lottery. This
comes as no great surprise to most parents. We all know and accept that each
pregnancy carries risks. On the other hand, we do want explanations when a
severely handicapped child is born. In my experience, the information that a dis-
ability is due to a chance event is perceived as good news by parents because it
absolves them of feelings of guilt and insufﬁciency about how they handled their
pregnancy.
8 Why Mutations Happen
There are two main causes of new mutations, insufﬁcient DNA repair and random
errors during DNA replication. DNA repair is necessary, because the DNA in our
cells is under constant attack from external factors that may damage it. External
damaging factors include radiation, chemicals, as well as various toxic substances
that are generated by the cell itself such as oxygen radicals. To protect our exis-
tence, our cells have developed an elaborate system of DNA damage protection and
especially DNA repair. This means that the large majority of DNA mutations is
immediately corrected and repaired. Our germ cells seem to be especially good at
preventing or repairing DNA damage. It was a striking and unexpected result from
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studies that were performed after the Nagasaki and Hiroshima atom bombs during
World War II that there was only limited evidence for an increase of inherited
genetic mutations. This is not to say that external factors are not relevant to new
mutations. They are obviously very important but at the current level of exposure to
noxious influences, they do not seem to be the determining factor whether or not a
mutation ensues in a child. In fact, studies of the frequency of new mutations in
children suggest a random distribution around the mean of 1–2 gene mutation per
newborn individual. The driving force for the generation of new mutations is in the
replication of DNA when our germ cells are created. Copying DNA is the essence
of creating sperm cells and egg cells. All DNA nucleotides need to be copied with
very high ﬁdelity. Viewed like this, it is perhaps surprising that the total number of
errors in a newborn is just 100 out of the 3 billion nucleotides of DNA that need to
be copied. Mutations are a part of all life.
9 Can We Prevent Mutations?
If we view mutations as copy errors, then we must accept that it will not be easy to
prevent them from happening. Consequently, it becomes quite difﬁcult to further
reduce the occurrence of severe handicaps and diseases. Once we have minimized
the negative influences of DNA damaging substances and radiation, the remaining
mutations are due to copy errors that reflect an intrinsic function of our cellular
machinery. There may be a practical solution however. We may try to reduce the
number of cellular divisions in the germ-line as much as possible. More de novo
gene mutations happen during spermatogenesis than during oogenesis. This is
because sperm cells continue to copy and then divide over a man’s lifetime while
the egg cells are already completed by the time a girl is born. In fact, the mutation
rate in the child is strongly dependent on the age of the father (Risch et al. 1987;
Goriely and Wilkie 2012). While it is probably not practical to try and convince
men to have their families young, it is a practical possibility to freeze and store
sperm samples at a young age, and then use these later in life. While the impact on
an individual may not be immediately apparent, it is clear that if this policy were
universally adopted in the face of an increasing age at which men and women start
their families, a society could reduce the burden of severe handicaps and autism by
a large fraction. Whether this is acceptable or desirable is a different matter and will
invite a vigorous societal debate.
10 Accepting Risks
Each pregnancy carries risks and this is a generally accepted fact. Because we
cannot prevent mutations from happening, we cannot reduce or eliminate all risk,
even if we live healthy lives and provide the best possible pregnancy care.
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Ultimately, early detection by prenatal diagnosis may be the only real option if we
want to prevent severe handicaps. Whether this is acceptable in the form of uni-
versal prenatal diagnosis is again a matter for societal debate. It is clear that such
discussions carry tremendous societal, ethical and emotional and even personal
connotations and that they cannot be solved from the respective perspectives of
biology, medicine or genetics. I believe that such a debate will take place over the
coming years. In this respect, it may be instructive to read some of the reactions to a
recent paper by cancer expert Vogelstein that suggests that most cases of cancer in
Western populations are due to random mutations and that their risk is strongly
related to the number of cell divisions per tissue (Tomassetti and Vogelstein 2015a).
The authors concluded from their ﬁndings, that it is probably more worthwhile for
society to try to detect cancers at an early stage than it is for society to invest in
cancer prevention. Several commentators objected to this generalization, and partly
for good scientiﬁc reasons. Nonetheless, the perceived dichotomy between external
factors (and inherited predispositions) which we can avoid or ameliorate, and the
randomness of mutations which strike from nowhere also seems to have inspired
some of these comments. Or as Tomassetti and Vogelstein put it in their response:
“Replicative mutations are unavoidable. They are in a sense a side-effect of evo-
lution, which cannot proceed without them. That they play a larger role in cancer
than previously believed has important scientiﬁc and societal implications.”
(Tomassetti and Vogelstein 2015b).
All in all, the recent recognition that spontaneous mutations are an important
driver of severe illnesses, such as intellectual disability, autism, schizophrenia, and
cancer is likely to fuel another nature-nurture debate where random mutation events
are contrasted with bad influences from the environment. Nature-nurture debates are
never fully solved because the opposing sides are not ready to compromise. Still,
such debates are always interesting and instructive, and in the end genome
sequencing will provide us with real scientiﬁc data to weigh these two respective
forces. At the end of the day, we need to come to terms with randomness as an
integral part of our biology. This include accepting limits to the extent to which we
can and cannot manage our existence.
11 Are Mutations a Necessary Part of Our Existence?
It is often argued that because mutations are the drivers of evolution, we should
welcome them as a good thing. In general terms, advantageous mutations may
indeed drive improved species adaptation and promote evolution. Nonetheless,
since mutations may easily destroy the capacity of the organism to reproduce, there
must be an upper limit to the number of random mutations a species can endure. In
fact, in humans, the total number of copy errors in a newborn is just 100 out of the
3 billion nucleotides of DNA.
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So is there an optimum rate for random mutational events, and how is this
determined? First of all, it is clear that the answer to this question varies. In fact,
frequency of random mutation can vary 100-fold between species, and each species
has its own speciﬁc mutation rate. This species-speciﬁc mutation rate is not random,
as it appears strongly dependent on the size of the genome, with bacteria having the
lowest mutation rate and mammals having the highest mutation rate. All this
suggests that for each species, there is a relatively constant and likely optimized
error-rate of DNA replication.
So if our mutation rate is ﬁxed, why is it what it is? In the absence of a divine plan,
we may consider the following possibilities. First, it may be that our current human
rate of evolution exactly matches the requirement for adaptation to a changing
environment. If this were true then one would expect that there should be some
variability of mutation rate within a species over evolutionary time. Simply put: In
order to cope with changes in the selection regime, populations should evolve
mechanisms that tune the rate of mutation, amongst other things, in order to increase
their long-term adaptability (Carja et al. 2014). There is currently not a lot of evi-
dence to support this idea, although it has recently been argued that there are data to
support that the rate of human mutation may not be stable over time (Harris 2015).
Another possibility is that the mutation rate is as low as our species can afford.
Keeping mutation rates low through high ﬁdelity of DNA replication and reliable
repair of mutations, is clearly a strategy that involves considerable cost to the
organism. Since resources are limited, there may be a point where it becomes much
more rewarding to species overall survival to stop investing in mutation prevention
and repair, and rather divert resources and energy to other ways to promote survival
and ﬁtness. One weak spot in replication that has not been ﬁxed by evolution, is to
do with the defective proofreading capacity of polymerase alpha during replication
(Reijns et al. 2012).
12 Conclusion
There may be an inherent tension between the interest of the individual and that of
the species it belongs to as to the allowing of randomness. If we go by the “Adapt or
die” paradigm, then we need random mutational events to survive as a species. But
at the same time such random mutations may kill us before we reproduce. We need
a bit of randomness in our existence otherwise our species cannot survive. But we
need to dose this randomness very carefully or the resulting chaos will destroy us.
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Chance, Variation and the Nature
of Causality in Ecological Communities
Hans de Kroon and Eelke Jongejans
It’s a coincidence, it is not scientiﬁc.
Major Walsh in Close Encounters of the Third Kind
(Steven Spielberg, director; Columbia Pictures, 1977)
Abstract Chance is pervasive in nature. Erratic events such as storms and ﬁres can
cause major damage to an ecosystem. Rare successful long distance dispersal events
like a viable seed landing in just the right habitat can form the stepping stone for
range expansion of a plant species. Illustrated with two examples we argue that in
ecology chance events are scale-dependent. We show how random stochastic
variation in species interactions may result in relative stability at a higher com-
munity level. In other systems the reverse may take place, in which deterministic
interactions result in unpredictable chaotic dynamics. Analysing the processes and
dynamics at these different scales has led to an increasing mechanistic under-
standing of the variation in ecological communities in space and time.
Unambiguous identiﬁcation of cause and effect relations from this work is of the
greatest importance, as many ecosystems in the world are not amenable to exper-
imentation. This work should form the scientiﬁc basis for identifying the threats to
ecosystems and deﬁning proper conservation and mitigation measures.
1 Introduction: The Fascinating Complexity
of Ecosystems
One central problem in ecology is understanding the distribution of species and
individuals over the landscape. Species are organised in ecological communities of
producers (generally plants) and consumers (herbivores and predators) that change
across the landscape. Climatic factors and soil and water conditions may change
already over short distances and vary with altitude vs latitude. Adaptations deter-
mine the distribution of species over gradients. Beautiful nature documentaries
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often focus on these amazing characteristics of species by which they are able to
cope with the challenges of their often extreme environment.
An important goal in ecology as a scientiﬁc discipline is understanding the
driving forces, or underlying mechanisms responsible for differences in distribution
of species in their natural habitats. However, how much mechanistic understanding
is possible in ecosystems in which chance processes play a prominent role? For
example, long-distance migration of plants is subject to the coincidental combi-
nation of a rare event like a heavy storm taking place at exactly the right time and
place carrying ripe seeds to another location with exactly the right conditions for
establishment. Such events are hardly tractable in the ﬁeld. How much does chance
affect distributions of individuals and interactions between them, and how much do
actual ecological and evolutionary processes contribute? The question is important
not only for the progress of ecology as a scientiﬁc discipline, but also for under-
standing the impact of disturbances (such as global climate change) and formulating
appropriate interventions to mitigate such disturbances.
Illustrated with two examples, we argue that coincidence, variation and causality
are scale-dependent. With scale we imply the extent of time and space (McGill
2010), but also the hierarchical structure of ecosystems, in which individuals of the
same species are grouped within populations, populations of different species are
grouped within structured ecological communities, which in turn interact with
abiotic conditions regarding climate, soil and water within the landscape. Patterns
expressed at one scale are driven by causal processes at a smaller underlying scale.
Vice versa, random processes at a lower scale sum up to measurable variation at a
higher scale. As a result, rare events at a lower scale can be predicted at a higher
scale, e.g. under which climatic conditions new soybean rusts from South America
can be expected in North America (Isard et al. 2011).
In the ﬁrst example we give an overview on current theory explaining the
maintenance of species diversity, with emphasis on hyper-diverse communities such
as tropical forests. The complexity is daunting. Such communities exist of hundreds,
sometimes thousands of species, each with their own characteristics, ecological
relationships with other species and responses to environmental conditions. What
are the stabilizing forces preventing species from extinction? How important are
stabilizing forces preserving these communities relative to chance effects?
In the second example we investigate trends of populations of species over time,
as they are influenced by deterministic and stochastic factors. Studying such trends
is of great importance for the conservation of species and the prediction of the
impact of environmental stress factors. We will see that in the currently fragmented
landscapes all over the world, populations are ruled by chance events affecting the
extinction of small populations, as well as rare long-distant dispersal events. How
can we gain control over this stochasticity, in order to understand and predict how
environmental factors influence the viability of populations? Answering this
question very much depends on the spatial scale at which we are studying pro-
cesses, from a very local patch of suitable habitat where a limited number of
individuals survive and reproduce, to a region (such as an entire country) har-
bouring numerous of these small populations that together form a predictive trend.
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2 Example 1: Explaining the Maintenance of Species
Diversity
2.1 Coexistence Theory: Species Differ in Niches
One of the most long-lasting questions in ecology is to explain how so many
organisms can coexist in a community. Hyper-diverse communities (Box 1) are
tantalizing examples challenging a long-standing paradigm in ecology. The ‘com-
petitive exclusion principle’, formulated by the Russian biologist Georgy Gauss in
the 1930s and based on laboratory experiments with Paramecium (unicellular cili-
ated protozoa), states that two species can only stably coexist if they differentiate in
their fundamental requirements such as their food source (their ‘niches’). Early on,
the competitive exclusion principle received theoretical support from population
models (Lotka 1920; Volterra 1928). The Lotka-Volterra equations describing the
competition between two species and deﬁning the conditions for competitive
exclusion or stable coexistence can be considered the E =mc2 of community ecology.
They still form the cornerstone of modern coexistence theory (Chesson 2000).
BOX 1: the dazzling number of species that coexist in natural plant
communities
Plant communities can harbour very high numbers of species in a given area.
Communities differ in composition and complexity. Why are some commu-
nities more species-rich than others? Why are the tropical forests over-
whelmingly species-rich and why are these levels of biodiversity not reached
in the temperate or boreal forests?
The differences are enormous. Current estimates suggest the minimum
number of tropical tree species in the world between 40,000 and 53,000 (Slik
et al. 2015). The number of tree species described globally for temperate
forest is only 1166 (Latham and Ricklefs 1993). Also at smaller scale, tropical
forests can contain an astonishing number of species. For example, a single
hectare (approximately one baseball ﬁeld or two soccer ﬁelds) can support
hundreds of species of trees (record: 942 species of trees per hectare in
Amazonian Ecuador; Wilson et al. 2012). An area of the size of a fraction of
the Radboud University campus would thus harbour approximately the same
the number of species as the entire temperate forest region in the world
including Europe, Asia and North-America (4.2 million km2). How did this
diversity arise, and how is the diversity maintained?
Extensively managed, relatively nutrient-poor grasslands all over the
world are another example of extreme plant species richness, albeit at a
smaller scale (Wilson et al. 2012). Per m2 such communities can have dozens
of species of higher plants (record: 89 species of vascular plants m−2 for a
mountain grassland in Argentina). How is it possible that such communities
are maintained, without a few superior species starting to dominate and drive
competitively inferior species to extinction?
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In its essence, coexistence theory states that different species in a community can
stably coexist if a species gains a competitive advantage over the resident com-
munity when that species becomes rare. Consequently, if for whatever reason a
species gets low in numbers, its population will bounce back resulting in coexis-
tence. Such frequency-dependent population dynamics is only possible if species
differ in their requirements to complete their life cycle, i.e. differ in their niches.
Niche differences can arise from many different characteristics, with food source as
the most obvious one. Differences in reproduction (the ‘regeneration niche’, i.e.
requirements for nesting in birds, micro-climatic conditions for seedlings to
establish) and natural enemies (herbivores and diseases) also constitute niche axes.
What is crucial is that these differences in requirements result in differences in
survival and reproductive schemes between species. Consequently, if a species
becomes rare in the community, its species-speciﬁc niche ‘opens up’, resulting in
positive population growth rates and recovery. For all species combined, niche
differences are a necessary stabilising force.
2.2 Natural Enemies as Niche-Axes: The Janzen-Connell
Hypothesis
This theory sparked a quest for important niche axes, particularly for plants for
which niche differences are hard to conceive because plants all have essentially the
same nutritional requirements. In the early nineteen-seventies, Daniel Janzen and
Joseph Connell invoked natural enemies in explaining the high tropical tree
diversity (Condit 1995; Connell 1971; Janzen 1970). Co-evolution between the
feeding adaptations of herbivores and the defence mechanisms of plants has led to
sophisticated adaptations resulting in numerous speciﬁc plant-herbivore relation-
ships. In what is now known as the Janzen-Connell hypothesis, they argued that
each plant species accumulates its own speciﬁc community of natural enemies,
which is more detrimental to this particular plant species than to other species in the
community. Consequently, offspring of a tree has relatively lower chances for
establishment close to the parent tree than at further distance where other tree
species are growing. A given species therefore cannot stand its local ground for-
ever, but, Janzen and Connell hypothesized, if this is a reciprocal process applying
to all species in the forest it will lead to stable coexistence of large numbers of tree
species. Nearly ﬁfty years after its conception, the Janzen-Connell hypothesis has
only gained in importance in community ecology (Comita et al. 2014). Attention
has shifted from aboveground herbivores to belowground enemies (root feeding
larvae, worms and insects, and particularly soil pathogenic micro-organisms
including bacteria, fungi and other unicellular organisms) (Mangan et al. 2010).
Janzen-Connell effects are also considered an important driving force in
species-rich grasslands (Bever et al. 2012; de Kroon et al. 2012; Petermann et al.
2008).
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But how can the Janzen-Connell hypothesis result in stable coexistence of many
species? The reason is that Janzen-Connell effects balance competition between
trees of the same species relative to competition between trees of different species.
If a tree species becomes dominant it will be at disadvantage relative to other
species in the community. Conversely, when a species gets rare in the community,
its seedlings may easily ﬁnd suitable areas for growth and the species will gain in
competitive ability and abundance. Such frequency-dependent responses are con-
sistent with the general theory of species coexistence (Chesson 2000).
2.3 Coexistence Through Intransitive Competition
and Rock-Paper-Scissor Games
The frequency-dependent population dynamics expected from Janzen-Connell
effects have been compared to intransitive competitive networks. Intransitive
competition implies that competitive abilities of different species cannot be ranked
along a hierarchy in which a single species gains competitive dominance (Buss
1980; Gilpin 1975). An example of an intransitive competitive network is when
species A is superior to species B, and B is superior to C, but C is superior to
species A (A > B; B > C; C > A). Models of spatial distributions of individuals and
populations suggest that intransitive competitive relationships result in coexisting
populations (Laird and Schamp 2006). They contrast with transitive or hierarchical
competition, as is predicted from competition for essential resources. Transitive
competition implies that when species A is competitively superior to species B, and
B to species C, species A will also win in competition with species C (A > B;
B > C; => A > C). Indeed, if species compete for a limited soil resource, it is
inconceivable that a superior competitor A that wins in competition with a species
B will lose in competition with species C that is itself competitively inferior to
species B (de Kroon et al. 2012; Lankau 2010). However, species-speciﬁc
belowground interactions may result in species interactions consistent with
intransitive competitive networks (Lankau et al. 2011).
Intransitive competition is also referred to as a rock-paper-scissor game. This
concept has been developed as an example of game theory (Nowak and Sigmund
2004; Weitzel and Rosenkranz, this volume), and it is easily conceivable because
you play it with your kids. Rock wins from scissor, scissor wins from paper, paper
wins from rock, there is not a single winner. If each player makes one of the three
choices completely at random, independently from what the other players chose or
have chosen, and is therefore unable to predict any of the other players, all players
will end with a similar proportion of runs won. The trick is to predict a pattern of
choice with your competitors, which is never completely random but is for instance
based on previous choices.
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2.4 Tests with Bacterial Communities: Rock-Paper-Scissor
Dynamics Is not Enough for Stable Coexistence
How can a rock–paper–scissor game based on unpredictable interactions among the
players result in stable (i.e. predictable) coexistence of the players themselves? It
should be realized that in ecology the play is implemented somewhat differently
from human politics and economics. In a sizable ecological community the number
of players (i.e. individuals) is almost inﬁnite, and it is assumed that individuals of a
given species share a common strategy (i.e. they behave either as rock, paper, or
scissor and do not change). So the game is played among species, but over
numerous of individuals interacting with each other, and the unpredictability lies in
the random encounters of individuals of different species at one place and time.
Does intransitivity in competitive relationships among species indeed result in
stable coexistence?
With life spans of hundreds of years, this question is hard to investigate empir-
ically for tropical trees. Bacteria, however, with well-deﬁned characteristics and a
short generation time, have shown to be interesting model systems for testing
questions of species coexistence (Hol and Dekker 2014; Kerr et al. 2002). And the
answer is no, intransitivity all by itself does not necessarily lead to coexistence. Kerr et al.
(2002) carried out a compelling test with the model bacteria Escherichia coli. Three
strains that together constitute an intransitive competitive network were grown in mix-
tures. One strain produces the toxin colicin (colicinogenic cells C), to which other strains
are either sensitive (sensitive cells S) or immune (resistant cells R). Colicin production,
and to a lesser degree immunity, is costly to the cells and compromises the growth rates
of the C and R strains. As a result, this C- S- R system satisﬁes the rock–paper–scissor
relationship because C can displace S (because C kills S), R can displace C (because R
has a growth-rate advantage) and S can displace R (because S has a growth-rate
advantage) (Kerr et al. 2002). When all three strains were mixed together in liquid
medium in a flask and shaken, maximizing interactions among the bacteria, the S strain
was rapidly driven to extinction by C, and subsequently C was outcompeted by R due to
the higher growth rate of the latter.
Why do the strains fail to show coexistence, although the conditions of intran-
sitivity are met? Theoretical models predict that if the competitive relationships are
transitive, but the dynamics lead to different strengths of interaction, fluctuations
may appear and one strategy may eventually win (Nowak and Sigmund 2004).
In the case of E. coli, the toxin produced by the C strain is immediately lethal to the
S strain, but the growth advantage of the S strain over the other two strains results in
slower replacement. Consequently, when the communities interact ‘globally’ in a
shaken flask, S is eradicated quickly and the intransitive network collapses.
Interestingly, Kerr et al. (2002) showed that when interactions among the three
types of bacteria were not global but local, at the surface of a petri dish ﬁlled with
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agar, coexistence did occur. Here encounters were no longer random because the
strains occurred in patches (clumps) and interacted at the borders where patches of
different strains met. Pictures of the petri dishes over time show that strains were
chasing each other, as predicted by the rock–paper–scissor relationships, resulting
in a pattern of clumps that is changing all the time. Kerr et al. (2002) concluded that
“balanced chasing in a spatially structured, non-hierarchical community may result
in the maintenance of diversity”. Spatial structure where individuals with similar
strategy clump and limited dispersal may give much better chances for the main-
tenance of diversity than well-mixed populations (Nowak and Sigmund 2004).
2.5 Global Stability in Hyper-Diverse Plant Communities
Consistent with Local Rock-Paper-Scissor Dynamics
To what extent is this coexistence mechanism also to be expected for hyper-diverse
communities of tropical forest or grassland? An increasing number of studies have
shown that competitive relationships between plant species are not hierarchical but
intransitive (de Kroon et al. 2012; Soliveres et al. 2015). Dynamics are obviously
orders of magnitude slower than in bacterial communities but, interestingly,
long-term observations have revealed patchy dynamics of grassland species that are
reminiscent of those of the bacterial patches in petri dishes. In grasslands at the
slopes of the Krkonoše mountains in the Czech Republic, species form patches that
change position all the time because individuals die and are replaced by other
species at one location while they appear at locations nearby as a result of clonal
expansion or germination (Herben et al. 1993a). The replacements of species are
largely random and to some degree intransitive and thus resemble the “balanced
chasing” described above (Herben et al. 1997; Herben et al. 1993b). The conse-
quence is a very stable community as a whole, while paradoxically numerous
replacements take place at a local scale. Indeed, a 10 × 10 m area of these grass-
lands would look very much the same with the same species co-occurring year after
year, but if one could make a movie of the area over decades the species would be
seen to move around like ants in an ants nest. For tropical forest, the
Janzen-Connell hypothesis predicts very similar spatial dynamics. Although there is
a huge number of trees in a tropical forest, a particular tree will interact most with
its direct neighbours, while dispersal distances are limited in most cases. However,
replacements are even slower than in grasslands. The oldest forest dynamics plot at
Barro Colorado Island in Panama (where all trees of all species over 50 ha are
mapped; Condit 1995) was laid out in the early 1980s and is still way too young for
a demonstration of such dynamics.
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2.6 Global Stability Through Neutral Dynamics if Species
Are Demographically Equal
The growth rate differences between the bacterial strains of E. coli in the study of
Kerr et al. (2002) hinge upon an important element in current coexistence theory,
i.e. ﬁtness differences between species (Chesson 2000). As explained above, the
key stabilizing force in communities are the niche differences, the fundamental
requirements between species affecting their population growth rates. Because of
these differences, individuals of the same species have stronger competitive inter-
actions than individuals of different species. In other words, species limit their own
growth more than they limit the growth of other species, i.e. intraspeciﬁc compe-
tition is stronger than interspeciﬁc competition. The degree to which intra- and
interspeciﬁc competition coefﬁcients must be different for stable coexistence to
occur depends on the average ﬁtness differences between species (Adler et al. 2007;
Chesson and Kuang 2008). Fitness in this context refers to the relative degree of
adaptedness of that species to the conditions of the habitat in the absence of niche
differences (Chesson 2011). Species with higher ﬁtness develop higher population
growth rates and will win the competition. Niche differences balance the ﬁtness
differences stabilizing the dynamics and providing the conditions for coexistence.
Coexistence will also be promoted not only if niche differences are larger, but
also if ﬁtness differences are smaller. Spatial structure is one way to reduce the
effects of ﬁtness differences, as the examples of E. coli and grasslands illustrate.
Indeed, competitive replacement may be slowed down considerably if competitors
are growing in patches, with interspeciﬁc interactions taking place at the border. In
such cases, most of the interactions in the community are between members of the
same species, rather than between members of different species, favoring the
weaker competitor (Stoll and Prati 2001). Spatial structure and limited dispersal,
both prominent in most ecosystems, are thus forces that equalize ﬁtness differences
between species and promote coexistence.
The most radical and influential idea with respect to the maintenance of species
diversity has been the formulation of ‘neutral theory’ (Hubbell 2001). Neutral
theory essentially states that all species are demographically equal, i.e. that ﬁtness
differences do not exist. Species may differ in numerous traits and resource
requirements, but do not translate into a net difference in population growth rates
between the species under prevailing habitat conditions. In this theory, there are no
niche differences and there is no stable coexistence, but there is an opportunity for
long-time co-occurrence. Individuals do compete for limited resources but com-
petitive strengths are similar for all individuals, irrespective of species identity,
resulting in replacements driven by chance. All these random replacements add up
to neutral dynamics in which populations of different species are maintained if the
community is of sufﬁcient size. Population numbers do fluctuate as a result of
stochastic (e.g. climatic) influences and are not buffered against extinction.
Particularly in communities of limited size, such as in fragmented habitats,
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populations have a chance of going extinct under neutral dynamics due to demo-
graphic stochasticity (as further explained in de second example below).
When published in 2001, Hubbell’s book was a provocation to the many
community ecologists studying niche axes in their communities. Fifteen years later,
neutral theory has been shown to predict community characteristics surprisingly
well (Rosindell et al. 2011). It has been accepted as an inherent element in com-
munity theory and not only in the tropical forest that formed its inspiration. Indeed,
also in species-rich grasslands much of the competitive interactions appear largely
equivalent among species (Law et al. 1997), resulting in random replacements at the
local scale, and near neutral dynamics at the larger scale of the community, despite
the fact that we know that these species differ in their ecological requirements.
2.7 Coexistence Mechanisms May Result in Unpredictable
Dynamics
While consensus is now emerging about how neutral and niche processes together
govern community dynamics, we should realize that they do not necessarily result in
overall community stability. Ground-breaking mathematical theory developed in the
1970’s by Robert May, showed that simple differential equations with
density-dependent feedback could result in very complex non-linear dynamics of the
system with chaotic fluctuations that are by deﬁnition unpredictable (May 1976;
Weitzel and Rosenkranz, this volume). Work of Jef Huisman and co-workers has
demonstrated that such dynamics bear relevance for the coexistence of many species
of plankton in aquatic ecosystems. Huisman and Weissing (1999) showed theoret-
ically that a well-parameterised competition model, describing the competition for
limiting resources (such as nitrogen, phosphorus, silicon, light and inorganic carbon)
gave rise to coexistence of many different species of plankton. The number of
species coexisting was much more than expected on the basis of their differences in
resource requirements as predicted by the competitive exclusion principle (i.e. their
niche differences alone). The model predicted that the species displaced each other in
a cyclic fashion, giving rise to oscillations and chaotic dynamics, reminiscent of the
non-linear dynamics described by May (1976). Despite sometimes major fluctua-
tions in species numbers, when a species became dominant, other species at low
numbers bounced back, though at different rates. Later empirical work eloquently
demonstrated that these predictions may actually occur in reality (Benincà et al.
2008). In a laboratory setup with a plankton community in tanks many different
species coexisted for a period up to 2300 days, covering a couple of hundred
generations. They did so while showing population size fluctuations over several
orders of magnitude that were essentially unpredictable, yet leading to overall per-
sistence of the community. Note that the conditions were stable and there was no
spatial structure within the tanks, all plankton species interacted with random
encounters (as in the flasks of Kerr et al. 2002). The chaotic fluctuations were
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attributed to different species interactions in the planktonic food web, giving rise to
different periodicities in the ups and downs of the various populations. It is important
to realize that these dynamics arise from inherent deterministic relationships, i.e.
from competition and predation process (Huisman and Weissing 1999).
Recently, Benincà et al. (2015) demonstrated for the ﬁrst time that near-chaotic
dynamics may occur in the world outside. In an intertidal ecosystem in New
Zealand, cyclic replacements occur of barnacles colonizing bare rock, brown alga
overgrowing barnacles, mussels settling on barnacles and algae, giving rise to bare
rock as the mussels eventually detach. The cyclic fluctuations of the populations in
this community become irregular through the seasonality of the system and the time
needed for the establishment of each of the species. Interestingly, the cyclic replace-
ment is reminiscent of rock-paper-scissor interactions (Benincà et al. 2015) but the
dynamics do not resemble those of the E. coli strains described above (Kerr et al.
2002). The reason might be that with sessile stages but global dispersal of recruits the
intertidal community is neither global (leading to the dominance of a single species in
the well-mixed flasks), nor completely spatially structured (resulting in balanced
chasing at patch edges and overall stability).
2.8 Conclusion: The Interplay Between Scale-Dependent
Predictable and Unpredictable Patterns in Community
Dynamics
We have seen three archetypes of long-term persistence of complex communities
with many different species, all operating in a very different way. In the case of
niche differences between species (as in the case of rock–paper–scissor games),
stabilizing forces may be strong and promote stability. Such communities are likely
spatio-temporally structured with many predictable species replacements at a local
scale. Neutral theory confronts us with the situation that numerous random inter-
actions at a local scale sum up to stochastic dynamics at a global scale. However, in
a relatively stable environment, competitive equivalence among species, as
assumed in neutral theory, can lead to overall predictable community patterns
(long-term co-occurrence). Finally, the plankton example shows the reverse, where
predictable species replacements result in chaotic dynamics of a community which
is as unpredictable as the weather (Benincà et al. 2008).
These contrasts feed the uneasy relationship that ecology has with deterministic
versus stochastic processes underlying the structure of ecological communities
(Bjørnstad 2015; Chase and Myers 2011; Vellend et al. 2014). Is any fundamental
process really stochastic, or does it always have an underlying deterministic origin?
These examples indicate that the scale of processes must be considered, with many
different possibilities. Truly stochastic (i.e. unpredictable) dynamics may ﬁnd their
origin in underlying deterministic processes, while stochastic interactions at a local
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scale may give rise to relatively stable (and hence predictable) dynamics at a global
scale. Each scale calls for its own methodologies describing processes and
dynamics (Vellend et al. 2014). It is important to understand the interplay of
deterministic vs. stochastic processes with the scales of organisation, as it affects the
nature of causality in ecology. We will see this now in our second example.
3 Example 2: Understanding Species Population Trends
3.1 Species Survive in Metapopulations with a High
Incidence of Chance Effects
In the current fragmented landscape, in almost all regions of the world, species are
distributed in discrete populations. At some point in time every single population
started with a colonization event of an area where the species did not occur at that
moment, and after a while (which may take days, years, or centuries) every pop-
ulation will go extinct when the last individual has died or left the area. The Finnish
ecologist Illka Hanski coined the collection of discrete populations in the landscape
a metapopulation (Hanski 1998). The success of a species is deﬁned by its
metapopulation dynamics, determined by the processes of immigration and
extinction. The classical example, and the one where metapopulations were ﬁrst
described, is the Baltic Sea with numerous islands for the coast of Finland inhabited
by butterflies that form small populations on the islands, connected by dispersal of
the butterflies between the islands. Hanski et al. (1994) demonstrated how the
islands are colonized and vacated by the butterflies, leading to continuous changes
in island occupation, but with remarkable stability of the metapopulation of but-
terflies in the archipelago.
The success or decline of species is described by the fluctuations in the
metapopulation as a whole. These global fluctuations are the accumulation of
numerous extinction and colonisation events at the local scale. As favourable
habitat may be small (as is the case for many of the islands in the Finnish archi-
pelago) chance effects play a large role. Any local population can be subject to
accidental hazards such as a ﬁre or storm leading to local extinction. The local
unpredictable variation is referred to as environmental stochasticity (Lande 1993).
In addition, demographic stochasticity exists whereby small populations can simply
go extinct due to chance effects (Lande 1993). The smaller the population, the
bigger the chance that all individuals leave the local habitat, die, or fail to repro-
duce, partly due to difﬁculties of ﬁnding mates and/or inbreeding depression.
Colonisation events, whereby unoccupied habitat is discovered by animals from
elsewhere, also have a high element of chance (unless dispersers actively search for
empty habitat).
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3.2 Farmland Birds: Understanding Population Trends
An urgent question nowadays is to what extent climate change, pollution, or
changes in land use form a threat to species of plants and animals (Bowler et al.
2015). And if so, can negative effects be mitigated? But how can we understand
these threats if species survive in metapopulations, where the dynamics are the
cumulative effects of numerous events where chance plays a major role? How can
we control this unpredictable variation, identify and quantify causes of decline, and
suggest measures to counteract the threats? As in our previous example, we deal
with local processes scaling up to patterns at larger scales, and stochastic local
dynamics leading to global stability.
We illustrate these questions with an example of the status of farmland birds in
the Netherlands and its association with neonicotinoid insecticides in the envi-
ronment (Hallmann et al. 2014). Farmland bird species in the Western landscape
have been decimated over the last hundred years as a result of agricultural inten-
siﬁcation, increased fertilisation and pesticide use. Many bird populations are now
conﬁned to small suitable habitat patches like hedgerows, or along water bodies,
often consisting of only few bird territories. Bird territories in the Netherlands are
counted in a standardized way by thousands of volunteers under auspices of Sovon,
the Dutch Centre for Field Ornithology. Bringing this information together we
know that, over recent decades, some bird species in the Netherlands show signs of
recovery, albeit not to the same extent throughout the country. Zooming in, we
typically see a patchwork across the Netherlands with local areas in which bird
populations increase, interspersed with areas with negative population trends.
Investigating 15 insectivorous farmland bird species, Hallmann et al. (2014)
demonstrated that these differences correlated with the local concentration of imi-
dacloprid in the surface water. Imidacloprid is the most widely use neonicotinoid, a
group of insecticides introduced in the mid-nineties. Neonicotinoids speciﬁcally
target the nervous system of insects and are therefore highly lethal to invertebrates
and much less so to vertebrates like humans or birds. Applied as seed coating or by
spraying, major quantities of insecticides are not taken up by the crop to be pro-
tected but wash out in the soils and accumulate in the waterways. It is in these
environments that larval stages of insects grow up, which form the bulk food of the
bird species investigated. Hallmann et al. therefore hypothesised that local popu-
lations of these bird species, relying on insects particularly in the breeding season,
are in decline due to food shortage.
Hallmann et al.’s study is essentially correlative, showing that local bird pop-
ulation trends are more likely to be negative when local imidacloprid concentrations
in the surface water are higher. The case for imidacloprid as a cause of bird decline
was reinforced in two ways. First, local bird trends over the last ten years were also
correlated to local changes in land use that were known to affect bird populations,
including changes in levels of nitrogen use, and changes in areas of maize, winter
cereals, fallow land, greenhouses and alike. In this analysis imidacloprid stood out
as by far the best explanatory variable for local bird population trends. Second, the
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correlation between imidacloprid and bird trends was much weaker and
non-signiﬁcant when bird trends in the same areas were considered before the
introduction of the compound, suggesting that the correlation was not due to some
unknown explanatory variable already present before the introduction of
neonicotinoids.
3.3 Mastering Chance Effects at Local Scale to Explain
Global Trends
Nevertheless, the Hallmann et al. (2014) study remains correlative, raising the
pertinent question: Are neonicotinoids the causal factor for the trends in bird
decline? In the worldwide press attention that the study received, this question came
up repeatedly. In a response to Hallman et al., the Dutch Minister of the
Environment expressed her concern about the effects of neonicotinoids on the
environment, but also said that changes in legislation could not be based on a
correlative study only. In the strict sense, demonstrating causality would require
experiments (Dively et al. 2015; Godfray et al. 2014; Rundlof et al. 2015) but for
birds this would entail ﬁeld trials at such a large spatial scale and over such a long
time that they are impossible to conduct. We therefore must ﬁnd other ways to
demonstrate causality. This is very difﬁcult because, as explained above, mecha-
nisms of colonisation, growth and extinction of the populations operate at a small
spatial scale, where chance processes and other local factors may prevail. Indeed,
even the interpretation of correlations at the global (metapopulation) scale in the
context of local effects can lead to apparent contradictions of the kind we also see in
epidemiology.
Emerging global trends such as the bird trends in relation to imidacloprid may
not necessarily be seen locally everywhere. At the scale of the Netherlands, the
trend was quite strong: bird populations declined with a rate of 3.5 % per year
where local imidacloprid concentrations exceeded 20 ng/l in the surface water.
While this trend was highly signiﬁcant, part of the variation in bird trends remained
unexplained, and appeared as noise around the correlation. Some of this variation
may be due to chance effects related to environmental and stochastic stochasticity.
But, how then can a population escape the hazards of neonicotinoids at a local
scale? This remains to be investigated, but as an example the following situation
can easily be envisioned. Imagine an agricultural ﬁeld adjacent to the dunes, which
are important nature reserves for birds in the Netherlands. If the insecticide pollutes
the local soil and waterways and deteriorates local insect populations, birds in the
vicinity may be little affected as they can forage in the dune area with its own
hydrology, not affected by the pollution nearby. Such a population may be healthy
and increasing, while the overall analysis predicts a declining population at this
location with a high imidacloprid load. However, given enough data at the scale of
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the Netherlands, the ‘noise’ of such local situations will not mask a general cor-
relation between bird trends and insecticide concentrations.
Throughout ecology such unexplained variation is rather common: ecosystems
are influenced by a very large number of factors at the same time. Ecologists
therefore strive to quantify more and more of the environmental factors that
influence e.g. bird trends, or at least try to determine what the most important
explanatory factors are. But even when we understand a fair amount of what drives
local populations (50 % of variation explained is certainly a glass well ﬁlled for
ecologists), the mechanisms (and chance events) of dispersal between areas remain
even more elusive. Recent attempts to model dispersal focus more and more on all
aspects of dispersal: what local conditions lead to the initiation of dispersal, how far
does an individual travel through a landscape, what makes him/her stop, and what is
the impact at the destination? Combining spatial population models and mecha-
nistic ‘gravity’ models of dispersal (reviewed in Jongejans et al. 2015) might
therefore be a way forward in linking local processes and global trends, although
unexplained variation will remain (due to chance but also due to unmeasured
factors).
3.4 Understanding Causality: A Comparison
with Epidemiology
Ecology is not the only ﬁeld of research that struggles with the reconciliation of
processes and patterns that are apparent (or not) at different scales. Similar difﬁ-
culties in relating global trends to local effects appear in epidemiology.
Epidemiological studies investigate large groups of people and identify the factors
that may explain the differences in health. Well-known examples include how
smoking is related to human mortality (Banks et al. 2015; Thun et al. 2013), and
how obesity (and diet) is related to an increased chance of diseases and premature
death (references in Würtz et al. 2014). However, as we all know, ‘local’ exceptions
to these convincing ‘global’ trends exist. Many people are acquainted with a person
reaching old age in relatively good health while smoking like a chimney. We can
ask a similar question as with the bird example: how can a person escape the hazard
of smoking? Detailed investigation of the medical condition and the habits of such a
person could perhaps give indications. If unsuccessful we consider the health of the
person as a happy coincidence, but this would not dismiss the hazards of smoking
in general. Still, the global trends between smoking and mortality remain essentially
a correlation.
As with our bird study, proper controlled experiments on humans regarding
effects of unhealthy diet or smoking are considered unethical and cannot be done.
Epidemiology has long recognized the weakness of the correlative nature of its
investigations for identifying the biological and behavioural causes of disease
(Galea et al. 2010; Hill 1965; March and Susser 2006). Still, it is possible to
discover cause-effect relationships from purely observational data (Pearl and Verma
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1991). Current methodologies attempt to solve this problem by capturing the
complexity of the many risk factors for human health in complex systems mod-
elling (Galea et al. 2010). Another way forward is advanced statistics on large
datasets together with targeted measurements. Human metabolic proﬁles are
important health indicators and an important question is to what extent they are
related to Body Mass Index (BMI) or to a genetic disposition for adiposity, even for
people in the non-obese range. By using a Mendelian randomisation framework,
Würtz et al. (2014) have recently shown how health indicators can be causally
related to BMI, by incorporating a gene score for predisposition to elevated BMI.
This statistical method is designed to infer causality in observational studies while
taking possible confounding effects into account.
Similar to the situation in epidemiology, observational studies in ecology are
often the only ﬁeld instruments to gauge the ‘health’ of populations of species of
conservation interest. Statistical and modelling techniques are only beginning to be
applied to master the explained against the unexplained variation, and to quantify
causation taking into account the many confounding factors operating at different
scales. Further work in this direction is required to convince public and decision
makers that effects are real and require appropriate action. The history of the
implementation of smoke restrictions indicates that this is not an easy trajectory.
4 Epilogue
Chance is pervasive in ecological systems. However, chance events never come
alone. They may have a solid deterministic origin or they may scale up to predictable
variation. In many cases stochasticity and determinism are closely intertwined
through the different scales of biological organisation. The scale-dependency of
cause and effect has an uneasy relationship with the scale-dependency of stochas-
ticity and determinism. We should take this relationship into account when deﬁning
causality, as well as in what can be considered as scientiﬁc proof. Methods are to be
developed to quantify causal relationships and distinguish them from random effects
and confounding factors.
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The Size of History: Coincidence,
Counterfactuality and Questions of Scale
in History
Olivier Hekster
Abstract Historians try to interpret the past by analysing patterns in human
behaviour in earlier periods of time. In some ways, that excludes ‘coincidence’ as a
mode of interpretation. Most historians view coincidences as closely related events
that lack causal relationship. That type of coincidence does not ﬁt into a historical
narrative, because historians tend to focus on causality, action, and consequence.
This is noticeably linked to questions of historical scale: the choice for the scale of a
speciﬁc narrative decides whether certain events are coincidental to the history
which is being described, or causal factors within that history. This relation between
historical coincidence and the scale of writing history is at the centre of this con-
tribution. It focuses on different trends in writing history, and analyses the possi-
bilities to use ‘coincidence’ as an interpretative tool in each of them. In doing so,
this article discusses counterfactual historical analysis (‘what if history’), deter-
minist views of history and their relation to speculative philosophy of history,
‘cliodynamics’ and ‘big history’. It ultimately argues for historical accounts that pay
attention to both the large processes that are likely to lead to certain trajectories, and
the enormous number of micro-causes that triggered the events as they happened.
Coincidence might fall outside of the analysis of (macro-) historians who are
looking for a comprehensive view of historical processes, but could still play a
proper role in thinking about historical trajectories.
1 Introduction: Coincidence and Comparisons
Historians try to interpret the past. They do so by analysing patterns in human
behaviour in earlier periods of time. In some ways, that excludes ‘coincidence’ as an
interpretative tool. The word ‘coincidence’, after all, derives from the Latin cum
incidere, which means ‘happening together’. Most historians take this to imply that
coincidences are events that seem closely related but lack a causal relationship. They
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just happen to occur at (roughly) the same time, or in a similar mode. This makes
them, at ﬁrst sight, less suitable as a historical explanatory notion.1 This rather
negative meaning of the word ‘coincidence’ in a historical context is best exem-
pliﬁed by the among American historians infamous list of ‘creepy coincidences’
between Abraham Lincoln and John F. Kennedy. The coincidences in question
range from ‘the names Lincoln and Kennedy both contain seven letters’ to ‘both
presidents were shot in the head on a Friday before a major holiday’. The challenge
to professional historians is then to explain this set of coincidences. Since the sort of
similarities assembled on the list can be drawn between any historical ﬁgures, these
‘coincidences’ only amass to ‘pseudo-historical demonstrations of data-massaging’
(Kern and Brown 2001, p. 534). What lacks is any attempt to explain the (historical)
signiﬁcance of these similarities, meaning that they do not usefully contribute to
modes of interpreting past events.
This is not to say that analysing similarities in itself is something that is con-
demned by modern historians. In fact, comparing and contrasting individuals or
societies which seem similar in their structural set-out but have only limited inter-
relation is one of the methodological starting points of comparative history. By
comparing given individuals, institutes or areas, core aspects of speciﬁc phenomena
can become clearer. But it is tacitly acknowledged that the historical relevance of
these similarities needs to be explained, in terms of cause and effect, for them to be
useful as a historical term. This can be explicitly contrasted with ‘coincidental’
similarities, as is clear from a recent overview of the progress of historical schol-
arship by J.H. Elliott. Elliott reflects on his earlier comparative study of the two
seventeenth-century statesmen cardinal Richelieu and the Count Duke of Olivares, in
which he noted several similarities between the two, one of the more trivial being that
both men were third sons of noble fathers, ﬁnding employment in the service of a
monarch. ‘But’, he observes, ‘this simple fact suggests one of the problems inherent
in comparative history. Are we dealing here with coincidence, or does the similarity
point to some wider consideration that is worthy of note?’ (Elliott 2012, p. 180;
Elliott 1991). Coincidences in themselves, clearly, are not deemed noteworthy.
Both Olivares and Richelieu received an early education for an ecclesiastical
career. The death of Olivares’ older brother meant that Olivares became head of the
family and needed to marry. Unwillingness of Richelieu’s older brother Alphonse
to become bishop meant that Richelieu would make a career in the church. Elliott
describes the developments in their respective families as ‘an initial coincidence’
but one that ‘went on to create a number of similarities’, which he does consider ‘of
obvious signiﬁcance’, such as the influence of neo-Stoic philosophy on their actions
as statesmen. He contrasts these to ‘other coincidences’ that ‘may lead to a dead
end’, although even such ‘chance resemblances’ can help sharpening the mind
(Elliott 2012, p. 180–1). There is clear differentiation here between (if no real
deﬁnition of) what is deemed relevant for explaining actions and events, and what is
1For the development leading to the exclusive use of cum incidere as coincidence, see Vogt
(2011), pp. 43–66 followed by a discussion of the Greek Tyche.
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deemed merely anecdotal, and without explanatory power. Something is either ‘a
mere coincidence’ or, more often encountered within historical scholarship, ‘not a
coincidence’, and therefore relevant.
Coincidence, in this reading, becomes something that does not ﬁt into a his-
torical narrative, mainly because historians, as a very recent Manifesto formulated:
‘focus on the question of how: Who did the changing, and how can we be sure they
were the agents? These analytics of causality, action, and consequence make them
specialists in noticing the change around us’ (Guldi and Armitage 2014, p. 14).
Notions that happened to happen but (the agency of which) cannot be explained fall
outside of such a view of historical analysis. If (human) agency is a core interest,
the question of coincidence becomes linked to discussions about the randomness of
human behaviour or about free will (see the articles of Weitzel and Rosenkranz,
Thijssen and Loy, and Van Elk, Friston and Bekkering in this volume), neither of
which cohere easily with the attention (or competence) of most historians.
There is also an aspect of scale involved. Whether a historian interprets some-
thing as coincidental to, or a central focus of causality of, events depends somewhat
on the historical scope of his or her analysis. The education of historical ﬁgures, for
example, may explain their historical actions. Few biographers would formulate
their protagonist’s education as ‘mere coincidence’, but for a historian who is
interested in larger historical trajectories, the education that a single individual
happened to have had, and which may explain speciﬁc actions that were part of a
wider chain of events, has much less explanatory force. In such a reading the
deﬁnition of historical coincidence becomes almost a matter of taste. To be more
precise: the choice for the scale of a speciﬁc historical narrative decides whether
certain events are coincidental to the history which is being described, or causal
factors within that history. This relation between historical coincidence and the
scale of writing history is at the focus of this contribution.
2 Contingency, Causality and Counterfactuality
As must be clear from the above, there is certainly some space for coincidence as a
factor in historical explanation. There is a number of semi-synonyms that feature
somewhat more frequently in modern historiography, among which ‘accident’,
‘singular event’, ‘chance’ and ‘contingent circumstances’ are especially noticeable.
The term ‘luck’ also features, but mainly as a (rather self-effacing) explanation for
success in the career trajectory of a particular historian, or as part of cautionary
reflections on the ways in which processes which are difﬁcult to influence or trace
have influenced historical discoveries. (DuPont Chandler 2004; McClellan III 2005;
Cushing 1992). Luck, it seems, can be allowed to have influenced individual his-
torians, but is not explicitly acknowledged as a factor in the historical processes that
these historians investigate.
The situation seems different when ‘contingency’ is mentioned. There is a
long-standing strand of historical research that deals with ‘turning points’, and at
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some of these turning points, in a famous dictum by the great British historian
George M. Trevelyan ‘history failed to turn’.2 The notion that events may have
‘failed to turn as expected is to admit the role of contingency, the element of chance
—randomness’ (Post 2009). This has ultimately led to a flourishing (though not
uncontested) strand of historical analysis which is known as ‘virtual history’ or
‘counterfactual history’. The question posed by historians in this form of research is
‘what would have happened if events at a certain turning point would have gone
marginally differently’. Even before explicit attention to such counterfactuality, this
had been an implicit mode of reasoning within scholarly historical works, going
back at least to the Roman historian Livy’s analysis of how a war between the
armies of Alexander the Great and Rome would have played out (Ab Urbe Condita
9.17–19; Morello 2002). Perhaps the most famous example of modern implicit
historical use of counterfactuality is the statement by the German historian Eduard
Meyer in his Geschichte des Altertums that if the Persians had beaten the Greeks
(especially the Athenians) at the battle of Marathon in 490 BC European culture
would have developed entirely differently:
Das Endergebniss wäre schliesslich doch gewesen, dass eine Kirche und ein durchge-
bildetes theologisches System dem griechischen Leben und Denken ihr Joch aufgelegt und
jede freiere Regung in Fesseln geschlagen hätte, dass auch die neue griechische Kultur so
gut wie die orientalischen ein theologisch-religiöses Gepräge erhalten hätte.3
This line of arguing was recognised as ‘counterfactual’ by Max Weber, who
started his career as an ancient historian. Shortly after the publication of Meyer’s
work, he noted how the argument that the development of European history would
have shifted dramatically with a different outcome of the battle at Marathon rested
on a series of assumptions. Meyer argued that a Persian victory would have blocked
the preconditions for Athenian supremacy, and with it (still according to Meyer) the
development of democracy and rationality. Weber showed the analogies that stood
at the basis of the argument (Persian behaviour elsewhere), and showed the
methodological pitfalls within such a line of argument. Meyer’ conclusions were
less at stake than his methods, as is clear from the title of Weber’s 1905 essay that
has become justly famous: ‘Objective possibility and adequate causation in his-
torical explanation’. In it, Weber questions
how the attribution of a concrete result to a single ‘cause’ is… feasible… given that… it is
always an inﬁnity of causal factors that brought about the single ‘event’.4
2Trevelyan (1918), p. 79. The quote is often contributed to Taylor (1945), p. 71, who describes
Germany in the contexts of the revolutions in 1848: ‘German history reached its turning-point and
failed to turn’.
3Meyer (1901), 446: ‘The end result would ultimately have been that a Church and a
well-developed theological system had brought the Greek life and thought under their yoke, and
placed chains on any aspiration to freedom; that the new Greek culture, much like oriental culture,
would have had a theological-religious character’.
4Weber (1905) with the comments by Ringer (2002). Cf. also Huizinga (1937), p. 137.
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The answer is counterfactual reasoning, by which, Weber argued, it becomes
possible to conjecturally sort and rank different possible causes. The historian can
take various events out of the equation, and then conjecture what the new historical
trajectory would be. This makes it possible to see which potential causes would
have brought about which effect. Causality and intention are at issue here. The
crucial Weberian terms are ‘objective probability’ and ‘adequate causation’:
Where an actual result was brought about by a complex of antecedent conditions that made it
‘objectively probable’, the ‘cause’ is termed ‘adequate’ in relation to the ‘effect’. Where a
causal factor contributed to a historically interesting aspect of an outcome without being
‘adequate’ in this sense, it may be considered its ‘accidental cause’ (Ringer 2002, pp. 165–6).
The ‘accidental cause’ in the Weberian sense is of course not the same as coinci-
dence, but his line of arguing highlights an awareness that developments in history
could have gone differently, and that often events that seemed less directly relevant
may have had wide-ranging consequences. Noticeably, in Weber’s argument a
single concrete cause leads to one concrete effect, making it particularly important
for him to distinguish between causal and coincidental relations.
There is, in fact, an element of the counterfactual in almost all assumptions of
causality. If we argue that one event causes a second event, we also argue that the
second event would not have taken place (or at least not in that way) without the
ﬁrst. In that sense, there is little difference between ‘true’ causes and coincidences,
as the coincidence still caused later events to happen. It is here that scale becomes
an issue. Historians accept events as a ‘true’ cause if they ﬁt the size of their
narrative interest. If they are too ‘small’, they are often waylaid as coincidental, if
they are too ‘big’ they become background context. Whether a cause is deemed of
the right size depends on what the historian is trying to (re)construct. Within that
reconstruction, there are protagonists, turning points and contexts. The scale of the
historical trajectory decides which events are too small (coincidental) or too big
(background). In that sense, a historical coincidence is a cause (in the counterfactual
sense) which is without explanatory force within the chosen narrative framework.
This is an important background to so-called ‘what if’ history, which tends to
focus on causes that seem too small for the historical trajectory which is being
analysed—and therefore seem to suggest that coincidence plays a major part in
history. Such attention for (single) events that could have gone either way has had
numerous advocates in the 20th century. One of the earliest examples of what
ultimately grew to be a proper genre of counterfactional history is a collection of
essays by professional historians called If It Had Happened Otherwise, which best
claim to fame is the inclusion of an essay by Winston Churchill on what would have
happened if Lee had won the Battle of Gettysburg.5 For much of the remainder of
the 20th century these essays were mainly influential on writers of ﬁction, lying at
the base of the genre of ‘alternate history/reality’.
5Squire (1931). Cf. Hacker and Chamberlain (1981), with an overview of early examples of
counterfactual history, and now Gallagher (2011).
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Yet, some historians also engaged with this line of thinking, and recognised that
the ultimate consequence of it would be that ‘the course of the world’s history
depends on accidents’. Notably, the historian and classicist J.B. Bury devoted an
essay on contingency, starting with the importance of the shape of Cleopatra’s nose.
If this nose had not been so attractive, the argument went, Mark Antony would not
have been so distracted as to lose the pivotal battle at Actium (31 BC) against the
later emperor Augustus. Of course, the ‘shape of Cleopatra’s nose was rightly
conditioned by the causal sequence of her heredity’, but since this causal link had
nothing to do with causal links determining the politics of Ancient Rome, the
‘collision’ of these two unrelated sequences, in Bury’s view, boiled down to
chance: ‘the valuable collision of two or more independent chains of causes’. He
reﬁnes this deﬁnition by differentiating between ‘pure’ and ‘mixed’ contingencies:
If Napoleon at an early stage in his career had been killed by a meteorite, that would have
been the purest of pure contingencies … The meteorite was completely disinterested in his
death.6
This emphasis on the role of chance on historical processes led to what has been
coined the ‘accidental view of history’, which opposed notion of historical
inevitability (Berenson 1952, 88). It was embraced by, amongst others, the
philosopher Isaiah Berlin. In his essay on ‘Historical inevitability’, he argued
strongly for recognition of the role of accidents in history, which he placed in
opposition to the (in his thoughts) determinist philosophies of history of Marx and
Hegel, to which we will return later in this essay. According to Berlin, explaining
human behaviour in terms of causality denied free will, and falsely absolved his-
torians of the task to morally evaluate historical actors: ‘to assess degrees of their
responsibility, to attribute this or that consequence to their free decision, to set them
up as examples or deterrents, to seek to derive lessons from their lives’.
Recognising that there are accidents that influence the course of events, and that
only these, ‘force majeure—being unavoidable—are necessarily outside the cate-
gory of responsibility and consequently beyond the bounds of criticism’.7
This view of history, and of the role of the historian, was famously opposed by
the historian and diplomat E.H. Carr, who took issue with ‘Cleopatra’s Nose’ in his
influential What is History. Carr explicitly argued against those who ‘pointed out
the absurdity of failing to recognise the role of accident in history’, singling out
Berlin whom he blames for talking nonsense (conceding that he did so ‘in an
engaging and attractive way’) and for flogging ‘this very dead horse back into a
semblance of life’. Berlin’s (and Karl Popper’s) opposition to a deterministic
outlook in history, with their emphasis on chance, was in Carr’s view little more
than ‘a parlour game with the might-have-beens of history’ (Carr 1961, pp. 92–99).
The role of the historian is to recognise patterns of historical signiﬁcance:
6Bury (1916/1930), pp. 60 (course of history), 61 (chance), 62 (heredity), 67 (Napoleon).
7Berlin (1954/2012), pp. 119–190, citing Berenson (p. 119), discussing the importance of moral
judgement (pp. 140–142), and discussing force majeure (p. 146).
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Just as from the inﬁnite ocean of facts the historian selects those which are signiﬁcant for
his purpose, so from the multiplicity of sequences of cause and effect he extracts those, and
only those, which are historically signiﬁcant; and the standard of historical signiﬁcance is
his ability to ﬁt them into his pattern of rational explanation and interpretation. Other
sequences of cause and effect have to be rejected as accidental, not because the relation
between cause and effect is different, but because the sequence itself is irrelevant. The
historian can do nothing with it; it is not amenable to rational interpretation, and has no
meaning either for the past or the present (Carr 1961, p. 105).
For a long time, Carr’s criticisms made ‘what-if-history’ suspect for serious
scholars. But counterfactual constructions of historical developments have blos-
somed as an academic branch of writing history since the publication of Ferguson
(1997). Ferguson, like Bury and especially Berlin before him, ultimately tries to
take distance from deterministic views of historical processes (Marxism prime
amongst them) and aims to show how a limited set of changes, in which contingent
factors would have changed crucial outcomes, would have resulted in an almost
unrecognisable historical trajectory; a ‘virtual history’ for the period 1646–1996.
There have, almost inevitably, been counter-reactions, most noticeably by
Richard Evans (2014), written at least partly to explain his ‘initial, somewhat
allergic reaction’ (p. xvi) to counterfactuals. Evans argues amongst other that the
impression that history could have developed in a radically different way by a
combination of minor moments of chance will challenge interest in what really
happened, and ‘allows historians to rewrite history according to their present-day
political purposes and prejudices’ (p. 63). Moreover, Evans argues, counterfactual
thinking does not, in fact, function well
as a vehicle for overcoming “determinism”, in the sense of the prioritization of larger
historical forces over smaller, personal, chance, and contingent events and circumstances
(Evans 2014, p. 104).
By selecting a ﬁnite number of ‘alternative outcomes that were at least plausible’,
counterfactual studies, according to Evans, highlight the importance of forces
beyond individual control. Noticeably, Evans’ criticism of these ‘altered pasts’ does
not focus on the existence and importance of chance events as such within the
functioning of history, but on the assumption that one minor alteration in the
historical timeline would cascade towards major changes over a prolonged period
of time. In Evans’ view, history is not necessarily ﬁxed, but historians should not
have the liberty to adapt it as they see ﬁt (Evans 2014, p. 46).
Criticism on counterfactual history is not quite the same as criticism on coun-
terfactual thinking within historical analyses, which is much less disputed. Indeed,
the above-mentioned History Manifesto sees historical expertise in counterfactual
thinking as an important asset for answering questions of sustainability, and pos-
sibly other problems that are acute in modern society (Guldi and Armitage 2014,
pp. 31–4, with Booth 2003 and Thompson 2010). Such a use of counterfactual
history partly closes the gap between counterfactual history and counterfactual
analysis. The latter aims to draw clear distinctions between causal and coincidental
relations, but does not suggest alternative trajectories. It also tries to apply coun-
terfactual analysis on events that are of the ‘right’ scale.
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‘What if’ history clearly does suggest alternative trajectories, but the suggestion in
the Manifesto seems to lean more towards using counterfactuality as a mode of
drawing distinctions. There is, in any case, a burgeoning of recent literature discussing
the importance of counterfactual history, in which the plausibility of the selection of
historical changes is placed at the fore. If historical alternatives are grounded in
probability they are deemed to be ‘good reasoning’. If not, they are not (Bunzl 2004,
p. 845). Ultimately, coincidence in one form of the other lies at the basis of these
‘imagined’ historical developments. Something in the past needed to have gone dif-
ferently. But the emphasis seems less on the importance of that ‘coincidence’ than on
the plausibility of the counterfactual consideration: how likely is it that something
would have gone differently. History may not be predetermined, but randomness is
still kept in check. Coincidence has its role, but is not used as an interpretive tool.
3 Coincidence and the Construction of a Clear Course
of History
As stated above, at least some of the historians promoting counterfactual thinking,
and emphasising the importance of contingency in an ‘accidental view of history’,
did so in reaction to a determinist perspective. One of the ‘determinist’ views that
leaves least scope for chance is the one that sees historical events as the result of
divine providence. As formulated in the late-nineteenth century: ‘History, when
written rightly, is but a record of Providence; and he who would read history
rightly, must read it with his eyes constantly on God’ (Read 1862, p. 4). Very few
historians, none taken seriously, would now present an academic historical analysis
in such stark terms. Yet, there is still a noticeable absence for coincidence as a real
factor in interpreting history among the various approaches that look at the larger
schemes of history, ranging from speculative philosophy of history to
macro-historical explanations and long-term causes.
Speculative philosophy of history is in a way similar to Read’s notion of ‘a
record of Providence’. The ultimate trajectory is considered a given, and the process
is then interpreted in historical terms. Thus, Hegelian dialectics assume that history
follows a speciﬁc trajectory, through ‘thesis’ (historical developments) and the
resulting ‘antithesis’ (historical reaction) to synthesis until history fulﬁls itself. In
that sense: ‘world history exhibits nothing other than the plan of providence’ (Hegel
1807/1977). Hegel, as opposed to Read, might still be able to accept that chance
occurrences were part of history, and will have influenced the lives of historical
individuals over the course of time. These occurrences, however, were not signif-
icant in the greater scheme of things. They do not ﬁt the size of the framework in
which he places his historical narrative. Hegel’s large-scale path of history is
inevitable, and though it allows for coincidences to have happened, coincidence as
a concept is excluded as a relevant mode of interpretation.
In fact, all forms of history run some risk of taking a determinist point of view in
that too often an historical argument is geared towards the known outcome of a
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historical process. In the famous dictum by Schlegel: ‘Der Historiker ist ein
rückwärts gekehrter Prophet’. In its extreme form, this way of working leads to
so-called ‘Whig history’ in which the present is seen as the inevitable (and desir-
able) outcome of historical progress. Such a presupposition results in loosing track
of roads not taken or dead ends.8 The risk of falling in that methodological trap
seems to be larger when the scope of the historical argument is wider. Applied at a
cosmic scale, this appears to be at the basis of the so-called ‘Fine Tuning
Argument’, debunked by Landsman in his contribution to this volume.
There have of course been (and still are) nuanced, and influential, interpretations of
history by historians that focus on the structuring factors of human behaviour through
the ages. Best known, and a school of thought to which the likes of Popper and Berlin
reacted, is Marxism. Interestingly enough, Marxism is not prominent in current dis-
cussions on determinism in analytical philosophy. It does, however, feature with near
inevitability in debates regarding macro-historical scholarship (Adcock 2007, p. 351–2).
Following Popper’s criticisms, Marxism (much like the ‘speculative philosophies’ of
the likes of Hegel or Spengler) is sometime described as a form of ‘historicism’, which
is then presented as an inflexible method of predicting the ‘future course of human
history’. The term ‘historicism’ is, however, more commonly associated with the
notions of the famous nineteenth-century historians Ranke and Humboldt, in which the
historical notions are in continuous flux. Historical ideas and historical developments
deﬁne the nature of institutions or states and are the historicists object of study
(Ankersmit 1995, p. 143; Vogt 2011, pp. 367–92 and 495–502). To avoid confusion,
this chapter will avoid the massive debates about the different sorts of historicism, and
formulate the argument in a context of determinism and macro-history.
It is important to note the difference in the deterministic aspects of Marxist
scholarship, and the absolute ‘hand of god’, and slightly less absolute Hegelian
dialectics, with which this section opened. Marxist views of history, in a simpliﬁed
form, assert that there is an inevitable sequence within societies (‘social forma-
tions’) which depends on inter linkage between ‘modes of productions’ (economic
systems) and internal conflicts (‘contradictions’) (Burke 1992, pp. 141–4). This
certainly implies economic determinism; the notion that economic causes determine
human events, or at least have a primary role in explaining outcomes. Such
mono-causal explanations of historical events are looked at with suspicion by most
modern historians, which partly explains the bogey-man role Marxism has come to
play for those arguing against determinist points of view. Does Marxist theory also
imply historical determinism? Much, as always, depends on deﬁnition:
When unpacked more fully this belief [historical determinism] is usually interpreted as a
substantive claim that the aggregate course of major historical events traces a structured
process of successive changes unfolding inevitably through the events of the past, present,
and onto the future (Adcock 2007, pp. 352–4).
8F. V. Schlegel, Athenaeum 1798.2, 20: ‘The historian is a prophet looking backwards’. Whig
history: Mayr (1990). The term ‘Whig history’ was coined by Butterﬁeld (1931). A recent con-
tribution on coincidence in history, discussed further below, stresses the importance for historians
to keep an open mind regarding the course history did not take: Nijhuis (2003).
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This excludes the possibility that coincidence influences the ultimate—inevitable
—course of history.
Marxism’s certainty that civilization will progress from primitive communism to
the rise of private property and the development of an aristocracy, and then through
feudalism and capitalism to true socialism/communism ﬁts that deﬁnition of his-
torical inevitability. Yet Marxism leaves scope for (temporary) developments that
do not ﬁt its pattern of history, such as the ‘refeudilization’ of Spain and Italy, and
for individual actions or exogenous explanations to decide the pace if not the course
of history. Coincidence, in these contexts, is possible and may influence the course
of history. Within a smaller scale of analysis, ‘coincidence’ is deemed acceptable.
But it does not influence the outcome of the large-scale historical process. As an
explanatory notion it is irrelevant for the clear course of historical developments
that are at issue in Marxist (historical) thinking (Burke 1992, pp. 141–2).
Is the exclusion of coincidence as a ‘historical tool’ from such large views of
history inevitable? Elsewhere in this volume, De Kroon and Jongejans set out how,
when looking at the complexities of ecosystems, the scale of organisation is a
crucial factor in distinguishing between developments that appear unpredictable or
determined. Possibly, the same applies to the study of historical ‘systems’. Popper’s
and Berlin’s sustained attack on Hegel and Marx, combined with the economic
determinism in Marxist theory and its resulting mono-causality, has made the mere
mention of historical determinism suspect. Yet, already half a century ago Ernst
Nagel countered many of Berlin’s objections to determinism as such. The central
philosophical premise of determinism—every human event is the effect of ante-
cedent causes—does not, he held, necessarily imply a claim about inevitably
structured patterns in history as a whole (Nagel 1966). In fact, historical narratives
can easily be construed as a sequence of events, in which speciﬁc actions were the
trigger for subsequent events. Tracing a ‘series of causal mechanics’ can form the
basis of relevant historical explanations (Hedström and Swedberg 1998). With
relative frequency, recent attempts at macro-historical explanations of the past have
been criticised ‘for displaying unjustiﬁed determinism’. Yet macro-history (or even
determinism) is not in itself incompatible with explanations that include causal
complexity or choice. Like we saw in this contribution so far, and was made clear in
the contribution of De Kroon and Jongejans, much depends upon the level at which
we are analysing (or narrating) the historical system:
Truly stochastic (i.e. unpredictable) dynamics may ﬁnd their origin in underlying deter-
ministic processes, while stochastic interactions at a local scale may give rise to relatively
stable (and hence predictable) dynamics at a global scale.
Even contingency, it seems, can be included in a macro-historical approach, if
contingency effectively means contingent upon causes that cannot be explained by
current theory (Adcock 2007, p. 347; pp. 354–5). So it seems that there is theo-
retically nothing that blocks a macro-historical approach that incorporates contin-
gency, if not perhaps coincidence, as an interpretive framework.
Indeed, the History Manifesto, which, as we have already seen, advocated the
use of counterfactual thinking among historians, also makes a bold statement for the
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return of ‘grand sweeps of history’, emphasising the importance of larger historical
models—Braudel’s longue durée—for modern society. Yet it warns that the
timescale should still be such ‘that historians can do what they what they do best:
comparing different kinds of data side by side’. Only then can multiple causality be
stressed, showing that ‘the reality of natural laws’ nor ‘the predominance of pattern’
is ultimately decisive. Individuals can choose (Guldi and Armitage 2014, pp. 52–
60). Historical events may be decided by such complex combinations of causes that
‘contingency’ should be incorporated in an historical analysis. Still, looking at
historical developments in the longest-term perspective raises the risks of losing
sight of contingency. As famously set out by A.J.P. Taylor: ‘every road accident is
caused, in the last resort, by the invention of the internal combustion engine and by
men’s desire to get from one place to another… But a motorist, charged with
dangerous driving, would be ill-advised if he pleaded the existence of motor cars as
his sole defence’ (Taylor 1961, pp. 102–3, paraphrased by Guldi and Armitage
2014, p. 57).
4 Coincidence, Big History and Accidental Cause
Scale, it seems, is a relevant if not necessarily decisive factor in the extent to which
coincidence can be included in an analysis of historical processes. At the same time,
we have seen theManifesto’s plea to reclaim the telling of large historical narratives
as a skill for professional historians. That attempt has much to do with the influence
of discussions about human history by non-historians. Prime among them is Jared
Diamond. Diamond (2005) is mentioned by Guldi and Armitage (2014), 57 as ‘a
gripping account of the fates of societies stricken by plague, mixing archaeological
evidence with the history of species extinction and ethnic deracination’, though it is
simultaneously noted that the work lacks the engagement with detail that charac-
terises the works of some recent historians. More influential than Diamond (2005) is
Diamond (1997).9 It is a key example of a successful account of long-term his-
torical processes. But it is not written by a historian, nor does it refer to writings by
historians. The time-scale, also, is wholly different. Where the largest scope of a
macro-historical analysis by a historian focuses on 3,000 years, Diamond’s ‘big
history’ covers more than 13,000 years.10
At the core of Diamond’s book lies the theory that the main reason for Eurasian
dominance in history has to do with environmental advantages. Physical geography
9This book has amassed prizes (amongst which the Pulitzer and the Aventis Prize), sold in
enormous numbers, and was ﬁlmed by National Geographic. It has become so well-known that
Mitt Romney attempted to use the book to support one of his claims in the 2012 American
presidential campaign, which led to a published reaction by Diamond in the New York Times,
followed by a host of tweets and articles: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/02/opinion/mitt-
romneys-search-for-simple-answers.html, visited on 20.3.2015.
10The term ‘Big history’ was coined by Christian (2004).
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underlies historical developments. In Diamond’s own words, European historical
dominance resulted from
accidents of geography and biogeography—in particular to the continent’s different areas,
axes, and suites of wild plant and animal species. This is, the different historical trajectories of
Africa and Europe stem ultimately from differences in real estate (Diamond 1997, p. 401).11
The book is well written and an extremely rewarding read, but its very strong
reading of historical processes and near-negation of human agency has led to
continuous critical reactions. One returning feature in that criticism is Diamond’s
exclusion of cultural autonomy. The environmental historian J. R. McNeill for-
mulated his objections to this emphatically, in an exchange of views with Diamond
in the New York Review of Books (May 15, 1997)
Much more powerfully than any other species, [humans] change the environment around
us; and have done so ever since our ancestors began to control ﬁre and to use tools. Learned
behavior, channeled along innumerable different paths by divergent cultures, is what allows
us to do so. Human beings do indeed often “approach limits imposed by environmental
constraints” only to ﬁnd a way to overcome and escape those constraints, as the history of
technology repeatedly illustrates.12
A second, related, point of criticism is that of the book’s apparently linked
geographic and historical determinism:
At its worst, it develops an argument about human inequality based on a deterministic logic
that reduces social relations such as poverty, state violence, and persistent social domi-
nation, to inexorable outcomes of geography and environments (Correia 2013, p. 1).
One can discuss the merits of and problems with Guns, Germs and Steel at
length. For the purposes of this article, however, it is especially interesting to
compare the outlook of history in the book to that of Marxism as discussed above,
and note the reactions by professional historians. Marx’s economic determinism fed
a form of historical determinism, leading to critical reactions by historians both
because of the mono-causal explanation of the course of history, and because of the
absence of human agency. Replace ‘economic’ with ‘geographic’ and the outline of
argument and reaction is the same for Guns, Germs and Steel, again an approach to
history written by a non-historian. The comparison goes awry at several levels, but
both theories deny coincidence the power to influence the outcome of historical
trajectories. Diamond’s dialogue with McNeill is telling:
11Note how, in some ways, Diamond seems to work from a ‘ﬁrst cause’, the existence of which is
not further explained. The underlying geographies of the world are, in Diamond’s own words:
‘accidents’. This is, however, a very different mode of using coincidence as an instrument in
historical analysis than the one this chapter is interested in.
12http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/1997/jun/26/guns-germs-and-steel/, visited on 20.3.
2015.
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Yet the emergence of such [literate] societies in Eurasia was no accident. It had long
antecedents with clear environmental causes … over the hundreds of generations of
post-Ice Age human history, and over a large continent’s thousands of societies, cultural
differences become sifted to approach limits imposed by environmental constraints.13
Clear courses of history seem to leave little room for coincidence as an interpre-
tative tool—and even less so if human agency is excluded.
5 Coincidence and Cliodynamics
Not all large-scale narratives of human history exclude the importance of agency or
coincidence. Yet there is an inherent tension between the drive towards explaining
long-term dynamical processes in history and attention to individual human actions.
This comes clearly forward in the recently developed school of thought called
Cliodynamics, consisting mainly of sociologists with an historical interest. Its
agenda is to recognise ‘laws of history’:
Cliodynamics (from Clio, the muse of history, and dynamics, the study of temporally
varying processes) is the new transdisciplinary area of research at the intersection of his-
torical macrosociology, economic history/cliometrics, mathematical modeling of long-term
social processes, and the construction and analysis of historical databases … ultimately the
aim is to discover general principles that explain the functioning and dynamics of actual
historical societies.14
Unsurprisingly, ‘coincidence’ does not feature in ‘Cliodynamic’ scholarship, into
which some of the recent scholarship of Jared Diamond might also be included
(Diamond and Robinson 2010, with Thomas 2010). What Cliodynamics aims at are
general principles, explaining how historical societies developed and functioned.
Binding the various scholarship within this new subdiscipline of historical sciences
is (1) attention for the general principles that explain the dynamics of societies, that
lead to (2) models, often formulated in mathematical terms, which are the con-
fronted with (3) empirical content. The data from historical societies are used to
develop general patterns, and test the accuracy of assumption from the models. Data
from (other) historical societies can then be used to test the model predictions. The
basic assumption is that history can be modelled, and that these models can help us
‘predict’ what happened in individual societies (Turchin 2011).
At ﬁrst sight, attempts to discover ‘laws of history’ would seem to side with the
above-discussed systems of deterministic history. The much more speciﬁc attention
to modelling in this new approach to large-scale historical processes, however,
allows randomness to be systematically incorporated into thinking about these
historical processes. In brief, the main purpose of Cliodynamic scholarship is to
13http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/1997/jun/26/guns-germs-and-steel/, visited on 20.3.
2015.
14http://cliodynamics.info/.
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develop a highly sophisticated model to describe historical societies. The model
includes a range of (competing) general principles that are ‘translated’ into sys-
tematic regularities, which can then be described as ‘structural events’. Some of
these events are predictable and can be modelled. Some events cannot. Which is
where randomness comes in.
In the terms just described, randomness is a modelling device. There are
developments and actions that are excluded from the model, in order to make events
understandable. The reason to exclude them can be because the actions cannot be
predicted (because, for instance, they follow from the human free will), or because
the predictable causes behind the actions are unknown to the scholar designing the
model, or, ﬁnally, because these causes are known but too complex for the model.
The absence of these actions from the model does not deny that both structural and
non-structural forces are continuously operating within societies and should be
included in a perfect model. But describing the unknowable/unknown/too complex
aspects of historical processes as ‘random’ allows the model to function, and gives
the scholar possibilities to differentiate between structural forces and factors that are
now described as random. Almost all authors working within this framework deﬁne
human agency as ‘random’ (Goldstone 2003; Skocpol 2003).
The underlying assumption is one of complex causality, in which there is dif-
ferentiation between structural causes and triggering events. In terms of the model,
these triggering events might be ‘random’, but that does not deny them their place
of importance. These triggering events are, however, difﬁcult to predict. The
underlying ‘macro-causes’ amplify these triggering notions (‘micro-causes’), in
which agency is crucial. Agency is essential, but not really what this ﬁeld of study
is particularly interested in. Instead, the structural causes underlying the effects of
the triggering events are focus of attention. Randomness is accepted, but the interest
is in the grand ‘mechanisms’ of societal change (Turchin 2006). Coincidence is not
really denied, but it is certainly pushed to the background. There seems to be little
attention to the role of coincidence in history when non-historians pose the ques-
tions—and it is certainly not used as a mode of interpretation.
6 Coincidence as an Interpretative Tool?
Might there be a mode to include coincidence as an interpretative tool in historical
research, in light of the above brief overview? It seems clear that if such a notion
can be used, it should give sufﬁcient attention to so-called micro-causes, in which
human agency is of great importance. Individuals have freedom to take speciﬁc
actions. They of course do so within socio-biological frameworks (see the contri-
butions by Weitzel and Rosenkranz and Van Elk, Friston and Bekkering) and
within the context of a larger historical frameworks, which is what macro-history
focuses on. However, as Ton Nijhuis recognised in a stimulating recent contribution
on exactly this topic—coincidence in history—the action chosen out of a range of
possible courses of action has influence on historical developments, and needs to be
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taken seriously. History was not a closed trajectory before it happened, and the
outcome that we happened to arrive at is not necessarily more worthwhile because
this is the course events took. Nijhuis draws the analogy between studying history
and walking in an unknown landscape. If you only look at the trodden path, you fail
to see the various avenues that you can take, and others could have taken (Nijhuis
2003, p. 63). In a macro-historical perspective, developments are homogenous and
continuous. In reality, there are heterogeneous and discontinuous serial events, that
only the analysis of micro-history can make visible. In this context both Isaiah
Berlin and the well-known Italian historian Carlo Ginzburg have used Tolstoy’s
War and Peace as an example. Tolstoy assumed that ‘a historical phenomenon can
become comprehensible only by reconstructing the activities of all the persons who
participated in it’ (Ginzburg et al. 1993, p. 24; Berlin 1978). In the intersection
between private actions and the public world, history develops. For a systematic
recognition of the role of coincidence in history, our analysis needs to be at the right
scale. It needs to value human agency, and the stochastic element this brings into
historical developments, whilst at the same time identifying the underlying pro-
cesses which may be much more predictable.
The ideal historical account should take both into consideration, going back and
forth between the large processes that are likely to lead to certain trajectories, and
the enormous number of micro-causes that triggered the events as they happened. In
that context, one might be able to usefully employ the famous thought experiment
of the evolutionary biologist Stephen Jay Gould:
I call this experiment “replaying life’s tape”: You press the rewind button and, making sure
you thoroughly erase everything that has actually happened, go back to any place in the
past … Then let the tape run again and see if the repetition looks at all like the original.15
Gould’s work has been intensely discussed (and occasionally maligned), but the
metaphor of replaying the tape might be a way of coming to grips with the relation
between coincidence as an interpretive tool and discussion on the size of history.
How likely do we deem certain historical events if they were to be played out
again? To what extent does that depend on the scale of the historian’s narrative?
How often would Antony’s distraction with Cleopatra’s nose lead him to lose the
battle at Actium if we were to reply the events of 2 September 31 BC? Would it be
in the region of 2 out of 10.000 times (a contingent chain of events) or 9998 out of
10.000 (quasi-determined)? And might the result be different depending on our
perspective? If we were to replay the whole year 31 BC, or the longer period of 44–
31 BC, would that decrease the likelihood that this chain of events were to happen
again? This could be a way to start recognising the possible role of coincidence in
various ‘triggering events’. Coincidence might fall outside of the interpretative
toolbox of the sociologists and macro-historians who are looking for a compre-
hensive view of historical processes, but could still play a proper role in thinking
15Gould (1989), 48, with the discussion in Vogt, Kontingenz und Zufall, 231–234. The possi-
bilities of using Gould’s thoughts for my argument, and their possible repercussions in this
context, were kindly pointed out to me by Robert-Jan Wille.
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about historical trajectories. Not ‘what if’ history exactly, but rather history with an
open mind.
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Accidental Harm Under (Roman)
Civil Law
Corjo Jansen
Abstract A leading idea under Roman private law and nearly all European legal
systems is that an owner has to bear the risk of an accidental loss (casus). An
accident is a circumstance for which a third party cannot be blamed (culpa or fault).
A person suffering damage from an accident had to bear that damage himself. This
idea has been subject to attack throughout history. Every once in a while, it is said
that ‘bad luck must be righted’ (‘pech moet weg’). This position has not become the
prevailing viewpoint among lawyers. Although it does not seem very realistic, ‘bad
luck must be righted’ did form the basis of social security policies of the
Netherlands and some other western countries after World War II: social security
‘from womb to tomb’. The scope of social security beneﬁts has been reduced in
many countries in the last decades of the twentieth century, because the costs were
no longer affordable. The idea that a owner has to bear the risk of casus has
withstood the test of time quite well. That accidental harm must be borne by the one
suffering it, is legally and morally justiﬁable.
1 Introduction
While engaging in activities, a person may suffer damage himself or, even worse,
cause damage to someone else. An example for each situation is very easy to
provide for. The ﬁrst situation involves damage brought on by one’s self: An
individual slips and falls after a heavy rain shower and breaks a leg. The second
situation involves damage brought on by another person: A bicyclist knocks down a
pedestrian, who winds up with a broken arm. The moment at which the damage
arises is often the point in time when the law comes into the picture. A signiﬁcant
task of the law is to formulate rules to specify in which cases damage must be
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compensated, for a person’s freedom of action is not unlimited. The question arises
whether someone who has suffered damage has to bear the loss himself or whether
another person should bear liability for this.
A leading idea under the law is that the loss should lie where it falls.1 This notion
reflects the old adage under Roman law, ‘casum sentit dominus’. An owner has to
bear the risk of an accidental loss or an accidental deterioration which has resulted
in harm to him.2
This viewpoint has been criticised by, for example, the renowned German
professor of Roman law, B. Windscheid (1817–1892): “Unbrauchbar und in dieser
Allgemeinheit unrichtig (…).”3 Another prominent German scholar, H. Dernburg
(1829–1907), was equally disapproving of the casum sentit dominus rule, stating:
“Ihre Unhaltbarkeit wird (…) nicht leicht bestritten.”4 And yet, under nearly all
European legal systems, this rule appears to be authoritative. The legislator in
Austria even laid it down in that country’s civil code (§ 1311 ABGB of 1811): “Der
bloße Zufall trifft denjenigen, in dessen Vermögen oder Person er sich ereignet.”5
The Roman law adage ‘casum sentit dominus’ is still important to day. The civil
law systems of the Continent stem from Roman law. This law has become the
intellectual ground for a largely homogenous legal culture on the Continent, based
on the reception of Roman legal rules and principles. The two most important civil
codes influenced by Roman law are the Code civil (Cc) of France (1804) and the
Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (BGB) of Germany (1900). Spain, Portugal, Belgium, the
Netherlands, the former colonies of France and nearly the whole of South America
have adopted the French Cc. Greece and Japan adopted the German BGB.
Contrariwise to the Continent, England developed an unique legal tradition. This
tradition is called Common Law. Nearly 40 % of all the people live in common law
countries, like the United States of America, Australia, New Zealand, India,
Pakistan and the other former colonies of England. Also the common law tradition
has accepted the idea that loss should lie where it falls. That’s why nearly all legal
systems in the world know the adage ‘casum sentit dominus’. In this article, the
focus is on the Roman law tradition.6
An issue which crops up under Roman law (and thus under Continental civil
law) is the meaning which needs to be given to the concept of ‘casus’ (‘accident’).
Roman-law sources suggest two meanings here. In the ﬁrst instance, these sources
teach, an ‘accident’ refers to some natural phenomenon (‘act of God’), such as a
1Hartlief (1997); Sieburgh (2000); Markesinis and Deakin (2003), p. 42.
2Code of Justinian (C.) 4,24,9; Digests (D.) 50,17,23 (casus a nullo praestantur). See Wacke
(1984), p. 271; Zimmermann (1996), pp. 154, 162, and 281; Sieburgh (2000), p. 5. Also referred to
as ‘res perit domino’.
3Windscheid and Kipp (1900), § 264, fn. 5: ‘Useless and in this indeﬁnite way wrong’.
4Dernburg (1903), p. 123, Note 3. For other examples, see Ranieri (2009), pp. 569–572.
5Wacke (1984), p. 670. Cf. Article 1105 Código Civil (Spanish Civil Code). In the Netherlands,
see the Flood Damage Act 1953, Article 8:543 Dutch Civil Code and Article 8:1004(2) Dutch
Civil Code.
6Zweigert and Kötz (1998), pp. 68–69, 218 et seq., 298; Zimmermann (2011), 27 et seq.
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lightning strike, flood, earthquake or compact impact.7 Further, an ‘accident’ may
involve some misfortune, an unfortunate confluence of circumstances or ‘allge-
meine Lebensrisiko’.
To ﬁgure out the place ‘casus’ occupies under (Roman) private law, let’s revisit
my two earlier examples. If a person slips and falls after a heavy rain shower and
breaks his leg, that person must bear the risk of his loss. The fact that the person
slipped and fell is a risk which everyone runs in daily life. Another party cannot be
made to pay for the damage. The situation might be different if an individual slips
on a banana peel which was deliberately put on the floor. There is a very good
chance in that case that someone else will be liable for the loss suffered. In the
example where a pedestrian breaks his arm because of the bicyclist’s actions, the
question likewise arises whether the person suffering damage can hold someone
else liable or not. The major reason for having another person foot the bill for the
injury in the last two examples is that the injury can be traced back to the fault
(culpa) of the persons causing the damage. The bicyclist bears blame for the
pedestrian’s broken arm, just as the person placing the banana peel on the floor can
be blamed for the broken leg (liability without fault is also possible under the law,
by the way, but I won’t get into that here). “Fault is the basic element of the law of
torts.”8 In these examples, ‘accident’ stands in contrast to fault (in the sense of
blameworthiness).9 Unlike with ‘fault’, the damage is not attributable to a person in
the case of an ‘accident’. By law, an accident is a circumstance for which a third
party cannot be blamed or which is not attributable to someone.
Are there other meanings given to ‘accident’ which are relevant in (Roman)
private law and which modify or expand the deﬁnition? In his inaugural lecture, De
Mul, professor of philosophy in Rotterdam, argued that, under private law, the term
‘accident’ mainly signiﬁes something being determined by fate and is often asso-
ciated with such concepts as ‘unforeseen’ or ‘unforeseeable’.10 I won’t get into the
ﬁrst part of De Mul’s deﬁnition. As to the second part, I note the following. For
lawyers, concepts like ‘unforeseen’ and ‘unforeseeable’ are primarily factors in
determining whether certain harm came about because of someone’s fault. There is
fault when what could have been foreseen by a diligent man was not foreseen. Fault
entails someone’s having acted differently than he should have, given the cir-
cumstances of the case.11 If that is so, he can be blamed for the harm. The meaning
7I won’t get into the tricky distinction between casus and vis major (force majeure or ‘scourge of
God’: D. 19,2,26,6). There is some overlap between the two terms. Coing (1989), p. 462, and
Deroussin (2007), pp. 592–593.
8Owen (1995), pp. 201, 208–209, 223 et seq.; Atiyah (1997), p. 3; Zimmermann (1996), p. 1034;
Markesinis and Deakin (2003), 41 et seq. Cf. D. 50,17,23.
9Bruins (1906), pp. 71–72; Rümelin (1896), p. 17; Von Bar (1999), Nos. 318-322, 485;
Sieburgh (2000), 14 et seq.
10De Mul (1994), pp. 8–12, mentions two other basic connotations of ‘accident’: fortuitous (in-
cidental or inessential) and contingent. See also Rümelin (1896), pp. 8–9 and 18.
11Cf. D. 9,2,31; Zimmermann (1996), pp. 1007–1009; Hartkamp and Sieburgh 6-IV* (2011),
No. 100.
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propounded by De Mul leaves the above deﬁnition of ‘accident’ intact. In
Rümelin’s words: “[Im Gegensatz zur Schuld spielt Zufall, das nicht
Vorhergesehene und erfahrungsgemäss nicht Vorhersehbare] die Rolle eines
Grenzbegriffs für irgend welche Verantwortlichkeit.”12 Moreover, unintended
consequences of people’s conduct are often referred to as ‘accidental’.13 They, too,
may be taken into account when assessing whether a certain action may be imputed
to someone or not. Again, modifying the deﬁnition of ‘accident’ (in contrast to
‘fault’) does not seem necessary.
A brief digression about the sources of the obligation helps us to analyse the
function of casus (accident) and culpa (fault) under (Roman) private law and the
legal consequences which ensue from this. With regard to each Roman-law or other
source, the notion of casus or culpa is, to a certain degree, developed differently.
2 Sources of Obligation Under Roman and Modern Law
An obligation to compensate another person’s damage is not obvious. In his
Institutes, the Roman lawyer Gaius (110–185 AD) distinguished two categories
from which such an obligation might arise. “Every obligation arises either from
contract or from wrongdoing.”14 The distinction between these two sources of
obligation has withstood the test of time. It can also be seen in modern legal
systems. Obligations to pay compensation do not, however, only arise from contract
or wrongdoing. Gaius recognised this as well. In the second book passed down in
his name, Res cottidianae sive aurea, Golden Words, Gaius added a third category
as a source of obligation: “Obligations arise either from contract or from wrong-
doing or, by some special right, from various types of causes.”15 What were
examples of such another cause? Gaius talked about several of these in the third
book of his Golden Words. One example was managing someone else’s interest,
negotiorum gestio (‘agency without a mandate’). If someone looked after an absent
person’s affairs without having been instructed to do so, the two individuals became
connected to each other and could litigate against one another based on the notion of
management of another’s affairs without authorisation. These legal actions did not
arise from contract or wrongdoing. After all, the party managing the absent party’s
affairs had not concluded a contract with the absent party beforehand. Managing a
person’s affairs without a mandate was not a form of wrongdoing, either.16
12Rümelin (1896), p. 53.
13Rümelin (1896), p. 18; De Mul (1994), p. 12.
14Institutes of Gaius (Gai. Inst.) 3,88: (…): omnis enim obligatio vel ex contractu nascitur vel ex
delicto.
15D. 44,7,1,pr.: Obligationes aut ex contractu nascuntur aut ex maleﬁcio aut proprio quodam iure
ex variis causarum ﬁguris.
16D. 44,7,5,pr.
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The emperor Justinian (527–565) adopted the distinction from the Golden Words
in his Institutes and changed it a little: “A further sub-classiﬁcation results in four
categories: speciﬁcally, obligations arising from contract, as if they were a contract
(quasi-contract), or from delict, as if they were a delict (quasi-delict).”17 Many
European legislators built upon Justinian’s views in their legal codes. This also held
true for the Dutch Civil Code of 1838. Under Article 1269 of this Code, all
obligations resulted from either contract or the law [de wet]. Pursuant to
Article 1388 Dutch Civil Code 1838, the latter category could in turn be
sub-divided into obligations emanating “from the law alone or from the law as a
result of human conduct”. Obligations ensuing from the law due to people’s con-
duct arose from “a lawful or an unlawful act” (Article 1389 Dutch Civil Code
1838). The provisions in Article 1269 Dutch Civil Code 1838 were criticised in the
literature. In laying the foundations for the current Dutch Civil Code (1992),
E.M. Meijers (1880–1954), professor of civil law in Leyde, tried to restore Gaius’s
deﬁnition. Meijers’s original wording of Article 6:1 Dutch Civil Code stated that
obligations arose from contract, tort or other juridical facts if these ensued from the
law. He wanted to prevent obligations from rising outside the law based on the
principle of reasonableness and fairness (‘good faith’) or based on unwritten law or
custom. That simply produced legal uncertainty and legal inequality.18 Legislators
after him looked to the Dutch Supreme Court’s decision in Quint v Te Poel19 to
formulate the sources of obligation under the new Dutch Civil Code. According to
Article 6:1 Dutch Civil Code, obligations can only arise from the law. The words
‘from the law’, the Dutch Supreme Court explained, do not in any way mean that
each obligation has to be expressly provided for by the law. In situations not
provided for by law, the solution must be accepted “which ﬁts into the statutory
legal system and is in line with rules already laid down for similar situations.” Still,
Justinian’s ancient Roman classiﬁcation system lies behind the sparse wording of
Article 6:1 Dutch Civil Code.
I will successively discuss the role of casus under Roman tort law, Roman
contract law and Roman law concerning negotiorum gestio.20
17Institutes of Justinian (Inst.) 3,13,2: Sequens divisio in quattuor species diducitur: aut enim ex
contractu sunt aut quasi ex contractu aut ex maleﬁcio aut quasi ex maleﬁcio. See also Inst. 4,5,pr.
18Asser, Hartkamp and Sieburgh 6-I* (2008), No. 47 et seq.
19Dutch Supreme Court (Hoge Raad), 30 January 1959, Nederlandse Jurisprudentie (NJ) 1959,
548.
20Casus does not come into play with quasi-delicts.
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3 Accidental Harm Under Roman Tort Law
and Subsequent Criticism
The sources are very clear about the fact that, under Roman tort law, a person
suffering damage from an accident had to bear that damage himself. Gaius con-
tended that a party causing damage without fault or not intentionally, but instead by
accident (casu), should remain ‘unpunished’.21 The lawyer Alfenus (who lived in
the ﬁrst century before Christ) responded similarly when asked whether the owner
of a slave who had broken his leg during a game after being pushed hard could
litigate pursuant to the lex Aquilia, a statute reforming the law on wrongful damage
to property by the Roman assembly of the plebs (the comitia centuriata) from 286
or 287 BC, named after the person who proposed it, the tribune Aquilius. Litigation
was not possible, “[because] the unfortunate event needed to be deemed the result
of an accident (casu) rather than fault.”22 This position has been subject to attack
throughout history. The natural law scholar Chr. Thomasius (1655–1728) regarded
‘you must not injure your neighbour’ (alterum non laedere), a perspective which
could also be found in the sources,23 as the guiding principle of tort law, from
which he concluded that every damage ought to be compensated, even if it was
caused by accident. “It is not only equitable but even just that I should make good
damage done by accident.” If, for instance, a person accidentally dropped some-
one’s crystal glass, that person was, Thomasius felt, liable for the damage. It was
his curiosity, not the owner’s curiosity, which made the glass fall.24 Thomasius’s
position did not reflect the view of Roman lawyers. It has also not been embraced
very much by today’s lawyers. Every once in a while, it is said that ‘bad luck must
be righted’ [pech moet weg], even if one can only blame one’s self for it, but this is
not the prevailing attitude. Lord Steyn, a justice of the current Supreme Court of the
United Kingdom, articulated this feeling well:
“But we do not live in Utopia: we live in a practical world where the tort system imposes
limits to the classes of claims that rank for consideration as well as to the heads of
recoverable damages. This results, of course, in imperfect justice but it is by and large the
best that the common law can do.”25
21Gai. Inst. 3,211: Itaque inpunitus est qui sine culpa et dolo malo, casu quodam damnum
committit.
22D. 9,2,52,4: Respondi non posse, cum casu magis quam culpa videretur factum.
23D. 1,1,10,1.
24Thomasius (2000), Sec. IV; Jansen (2009), 231 et seq.; Atiyah (1997), pp. 178–179. To his
mind, the assumption that every type of loss ought to be compensated makes the compensatory
system unaffordable.
25[1998] 3 WLR 1539B-C (per Lord Steyn).
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4 Accidental Harm Under Roman Contract Law
A contract usually involves two people: a debtor and a creditor. They must act with
due care towards each other. The degree of care they need to exercise depends on
the type of contract and the object to which the contract pertains (a horse, for
instance, requires different care than a slave or painting). If debtors or creditors
breach their duties of care, they will be liable for the ensuing damage. Here’s an
example. A person lends his bicycle to his neighbour (‘the contract of commoda-
tum’). The bicycle is stolen from the neighbour. Is the neighbour liable for this
theft? This question cannot easily be answered. The crux of the issue is the scope of
the neighbour’s duty of care. Generally speaking, if a person does not exercise the
requisite duty of care, he is at fault and is liable. Commodatum consisted of a
gratuitous loan of a corporeal thing (mostly movables). The party borrowing the
bicycle does not owe any money to the other party. Furthermore, lending out the
bicycle is in the borrower’s interest. Hence, Roman lawyers believed that the party
who borrowed the bicycle, the neighbour in my example, had a very weighty duty
of care (‘custodia’, or a duty of safekeeping). Because of this duty, the neighbour
was liable to the lender of the bicycle in the event of theft. The borrower, who was
responsible for custodia, had to therefore compensate the lender’s damage, even
though, subjectively, the borrower bore no blame.
This basic principle regarding commodatum did not automatically apply to other
contracts. Some agreements merely entailed liability for intentional misconduct
(dolus), others, for intentional misconduct (dolus) and fault (culpa), and still others,
for intentional misconduct (dolus), fault (culpa) and custodia. The contract of
mutuum received special treatment. Such a contract consisted of transferring
ownership of a quantity of fungible goods (such as money or grain) to another
party, who undertook to return an equal quantity of goods of the same sort. The
most prominent example of a mutuum was the moneylending contract. The bor-
rower became the owner of the goods. Consequently, the borrower bore the risk of
destruction of the objects, even if this occurred by accident (casu fortuito), due to,
say, ﬁre, collapse, shipwreck or an attack by bandits or enemies.26 This principle
was consistent with the rule that owners bear the risk of an accidental loss.
With other contracts, the required level of due care varied, but was never
absolute. To quote the applicable Roman legislative text verbatim, “no one need
bear responsibility for accidents and deaths occurring to living beings which are not
attributable to anyone’s fault, escapes by slaves usually left unguarded, or rob-
beries, riots, ﬁres, floods or attacks by bandits.”27 Such occurrences corresponded
in large measure to ‘acts of God’ under English law. A borrower had to act with the
utmost due care, for example. As we have seen, this meant, too, that the borrower
was liable to the lender for theft. The borrower only avoided liability for events
26Inst. 3,14,2 and D. 44,7,1,4. See Wallinga (2009), p. 225 et seq.
27D. 50,17,23: (….) casus mortesque, quae sine culpa accidunt, (…) a nullo praestantur.
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which nobody could defend against (casus non praestat), such as attacks by ban-
dits, enemies or pirates, ﬁre and so on.28 As Schulz put it:
“[A borrower] was absolutely liable for certain typical accidents which were regarded as
avoidable by properly watching and guarding the borrowed thing, and on the other hand he
was not liable for other typical accidents which were invariably regarded as not avoidable
by the exercise of care.”29
A depositee who had offered to take possession of someone else’s property was
liable for intentional misconduct, negligence and custodia, but not for fortuitous
events (casus fortuitos).30 A man who could show that he had lost his bookkeeping
records on account of a shipwreck, collapse, ﬁre or similar accident (alio simili
casu) was not accountable to the banker from whom he had borrowed money.31
Likewise, losses incurred by accident (casu) were not chargeable to the balances
which slaves had to pay their masters.32 In contrast, a mandatary could not seek
reimbursement of his costs from the mandator if the mandatary had been robbed by
bandits or had lost property during a shipwreck. These events were attributable to
accident (magis casibusquam) rather than the mandate.33 If casus was involved, the
party who had suffered damage thus bore this damage himself. There was no reason
to shift the risk onto somebody else’s shoulders.
5 Accidental Harm in the Case of Negotiorum Gestio
The idea of the management of another’s affairs is a peculiarity under the law, since
furnishing unsolicited help to another person is a precarious undertaking. Such
conduct is readily seen as an undesirable interference or as a curtailment of
someone’s freedom. Under Roman law, no one was obliged to help another person.
Nevertheless, there was a strong notion that citizens should help their fellow citi-
zens in times of distress, by, for example, giving advice, providing a loan or
voluntarily managing someone’s interests without a mandate to do so. Schulz
described ‘management of another’s affairs’ as a “quite original genuinely Roman
creation without parallels in the laws of other peoples not dependant on Roman
Law.”34
28D. 13,6,18 pr. and D. 44,7,1,4.
29Schulz 1969, p. 515.
30D. 16,3,1,35. Zimmermann (1996), pp. 208–209. Such wide-ranging liability for a custodian is
rather exceptional. It can be seen, too, in French law, but not in German law. Normally, a
custodian is liable for dolus.
31D. 2,13,6,9.
32D. 40,5,41,7.
33D. 17,1,26,6; Zimmermann (1996), pp. 430–431.
34Schulz (1969), p. 624; Kortmann (2005), p. 99 et seq.; Jansen (2014), p. 43 et seq.
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The special nature of negotiorum gestio was also apparent in the manager’s
scope of liability; if an individual took care of the interests of an absent person who
was unaware of this, the manager became liable for both wilful misconduct and
negligence. A leading Roman lawyer maintained, however, that the party looking
after the affairs even “had to answer for accident (casus), for example if in the name
of the absent principal he transacts business the principal did not usually do.” It
goes without saying that such liability would be very extensive. Presumably, this
far-reaching liability was prompted by the deep-seated aversion to representing
someone’s interests against the will of that person.35
6 Other Meanings of ‘Casus’ in the Roman Sources
‘Casus’ does not just mean ‘accident’ in the Roman-law sources. Sometimes, the
word signiﬁes ‘misfortune’, ‘fate’, ‘adversity’ or ‘setback’. In these instances, it
refers—just like in the case of accident—to an event resulting in damage which
cannot be traced back to another party’s fault. One text, for instance, categorises
trees being uprooted or trees being blown over because of a storm as ‘casus’.36 A
Roman lawyer used the word ‘casus’ in a similar sense, when he noted that it is
neither decent nor natural to speculate about the misfortune or setback which a free
man has suffered.37
‘Casus’ sometimes relates to destiny, say, to the fact that a person is deaf or
blind.38 These meanings of ‘accident’ suggest something of the incomprehensibility
or arbitrariness of life and the vicissitudes of fate (see De Mul’s deﬁnition given in
this article’s introduction). ‘Accident’ here pertains not to human conduct, but to
divine or similar intervention. It sets forth the limit of what lies within a person’s
control.39
Finally, the Roman-law sources seem to imply that ‘casus’ also means ‘inde-
pendent of a person’s will’. The law made it possible for giving rise of a legal
consequence to hinge on a condition. Someone decided that the legal consequences
would only arise if or until an uncertain future event took place (such as ownership
not being transferred until the entire purchase price was paid). A slave, for example,
35D. 3,5,10; Zimmermann (1996), pp. 446–447. See also § 678 BGB (German Civil Code), which
adopted this solution. The Dutch Supreme Court has embraced this position as well: Supreme
Court, 19 April 1996, NJ 1997, 24.
36D. 7,1,12,pr.
37D. 45,1,83,5. See also D. 4,6,1,pr.
38D. 3,1,1,3 and 5. See also D. 4,4,11,5.
39Eijsbouts (1989), pp. 2, 16, 19–20. See also the deﬁnition of ‘treasure’ in Article 642(2) Dutch
Civil Code 1838 (Article 716 Code Civil (French Civil Code): a ‘treasure’ had to have been
discovered by pure chance (le pur effet du hasard) (Eijsbouts (1989), pp. 6–7). In the current
Article 5:13 Dutch Civil Code (a translation of § 984 BGB), chance is no longer an element of the
deﬁnition of treasure.
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might have been set free under a certain condition. This might have consisted of a
fact, an action or one or another fortuitous circumstance (casu).40
7 Brief Interlude: ‘Casus’ Under Roman Criminal Law
Unlike in modern criminal law, ‘casus’ (by accident) is mentioned in the text of
several Roman-law criminal provisions. The term had to do with the state of mind
with which a crime was committed: with premeditation (proposito); in the heat of
the moment (impetu) or by accident (casu, when, for example, a spear thrown at a
wild animal during a hunt killed a man).41 The state of mind was relevant in
determining the severity of the punishment. In the case of the more serious crimes,
ascertaining whether these had been committed with premeditation or by accident
(casus) was crucial, said the lawyer Ulpianus (who died in 223). For all crimes, this
distinction had to result in either a just punishment or reduced punishment.42
Hence, according to the emperor Hadrian (117–138), the punishment for an indi-
vidual who had committed manslaughter accidentally (casu) rather than inten-
tionally (magis quam voluntate) during a scuffle was moderated.43 In modern
criminal-law systems, intent, premeditation and negligence are the subjective ele-
ments of a crime. These days, casus is a factor in determining the degree of guilt
which can be ascribed to accused individuals when they have engaged in potentially
criminal conduct.
Accident always plays a role in criminal law to some extent. Whether certain
punishable conduct must be characterised as an assault or as manslaughter depends
on the consequence which ensues. Often, whether someone dies or is merely
seriously injured as a result of a sharp blow to the face is a matter of accident.
Potentially punishable conduct may likewise be nipped in the bud purely by
accident; consider, for example, the case of a heavy rain shower which extinguishes
a deliberately set ﬁre.44
40D. 40,5,33,1.
41D. 48,19,11,2.
42D. 48,19,5,2. See also D. 47,9,9.
43D. 48,8,1,3.
44Whether such an arson attempt constitutes a crime will depend on the circumstances of the case.
See Dutch Supreme Court, 19 March 1934, NJ 1934, p. 350 (the Eindhoven arson judgment) and
Dutch Supreme Court, 19 September 1977, NJ 1978, 126.
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8 Accidental Harm Under Modern Private Law
The viewpoints found in Roman law have—as stated above—often remained
valuable for modern civil law. To the extent they still apply, the scope of their
application must be determined. As we have seen, in Roman law, casus (in the
sense of ‘accident’) played a role in contract law, the management of another’s
affairs and tort law. The force majeure doctrine (‘non-attributable
non-performance’) has greatly diminished the role of accident in the area of con-
tract law. Briefly stated, a situation of force majeure exists if the debtor, for reasons
beyond his control, cannot fulﬁl his obligations. The failure of performance does
not result from his fault and is not at his risk. Notwithstanding this development in
modern private law, especially in the Dutch and German civil law, the ABGB
(Austrian Civil Code) and Código Civil (the Spanish Civil Code, 1889) still include
—consistent with the Roman-law tradition—casus (accident) in addition to force
majeure as a circumstance which frees debtors from their obligations (§1447 ABGB
and Article 1105 Código Civil respectively). French courts still take accidental
elements (l’aléa) into account as well.45
Almost all Continental legal systems look to the fault principle when a contract
is not performed or not in a timely or proper manner: If a debtor cannot be blamed
for the failure to perform, the debtor is not liable for damages. This principle was
expanded in the Dutch Civil Code of 1992. Debtors can claim force majeure if
performance is hindered for reasons for which they do not bear any fault and for
which they do not bear the risk.46 The standard concerning the debtor’s conduct is
objective insofar as the debtor must have acted as a prudent debtor would have
acted in the given situation (cf. Article 6:27 Dutch Civil Code and § 276 BGB). If
the debtor has violated this objective standard, it must be examined whether the
debtor can personally be blamed for this. If such personal blameworthiness (fault) is
lacking, the question becomes whether the debtor is liable based on the law,
juridical act or ‘generally accepted principles’/common opinion (see Article 6:75
Dutch Civil Code).47 A person may invoke force majeure, for instance, if his life or
liberty is threatened. Under generally accepted standards, the person is not liable
then. For a comprehensive comparative–law analysis of fault and wilful or inten-
tional misconduct in determining whether a debtor has breached his obligations
towards the other party, I refer to Ranieri.48
Casus seems to play a larger role in modern tort law than in modern contract
law. That is certainly true for the Netherlands. Whether a court must assume lia-
bility based on tort in a speciﬁc case will involve a weighing of the two viewpoints
mentioned earlier which dominate this area of the law: ‘the loss should lie where it
45Ranieri (2009), pp. 579–580, 584; Deroussin (2007), p. 594.
46Parlementaire Geschiedenis Boek 6 (1981), pp. 263–264; Hartkamp and Sieburgh 6-I* (2008),
No. 343; Ranieri (2009), p. 572.
47Hartkamp and Sieburgh 6-I* (2008), No. 344.
48Ranieri (2009), pp. 572–650.
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falls’ and ‘you must not harm your neighbour’. The general consensus in
Continental legal systems is that the maxim ‘the loss should lie where it falls’ must
prevail if the damage arose through an accident, such as a failed harvest, flood or
lightning strike. Even if the actions by a person resulting in damage actually come
down to nothing more than an unfortunate confluence of circumstances, the party
suffering that damage must bear that damage himself.
I mention a few examples. An old woman who wanted to get into a bus stepped back to
allow someone to go in front of her. In stepping back, she bumped up against another old
woman, who fell and broke her hip. A hiker in a forest kicked a branch. This branch lashed
the eye of the hiker behind him. The hiker who got hit with the branch lost an eye. Two
sisters were moving house. One of them lost her grip on a cabinet while going down the
staircase. As a result, one sister’s arm became wedged between the cabinet and the wall.
The arm had to be amputated.49
In each of these situations, the conduct leading to harm cannot be said to have been
improper or unlawful. What’s more, the people in question can hardly be blamed
for their conduct. The injury was related to an everyday risk, to the fact that we live
and participate in society. These incidents are sometimes termed ‘common or
garden accidents’. The ensuing damage ought to remain where it fell. The risk did
not exceed the general risk of damage which an individual runs in daily life.
Further, the nature of the activity was not so dangerous that precautionary measures
needed to be taken.50 Of course, the situation changes if a person’s traits and
abilities should have kept that person from participating in certain activities. “Just
as it is ethically acceptable for people to claim personal credit for conduct which is
partly a product of their good luck in having a certain personality and certain
capacities, so people must accept responsibility for conduct which is partly a
product of bad luck in having a certain personality and certain capacities.”51
9 Concluding Observations
Law and casus go back a long way. Accident was and is mainly important in
answering the question whether certain damage must be borne by the party suf-
fering the damage (the ‘owner’) or whether another party can be made to pay for
this. This other party may be a natural person (the one causing the damage) or a
legal entity (in particular, an insurance company). All of the Continental legal
systems assume that damage arising by accident remains the responsibility of the
party suffering the damage. For liability for the damage to be passed on to another
49Dutch Supreme Court, 11 December 1987, NJ 1988, 393; Dutch Supreme Court, 9 December
1994, NJ 1996, 403; and Dutch Supreme Court, 12 May 2000, NJ 2001, 300.
50Von Bar (1999), Nos. 319–320; Sieburgh (2000), 12 et seq.; Hartkamp and Sieburgh 6-IV*
(2011), No. 20. Contrary view: Van Dam (2000), No. 808. See also Rümelin (1896), p. 12 et seq.
51Cane (1997), p. 51.
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party, the rule is and was that the damage must have been the fault of or attributable
to that other party. The Roman-law adage ‘casus sentit dominus’ has withstood the
test of time quite well. That accidental harm must be borne by the one suffering it is
also morally justiﬁable. Owen expressed this as follows: “To the extent that risks of
harm from action may be deemed a necessary part of ‘proper’ choices of action in
an uncertain world, and hence ‘reasonable’ according to some fair standard, they
should be viewed as ‘background risks’ of life for victims to protect against and
bear.”52
Obviously, accident could be excluded as much as possible under private law.
‘Bad luck must be righted’ [pech moet weg] could be taken as the point of
departure. Although this starting principle does not seem very realistic, it did form
the basis of Dutch social security policy after World War II. The starving, humil-
iated and exhausted Dutch population expected a future in which socio–economic
security was guaranteed for everyone and was no longer left to chance. This dream
had to be realised by seeking high employment and an extensive system of social
security and social welfare beneﬁts. The Van Rhijn Commission (established on
7 April 1943)53 was the auctor intellectualis of this philosophy in the Netherlands.
It articulated the following legal basis for a complete system of social security
beneﬁts encompassing the entire population:
“The community, organised in the form of the State, is responsible for the social security
and protection against want of all of its members, provided that those members themselves
do what is reasonable to furnish such social security and protection against want.”54
The Van Rhijn Commission gained inspiration from overseas. Reports and plans in
the United States and Great Britain served as models for the Dutch proposals.
Winston Churchill (1874–1965) was instrumental here. Together with the American
president Franklin Delano Roosevelt (1882–1945), he was the originator of the
Atlantic Charter of 19 August 1941. That charter set out all sorts of freedoms,
including ‘freedom from want’. Such protection against want was intended to
accomplish the following: “to bring about the fullest collaboration between all
nations in the economic ﬁeld, with the object of securing for all improved labour
standards, economic advancement, and social security.” The ideal here reflected the
famous principle derived from Churchill, namely, ‘social security from womb to
tomb’.55 This welfare state ideal was taken too far by some, who subscribed to the
‘bad-luck-must-be-righted’ notion and who wanted to shift any damage which a
citizen might suffer primarily to the State (through social security, state funds, state
52Owen (1995), pp. 226–227.
53A.A. van Rhijn (1892–1986) was a secretary-general in several government departments (1933–
1940), Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries (1940–1941) and Secretary-General at Social Affairs
(1945–1950). His commission was responsible for providing a preliminary overview regarding the
principles and main features of social security in the Netherlands.
54Social Security Report (1945) II, p. 10.
55Jansen and Loonstra (2013), pp. 269–270. A variation on this saying is ‘from the cradle to the
grave’.
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pensions and the like). This goal entails many risks, as “[p]eople who have grown
up believing that the state would look always after them, no matter what misfor-
tunes should strike, are now driven to ﬁnd someone to sue, when they discover that
the state will not and cannot deliver on this expectation.”56
The scope of social security beneﬁts has been reduced recently in countries such
as the Netherlands. The costs were no longer affordable. The ‘damage’ was shifted
too much to the community, so that the pressure on private insurance and tort law
grew.57 Atiyah therefore argued that a no-fault system of liability should be
developed for accidents and the personal harm ensuing from these and that a system
of private and group insurance ought to be implemented for other cases of personal
harm.58 In principle, insurance, which provides the right to a beneﬁt if a particular
contingent event occurs, is not concerned about the cause of the event. Whether the
party entitled to the beneﬁt was at fault is irrelevant.59 Atiyah’s proposal, however,
has hardly generated any response. The part of casus under modern private law has
been anything but played out. The idea that the owner has to bear the consequences
of ‘accidents’ is still very much alive in all Continental legal systems.
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Taming Chaos. Chance and Variability
in the Language Sciences
Roeland van Hout and Pieter Muysken
Abstract This paper focuses on chance and variability in language, and how the
language sciences have dealt with that variability. After describing four types of
variability found: (a) Inter-species variability, (b) Inter-language variability,
(c) Variability in the linguistic signal within a given language, and (d) Inter-individual
variability, the paper discusses the work of two pioneers who have tried to deal with
this variability: Joseph H. Greenberg andWilliam Labov. These near-contemporaries
have tried to grapple with variability of types (b) and (c), as two separate enterprises.
Thus these researchers have tried to separate pure chance or randomness from
meaningful variability in two different ways, and in doing so have tried to tame the
chaos. For them indeed the mission of linguistics as a discipline is to eliminate chance
as much as possible, as the target of any scientiﬁc enterprise by deﬁnition is to isolate,
separate or exclude what cannot be explained or understood. Nonetheless, chance and
variability are key elements in language, and a proper understanding of language will
take these as the point of departure.What does it mean to say that chance is an inherent
property of human language? The paper outlines the beginning of answer to this
question.
1 Introduction
The publication of Ferdinand de Saussure’s Cours de linguistique générale a
hundred years ago, in 1916, heralded the beginning of modern linguistics. Since
then the ﬁeld has unfolded and developed into many directions.
Among the achievements of this past century is the discovery of the incredible
variability in human language. At the same time this variability continues to present
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a set of fundamental puzzles that need to be solved to ﬁnd the key in explaining and
understanding variability as an inherent property of human language. Variability
can be found at all levels of language and language use. We may distinguish four
types of variability.
(1) Inter-species variability: The communication system of humans differs in
many ways from that of other species, in the channels used (speech, sign,
gesture, body posture), the structure of the code used, and the purposes of
communication. Nonetheless, there are also speciﬁc features shared to
various degrees between human and non-human communication: vocal
learning, imitation, structure, exchange patterns, that need to be taken into
account.1
(2) Inter-language variability: The 7000 languages currently identiﬁed (a
small subset of the languages that have existed over the last 100,000 years
or so) vary enormously among each other. Their words and sounds differ,
as well as the distinctions they encode, and their grammatical patterns.
This is often referred to as the curse of Babylon. A special place is
reserved for the many signed languages of the deaf, which differ con-
siderably among each other, but also of course from spoken languages.
(3) Variability in the linguistic signal within a given language: Every utter-
ance is unique in its physical properties given shape by the human
articulators, which partly reflects aspects of the setting in which it is
uttered (formal/informal, for instance), features of the interlocutors (gen-
der, class, education, ethnicity, etc.), and other factors to be identiﬁed. The
sounds in speaking are complex, with an overwhelming set of details. This
is one of the mean reasons why automatic speech recognition is so hard.
(4) Inter-individual variability: Despite recent approaches emphasizing the
homogeneity within languages, speakers differ on many levels, which
allow us to recognize an individual through her or his speech signal.
Speakers differ in their linguistic abilities and verbosity, in their com-
municative styles, in their timbre and voice quality, etc., but also in the
perceptual systems they have built up. The same physical or acoustical
signal may be perceived differently, not only in segmenting the signal but
also in its social evaluation.
1The relation between these four levels is the subject of systematic exploration in one of the teams
operating in the NWO research consortium Language in Interaction (2013–2023), involving
researchers from Nijmegen and Leiden. Pieter Muysken’s contribution to this paper is funded
through the Language in Interaction grant.
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2 The Field
Given these types of variability, there have been two main reactions in the linguistic
research community in the recent past.
One important school of thought, generative linguistics, was inspired by the
towering ﬁgure of Avram Noam Chomsky (1928-). Chomsky, professor of lin-
guistics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology for most of his career, simply
ignored the variability in natural language. In his work the universal, cognitive
principles underlying our formal knowledge of grammar were the target of inves-
tigation, rather than the variable and transient actual usage. What underlying
abstract patterns play a role in determining the well-formedness (grammaticality) of
sentences (viewed as strings of words), and how do we derive the meaning of these
strings?
In Chomsky’s work, only Type 2 variability was deemed to be of interest, as it
was meant to be reduced to a universal, ﬁnite set of principles and parameters
underlying all human languages. Type 3 and Type 4 variability were considered to
either only noise (ﬁne mud grains floating in the water, irrelevant for a hydraulic
engineer) or outside the domain of linguistics (being part of psychology or the study
of human development). Type 1 variability was assumed to be beside the point,
given the uniqueness of the human language faculty.
Other researchers, however, have tried to separate pure chance or randomness
from meaningful variability in other ways, and in doing so have tried to tame the
chaos. It could be said that for them indeed the mission of linguistics as a discipline
is to eliminate chance as much as possible, as the target of any scientiﬁc enterprise
by deﬁnition is to isolate, separate or exclude what cannot be explained or
understood. On the other hand, chance or randomness can be made part of a theory
on language and language use. The concept that seems to be most relevant in the
latter approach is inherent variability, meaning that language is per deﬁnition
heterogeneous, in its very foundations. This concept does not deﬁne however what
the role of chance is. Chance in linguistics thus has no special deﬁnition, but it is
tackled nevertheless from various angles.
A researcher famous for attempting to tackle Type 2 variability is Joseph H.
Greenberg (1915–2001). Greenberg was an anthropologist and linguist who spent
most of his career as a scholar at Stanford. He started out with a study of the
influence of Islam on the Hausa in Africa but soon turned to languages. He ﬁrst
attempted to classify all the languages in the world in large groupings (language
macro-families). These were generally accepted for Africa, but which met with
skepticism for the Paciﬁc and the New World. More important for our concerns,
however, is his attempt to ﬁnd language universals, based on correlations between
structural traits, and thus coming to grips with Type 2 variability. For this purpose
he created a database with systematic data on around 30 languages from all over the
world. Current data bases are much larger, cf. the often cited WALS database
(Dryer & Haspelmath 2013). In his work, Greenberg built on earlier studies which
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had proposed speciﬁc ‘language types’, and therefore this approach is called lin-
guistic typology.
The scholar best known for attempting to come to grips with variability of Type 3
is William Labov (1928-). Labov was initially trained and employed as an industrial
chemist, but soon started using new techniques to record the English spoken around
him on the United States East Coast, almost like an engineer (Labov 1972). Initially
based at Columbia, but later moving on to the University of Pennsylvania, he has
pursued a life-long career in trying to capture Type 3 variation in speech, both
theoretically and empirically. How can we systematically study the variability found
in everyday language use, and how can we model it in a way that does justice both to
the nature of language itself and to the embedding of language in social systems?
Why do some people in New York pronounce the /r/ in ‘fourth floor’, while others
leave it out, and what does this tell us about the variable nature of the sound system
of New York English? Labov’s approach is referred to as variationist linguistics.
While the research programs initiated by Greenberg and the one associated with
Labov differ in many respects, they share the crucial strategy of attempting to tame
the chaos in their data by going to higher levels of aggregation, following the
strategy pioneered by Durkheim (1897) in his work on suicide. It is only at the
aggregate level of the whole population that we can understand suicide behavior,
since we cannot ask individuals afterwards why they did it. While Durkheim’s
concrete ﬁndings have been criticized both from the perspective of Simpson’s
Paradox2 and from that of the Ecological Fallacy, the strategy of moving from
seemingly chaotic and accidental behavior at the level of separate individuals
(‘tokens’) to general patterns at the level of aggregated groups (‘types’) has been
very successful in many sciences. For Greenberg, the aggregated group was the
population of human languages as a whole, for Labov it is the speech community
(like the inhabitants of a village, a city, an island, or even a region or country; again
the problem of the level of aggregation pops up).
Following in the footsteps of Greenberg and Labov, in this paper we will focus
on variability types 2 and 3, reflecting our own expertise.3 Thus, we will ﬁrst
explore different parts of the language sciences: the chance and variability in the
constitution of languages (type 2 variability), and then chance variability in pro-
duction (type 3 variability) and perception (taking in type 4 variability). Finally we
will combine these two perspectives and briefly discuss the consequences for
language change. We will focus here on the interaction between biological systems
2Simpson’s paradox, is a paradox in statistics: a trend which appears in different groups of data
disappears or reverses when these groups are combined in the sample.
3Pieter Muysken is a specialist in inter-language variability and language contact, and Roeland van
Hout has worked in the area of variation studies and statistics. Type 4 variability is being studied at
the Max Planck Institute for Psycholinguistics in Nijmegen in a group led by Antje Meyer. The
work on Type 1 variability is progressing rapidly, but has not yet reached even an interim level of
conclusiveness.
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and social constructs. The biological systems involved are constrained but open,
flexible and adaptive to all kinds of circumstances and they are made up by our
articulators, our ears, but also our brains (and even our bodies). The speech they
produce must be communicative but transferable and learnable at the same time, to
serve the emergence and establishment of communicative networks and social
groups.
3 Linguistic Typology: Chance and Variability
in the Constitution of Languages
Languages vary in almost inﬁnite ways: their sounds, their words, the order of the
words in the sentence, the distinctions encoded. How can we reconcile that vari-
ability with the fact that languages also show unity? While there are other
dimensions to variability, as noted (cf, our four types of variability), we will focus
here on inter-language variability.
3.1 L’arbitraire du signe
The most striking variability no doubt is that in the words of the different languages.
Thus the favorite four-legged creature that is being loved and fed in many Western
households is calledHund in German, chien in French, and perro in Spanish. In many
languages in the Bolivian Amazon it is called paku (but the creatures there are not
nearly as pampered). Form to meaning mappings are in fact coincidental, as pointed
out by Saussure: l’arbitraire du signe, the arbitrariness of the sign. There is nothing
inherent in dogs that gets them these different names. Is it pure chance only?
Not completely. A good place to start is historical linguistics. It has been known
for a long time that words in different languages may or may not be related. The
following words are all related:
pater  Latin 
padre  Spanish 
Vater  German 
father English 
vader  Dutch 
Indeed, they all go back to a reconstructed Indo-European form *pH2tér ‘father’
(the subscript on H refers to a particular sound combination). Forms and meanings
are passed not only from one generation to another, but also from one language to
another, when new languages split off from their predecessors. Variability comes in,
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but somehow the origin remains visible or deducible, constraining the role of
chance by chains of inheritance.
However, there are other factors as well. The fact that a number of languages in
Bolivia share the word paku is due to word spread or borrowing in language
contact. The word went from one language to the other, possibly as the practice
spread of keeping dogs as a domestic animal (used for hunting mostly). Thus there
is a number of words which have an extremely wide distribution in the languages of
the world, such as the words for ‘coffee’ and ‘tea’, or quite recently, ‘tsunami’.
Besides inheritance and contact, sometimes the presence of a word has a more
intrinsic explanation. Consider the following:
mamma  Dutch, English, Italian, ...  (Europe) 
mama   Quechua       (South America) 
mama  Lingala, Luo, Swahili   (Africa) 
mama  Mandarin Chinese    (E. Asia) 
Even though there are striking correspondences here, we assume that these words
are not historically related, but that their similarity is due to properties of the vocal
tract. Opening the mouth widely to give room to outgoing air produces an a-like
sound. Closing it, to stop the air, gives a m-like sound. In combination with a
repeating syllable, ma-ma is the result. Babies often will have mama as one of their
ﬁrst words, because it is easy to pronounce. Its frequent occurrence is to be explained
by ease of pronunciation rather than random developments (Jakobson 1960).
Some intrinsic explanations are referred to as motivation. The workings of
chance are undone or constrained by factors having to do with the way language is
processed, produced and learned. Motivations come in many forms, and are often
more quantitative and statistical rather than qualitative and absolute. While there are
various ways in which motivation plays a role in the lexicon, its role in the rest of
the language system is much more obvious.
One special such type of motivation comes from sound symbolism. A striking
example is the kiki—bouba effect described by Ramachandran & Hubbard (2001),
building on much earlier work by Köhler (1929). Sharp, pointed objects are often
referred to as kiki, by speakers of very different languages, smooth, rounded objects
as bouba, when forced to make the choice in a matching experiment.
Within a language, a particular sound combination may be associated with
particular sets of meanings. Examples from English include words starting with “sl”
to mark frictionless motion:
slide   slick  sled  slip  slither slosh 
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However, there is even a much larger class of words with negative or pejorative
meanings, some of them related to the previous set.
slang 
slant 
slap 
slash 
slate. 
slattern 
slaver 
slay 
sleek 
slime 
slipshod 
slit 
slobber 
slog 
slope 
sloppy 
sloth 
slouch 
slow 
sludge 
slug 
sluggard 
slum 
slump 
slur 
slut 
sly 
slab 
slack 
sleepy 
sleet 
slough 
slovenly 
Given the mixture of explainable and accidental/occasional forms and structures,
a main question in language science is how to detect the mechanisms or processes
that connect and perhaps partially explain the heterogeneity or variability by
investigating preferential aspects or patternings and how these are related to
inherent properties of a language.
While the diversity of human languages and the speciﬁc forms they take appear
accidental and governed by chance, the chance factor is constrained by all kinds of
processes and external factors. Is the consistency between the characteristics of
several languages occasional or are there preferential aspects or patterns?
Motivation can be external, in terms of iconicity, or internal, in terms of systemic
harmony. We will ﬁrst give a few examples of external motivation through
iconicity, which makes patterns of variation less accidental.
3.2 Iconicity
Iconic motivation can be deﬁned as pressure from the similarity or analogy between a
sign or linguistic structure and its meaning. To give a simple example, when I say: ‘I
went to buy a book and had an ice cream,’ normally I want to indicate that buying the
book preceded eating the ice cream. The temporal sequence in the utterance mirrors
the temporal sequence of events portrayed. This is temporal iconicity (Givón 1985).
Similarly, there is quantity iconicity. If I say druk druk ‘busy busy’ in Dutch in
response to the question ‘how are you doing?’, I mean to say that I am more than
just busy. Reduplication can be iconic in this way, but need not be; in many West
African languages reduplicating a predicate makes it into an adjective or noun.
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Another set of phenomena linked to quantity iconicity can be illustrated with the
following two sets of English prepositions:
of without 
to until
by during 
in in spite of
at because of
On the whole, the prepositions on the left are much shorter than those on the
right. They are also much more basic (and often grammatical) in their meaning.
On the whole, short words may have more basic meanings than longer words.
This effect is fairly general. Consider some Quechua case endings or postpositions
(Muysken 2008):
-pa/-q ‘genitive, of’ -manta ‘ablative, from’
-ta ‘accusative’ -kama ‘until’ 
-man ‘dative, to’ -rayku ‘because of’ 
-pi ‘locative, in’ -hina ‘like’ 
Again we ﬁnd a correlation between length and meaning complexity.
Sound symbolism may bring about iconicity as well. High front vowels
(notably/i/) are associated with small sizes, and low back vowels like /ɋ/ and /ɔ/,
with large sizes. Think of French petit ‘small’ (with /i/) and grand ‘large’(with /ɋ/).
There are exceptions, but this may well be a trend when we would study a whole
range of languages.
There is also intonational iconicity. In a great many languages, a question has a
rising, higher fundamental pitch than a statement. Ohala (1997) links this to the
acoustic frequency code, and claims there is possibly a cross-species association of
high acoustic frequency with small sizes and low acoustic frequency with large
sizes.
3.3 Dependencies
Internal motivation is a complicated issue as well, and subject to much debate, a
debate that centers around the concept of dependencies. How does property X of a
language system depend on, or how is it predicted by, property Y? There are all
kinds of dependencies that have been proposed, with various degrees of success.
Indeed, some people would claim that ﬁnding and accounting for these depen-
dencies is the key mission of linguistics as a discipline.
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To take a simple example, consider a ﬁve vowel system such as the one of
Spanish:
i    u 
e  o  
a   
This is highly symmetrical (for every front vowel there is a back vowel, and vice
versa), and fully occupies the ‘vowel space’. Notice also that it contains an uneven
number of vowels, with a single /a/ at the bottom.
Contrast this with a (non-existent) system like:
e   o 
æ   
a 
This system is not at all symmetrical, and further more does not exploit the
‘high’ vowels /i/ and /u/ in the vowel space.
The following table, from Schwartz et al. (1997, p. 244), shows the distribution
of vowel systems in a data set of 189 languages from different parts of the world.
The odd-numbered symmetrical systems are marked in bold italic, and constitute
144 of the total set of 189 languages. The non-symmetrical language are by far
more rare (41 versus 148), often being left asymmetrical (more front than back
vowels). In the front the vowel space is simply larger than in the back.
Number of languages 
Number of vowels Symmetrical Left Right
3 17 1 0 
4 0 14 4 
5 97 1 0 
6 3 12 4 
7 23 0 0 
8 0 3 2 
9 7 0 0 
10 1 0 0 
Total 148 31 10 
The symmetries in the vowel system can be viewed as a case of structural
dependency: the presence of /o/ in Spanish ‘depends on’ or is ‘predicted by’ the
presence at the same level of /e/, and thus not a pure accident, even though the fact
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that Spanish has a ﬁve vowel system is in itself accidental. Related languages such
as Portuguese and French have more complicated vowel systems.
Similar symmetries are found in the consonants. Consider the stops of Cuzco
Quechua, which includes a regular, an aspirated (pronounced with aspiration), and
an ejective (pronounced with a sudden burst of air) series:
Regular p t č k q
Aspirated ph th čh kh qh
Ejective p’ t’ č’ k’ q’
This system is highly symmetrical: for each regular stop there is an aspirated and
an ejective stop. Another Quechua variety, Ecuadorian Quechua, has a slightly
simpler system, which is likewise symmetrical:
Regular p t č k
Aspirated ph th čh kh
The overall presence of aspirated and ejective consonants in these varieties of
Quechua may be an accident (which has a historical explanation through influence
from a neighboring language, Aymara), but the fact that they come in a series or
sets can be viewed as a result of a dependency, and hence not as accidental. Various
theories have been proposed to explain sound symmetries, but this need not concern
us here.
The dependencies that are found in the languages of the world are the object of
research in language typology, the research program started by Greenberg. The
team of Frans Plank at the University of Konstanz has created a data base con-
taining no less than 2029 of statements about such dependencies.
A typical example (#1 in fact in the list compiled in Konstanz), based on
Greenberg (1963), would be:
IF adpositions precede their noun phrases (i.e., they are prepositions), THEN
head nouns almost always precede their attributive nouns (genitives or pos-
sessor (poss) phrases).
This would predict a dependency such as:
‘In the house’ (preposition) > ‘The house of Mary’ (poss)4
Dependency #2 is the complement of #1:
IF adpositions follow their noun phrases (i.e. they are postpositions), THEN
head nouns almost always follow their attributive nouns (genitives).
4Notice that in English we also have ‘Mary’s house’, which illustrates the problems in making
general statements about a language, of the type Language X has Property Y.
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Thus we ﬁnd in Quechua the following examples:
wasi-pi [house-in] (postposition) > Mariya-q wasi-n [Mary-poss house-her]
These statements of dependencies are generally statistical in nature: there are
always some exceptions to the general pattern.
Much research has been done on trying to explain these dependencies in
terms of processing constraints, but many questions remain in this general area,
including the question to which extent such dependencies are truly universal, or
lineage-speciﬁc, as argued by Dunn et al. (2011)? Also: why are some depen-
dencies (almost) without exceptions, and others more a tendency than an
absolute?
Typological patterns and dependencies are the result of inheritance and
contact, but at the same time of internal motivation and external social factors,
unfolding in time and space. We can use chance to model this enormous
variability, admitting that our understanding is incomplete and our models are
too global to catch the complexity of languages. The alternative is to give room
to the concept of chance/probability, by including it as an inherent property of
the language system or to put it somewhere on the interface between language
and the social, epigenetic factors in which language and language use are
embedded.
Summarizing and taking a very broad perspective, we can say that linguists
have discovered a number of things in the typological paradigm initiated by
Greenberg:
(a) There is much more variability than had been imagined. Many putative
‘universals of language’ turn out to have counterexamples somewhere among
the 7000 languages in the world (Evans and Levinson 2009).
(b) Many universals hold only for a large group of languages.
(c) There are regularly exceptional pattern, some of which can be classiﬁed as
‘rarissima’ (Wohlgemut and Cysouw 2010).
(d) There are ‘local optima’, i.e., correlations and dependencies which hold
between features in speciﬁc language groups. Some of these are lineage
speciﬁc, i.e., limited to speciﬁc languages.
(e) Many majority solutions may be due to a functional explanation or constraint.
Examples: (i) The almost universal noun/verb distinction may be linked to the
need of humans to be able to refer to both objects and actions/activities.
(ii) The almost universal ordering… subject… object… (but not… object…
subject …) may be linked to the facts that subjects are often the topic and
topics occur early in the sentence.
Could some functional constraints be indeed absolute, and hold for all languages
because they are wired into the human brain as a result of evolution?
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4 Variationist Linguistics: Chance in Production
and Perception
The variability in the acoustic signal is enormous. No two speech sounds are the
same, because of varying physical circumstances, differences between vocal tracts
and the complexity of producing sounds. Nevertheless, in concrete interactions
speakers and listeners interact smoothly and understanding seems to proceed in a
self-evident way. Speakers seem to abstract from concrete sounds, handling lan-
guage on the level of words and utterances. On that level however, the problem of
variability reoccurs. Speaking implies making choices, continuously, between
constructions, between words and even between pronunciations. To what degree is
variation free and what are the constraints? Chance plays a role in the many
decision processes involved in speaking, but to estimate its role we have to explain
as much as possible the role of all sources of variation involved in the process of
communication, i.e. in using language. Substantial parts of the variability is redu-
cible to (a) priming by the communicative context, (b) intention of the participants
in the process of communication (including ‘free will’), (c) language internal
constraints (properties relating the various linguistic elements; internal motivation),
and (d) external constraints that characterize the speech community involved as a
whole (community proﬁle) and its individual speakers (their social proﬁles). These
factors are rooted in the way we speak (production) and the way we perceive and
understand (perception).
Leaving out word ﬁnal t
The complexity can be illustrated by a simple phenomenon, t-deletion,
which may have different sources:
1. the distinction between nie and niet (not) and da and dat (that), which are
different small words, stored in the lexicon of many southern speakers in
the Dutch language area;
2. phonetic reduction in consonant clusters at the end of words: herfst vs
herfs (autumn), resulting in the absence of the word ﬁnal plosive sound in
the speech produced, a phenomenon that is present in many other
languages;
3. phonetic reduction may be restricted by the morphological status of a
word; in Nijmegen reduction occurs less in past participles than in nouns
(feest (party, noun) en gefeest (partied, past particple, verb feesten); the
same constraint has been found for American English (Guy 1980).
4. morphological analogy may lead to the deletion of the/t/in ﬁrst person
present tense in words ending in consonant clusters: ik vin vs. ik vind (I
think);
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5. this analogy wrongly applies to speciﬁc irregular past forms: ik moes vs. ik
moest (I must).
All these sources of variation are active in speakers from the town of
Nijmegen, for instance.
The differences between speakers can partly be explained by using a mixture of
factors, from internal and also external origin, but we cannot, despite advanced
statistical modeling, predict what happens at the level of the individual occurrence.
The predictions are fairly correct only on higher levels of aggregation. Predictions
are sometimes fairly successful in explaining inter-individual variability by taking
into account the social proﬁles of speakers, including social background charac-
teristics such as age, gender and educational background. It means that speech is
indexical for social characteristics of the speaker: the speech signal carries social
meaning. Young people are marked by other speech features than older speakers.
Parts of the variability keeps out of touch however, as unexplained error, perhaps
based on pure probability.
Even if much language behavior is probabilistically determined, certain behavior
lies closer to our consciousness threshold, implying that it is more under our control
(avoid using zij (them, subject) instead of hun (them, the object form). The prob-
lematic relationship between consciousness and variability is a classical problem in
studies of language variation and we have to investigate the type of relationships
between them by using the scale [unconscious/probabilistic] …. [conscious/
categorical], to ascertain that variability is not the outcome of insufﬁcient cognitive
control or interfering cognitive mechanisms.
Another approach is the distinction between active control on the level of the
speaker (‘agency’) and a passive, more computationally oriented approach where
‘control’ is being carried out by ‘variable constraints’. Speakers have possibilities of
cognitive control over their speech and language behaviour. The impact of control
can clearly be observed on higher levels of aggregation, where decisions are being
taken and which can be successful. In French, there is active policy to resist word
borrowings and to use native words. In English, the old counting order of
one-and-twenty, ﬁve-and-ninety has been replaced by the order of going from larger
to smaller numbers (twenty-one, ninety-ﬁve). The numerals between 10 and 20
were kept out from this revision. It links cognitive control and social forces.
The role of social forces can be illustrated as well by the course of sound
changes in language. The Dutch vowel system is currently undergoing several
related sound changes. The tense mid vowels [e:,ø:,o:] tend to become realized as
diphthongs [ei,øy,ou]. The diphthongs [ɛi,œy,ɔu] are beginning to lower (referred to
as ‘Polder Dutch’; Stroop 1998, van Heuven, van Bezooijen & Edelman 2005;
Jacobi 2009), causing e.g. kijk ‘look’ to sound more like [kaik] rather than [kɛik].
Change means that variation may lead to a change in the speech or language of a
community. Again, different views can be proposed whether sound change originates
in production or in perception. Is it the speaker, who realizes speech forms differently
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because of structural/systemic constraints—for example, pronouncing the Dutch verb
kijken (to watch) with a novel vowel [ai] rather than conservative [ɛi] to preserve
distinctiveness from keken (past tense kijken), whose vowel [eː] is changing into [ei]
(Stroop 1998; Jacobi 2009)—or articulatory constraints (e.g. Ohala 1983; Browman
& Goldstein 1989; Zsiga 1997)? Is it perhaps the listener, who may misperceive
speech forms (e.g. Ohala 1981; Blevins 2004)? Or is it because the novel speech form
is positively evaluated, leading to the desire to sound like and imitate the other speaker
(Giles 1973;Gussenhoven 2000; Pierrehumbert 2001; Bybee 2002)? In sum, in sound
change at least three different perspectives play a role: production, perception and
evaluation, and the complex interplay between these three perspectives helps to deﬁne
the process of selecting new variants in the language community (Yu 2013). It makes
clear that we have to add the social embedding of patterns of language variation to
understand what is going on in a language.
The aim of variationist linguistics is to explain patterns of variation as much as
possible by maximizing the sources of variation involved in language use: the
properties of the vocal tract and the ears (both being originally biological sources),
social forces (the environment, the social group) and cognitive processes (the brains).
5 Chance: Conundrum or Inherent Property?
Now that we have described the ways in which both language typology and vari-
ationist linguistics have attempted to come to grips with accidental aspects of
language behavior, we can try to understand where they intersect.
First of all, there is no principled difference between variation between (studied
by Greenberg) and variation within (studied by Labov) languages. We can give an
example from syntax and one from phonology.
In syntax, we often ﬁnd, as was discovered by Greenberg, that the position of
the verb at the end of the sentence (called SOV) correlates with that of
possessor (poss) phrases before the noun, as in the following Quechua
example:
Mariya wasi-ta riku-n [Mary house-object see-s] ⇔ Mariya-q wasi-n
[Mary-poss house-her]
Likewise, a verb in the middle of the sentence often correlates with a pos-
sessor phrase after the noun, as in Spanish:
Maria ve la casa [Mary sees the house] ⇔ la casa de Maria [the house of
Mary]
This patterns holds at the level of a large language sample. However, Luján
et al. (1984) have shown that it also holds with the bilingual Quechua/Spanish
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speaking community of Cuzco: those Spanish varieties more influenced by
Quechua show the Quechua word order both in verb placement and in pos-
sessor placement, leading to patterns such as:
La casa Maria ve [the house Mary sees] ⇔ de Maria la casa [of Mary the
house]
Thus syntactic variation between languages may also occur within a single
language community, and there is no reason why it should be different.
We also ﬁnd instances in pronunciation where the same variation patterns occur
at the community and at the global level. The rhotic consonant/r/comprises a large
class of sounds. Most language have a rhotic consonant (about 75 % of the world’s
languages) (Maddieson 1984). The most common rhotic is the alveolar trill (with
the tongue tip), occurring in about half of the languages of the world (Maddieson
1984), but many other variants are found, the uvular trill being one of the infrequent
ones (but being the standard pronunciation in French and German). Ladefoged and
Maddieson (1996, p. 235) point out that all different forms of rhotics in the lan-
guages of the world occur as well in the various dialects of English. The same is
true for German (Wiese 2011).
In a study of the/r/in the Dutch language area Sebregts (2015) distinguished 20
different rhotic forms. He did not study dialects but standard Dutch as spoken by
ordinary speakers. The different forms he found are grouped in six variant types in
the ﬁgure below, where their distribution is given for ten towns (with a sample of
about 40 speakers per town), six in the Netherlands (n) (upper part of the map) and
four in Flanders (f) (lower part of the map). The bars represent the six /r/ variants.
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Alveolar /r/ variants are realized with the tongue tip, the uvular variants with the
back of the tongue. A trill gives a regular impression, a fricative is marked by
friction. An approximant is a underachieved realization. The bunched variant is the
vowel-like realization, which came to be part of standard Dutch in the Netherlands
as a post vocalic variant ever since the 1960s. The bars in the ﬁgure above show
how different the pronunciations are between towns, but even within a number of
towns.
These two intersections show that variation between (type 1 variability) and
within (type 2 and 3 variability) share the same linguistic characteristics and uses
the same sources of linguistic elements or components. That is an important con-
clusion, which also means that chance and variation in language are not as such a
source for language evolution. Language can be related, as family members, and
inheritance is an important aspect in the historical development of languages, but
speciﬁc types of languages or language structures are not better equipped to deal
with social life, thinking, or culture. Language change does not result in the
selection of a best language. The only ﬁlter that seems relevant is learnability of a
language. The language has to be transmitted from one generation to the next.
Children need to shape their own language on the basis of the input of their parents
and other speakers.
The intersection of the three types of variability seem to help us in understanding
how quickly languages may change, although we admittedly do not understand
completely how speciﬁc structures may originate from other ones. We have to
investigate further the elements involved in making human languages.
We have explicitly formulated this as ‘human language making’, to emphasize
the active role of humans in creating communication through language. They use
their mouths and ears, their primary biological sources, which give them almost
inﬁnite possibilities to shape sound structures to communicate. The adaptiveness
and flexibility of human sound systems at the same time create probabilistic pat-
terns of variability. They belong together. What is the form of this link on other
levels of the language system, like words, morphemes, or syntactic structures? The
link seems recursive. We see again many possibilities, structures, with open ends,
ready to adapt to the communicative needs. That means that probabilistic patterns
are fundamental in human language.
In many applications in language research probabilistic properties are becoming
part of the (computational) models developed. That applies in particular to language
and speech technology. In automated computer translations several software
methods are used, among which probabilistic approaches play a prominent role in
establishing relationships between the languages involved and between the concrete
constructions and linguistic schemes belonging to the languages involved. One
could say that probabilistic grammars take over, but even more crucial is the
fundamental role of analogy (inductive patterns, based on frequency patterns in
language use and matching patterns of language use).
This development runs counter to the basic assumption of the conception of
language and language structure as a rule system. This approach was dominant over
the last decades in language sciences, in which Chomskyan linguistics handled
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rules (or concepts related to rules, like movement) as absolute entities, excluding
whatever probabilistic mechanisms. Variability was excluded by deﬁning the
research object of the language sciences as the competence of the ideal
speaker/hearer, all variability being excluded and related to performance factors.
Assuming homogeneity deprives chance from being a conundrum. This is a
wrong point of view that deprives linguists from the proper drive to explain the
enormous amount of variation in languages. It is the very task of linguistics to solve
the conundrum of variability, the curse of Babel. In doing so, we need to involve
cognition (the brains), but also the way we construct social reality and the social
group(s) we belong to. Cognition is not only an inside property of the brains, it is
the outcome of social interaction. Language is, as Labov states, outward bound.
What does it mean to say that chance is an inherent property of human language?
It means that language has inﬁnite ways of expressing meaning, often careful ways,
but not always. At the same time it means that so many different subsystems are
being involved that their interactions can be understood in the end, hopefully, but not
predicted. In understanding language variability it remains fundamental to solve the
link between the individual and her/his group. Many patterns of variation are deﬁned
by the level of aggregation and that certainly applies to language and social behavior.
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